

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM ITS

CONQUEST BY THE ROMANS TO THE PRESENT TIME

B. C. 146 TO A. D. 1864

BY

GEORGE FINLAY, LL.D.

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WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS, BY THE AUTHOR,

AND EDITED BY THE

REV. H. F. TOZER, M.A.

TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW OF EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD

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THE BYZANTINE AND GREEK EMPIRES. PART II

A. D. 1057 — 1453

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A.D. 1057-1204.

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HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE AND GREEK EMPIRES.

BOOK THIRD.

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE BYZANTINE GOVERNMENT.

A.D. 1057-1204.

CHAPTER I.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MODIFIED BY THE IMPOVERISH-
MENT AND DEPOPULATION OF ASIA MINOR.

A.D. 1057-1081.

SECT. I.—*Reigns of Isaac I. (Comnenus), and of Constantine X.
(Ducas).*

General observations on the policy of the emperors and the changes in the
Byzantine administration.—Character and reign of Isaac I., A.D. 1057-1059.
—Character and policy of Constantine X., A.D. 1059-1067.—Armenian
Frontier.—Seljouk Turks.—Invasion of the Ouzes.

THE contemporaries of Isaac Comnenus believed that the Byzantine, or, as they called it, the Roman empire, had attained a degree of wealth and power which secured it a permanent superiority over every other government. A review of the vicissitudes it had undergone in the preceding ages, entitled them to look forward with confidence to centuries of future prosperity. But to those who study the causes of decline in the Byzantine government from a modern point of view, the empire presents a very different aspect. To us, it is apparent that the administrative organization of

the Byzantine state, and the social and religious feelings of the popular mind, had already undergone a change for the worse. The power of the emperor had become more absolute in the capital, by the neglect of official education and regular promotion among the servants of the state. His arbitrary will had taken the place of the usages of the administration, and courtiers now assumed duties which were formerly executed only by well-trained and experienced officials. This increase of arbitrary power did not conduce to augment the energy of the central government in distant provinces; justice was administered with less firmness and equity, and the distant population felt fewer benefits from their connection with the emperor and with Constantinople. The concentration of all executive power in the cabinet of the sovereign, moreover, caused much important business to be neglected, in which neither the emperor's personal interest nor authority appeared to be immediately interested; for sovereigns, like private individuals, generally pay more attention to what relates to their own advantage than to what concerns only the public welfare. The repairs of distant ports, aqueducts, and roads, the improvement of frontier fortifications, and the civil government of unprofitable possessions, were held to absorb more than a due proportion of the funds required to maintain the imperial dignity. The pageants of the palace, of the hippodrome, and of the church, became every year more splendid, for each emperor wished to surpass his predecessors; and in no branch of the imperial duties was it so easy to purchase popular applause. In the mean time, the facilities of provincial intercommunication and the defence of the frontiers were proportionably neglected.

The emperors must be held responsible for the decline of the imperial administration in the Byzantine empire; but we must not forget, that the emperors were so frequently elected by revolutionary movements, that their policy indicates the tendency of public opinion as well as the instincts of executive power. The Basilian dynasty, which ruined the political edifice, was an inferior race of men to the Isaurian princes who repaired it. Basil I. was ignorant of civil business, and ill fitted by education to appreciate the value of the system of which accident constituted him the head. Leo VI., Constantine VII., and Romanus II. never appeared as leaders

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of the Roman armies. It was therefore not unnatural that these princes, alarmed by the repeated rebellions, seditions, and conspiracies of the great officers of state and commanders-in-chief, should feel extremely jealous of the territorial aristocracy, which had secured to themselves the possession of the highest posts in the government of the empire. In order to avoid the danger of intrusting the nobility with official power, these emperors established a cabinet, consisting of their own private secretaries, which controlled the acts of the ministers of state; and they gradually filled the highest offices in the administration with persons belonging to their private households. Every other object gave way to the importance of guarding against revolutions and rebellions; and as the nomination of eunuchs to the highest dignities was a considerable security against the frequent attempts to change the emperor, which had proved so destructive to private property and commercial enterprise, it was not unpopular among the wealthy and industrious citizens and agriculturists. As eunuchs were incapable of mounting the throne, their interests generally led them to guard against revolution and avoid change. Hence they were frequently intrusted with the command of large armies and important military expeditions; and, what appears to modern ideas a degradation of the empire, was by contemporaries regarded as a wise conservative policy.

The practice of conducting public business through the medium of a cabinet of private secretaries, led to many evils. Councils of the ministers and great officers of state were laid aside, and the authority of established usages and systematic rules was diminished. Each minister and general received his orders directly from the emperor, and communicated with an imperial secretary; and, consequently, subserviency to power became the surest means of advancing the fortunes of all public servants. Wealth was attained and ambition was gratified by affected devotion to the person of the emperor, by mean servility to the court favourite, and by active intrigue among the members of the imperial household, much more surely and rapidly than by attention to professional duties or by patriotic services.

This change in the position of the servants of the state enabled the sovereign to intrust the direction of the government

to the members of his household. Now, though these men were not trained in the public service, yet their previous duties in the management of a large domestic establishment prevented the practice from producing so great an amount of public inconvenience as to cause general dissatisfaction. It lowered the standard of official attainments and diminished the influence of personal responsibility and high character, but it led immediately to no actual disorder. We must recollect that many of the great families in the Byzantine empire at this period possessed households so numerous as often to count their domestic slaves by thousands. Those who maintained such establishments in the capital were proprietors of immense estates in the provinces, and the intendants who managed their affairs were consequently trained to business in a school which afforded them as extensive an experience of government as can now be gained by the persons who direct the administration of many German principalities. This fact affords some explanation of the capacity for government so generally displayed by the aristocracy of the Roman and Byzantine empires, and of the aptitude shown by eunuchs to perform the duties of ministers, and even of generals. Both these classes found their sphere of duty enlarged and not changed, when from nobles they became emperors, or from stewards ministers of state. But this system being opposed to the true basis of society, which requires a free circulation in all its classes, had a tendency to weaken the body politic. The imperfection of our knowledge in relation to the connection between social and political science, often prevents our tracing the decline of states to their real causes, which are probably more frequently social than political.

The domestics of the Basilian dynasty carried on the work of political change by filling the public offices with their own creatures, and thereby destroying the power of that body of state officials, whose admirable organization had repeatedly saved the empire from falling into anarchy under tyrants, or from being ruined by peculation under aristocratic influence. In this manner the scientific fabric of the imperial power, founded by Augustus, was at last ruined in the East as it had been destroyed in the West. The emperors broke the government to pieces before strangers divided the empire.

The revolution which undermined the systematic admi-

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nistration was already consummated before the rebellion of the aristocracy placed the imperial crown on the head of Isaac Comnenus. No organized body of trained officials any longer existed to resist the egoistical pretensions of the new intruders into ministerial authority. The emperor could now make his household steward prime-minister, and the governor of a province could appoint his butler prefect of the police. The church and the law alone preserved some degree of systematic organization and independent character. It was not in the power of an emperor to make a man a lawyer or a priest with the same ease he could appoint him a chamberlain or a minister of state.

As it was under the later princes of the Basilian period that scientific knowledge ceased to be a requisite for official rank, it is from this period that we must date the decline of every species of learning in Byzantine society. The farther we advance in this history we shall see that the house of Comnenus only pursued the course traced out for the imperial government by its predecessors. Basil II. was the last emperor of the East who really had a Roman policy, and his views were confined too exclusively to military affairs. Circumstances henceforward directed the progress of events. No future emperor possessed the enlarged views or the political capacity necessary to arrest the social decay that was destroying the Byzantine power, nor did any one aspire at the glory of giving a new organization to the imperial government, in accordance with the new exigencies of society and the altered interests of the various classes of the population. It is only necessary to cite one example in order to exhibit plainly the manner in which official ignorance and local seclusion operated in disorganizing the internal administration. For eleven centuries the Roman census had been accurately compiled; and, from the time of Constantine at least, it had been carefully revised every fifteenth year, in order that necessary reductions and modifications of the most injurious imposts might thus be forcibly obtruded on the attention of the central government. Although the system of dividing the subjects of the emperor into classes or castes ceased to be rigidly enforced after the fall of the Western Empire, and the Byzantine government did not, like the Emperor Augustus, force every man to go up to be taxed into his own city, still

the census continued to be framed with great minuteness: every proprietor, every individual inhabitant of the empire, and every species of property, were inscribed in its registers by experienced officials. But when whole provinces were depopulated by the ravages of the Bulgarians and the Saracens, and extensive districts were peopled only by the herdsmen and shepherds of large landed proprietors, like the president Basilios and Eustathios Maleinos, the old system of the census was necessarily relaxed. The great corps of land-surveyors, estimators, and assessors, which for ten centuries had performed its duties with systematic precision, was first diminished, from motives of economy, and then disorganized by being placed under the orders of ignorant and rapacious inspectors, chosen from among the favourites of the court. The consequence was, that this great branch of the Roman imperial constitution was gradually neglected by statesmen who pretended to govern by precedent on conservative principles; and as the census was more and more imperfectly executed, the central government became constantly more and more ignorant of the real resources of the empire.

The insecurity of property in the frontier provinces, and the condition of the lower classes on large agricultural estates, reduced the judicial establishments of the empire. As communications became rarer, the business of the courts of law diminished; and, except in the commercial cities, there no longer existed a body of independent lawyers to watch the judges, and restrain the exactions of the fiscal administration and the territorial aristocracy. The judges themselves soon consisted of an inferior class of men; they were no longer able to procure the voluminous and expensive law-books required to qualify them for pronouncing their decisions with promptitude and equity. Justice consequently was ill administered, and the people in the distant provinces became more inclined to seek protection from the great landed aristocracy of their immediate neighbourhood, than to look, as formerly, to the emperor alone for security and justice. The spell, which had so long, and under so many vicissitudes, connected the people with the central authority, was thus broken.

In this general decline of civilization, while the roads were falling to decay and the population decreasing, it seems

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strange that the revenues of the Byzantine empire continued almost undiminished. This circumstance resulted from two causes. The ruin of the power of the caliphs removed a commercial rival in Asia, and the improvement in the condition of the people throughout Europe created additional markets for the manufactures of the Byzantine cities; at the same time, the abundant supply of the precious metals, which for about two centuries had aided in sustaining the power of the emperor, still continued. Though it is difficult to trace from what sources this supply flowed, the fact itself is well established.

The army, next to the finances, was the basis on which the emperors rested their power. The depopulation of the agricultural districts, and the high price of labour in the manufacturing and commercial cities, rendered the Byzantine government more dependent on foreign mercenaries in the eleventh and twelfth centuries than it had been in the ninth and tenth. At the same time the rapid advances which the population of the other European nations was now making in wealth and civilization rendered it more difficult than formerly for the emperors to purchase the military services of the best European warriors. From this period the Byzantine armies begin to be inferior to those of the western nations; their military system was conservative, while that of the western nations was progressive. The Normans were already superior to the Byzantine troops in valour and endurance, and almost their equals in tactics and science: they soon became their superiors not only in every military accomplishment, in science, and virtue, but also in political wisdom.

The reign of Isaac Comnenus, though short, proves that he was a man of no ordinary powers of mind¹. He saw clearly

¹ From the accession of Isaac Comnenus to the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders, the Byzantine annals possess a more authentic character than in the period between Constantine VII. and the extinction of the Basilian dynasty. There are several contemporary historians. John Scylitzes, who was a native of the Thrakesian theme, and held successively the offices of protovestiaris, drungarios of the watch, and curopalates, may be considered as a contemporary for the history of the period from the accession of Isaac I. to that of Alexius I. Anna Comnena gives us her father's reign. Cinnamus, who was imperial secretary of Manuel I., gives us the reign of John II. and nearly the whole of that of Manuel. And Nicetas, who held the offices of logothetes and governor of Philippopolis, was a witness of the storming of Constantinople by the Crusaders. His history embraces the period from the accession of John II. to the establishment of the Latin empire of Romania.

the downward tendency of Byzantine affairs, and he made a vigorous effort to arrest their descent. His education and position in life had afforded him the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the whole fabric of the government, and his natural talents enabled him to profit by the advantages of his position. Hence, although he was placed on the throne as the leader of an aristocratic revolution, his policy was to preserve and not to alter the ancient system of administration. His father, Manuel Comnenus, was a favourite officer of the Emperor Basil II., who, after his death, undertook the guardianship of his two sons, Isaac and John¹. They received the best education which the age afforded in the monastery of Studion, and Isaac commenced his career of public service in the emperor's body-guard. Under the eye of the indefatigable Basil he learned the steady application to business and the active warlike habits of that prince; but with these virtues he acquired also something of the grave, melancholy, and inflexible character of his patron.

The powerful partisans who raised him to the throne naturally shared the principal dignities of the empire among themselves; but Isaac, in as far as he was able, conferred on them rewards which induced them to quit the capital, and leave him free to direct the central administration without their interference². Katakalon received the office of curopalates, which was also conferred on the emperor's brother John Comnenus, in whose person it was united with that of *megas domestikos*, or commander of the forces. The support of the patriarch Michael Keroularios, whose boldness and activity made him an important ally, was purchased by an imprudent augmentation of his political power. The right of nominating the grand *oeconomus* or chancellor, and the *skeuophylax* or treasurer of the church of St. Sophia, had been hitherto vested in the emperor, but Isaac now resigned this patronage to the ambitious patriarch.

The dilapidated state of the finances, caused by the extravagant expenditure of Constantine IX. (and indeed of most of the emperors who had filled the throne since the death of

¹ Manuel, who defended Nicaea against Bardas Skleros, is called *Erotikos* by Cedrenus (690) and Zonaras (ii. 217), but his family name was Comnenus, as appears from Nicephorus Bryennius (16).

² Zonaras, ii. 268.

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Basil II., all of whom had wasted immense sums in gifts to their favourites, in courtly splendour, and in ecclesiastical buildings), called for Isaac's immediate attention, and his first care was to reform the administration of the public revenue. He annulled the grants of the state domains made by the successors of Basil II. to private individuals, and resumed the sums affected for the foundation and maintenance of a number of monasteries in which the monks were living together rather like clubs of wealthy bachelors than as holy societies of virtuous cenobites. To each monastery the emperor made a fixed allowance regulated according to the number of the monks by which it was tenanted. This reduction of the wealth of men who in many cases had sought retirement to enjoy luxurious ease, very naturally excited much dissatisfaction among the higher classes, to whom the monasteries afforded the means of providing for their relations without expense; but John Scylitzes, the best historian of this period, who himself attained the rank of curopalates, approves of the conduct of Isaac in curtailing the incomes of the monks¹. The emperor also carried his reforms into his own court by diminishing the expenditure of the imperial household, and abolishing many pensions conferred on senators, nobles, and courtiers, as a matter of favour, without their having any duties to perform. Whenever the arbitrary will of individuals can influence government, there is a great difficulty in preventing the unnecessary accumulation of high-paid and useless titled functionaries. Courtiers receive military rank without having served, and without any reference to the numbers of the army or navy. The reforms by which Isaac sought to eradicate these abuses offended a considerable body of idle courtiers in the capital, who were enjoying the fruits of severe impositions wrung from the provinces, and he was assailed with murmurs of dissatisfaction. The poor had too many causes of suffering, which the emperor could do nothing to relieve, to have derived any immediate benefit from these reforms, or felt any gratitude to the reformer. And indeed, Isaac seems to have adopted his improvements for the purpose of rendering the public establishments of the empire more efficient, and without any view of diminishing the weight of

¹ Scylitzes (Joannes Curopalata), printed at the end of Cedrenus, 808.

the public burdens. Every report to his disadvantage was eagerly circulated among the ecclesiastics and the courtiers; they were disseminated among the people, and have coloured the views of historians concerning his character and policy. Every Byzantine writer cites as a proof of his unbounded arrogance that he changed the type of the gold coinage of the empire, and impressed on it his own figure, with a drawn sword in his right hand,—thereby, as they pretend, ascribing his elevation to the throne, not to the grace of God, but to his own courage¹.

The emperor vainly endeavoured to quiet the turbulent disposition of the patriarch by bestowing offices of honour and profit on his nephews; the demands of the proud priest grew daily more exorbitant and his language more insolent. When Isaac at length refused his requests, he indignantly exclaimed to his followers, ‘I made him an emperor, and I can unmake him².’ He proclaimed himself the equal of his sovereign by wearing the red boots which the severe ceremonial of the Byzantine court set apart as one of the distinctive ensigns of the imperial power. This assumption was really equivalent to an act of rebellion against the civil power; and when the patriarch was reproached with his pretensions, he defended his conduct by declaring that there was little or no difference between an emperor and a patriarch, except in so far as the ecclesiastical dignity was more honourable. As such insolence could not be safely tolerated, the emperor determined to depose Michael Keroularios and appoint a new patriarch; but it appeared dangerous to take any measures openly against the head of the church in the capital. Isaac watched for an opportunity, and when the patriarch on the feast of the Holy Apostles performed an ecclesiastical ceremony without the walls of the capital, he was taken into custody by a company of Varangians, and transported to the island of Proconnesus. A synod was convoked to depose him, but his death relieved the emperor from further trouble, and Constantinos Leichudes the president of this synod, though a layman,

¹ A representation of this coin may be seen in Sauley, *Essai de Classification des Suites Monétaires Byzantines*, planche xxiv. 4; Scylitzes, 807; Zonaras, ii. 268; versified by Ephraemius, 140, v. 3230.

² The patriarch used a vulgar proverb—‘Oven, I built you, and I can knock you down.’

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was at the emperor's recommendation elected his successor with all the regular formalities¹. The high reputation of Leichudes rendered his nomination popular. For a long time he had been the principal minister of the Emperor Constantine IX., and his prudent administration was supposed to have averted many of the evil consequences with which that prince's vices threatened the empire.

An invasion of the Hungarians and Patzinaks suddenly summoned Isaac to the northern frontier in the summer of 1059. When he reached Triaditza, the Hungarians and the greater part of the Patzinaks retired, and concluded a treaty of peace. Selte alone, one of the four chiefs who had conducted the famous retreat of the Patzinak auxiliaries from Asia Minor across the Bosphorus in 1049, refused to agree to any terms, and carried on the war from the fastnesses he held on the banks of the Danube. He was soon defeated, and his stronghold destroyed; but while the Byzantine army lay encamped near Lobitza, which had been fortified by Selte as a stronghold in the time of Constantine IX.², a sudden autumnal storm broke over the camp with fearful violence; men and horses were swept away by the torrents, and the tents were blown down. The emperor sought shelter under a magnificent old oak, where he was leaning against the trunk when a sudden noise behind induced him to withdraw a few paces in astonishment. His wonder was soon increased by a terrific clap of thunder, and the mighty oak against which he had been leaning fell all around, shivered to pieces. The communications of the army were interrupted by snow for a few days, and the troops were in danger of starvation. This storm having occurred on the 24th of September, which is the feast of St. Thekla, the emperor, as soon as he returned to Constantinople, dedicated a chapel in the palace of Blachern to this saint, whose especial protection he believed had saved him from death³.

Not long after his return to Constantinople, the emperor was suddenly attacked by a dangerous illness as he was hunting on the shores of the Bosphorus. Michael Psellos,

¹ Scylitzes, 839. For the chronology, see Cuper (*De Patriarchis Constan.* 126), who retains that of Baronius in preference to Pagi.

² Cedrenus, 780.

³ Anna Comnena, 89; Scylitzes, 810.

whose treachery had aided him in mounting the throne, records that his malady was an attack of pleurisy; but Scylitzes adopts the opinion generally current among the people, that the disease had a miraculous origin¹. Isaac was as passionately devoted to the chase as any of his predecessors, or as any Norman king. As he was pursuing a wild boar of monstrous aspect, the grim animal directed its course straight to the sea and vanished in the waters of the Bosphorus. In disappearing, it shadowed forth a demoniacal form, and a flash of lightning threw the emperor senseless from his horse. He was taken up in an alarming state by his attendants, and transported in a boat to the imperial palace. His life was for some time in danger; and believing himself to be on the point of death, he assumed the monastic garb, and selected as his successor Constantine Ducas, the man he deemed best able to restore order in the administration from his financial skill. He set aside his own brother John, in order that the empire might be governed by the man who was considered best fitted to be emperor, yet he was deceived in his choice². He recovered from his illness; but, when restored to health, he showed no regret that he had resigned the throne, and retired into the monastery of Studion, where he had received his education, performing all the duties of the humblest monk, and taking his turn to act as porter at the gate. His wife Katherine, a princess of the Bulgarian royal family, confirmed him in his pious resolutions, and retired also from the world with her daughter Maria³. After the death of Isaac, his wife celebrated the anniversary of his decease by an annual religious ceremony, at which she made a liberal distribution of alms. On one occasion she ordered the sum to be doubled, and when it was observed that the liberality was too great for

¹ Zonaras, ii. 271; Scylitzes, 811; Nicephorus Bryennius, 18.

² Gibbon adopts the statement of Nicephorus Bryennius (18), that John refused the imperial crown; but it appears to be merely a flourish of family pride, for Scylitzes expressly declares that Isaac set aside his brother.

³ Nicephorus Bryennius (17) says that Katherine was the eldest daughter of Samuel, king of Achrida; but Samuel died forty-five years before Isaac resigned his crown. See Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byzantinae*, 171. Cedrenus (716) mentions that when the two daughters of Samuel were presented to Basil II., they saw Maria, the widow of Ladislas, who had murdered their brother, standing near the emperor, and rushing at her to beat her in the imperial presence, were hardly persuaded to restrain their violence even by Basil. This seems very unlike Katherine, the wife of Isaac Comnenus.

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her fortune, she replied, 'Perhaps these gifts may be the last I can bestow.' Her presentiment was soon verified, and her last solemn command was that her body should be interred in the cemetery of Studion as a simple nun, without any sign to indicate that she was born a Bulgarian princess and had been a Roman empress.

Constantine X. displayed on the throne little of the talent which Isaac I. supposed him to possess¹. He had appeared an able minister as long as his conduct was directed by an energetic superior, but on the throne he acted as an avaricious pedant. He declared that he valued his learning more than his empire; his conduct proved that he valued money as much as learning, and his reign convinced his subjects that his intellect fitted him for composing orations according to the rules of rhetoric rather than for governing men according to the dictates of justice. Avarice and vanity directed his whole conduct as emperor; naturally sluggish, he hardly thought seriously on any subject but how to increase the receipts of the imperial treasury, and how to display his own eloquence. To satisfy the first, he augmented the weight of taxation by letting out the public income to farmers of the revenue, who used every exaction to augment their profits; and to give his people an opportunity of appreciating his eloquence, he sate as a civil judge in one tribunal, when he ought to have been performing the duties of a sovereign, and watching over the conduct of the judges in every tribunal in his empire. Yet even in his judicial capacity he constantly violated the laws, from a blind confidence in his own discernment, which led him to believe that he could measure out equity to individuals in opposition to the general principles of the law.

To save money, he reduced the army, neglected to supply the troops with arms, artillery, and warlike stores, and left the fortifications on the frontiers unrepaired and the garrisons unpaid. Isaac removed from the army a number of officers who received pay without performing military service, but

¹ Constantine X. was not descended from a male branch of the ancient family of Ducas, which became extinct after the revolt during the minority of Constantine VII. He was descended from a female line, and his family was generally called Doukitzes, to mark the inferiority of the modern house which had assumed the name of Ducas. Zonaras, ii. 272.

Constantine Ducas restored the abuse, and again weakened the military establishments of the empire by intruding civilians into the army that they might receive the pay of officers. He also made great promotions among the senators, municipal officers, and heads of corporations in Constantinople, in order to secure a strong body of partisans in the capital. For the same purpose, while he diminished the numerical strength of the army by neglecting to recruit the native legions, he liberally provided for the Varangian guard in the capital, on whose attachment his own personal security depended¹.

The fate of the population of the Byzantine empire was now decided by the personal character of the emperor. The avarice of Constantine Ducas caused the ruin of the Christian inhabitants of great part of Asia Minor. The decline of the Byzantine power at this period has been erroneously attributed to a decided military superiority on the part of the Seljouk Turks, to the great ability of Alp Arslan, and to the rashness of Romanus IV. (Diogenes); but the events of the reign of Constantine X. prove that it was the consequence of his acts. His avarice caused the loss of the two fortresses which defended the frontiers of the empire in the east and the west, Ani and Belgrade; and he allowed the independent Armenians to be completely subjugated by the Mohammedans without an effort in their favour. These warlike mountaineers long formed an impregnable barrier against the progress of the Mohammedan powers. The difficulty the great Sultan Alp Arslan met with, in subduing their country, even though he was aided by intestine discord, fomented by the ecclesiastical intrigues of the Byzantine court, proves that a small imperial army might have repulsed the Seljouk Turks from the fortified cities of Armenia, and secured the independence of the Christian tribes who occupied the labyrinths of the Caucasian and Armenian mountains, thereby preventing the Turks from reaching the Byzantine frontier.

It has been already noticed that the policy of the Byzantine court, under the Basilian dynasty, was hostile to Armenian

¹ Scylitzes, 822. A proof is afforded by the insurrection of the Varangians, on the marriage of Eudocia with Romanus Diogenes. Some tales recorded in the history of Armenia attest the general reputation of Constantine X. for avarice.

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independence, and it has been mentioned that the destruction of the Armenian kingdom had thrown open the Byzantine possessions in Asia Minor to the invasions of the Seljouk Turks. Constantine X. made the Byzantine policy of uniting all Christians in the East under the imperial government and the Greek church a pretext for refusing aid to the independent Christians of Iberia and Armenia. He pretended that it would be impolitic to aid those who refused to become vassals of the empire, and criminal to support those who were opposed to the orthodox church. Basil II. had apparently united the greater part of the Armenian clergy to the Greek church, but in reality he only destroyed the independence of the nation; and the very circumstances which aided his conquests weakened the defensive power of the imperial government on their newly-acquired frontier.

It is important to observe the position of the country peopled by the Armenian race at the time of the Seljouk irruption into Asia Minor, in order to understand how the Byzantine government was so easily deprived of some of the richest and most populous provinces of the empire. The emperors of Constantinople had suffered far greater losses at the periods when Heraclius and Leo III. mounted the throne, and yet both these princes restored to the empire no inconsiderable portion of its ancient power and glory; but the blow inflicted by the Seljouk Turks, and the avarice of Constantine X., proved an immedicable wound. In the year 1016, Armenia was first invaded by this new race of conquerors, whose descendants form at the present day the most numerous part of the population of the Ottoman empire in Asia Minor. Sennacherib, the prince of Vaspourakan, ceded his possessions to Basil II., and received in exchange an appanage in Cappadocia, including the cities of Sebaste, Larissa, and Abara¹. In the year 1022, Basil II. forced John, king of Armenia, to make the cession of his dominions after his death, which Constantine IX. compelled Gaghik to carry into execution by surrendering Ani in 1045. Gaghik received as an appanage a territory on the frontiers of Cappadocia, including the cities of Bizou, Khorzen, and Lykandos. The power of the

¹ Cedrenus (711) fixes this event in 1016; but Saint-Martin (*Mémoires sur l'Arménie*, i. 368) places it in 1021.

kings of Iberia was also curtailed about the same time. They were compelled to cede the southern portion of their dominions to Liparites, an Orpelian prince, who was taken prisoner by the Turks at the battle of Kapetrou, and released by Togroul¹. Liparites was subsequently murdered by Bagrat, the king of Iberia, and the whole of Georgia and Abasgia were again reunited². Ivane, the son of Liparites, retired into the empire, and received from the Emperor Isaac I. an appanage at Archamouni, near Erzeroum.

The Seljouks continued their attacks on Armenia during the reigns of Theodora, Michael VI., and Isaac I., and the ravages they committed drew the serious attention of the Byzantine government to the eastern frontier. At the accession of Constantine X. it was evident that the emperor, who was in possession of the greater part of Armenia, must undertake the defence of the whole country, or great part would fall into the hands of the Mohammedans. The principalities of Kars and Lorhi, and the kingdom of Iberia (Georgia), were unable to resist the Turks, if left to their own unassisted resources³. The ambition of Ivane, the son of Liparites, opened the passes of the Armenian mountains to the enemies of his country and religion. Dissatisfied with his appanage in the empire, he endeavoured to render himself master of the neighbouring district of Karin, and involved himself in hostilities with the imperial authorities. In order to secure allies capable of protecting him, he connected himself with the Seljouk Turks, and guided the plundering incursions of the Mohammedan armies. In the mean time the Emperor Constantine X., instead of reinforcing his troops in Armenia, and establishing order within his own frontier by seizing Ivane, occupied himself exclusively with the project of effecting a union of the Byzantine and Armenian churches, which he endeavoured to render a profitable undertaking for his treasury⁴. The disorders on

¹ See vol. ii. p. 443.

² Saint-Martin, ii. 230.

³ The kings of Ani or of Armenia, as they are usually called from having been the most distinguished of the Armenian princes, the kings of Iberia or Georgia, and the sovereigns of Kars and of Lorhi, or Armenian Albania, were all descendants of the Bagratian family. The princes of Vaspourakan were Ardzrounians, to which family the Emperor Leo V. belonged. Saint-Martin, i. 418; Chamich, ii. 1.

⁴ Chamich, *History of Armenia*, ii. 147.

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the frontier were allowed to increase, as a means of depressing the nobility and clergy hostile to the union and able to offer some resistance to the fiscal oppression of the Byzantine court. The unjust proceedings of the imperial government and the Greek clergy, in their infatuated zeal for political and ecclesiastical unity, augmented the religious bigotry of the Greek and Armenian peoples, and sowed the seeds of a deep-rooted national animosity. The calamities of the independent Armenian Christians were regarded as gain to the orthodox church, and the emperor fomented civil dissensions among the warriors who formed the strongest barrier of his own provinces against the incursions of the Mohammedans.

In the year 1060, while the affairs of Armenia were in this disturbed state, the armies of Togroul Beg invaded the empire on the Mesopotamian frontier, and laid siege to Edessa. The attack was repulsed by the activity of Vest Katchadour, an Armenian who commanded at Antioch, in Cilicia; but the Seljouks soon renewed their invasion, and a body of their troops advanced as far as Sebaste, which was taken by assault, and plundered for the space of eight days. The following year they surprised the town of Arkni, a frontier fortress of the Mesopotamian theme¹. The Byzantine general of the district, and a foreign officer named Frangopoulos, with the troops stationed at Edessa, made an attempt to revenge this loss, by attacking the Turkish fortress of Amida, but were defeated in their enterprise.

In the year 1063, Alp Arslan, who succeeded his uncle Togroul as great sultan, commenced his expeditions against the Christians, by leading his army in person into Iberia and the northern parts of Armenia. He compelled David, the Bagratian prince of Lorhi, to give him a daughter in marriage, and laid waste the kingdom of Iberia in the most cruel manner, for it was the policy of the Turks to depopulate the country they desired to subdue. The desolation of the hitherto rich and well-cultivated regions of Iberia, which had been long celebrated for the industry of the inhabitants, the wealth of its numerous towns, and the valour

¹ The Byzantine writers make no mention of the loss of the mines near Arkni or Arghana.

of its warlike population, is to be dated from the destructive ravages of Alp Arslan. The country was compelled to submit to the great sultan; and though the authority of the Turks was never very firmly established, these invaders gradually rendered Iberia, which at the commencement of the eleventh century was the happiest portion of Asia, a scene of poverty and depopulation.

When the spirit of the Georgians was broken, Alp Arslan attacked Ani, the capital of Armenia, which was garrisoned by a Byzantine force under Bagrat, an Armenian general in the Byzantine service. Ani was situated on a rocky peninsula overhanging the rapid stream of the Rha, the ancient Harpasus. A deep ravine joining the bed of this river protected the city on the west. The base of the triangle on which it stood looked towards the north, and was the only side by which the fortifications could be approached. The ruins of the massive walls that defended the city in this direction still exist to the height of forty feet, attesting the importance of the place, and the wealth and military skill of the Armenian kings who fortified it in the tenth century. The position of Ani was strong, and its fortifications solid, but the army of Alp Arslan was numerous, and well provided with all the warlike machines then used in sieges; the people detested the Byzantine government so much as to be indifferent to their fate, while the spirit of the garrison was depressed by a conviction that the Emperor Constantine would be induced by avarice to abandon them to their own unassisted resources. Ani nevertheless made a gallant defence, and, refusing to capitulate, was taken by storm on the 6th of June 1064¹.

After the conquest of Ani, Gagghik, the Bagratian prince of Kars, made the humblest submission to the victor, and was allowed to retain his dominions as a vassal; but he felt his position under the Mohammedans to be so insecure, that he availed himself of the return of Alp Arslan into Persia to cede his territories to the Byzantine emperor, who gave him in exchange the city of Tzamandos with its neigh-

¹ There is an interesting account of the ruins of Ani in Hamilton's *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia*, i. 197. For the history of this capital of Armenia, see Saint-Martin, *Mémoires sur l'Arménie*, i. 112. There was another fortress called Ani. Saint-Martin, i. 72.

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bourhood as an appanage¹. This transaction removed the last of the Armenian princes from his native country, and was followed by an immense emigration of the people into the provinces of the empire lying to the west and south of their ancient seats. Adom and Abousahl, the sons of Sennacherib, held Sebaste; Gaghiik, king of Ani, resided at Bizou; and Gaghiik, prince of Kars, now took up his residence at Tzamandos. Whatever might have been the project of the Byzantine court in effecting these strange translocations on the Armenian frontier, it appears to have failed. The duration of these vassal establishments was short and troubled, but from the colonies of Armenian emigrants, a new independent Armenian kingdom arose in Cilicia, which occupied a prominent part in history during the earlier crusades².

During the campaigns of Alp Arslan in Georgia and Armenia, several small armies of Turks invaded the provinces of Mesopotamia, Chaldia, Melitene, and Coloneia. They plundered the open country, putting all the armed men to the sword, and carrying off the younger inhabitants for the Mohammedan slave-marts. Whenever large bodies of Byzantine troops could be assembled to oppose them, they avoided an engagement, and effected a rapid retreat. The plan by which they expected to render themselves masters of the provinces they invaded, was to exterminate the cultivators of the soil in the extensive plains, in order to leave the country in a fit state to be occupied by their own nomadic tribes. The villages, farm-houses, and plantations were everywhere burned down, and the wells were often filled up, in order that all cultivation might be confined to the immediate vicinity of fortified towns. By this policy they rendered agricultural property in many extensive districts of Asia Minor so insecure, that whole provinces were

¹ Chamich (ii. 153) says Gaghiik exchanged Vanand, of which Kars is the capital, for the cities of Amasia, Comana, Larissa, and the fortress of Zamindav (Tzamandos), besides one hundred villages. He would in this case have been a great gainer by the invasion of Alp Arslan, but it is not necessary to say that this is an idle exaggeration. Gaghiik was murdered by the Byzantines in 1080.

² For the foundation of the Reubenian or Roupenian kingdom of Cilicia, see Chamich, ii. 165; Saint-Martin, i. 388. For the coins, Brosset, *Bulletin de l'Académie de St. Petersbourg*, vi. 3, 4; Sibiljan, *Beschreibung von xvii. unedirten Münzen der Armenisch-Rubenischen Dynastie in Kilikien*: Wien, 1852.

left vacant for their occupation before the Seljouk power was able to conquer the cities. So boldly did they pursue these ravages, that Scylitzes records incursions of Seljouk bands even into Galatia, Honorias, and Phrygia during the reign of Constantine X¹.

About the time the fortress of Ani was irretrievably lost, the equally important city of Belgrade, which served as the bulwark of the western provinces, was allowed to fall into the hands of the Hungarians without an effort on the part of the emperor to save it. Solomon, king of Hungary, seeing the unprotected state of the Byzantine frontier in Europe, made the plundering incursions of some brigands from Bulgaria a pretext for commencing hostilities and laying siege to Belgrade. The garrison defended the place for three months; but when it appeared that the emperor's avarice would prevent his making any attempt to raise the siege, the place capitulated. Hungarian history boasts of several victories obtained over the imperial troops who attempted to relieve Belgrade, but the Byzantine writers are silent even concerning its capture².

The year after the loss of Ani, the Ouzes or Uzes, a nomade tribe of Turkish origin, whom the Byzantine historians call a more noble and numerous race than the Patzinaks, invaded the European provinces of the empire³. This people appears to have first entered the territory of the Patzinaks as friends, and to have lived among them as allies; but in a short time they became engaged in the fiercest hostilities, from the impossibility of fixing any settled frontiers for nomade tribes in the immense plains to the north of the Black Sea. At this period some accidental circumstance impelled an immense body of the Uzes to emigrate, and enabled them by passing through the centre of the Patzinak territory to reach the banks of the Danube, where they assembled boats and rafts in sufficient numbers to cross the river. The military force of

¹ Scylitzes, 814.

² Bonfin. *De Reb. Hungaricis*, dec. ii. l. 3; Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xiv. 448.

³ The Uzes are considered to be a branch of the Ghouzes, who figure in the history of the Seljouk Sultans of Persia. The Uzes were also termed Plawzer or Polowzer, Valvi or Falones. On this subject, see Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 22, and his authorities; Rémusat, *Recherches sur les Langues Tartares*, 320; Schafarik, *Slawische Alterthümer*, ii. 646.

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the invaders amounted to sixty thousand men¹, and two generals, Basilias Apokapes and Nicephorus Botaneiates², who commanded the garrisons on the Danube, hastening to oppose their advance, were defeated and taken prisoners. The Uzes then divided their army, in order to extend their plundering incursions over a greater space. One division advanced to the vicinity of Thessalonica, and sent forward parties who extended their ravages even into Greece³. But the abundance in which the barbarians revelled during the autumn spread disease in their ranks; and the ease with which they had penetrated into every province made them negligent of military precautions. The consequence was that their dispersed bands were everywhere attacked, and they lost all the booty they had collected. When the severity of winter interrupted their communications, the mountaineers of Haemus ventured to harass their main body, which was at last hemmed in on all sides by enemies.

The Emperor Constantine remained an inactive spectator of the ruin of the European provinces, and only availed himself of the reverses of the invaders and the successes of the mountain tribes to negotiate with the leaders of the Uzes, and secure their retreat with the smallest expenditure of money. At last, however, the complaints of the people of Constantinople against his avarice and cowardice became so loud as to threaten a revolution, and the emperor felt the necessity of marching out of the capital as if he intended to put himself at the head of an army. After holding a solemn fast, he proceeded to the town of Choïrobacchus, on the road to Adrianople, attended only by a guard of one hundred and fifty men. Shortly after his arrival at that place, it was officially announced to him by a courier from the army that the principal body of the Uzes was completely dispersed. One division, which had advanced as far as Tzourla, had been overwhelmed by the Byzantine troops, while those near the Danube had been cut off by the combined attacks of the Bulgarian militia and the Patzinaks. It is probable that the Emperor Constantine X. was aware of these circumstances

¹ Zonaras, ii. 273. Scylitzes (815) says 600,000.

² The future emperor, Nicephorus III.

³ Scylitzes, 815; Zonaras, ii. 274.

before he quitted the capital ; but he affected to receive the intelligence as unexpected, and attributed the successes to his own piety and rigid fasts, not to the discipline of his army or the valour of his subjects and allies. The heavenly host, hired by prayers instead of byzants, was said to have fought like ordinary mercenaries, and slain the Uzes with the usual weapons. The manner in which the heavenly battalions received payment was peculiarly gratifying to the disposition of Constantine X. According to the usual policy of the Byzantine court, which sought to maintain a balance of power not only among the rival nations beyond the frontier, but even among the various races of its own subjects, the survivors of the Uzes were established as colonists on public lands in Macedonia. No fact can establish more strongly the anti-Greek spirit of the Byzantine government at this period than the notices we find of these Turkish colonists. They adopted the Christian religion, and were treated with great favour by the emperors; for their isolated position rendered them more devoted partisans of the central authority, and of the personal power of the emperors, than native subjects. Some of their leading men were honoured with the rank of senators, and rose to the highest dignities in the state¹. Their national feelings proved, however, at times stronger than their Christianity or their Roman civilization, so that when a body of these Uzes in the army of Romanus IV. was opposed to a kindred tribe of Turks in the army of Alp Arslan, before the battle of Manzikert, they deserted to the sultan, and joined their countrymen.

During the reign of Constantine X. a severe earthquake spread desolation round Constantinople, and ruined many districts which lay beyond the reach of hostile invasions. A greater amount of vested capital was destroyed in a few hours than the fiercest barbarians could have annihilated in a whole campaign. The walls of cities, aqueducts, churches, and public buildings, were thrown down throughout all Thrace and Bithynia. At Cyzicus, an ancient temple of great size and splendour, and of a solidity of construction which seemed to announce eternal duration to those accustomed to the puny

¹ Scylitzes, 816.

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architectural efforts of the Byzantine emperors, was destroyed¹. At Nicaea, the walls of the great church, in which the first council of the Church had assembled, were crumbled to their foundations. Earthquakes continued to be felt with alarming violence for the space of two years, as if to terrify men from repairing the dilapidations of the first terrific shock.

When Constantine X. found his end approaching, he conferred the regency of the empire, and the guardianship of his sons, who had already received the imperial crown, on his wife, Eudocia Makrembolitissa²; but he exacted from her a written promise not to marry a second husband, and he deposited that document in the hands of the patriarch John Xiphilinos. He also engaged the senate to take an oath that it would never acknowledge any other emperor than his own children. The names of the sons of Constantine X. who had received the imperial title were Michael, Andronicus, and Constantine. The last, having been born after his father ascended the throne, was called Porphyrogenitus³.

¹ This is doubtless the temple mentioned by Dion Cassius, who says it was regarded as one of the wonders of the world. Its columns were monoliths seventy-five feet in height, and twenty-four in circumference. A preceding earthquake in A.D. 443 had laid half of Cyzicus in ruins. For some account of the various public buildings of this city and their remains, see Hoffmann, *Griechenland und die Griechen im Alterthum*, ii. 1605.

² Eudocia has been erroneously called the daughter of Constantine Dalassenos. The origin of the name Makrembolitissa is unknown. She was the author of a work called 'Ionia,' a kind of historical and mythological dictionary, published by Villoison in his *Anecdota Graeca*. Constantine X. is said to have married Eudocia in the reign of Michael IV., this would make her at least forty-seven years old at her husband's death; and as she lived twenty-five years after the death of Romanus IV., she must have died at the age of seventy-five. Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 161; Zonaras, notes, ii. 115, edit. Paris; 92, edit. Venet. [She received the name of Macrembolitissa from being the daughter of Johannes Macrembolites: see Flach's *Die Kaiserin Eudocia Macrembolitissa* (Tübingen. 1876). This sketch of the empress's life, in the view it gives of her character, avoids the fault of many writers on Byzantine history of ignoring good and honourable qualities where they are to be found, and the author has made use of the latest authorities on this period; but there is a tone of exaggeration about it, which detracts from its value as an illustration of history. He takes Romanus IV. for his hero, and Psellus for his villain. Ed.]

³ Scylitzes, 818.

SECT. II.

Regency of Eudocia, A.D. 1067: her second marriage.—Romanus IV. (Diogenes), A.D. 1068–1071.—Irruption of the Seljouk Turks.—Campaigns of Romanus IV.—Defeat at Manzikert.—Misfortunes and death.—End of Byzantine power in Italy.—Michael VII., A.D. 1071–1078: Character.—Administration.—Rebellion of Bulgarians and Slavonians.—Ravages of Seljouks.—Rebellion of Oursel and John Ducas.—Treaty of Michael with Seljouk Turks.—Rebellions of Bryennios and Botaneiates.—Michael dethroned.—Nicephorus III., 1078–1081: Character.—Defeat of Bryennios and Basilakes.—Rebellion of Melis-senos—of Alexius Comnenus.—Taking of Constantinople.—Nicephorus III. dethroned.

In exacting from the senators an oath to maintain the rights of the young emperors, it was not the intention of Constantine X. to confer any additional power on the senate; but the circumstance served as a pretext for every ambitious member of that body to plot for his own advancement, under the pretext that he was performing the duty imposed on him by his oath. Eudocia soon perceived that she was in some danger of losing the regency unless she could secure some powerful aid. Her ambition suggested that by choosing a second husband, whom she could raise to the imperial title, she would be able to retain her position even after the majority and marriage of her eldest son. Policy favoured her views, for the prudent government of Nicephorus II. and John I., when they reigned as guardians and colleagues of the young emperors, Basil II. and Constantine VIII., sanctioned the plan of electing an emperor to act as regent. Love determined the selection of Eudocia. Her choice fell on Romanus Diogenes, who had been convicted of treason against her children's throne, and was then waiting to receive his sentence. His popularity with the army was great, and when he received a full pardon from the empress-regent, it excited no suspicion that she viewed him with peculiar favour. The Seljouk Turks had overrun all Cappadocia, and the capture of Caesarea rendered it necessary to place the army under the command of an able and enterprising general. But before Eudocia could venture to marry Romanus, it was necessary to destroy the document she had signed, promising never to contract a second marriage. Her written engagement was in the hands of the Patriarch, who held it as a national deposit.

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It required, therefore, some diplomatic skill to enable the empress to accomplish her object; but she could reckon on the utter absence of any sentiment of patriotism among the Byzantine clergy. The duplicity of the empress was aided by the credulous ambition of the Greek Patriarch, John Xiphilinos, who, though he had quitted high rank to become a recluse on Mount Olympus, resumed all the vices of Constantinopolitan society on mounting the patriarchal throne. Eudocia understood his character, and by leading him to believe that she intended to select his brother as her husband, induced him to deliver into her hands the document committed to his custody, and persuaded him to become the proposer of a measure in the senate, by which that body pronounced an opinion in favour of her second marriage. When her plans had completely succeeded, she confounded the Patriarch, and gratified the people and the army, by announcing that she had selected Romanus Diogenes, the bravest general in the empire, to fill the imperial throne, and act as guardian to her sons¹.

Romanus IV. was of a distinguished family of Cappadocia. He was connected by birth with most of the great aristocratic nobles of Asia Minor. His father, Constantine Diogenes, committed suicide in the reign of Romanus III., and he inherited the courage, generosity, and vehemence of his parent². Though an able and skilful officer, his military talents were obscured by a degree of impetuosity that made him too often neglect the suggestions of prudence in those critical circumstances, when a long train of future events depends on the calmness of a moment's decision. Rashness and presumption were the defects both of his private character and public conduct. Though his marriage with Eudocia seated him on the throne, he found his authority in the capital circumscribed by the influence of the officials, who pretended to support the power of his wife as empress-regent, and who were guided in their opposition by John Ducas, the late emperor's brother, and the natural guardian of the young emperors after the second marriage of their mother. John Ducas also held the rank of Caesar, and his family influence in the senate was very great. The Varangian guard likewise viewed the elevation of Romanus

¹ 1st January 1068; Scylitzes, 822.² Vol. ii. p. 399.

IV. with great jealousy, on account of his popularity with the native troops, whom he had always favoured. These foreigners openly expressed their discontent at the marriage of Eudocia, which they declared was injurious to the legal rights of the sons of Constantine X., and their seditious behaviour was with difficulty suppressed. In this state of things, Romanus IV. felt that he could only become the real sovereign of the empire by placing himself at the head of a powerful army in the field, and the state of the war with the Seljouk Turks imperiously demanded the attention of the Byzantine government.

In the year 1067 the Turks had extended their ravages over Mesopotamia, Melitene, Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia; they had massacred the inhabitants of Caesarea, and plundered the great church of St. Basil of the wealth accumulated by many generations of pious votaries. After this campaign, their army wintered on the frontiers of the empire. Romanus now prepared to arrest their future incursions. He looked upon them as little better than hordes of brigands, and thought their light cavalry was ill fitted to contend against a regular army. Confident of superiority on the field of battle, he expected success in the operations of a campaign. The whole disposable forces of the empire were assembled in the Anatolic theme; but the neglected discipline and various tactics of the troops composing the motley army, while they revealed the ruinous effects of the avarice of the late emperor, ought to have cautioned an experienced general to commence his operations by giving unity of action to the body under his command before opposing it to the enemy. Heraclius, and Leo the Isaurian, had re-established the power and restored the glory of the Roman empire with worse materials than the legions of Slavonians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Franks, and Varangians in the army of Romanus IV. But it required time and patience to restore the once-celebrated discipline of the Byzantine army, and to make the modifications which were called for in the arms, armour, and tactics of the native soldier; and the headstrong disposition of Romanus rendered him utterly unfit for such a task. He hurried his troops into the field with all their imperfections, and his rashness inflicted a mortal wound on the empire of the East. It is not necessary to follow his operations in detail, nor to mention all the rapid movements of the Seljouk

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invaders. The ruin of the Byzantine power in Asia, the extermination of the greater part of the Christian population, the unhappy fate of Romanus himself, and the noble behaviour of his conqueror Alp Arslan, immortalized in the pages of Gibbon, have invested this war with romantic interest, and conferred on it a degree of importance to which neither the military skill nor the political wisdom of the rival combatants entitle it. The Seljouk armies were principally composed of cavalry, intent on plunder. The Roman troops were mercenaries, destitute of loyalty and patriotism. The Seljouk leaders perceived that, as long as the Byzantine provinces were inhabited by a numerous population of Christians, supported by a regular army and defended by a line of fortresses commanding the great roads, it would be impossible for nomade tribes to retain possession of any conquests they might contrive to make. Their policy was consequently directed to two objects: in the first place, to enrich their followers, increase their own fame, and augment the numbers of their troops by rapid inroads for the collection of plunder; in the second, to reduce the open country as quickly as possible to such a state of depopulation as would admit the establishment of permanent nomade encampments, in the midst of districts which they had rendered desolate within the frontiers of the empire. The instincts of their rude nomadic life, as well as their hatred of Christian civilization, which they felt was the most dangerous obstacle to their power, induced them to exterminate the agricultural population with unrelenting cruelty. The great Sultan Alp Arslan was well aware that this war of incursions and devastation offered surer prospects of ultimate success than a series of pitched battles with the disciplined mercenaries of the empire. For two years he withdrew from the scene of action, and left to his lieutenants the task of ravaging and depopulating the Christian provinces of Asia Minor.

The first military operations of the Emperor Romanus were attended with success. Antioch was exposed to the attacks of the Saracens of Aleppo, who were emboldened, by the assistance of Turkish troops, to attempt the reconquest of the Byzantine province in Syria. The emperor marched to the south-eastern frontier of the empire, to re-establish the supremacy of the imperial arms; but as he was advancing

towards Lykandos, it was announced to him that an army of Seljouks had suddenly broken into Pontus and plundered Neocaesarea. Without losing an hour, he selected a chosen body of troops, and by a rapid countermarch through Sebaste and the mountains of Tephrike, overtook the retreating Turks, and compelled them to abandon their plunder and release their prisoners; but their activity secured the escape of the greater part of their troops. The emperor then returned southward, advancing through the passes of Mount Taurus to the north of Germanicia, called then the defiles of Koukousos, and invading the territory of Aleppo, captured Hierapolis (Membig), which he fortified as an advanced post for the protection of the southern frontier of the empire. After a good deal of severe fighting with the Saracens of Aleppo, he returned by Alexandretta and the Cilician gates to Podandos¹. Here he learned that, while he had been wasting the strength of his army by an useless inroad into Syria, a fresh horde of Seljouks, finding the eastern frontier ill-guarded, passed all the fortresses, and penetrated by a rapid march into the very heart of Asia Minor. They took and plundered Amorium, after which they effected their retreat with such rapidity that Romanus was unable to pursue them, and therefore continued his march to Constantinople, which he reached in January 1069.

The emperor's second campaign produced no better results than the first. It was deranged by the rebellion of a Norman noble in the Byzantine service, named Crispin, who, moved either by the unbounded insolence and rapacity of the Frank mercenary nobles, or by the necessity of securing the support of his troops, whom the emperor may have neglected to pay with regularity, commenced plundering the country, and robbing the collectors of the revenue². Though Crispin was himself overpowered and exiled to Abydos, many parties of Frank soldiers continued to infest the Armeniac theme and commit great disorders. The country round Caesarea was again overrun by the Turks, and the emperor was compelled to employ his army in clearing his native province from their

¹ Scylitzes (827) gives a detailed account of the emperor's operations.

² Concerning the family of this Robert Crispin, see the note of Ducange to Nicephorus Bryennius, 88, edit. Venet.

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bands. He found the operation so tedious that it exhausted his patience ; and in order to bring matters more speedily to a termination, he ordered all his prisoners to be put to death as highway robbers, and refused to spare a Seljouk chief who had fallen into his hands, though he offered to pay an immense ransom for his life. Having delivered Cappadocia from the invaders he marched forward by Melitene to the Euphrates, and crossed the river at Romanopolis, with the intention of advancing to Akhlat, on the lake of Van. By the capture of this fortress he hoped to protect the Armenian frontier. Instead of sending forward one of his generals to execute this duty, and remaining himself with the main body, of the army, to watch over the conduct of the campaign, he placed himself at the head of the troops destined for the siege of Akhlat, and intrusted the command of the forces destined to cover the frontier of Mesopotamia to Philaretos. This general was defeated during his absence, and the Seljouks again spread their ravages far and wide in Cappadocia and Lycaonia. They advanced as far as the district of Iconium, which they plundered in their usual manner, and then rapidly retreated with the spoil they had collected. The march of the emperor towards Akhlat was arrested by the news of their advance on Iconium. He returned to Sebaste, and sent on orders to the Duke of Antioch to secure the passes at Mopsuestia, while he pressed onward to overtake the Turks at Heracleia (Kybistra). The invaders, hemmed in by these hostile armies, were attacked in the mountains of Cilicia by the Armenian inhabitants ; and by abandoning the greater part of their booty, and making only a momentary halt at Valtolivadi, they contrived to gain a march on their pursuers and cross Mount Sarbadik, from whence they escaped to Aleppo¹.

In the year 1070 the command of the imperial army was intrusted to Manuel Comnenus, nephew of the Emperor Isaac I., and elder brother of the future Emperor Alexius. The general business of the administration, and a particular desire to save Bari from falling into the hands of the Normans,

¹ The date of this campaign is fixed by the conflagration of the great church of Blachern, in the eighth indiction and year of the world 6578 ; that is, in autumn of A.D. 1069. Scylitzes, 832, Zonaras, ii. 280. It was again burned down in 1434. Phrantzes, 158, edit. Bonn.

by whom it was closely besieged, detained Romanus IV. in the capital. Manuel Comnenus had risen rapidly to the highest military rank, more by means of his aristocratic position than by superior talents, and was distinguished more by his personal courage than his military experience. The army was regarded in the Byzantine empire at this period as the special occupation of the nobility, and its highest commands were filled either by members of the great families of Ducas, Comnenus, Botaneiates, Bryennius, Melissenos, and Palaeologos, by Armenian princes and nobles, or by captains of foreign mercenaries, like Hervé, Gosselin, Crispin, and Oursel. Such an army required the strong hand of an emperor like Leo III., and the indefatigable activity of a Constantine V., to compel it to respect order, and keep it amenable to discipline.

Manuel Comnenus established his head-quarters at Sebaste, to watch any parties of Turks who might attempt to invade the empire. He was soon drawn into an engagement by a Turkish general named Chrysoskroul or Khroudj, in which he was defeated and taken prisoner. The Turks then continued their ravages, penetrating as far as Chonae, which they sacked, after plundering the great church of St. Michael, and carrying off all the holy plate, rich offerings, and pious dedications accumulated within its walls. The Christians were insulted by seeing this great temple converted into a barrack for the cavalry of the Mussulmans, and terrified by witnessing the destruction of other buildings. Many of the unfortunate inhabitants who attempted to escape slavery by flight, perished, on this occasion, by a singular fate. The rivers in the vicinity of Chonae pour their waters into an immense subterranean cavern, and it happened that while the wretched fugitives were attempting to escape from the Turks, a sudden inundation swept men, women, and children into this fearful chasm¹.

At this time Chrysoskroul was revolving projects of rebellion against Alp Arslan, and he admitted his prisoner, Manuel

¹ Scylitzes (834) thinks that the misfortunes of the empire, caused by the elements as well as the Turks, indicated the wrath of God against the Greeks for tolerating heresy. Herodotus (vii. 30) mentions the chasm at Kolossae, about two miles from Chonae; and Hamilton (*Researches in Asia Minor*, i. 509) gives an interesting account of the aspect of the spot at present.

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Comnenus, to his counsels, for he was anxious to secure some support from the emperor. Manuel persuaded him to visit Constantinople in person, where he concluded an alliance with Romanus. The news of this act of rebellion called Alp Arslan to the scene of action. Though he had intrusted the conduct of the war to his officers as long as the plunder of the Roman empire was its principal object, the moment that the aspect of affairs was changed, by the appearance of a rival to his throne, the great sultan hastened to the Byzantine frontier. He besieged and captured Manzikert, and invested Edessa; but, after losing fifty days before its walls, he was compelled to retire into Persia.

Early in the spring of 1071, Romanus marched at the head of a numerous army to recover Manzikert and meet the sultan. Various inauspicious omens are said to have announced the disastrous issue of his enterprise, and the proofs his army gave of insubordination warranted the inference that his military operations would prove unsuccessful. Wherever a camp was formed the soldiers pillaged the inhabitants, and on their march they treated the emperor's subjects as if they had been his enemies. When an attempt was made to enforce stricter discipline, a whole corps of German mercenaries broke out into a dangerous mutiny, which the emperor had great difficulty in appeasing¹. The army, however, continued to advance by Sebaste to Theodosiopolis, where the plan of the campaign was finally arranged. Romanus, believing that Alp Arslan would be delayed for some time in Persia on account of the backward state of his preparations, resolved to divide his army in order to gain possession of Akhlát, in which there was a strong Turkish garrison, and which, in the possession of the Byzantine army, would form an excellent base of operations against Persia. Oursel, a Frank chief, with a division composed of European mercenaries and Uzes, was sent to besiege Akhlát; while Trachaniotes, with a strong division of Byzantine infantry, was detached to cover the operation². The main body, under the immediate command

¹ Scylitzes, 836; Zonaras, ii. 281, τὸ τάγμα τῶν Νεμίτζαν. The Othomans still call the Germans Nemtsch.

² For the genealogy of Oursel Bailleul, or Russel Baliol, see the notes of Ducange to Nicephorus Bryennius, 90, edit. Venet.

of the emperor, after this reduction of its force, advanced to Manzikert, which was soon retaken. Romanus had hardly gained possession of his conquest before his advanced guard fell in with the skirmishers of the army of Alp Arslan, and in some cavalry engagements which ensued the Byzantine troops were severely handled. On the first encounter, Romanus, who was not aware of the sultan's rapid advance, supposed that only a small force was opposed to the imperial army; but when he became aware that the whole Turkish army was in his vicinity, he despatched orders to Trachaniotes and Oursel to rejoin the main body. These officers, however, finding themselves unexpectedly in the immediate neighbourhood of a large Turkish force, retreated within the frontiers of Mesopotamia, instead of countermarching to effect a junction with the emperor's army. It is difficult to say whether they were induced to take this step from military reasons or treasonable motives. In the mean time a body of Uzes, which had remained with the main body of the army, finding themselves opposed to a division in the hostile army of similar language and race, deserted to the Turks¹.

The two armies were now so near that a battle seemed unavoidable; but still Alp Arslan, who would willingly have avoided risking a general engagement with the regular army of Romanus, made an offer to conclude peace on favourable terms. Romanus haughtily rejected the proposal, unless the sultan would consent to retire, and allow the Byzantine army to occupy the ground on which he was then encamped. Alp Arslan knew that no secure peace was ever purchased by disgrace. Roman pride misled Romanus with visions of vain glory, and he bestowed not a thought on the duty he owed to the empire. He was bent on rivalling Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, when he ought to have been meditating on the best means of preventing the Turks from plundering Caesarea, Amorium, Iconium, and Chonae.

¹ The kindred tribe of the Ghouzes, whom these Uzes appear to have joined, rebelled against the Sultan Sandjar, the grandson of Alp Arslan, called by the Orientals the Second Alexander, though the name of the Second Darius would have been quite as apt, and kept him for four years a prisoner beyond the Oxus. Sandjar died in 1157, and with him terminated the power of the Persian Seljouks, not, as Gibbon says, with Malekshah. Price, *Mohammedan Empire*, ii. 366; Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, trad. par Hellert, i. 24. A list of the Seljouk sultans is given in the Appendix at the end of this volume.

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Both parties prepared for a desperate contest. Romanus placed himself at the head of his own centre; the right wing of his army was commanded by Alyattes, a Cappadocian general; the left, by Nicephorus Bryennius; and the reserve was led by Andronicus, the son of the Caesar John Ducas, the emperor's bitterest enemy¹. The Turkish sultan intrusted the immediate command of the battle to the eunuch Tarang, who acted as his lieutenant-general, reserving to himself the direction of the reserve and the power of performing all the duties of a general, without being called upon to act as a mere soldier. But he felt the importance of this first great battle between the Byzantine and Seljouk armies in deciding the fate of the two empires; and he declared that, unless he proved victorious, the field of battle should be his grave. The strength of the Roman army lay in its legions of regular infantry and heavy-armed cavalry, while that of the Turks reposed principally on the excellence of its light cavalry; hence the difficulty of obtaining a partial advantage was not great, but it required a well-combined system of manœuvres to secure a complete victory. The object of the regular army ought to have been the capture of the enemy's camp, while that of the irregular force was concentrated in forcing any portion of their enemy to make a retrograde movement, in the hope of converting the retreat into a total rout. The rash conduct of Romanus, the vigorous caution of Alp Arslan, the treachery of Andronicus Ducas, and the cowardice or incapacity of the Byzantine nobility, combined to give the Turks a complete victory. The battle lasted all day without either party gaining any decisive advantage, when the imprudence of the emperor, in ordering a part of the centre to return to the camp before transmitting proper orders to the whole army, afforded Andronicus Ducas a pretext for abandoning the field. Romanus, when he perceived his error, vainly endeavoured to repair it by his personal courage. After fighting like a hero, his horse was at last killed under him, and, a wound in the hand having rendered him powerless, he was taken prisoner². The night had already set in, and the emperor was left to sleep on the ground with the other prisoners, if the pain of his wound and the agony of

¹ Nicephorus Bryennius, 29.² 26th August 1071.

his mind could admit of repose. In the morning he was brought before Alp Arslan, who, hearing that the Emperor of the Romans had fallen into his hands, placed himself on his throne of state, in the great tent set apart for the ceremonies of the grand sultan's court. As soon as Romanus approached the throne, he was thrown on the ground by the guards, and Alp Arslan, according to the immemorial usage of the Turks, descended from his seat and placed his foot on the neck of his captive, while a shout of triumph rang through the ranks of the various nations of Asia who composed his army. But the Byzantine historians who record this official celebration of his triumph, bear testimony to the mildness and humanity of the conqueror; and add that the emperor was immediately raised from the ground, and received from the grand sultan assurance that he should be treated as a king¹. That evening Alp Arslan and Romanus supped together, and their conversation is said to have been characterized by the noblest philanthropy on the part of the sultan and the most daring frankness on that of Romanus. Alp Arslan was really a man of noble sentiments; but at this time his policy led him to gain the goodwill of his prisoner in order to conclude a lasting treaty of peace, for he was eager to pursue other schemes of conquest in the native seats of his race beyond the Oxus. Instead, therefore, of consuming his time in ravaging the empire and planting his standards on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, he concluded a treaty of peace with Romanus, who engaged to pay him a suitable ransom for a Roman emperor².

¹ Gibbon (vii. 162) doubts the narrative that Alp Arslan planted his foot on the neck of Romanus, and prefers the romantic colouring which some Eastern historians have given to their accounts. Their tale, however, deserves little credit, for they attribute to Malekshah the victory of his father, and suppose that the sultan himself had previously been taken prisoner by the Byzantine troops, but had concealed his rank from Romanus until he was released by the stratagem of his vizier. Gibbon (vi. 79) records, without hesitation, that Justinian II., seated on a throne in the hippodrome of Constantinople, planted his feet on the necks of the dethroned emperors Leontius and Tiberius III. (Apsimar). The Persian emperor Sapor treated the Roman emperor Valerian in the same way. Gibbon, i. 406. Compare Scylitzes, 842; D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, 'Malekshah;' Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, iii. 116. The circumstances of Alp Arslan's death show that he could treat his prisoners with violence.

² Abulpharagius (*Chron. ar.* 228) says the ransom was a million of byzants; other writers make it 1,500,000 dinars, and say that Romanus engaged that the empire should pay a yearly tribute, 360,000 dinars or byzants, for fifty years. Weil, iii. 116. Romanus was only a prisoner for eight days.

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The release of Romanus only overwhelmed the unfortunate emperor with new misfortunes. The aristocracy and people of Constantinople disliked his government, because it had withdrawn a large part of the public expenditure from the court and the capital, and reduced the salaries of the nobles and the profits of the tradesmen; while the provincial governors and military chiefs were not attached to his person, because he controlled their peculations and oppressions by his presence. Corruption had penetrated so deep into the official society of the Byzantine empire, that the ruling classes were everywhere bent on converting the public service into a means of gain; and the people, deprived of all power, and even of the capacity of obtaining any political knowledge, were utterly helpless. Romanus had reformed the court, restrained the peculations of the aristocracy, and enforced discipline among the foreign mercenaries; but he was not popular with the people, for he had neither amused them with shows in the hippodrome, nor lightened the burden of their sufferings in the provinces. He was indeed the only man in the empire whose interests and policy were identical with the public welfare, but unfortunately he was deficient in the prudence and judgment necessary to render this fact generally apparent.

The captivity of Romanus produced a revolution at court. The Empress Eudocia was compelled to take the veil and retire into a monastery, while the Caesar John Ducas became the real sovereign in the name of his nephew, Michael VII. As soon as the news reached Constantinople that Romanus had returned into the empire, orders were sent off by the Caesar to prevent his being acknowledged as emperor. His enemies declared that he had only been elevated to the throne to act as regent for Michael VII., and that prince was now able to conduct the government. Both parties collected troops to support their pretensions. A battle was fought at Docea, in which the army of Romanus was defeated, and that emperor fled to the fort of Tyropoeon; but finding that he could not maintain himself there, he gained the mountains of Cilicia, and retired to Adana¹. He was soon

¹ Docea or Tosiye is still a town of twenty thousand inhabitants, of whom three thousand are Armenians. It is situated on the river Devrek, to the north of the direct road from Amasia to Constantinople.

pursued by Andronicus, who had betrayed him at the battle of Manzikert; and the Armenian governor of Antioch, Katchadour, who advanced to assist him, having been defeated, the garrison of Adana was so dispirited that they compelled Romanus to surrender on receiving assurance of personal safety. Andronicus required that Romanus should resign the empire and retire into a monastery. This treaty was ratified at Constantinople, and the safety of the dethroned sovereign was guaranteed by the Archbishops of Chalcedon, Heracleia, and Coloneia with the most solemn promises. But the Caesar John Ducas seized the opportunity to gratify his implacable hatred, and, in defiance of the engagement of his son and the promises of the bishops, ordered the eyes of Romanus to be put out. Executioners were sent to inflict the sentence, and to carry the unfortunate emperor to the island of Prote, where he was left without an attendant to dress his wounds, which began to putrefy. The dying Romanus bore the tortures inflicted on him with unshaken fortitude, neither uttering a reproach against his enemies nor a lamentation against his fate, praying only that his sufferings might be received as an expiation of his sins. His wife Eudocia was allowed to honour his remains with a sumptuous funeral. It is said that, before quitting Adana, he collected all the money of which he could dispose, and sent it to the sultan as a proof of his good faith. It was accompanied with this message: 'As emperor, I promised you a ransom of a million and a half. Dethroned, and about to become dependent on others, I send you all I possess as a proof of my gratitude¹.'

While Romanus was marching to the defeat which left all Asia Minor at the mercy of the Turks, the Byzantine empire lost its last hold on Italy. Argyros, the son of Mel, had been sent by Constantine IX. as katapan or viceroy, to arrest the progress of the Normans. He exerted himself with indefatigable energy both in open war and secret intrigue; but the defeat of Pope Leo IX., who fell into the hands of the Normans, rendered all the projects of the Byzantine

¹ The account of the reign of Romanus IV. by Nicephorus Bryennius must be received with suspicion, and corrected by the more accurate narratives of Scylitzes and Zonaras. Scylitzes is our best authority for this period.

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government vain, and Argyros repaired in person to Constantinople to solicit additional support. Isaac I., displeased with his conduct, dismissed him from all his employments, and the affairs of Italy were neglected. In the reign of Constantine X., an opportunity presented itself of re-establishing the imperial influence, in consequence of the dissensions of the Normans, but that emperor was too avaricious to take advantage of the circumstances. Robert Guiscard had unjustly seized the heritage of his brother Humphrey, and Abelard, his nephew, fled to Constantinople, attended by Gosselin, a Norman officer of ability and influence. Though the Byzantine officers in Italy received little support from the central government, one of their number, named Maurice, obtained considerable success, and with a corps of Varangians under his command repeatedly defeated the Normans and regained possession of several towns. But Robert Guiscard, concentrating the whole force of his countrymen, at last captured Otranto, Tarentum, and Brindisi, and laid siege to Bari, the last possession of the Byzantine emperors. The place was attacked in 1068, but was so well defended that the Normans were compelled to convert the siege into a blockade, and Romanus IV. made an effort to relieve it. In 1070 a fleet was intrusted to Gosselin, with ample supplies for the besieged city; but Gosselin was met by a Norman fleet under the command of Roger, the younger brother of Guiscard, and the future conqueror of Sicily. The Byzantine expedition was defeated, Gosselin was taken prisoner, and the garrison of Bari, hopeless of relief, capitulated on the 15th of April 1071. Thus, four years and a half after William Duke of Normandy conquered England, another Norman conqueror put an end to the authority of the Roman empire of the East in Italy¹.

The education of the Emperor Michael VII. had been intrusted to Michael Psellus, an able but intriguing pedant, who rendered the young prince a learned grammarian, but,

¹ Lupi Protospatae *Chron.*, in the *Bibliotheca Hist. Regn. Siciliae* of Carusius. Compare Scylitzes, 854; Giannone, *Storia civile del Regno di Napoli*, x. 1; and Muratori, *Ann. d'Italia*, iii. 137, vi. 205. The name of Aboulchares, one of the Byzantine governors, indicates a Saracen origin; he may have been sent to form an alliance with the Saracens of Sicily. The date of the capture of Bari is placed in 1070 in the notes to the edition of Muratori published at Milan in 1724, v. 44.

either from natural defects or improper instruction, he turned out a worthless sovereign¹. Instead of attending to political business, he spent his time in rhetorical exercises or in writing iambs². Feeble, vain, and suspicious, he was easily made the tool of those who flattered his weaknesses. The Archbishop of Side, an able and virtuous prelate, was replaced in the duties of prime-minister by Nicephoritzes, who was recalled from the office of chief judge in Greece to perform the duties of postmaster-general³. The emperor being as idle as he was incapable, and the new prime-minister as active as he was unprincipled, Nicephoritzes soon gained the exclusive direction of the weak mind of his sovereign, and established a complete supremacy over the court as well as the public administration⁴. This was done in a great measure by a lavish expenditure of public money; and while he satisfied the claims of others on the treasury, he took care to enrich himself.

The Byzantine empire had now reached a state of society in which wealth was the universal object of pursuit. Every nobler aspiration in the heart of man was dead; honour and fame were the dreams of children. Power itself was an object of ambition, because it was the surest means of attaining wealth, and it is needless to say that under such circumstances rapacity and extortion were vices inherent in

¹ Michael Psellus, whose desertion of the Emperor Michael VI. has been noticed, boasted of his hostility to the unfortunate Romanus IV. Though his learning obtained for him the title of Prince of Philosophers, he was evidently a base politician, and his want of moral rectitude rendered him unfit to develop noble sentiments in any mind. [M. Sathas, in the introduction to vol. iv. of his *Bibliotheca Historica medii ævi*, though he admits that Psellus was a time-serving courtier (p. cvii.), yet regards his character as having been greatly misrepresented (p. xxiii.). The ignorance that has prevailed about him is shown by his having been confused, even by authors of some note, with another man of letters called Michael Psellus, who lived in Andros at the end of the eighth and beginning of the ninth century, and by other strange errors (p. xxv.). M. Sathas, however, shows that Psellus acted discreditably in respect of the defeat of Romanus IV., displaying extravagant joy at the news, and loading him with abuse; but he defends him against the charge of being in any way accessory to his death (p. xvi.). Ed.]

² Scylitzes (856) adds anapaests, to make the folly and pedantry of the emperor greater.

³ Both the archbishop and his successor were eunuchs. Nicephoritzes, when young, had been placed in the imperial palace by Constantine IX. His office was now *ἀρχιεπίσκοπος τοῦ δρόμου*.

⁴ Nicephorus Bryennius, who was a Caesar, speaks of the talents and vices of Nicephoritzes with a mixture of admiration and blame. He says the eunuch possessed abilities equal to Pericles for throwing an empire into confusion!! p. 41.

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official life. The financial difficulties of the government, after the disasters of Romanus IV., must have caused some disorders even under the administration of an honest minister. The imperial revenues were diminished by the incursions of the Turks, which were pushed forward almost with impunity to the very walls of Nicaea and Nicomedia. The Byzantine practice of filling the provinces with colonies of foreign races, and the lately-adopted usage of settling appanaged chieftains in Asia Minor, led to several Armenian principalities in Cappadocia and Cilicia assuming an independent position¹. Yet even under these circumstances the great officers in the capital, the courtiers and the governors of provinces, all insisted on the full payment of their exorbitant salaries, leaving the troops of the line, the fleet, and the public administration to suffer from the diminished resources of the empire. The court of Constantinople and the shows of the hippodrome were as brilliant as ever; the fortifications, the aqueducts, the roads and the ports of the provincial cities were allowed to fall to ruin. The whole of the money which the minister could draw into the central treasury was devoted to satisfy the rapacious nobility, and keep the turbulent populace of the capital in good-humour. As usually happens when police and cleanliness are neglected for any length of time, famine and plague began to ravage the provinces of Asia Minor which the nomades had plundered. The people, crowded together in the cities, died of starvation and spread disease. Yet the rapacity and the exigencies of the treasury were so great, that the Emperor Michael availed himself even of these appalling disasters to collect money. The trade in grain was declared to be an imperial monopoly, and imperial ships were employed to form magazines of grain at Rhaedestus, where a corn-market was established. It is said that the agents of Nicephoritzes took advantage of the public distress to sell the modius of wheat for a byzant,

¹ Besides the Armenian principalities already noticed, many local governors acquired territorial establishments, as Katchadour at Antioch, Basil at Kesoun near Germanicia, and Ochin at Lambron in Cilicia. We find also an Armenian named Philaretos at Antioch, and his son Barsam at Edessa, when those cities were betrayed to Suleiman, sultan of Iconium. Reuben established the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia by uniting several of these principalities and some other Armenian colonies, A.D. 1080. Chamich, *History of Armenia*; and the additions to Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, by Brosset, tome xv.

and the popular indignation propagated the report that the measure was reduced to three quarters of its legitimate contents. The emperor, who was held by his subjects to be responsible for this fraud, received from them the nickname of Michael Parapinakes, or Michael the Peck-filcher¹.

While the people were thus oppressed, the principal military chiefs, both natives and foreigners, began to arrogate to themselves the authority of petty princes. Still, in attributing due importance to the temporary misgovernment of Michael and his minister, we must not neglect the general tendency of all extensive territories in the eleventh century to separate into smaller circles of political action. Centralization in an extensive state, even in the most civilized state of society, requires rapid means of communication. The theories of Roman law and administration, which had long tended to bind the subjects of the Byzantine empire together, had now lost their influence, and were supplanted by the power of personal and local authorities. The same social condition which caused the Byzantine empire to exhibit a tendency to separation may be traced alike in the history of the Germanic and of the Seljouk empires. Rebellions against the vigorous sway of Alp Arslan and Malekshah followed one another as rapidly as against the feeble rule of Michael Parapinakes and Nicephorus Botaneiates. The impulse of society was the same in the Byzantine and the Seljouk empires, though the results only were modified by the character of the individual sovereigns: the valour of the sultans enabled them to suppress insurrections and retain possession of their thrones; the cowardice of the emperors allowed rebellion to prosper and forced them to exchange their crowns for the cowls of monks; but both empires were equally broken in pieces.

The weakness of the Byzantine government suggested to the Bulgarians the hope of re-establishing their national independence. The Bulgarian aristocracy were always sure of finding a large body of supporters among the Sclavonian

¹ The medimnos and modios of Constantinople appear from the Byzantine writers to have been the same measure at this time, for both consisted of four pinakia. See the authorities cited by Ducange, *Glossarium med. et inf. Graecitatis*, v. *πινάκιον*. At present, in Greece, the usual measure of grain is the kilo (nearly our bushel, as it is equal to about sixty lb. of good wheat); half a kilo is called a pinaki. With regard to the monopoly, Scylitzes (850) says, *φοινδᾶκα ἐν τῇ Ραιδεστῷ καὶ μονοπωλεῖον συνεστήσατο*. See also vol. ii. p. 382, note 1.

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population of Macedonia and Greece, as well as among the Bulgarians of Thrace, who were as anxious to be governed by a prince of their own race as the tribes north of Mount Haemus. On this occasion the rebels sent a deputation to Michael, the sovereign of Servia and Croatia, the only Slavonian prince powerful enough to protect them, and offered the sovereignty of Bulgaria to his son Constantinos Bodinos. The offer was accepted, and the Servian prince was proclaimed king of the Bulgarians, under the name of Peter, at Prisdiana¹. The Byzantine army, under the command of Damian Dalasenos, a presumptuous noble, was completely defeated, the camp was taken, and a mercenary chief, called Longibardopoulos, was made prisoner with many other officers of rank. This Lombard, who had entered the imperial service rather than submit to the Normans, gained the favour of the prince of Servia, married his daughter, and commanded his troops against the emperor he had lately served. The king of the Bulgarians, after his victory, marched to Naissus, which he occupied, while he sent a division of his army to besiege Kastoria, and rouse the Slavonians of Greece to take up arms. But the attack on Kastoria was defeated, the Slavonians remained firm in their allegiance, and the king himself was routed and taken prisoner at Taonion in the month of December 1073². The German and Frank troops in the Byzantine army committed the greatest disorders in the country through which they marched. At Prespa, they destroyed the ancient palace of the kings of Achrida, and they plundered the churches of their plate and ornaments whenever they could force an entrance into the sacristies.

In Asia, Philaretos, an Armenian, who commanded a division of the army of Romanus IV. at the defeat of Manzikert, remained at the head of a considerable body of troops. After the death of Romanus he assumed the title of Emperor, and kept possession of a considerable territory in

¹ See Ducange, *Familiae Dalmaticae Sclavonicae, etc.*, 280, 281. Constantine Bodinus was sent prisoner to Antioch after his capture, but contrived to escape and return to Servia with the assistance of some Venetian merchants. He became sovereign of Servia some time later. The chronology of these events is full of difficulties. Lucius, *De Regno Dalmatiae*, 299, 441, n. xvii.

² Scylitzes (850) says this rebellion occurred in the eleventh indiction and first year of Michael; Zonaras (ii. 288) says in the third year of Michael, which agrees with the eleventh indiction.

the neighbourhood of Germanicia, which he governed as an independent prince, until at last he made his peace with the emperor on condition of being appointed Duke of Antioch¹.

Amidst these scenes of disorder, Nestor, a slave of Constantine X., who had risen to the rank of governor of the towns on the Danube, suddenly rebelled. Placing himself at the head of the garrisons under his orders, which were in a state of mutiny from want of pay, and eager to plunder the Bulgarians in their neighbourhood, he obtained the assistance of one of the chiefs of the Patzinaks, and marched straight to Constantinople. The rebels demanded the dismissal of Nicephoritzes, but finding their forces inadequate to attack the capital, they separated into small parties, and spread over the country to collect plunder. Nestor remained with the Patzinaks, and retired with them beyond the Danube².

Every calamity of this unfortunate period sinks into insignificance when compared with the destruction of the greater part of the Greek race by the ravages of the Seljouk Turks in Asia Minor. As soon as the conditions of the treaty with Romanus were repudiated by the government at Constantinople, Alp Arslan resolved to revenge himself for the loss of the stipulated ransom and tribute. Other wars demanded his personal attention, but innumerable hordes were poured into Asia Minor by different roads; and his son Malekshah intrusted Suleiman, the son of Koutoulmish, to form a permanent encampment within the Roman empire, in order to direct the movements of all the scattered tribes engaged in plundering it. Suleiman laid the foundations of a lasting dominion by attaching the agricultural population to his government, whether they were freemen or serfs. The peasants who cultivated the lands belonging to the great Byzantine landed proprietors were without any hope of bettering their condition. Suleiman treated them as proprietors of the land they occupied, on their paying a fixed tribute to the Seljouk empire, and thus the first foundations of the Turkish administration

¹ Scylitzes, 866; Le Beau, note to vol. xv. 72.

² According to a chronicle preserved in the Imperial Library at Vienna, and quoted by Malte-Brun, the Hungarians besieged Belgrade, which was in the possession of the Byzantine troops, in the year 1073, and in the siege they employed cannons and arquebuses. Paravey, *Mémoire sur la Découverte en Asie de la Poudre-à-Canon*, 7.

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were laid in the opposing interests of two different classes of the Christian population,—in the adverse interests of landlords and tenants.

The progress of the Turks at last roused the Byzantine government to exertion, and a motley army was formed by collecting together a number of corps composed of a variety of different nations. The principal object kept in view was to prevent the troops agreeing to elect a new emperor. Isaac Comnenus, an elder brother of Alexius I., was appointed to command this force, but was unable to prevent it becoming a scene of anarchy. The foreign mercenaries plundered the people, and when Isaac attempted to punish the soldiers of Oursel for their misdeeds, that Norman, who claimed an exclusive jurisdiction over his own corps, deserted the camp, and induced all the Franks to join his standard. He took possession of Sebaste, expecting to form an independent Norman principality in Pontus, as Robert Guiscard had done in Italy. In the mean time the army of Isaac Comnenus was defeated at Caesareia, his camp stormed, and himself taken prisoner by the Turks. The state of affairs in Asia Minor became then so alarming, that the Caesar John Ducas, who had hitherto spent the greater part of his time hunting in the forests near the shores of the Bosphorus, found himself compelled to take the command of the army. His first operations were directed against the rebel Oursel. The Caesar fixed his head-quarters at Dorylaeum, and the Norman encamped near the sources of the Sangarius. The two armies met near the bridge called Zompi, on one of the great lines of communication between Constantinople and the central provinces of Asia Minor¹. The desertion of his Frank mercenaries, and the disgraceful retreat of Nicephorus Botaniates with the Asiatic reserve, caused the complete defeat of the Caesar's army. John Ducas and his son Andronicus were both made prisoners, and the victorious mercenaries advanced to the shores of the Bosphorus, and set fire to some of the houses at Chrysopolis (Scutari). Oursel, however, already perceived that the force under his command was insufficient to overthrow the

¹ The position of the bridge of Zompi is of some importance in explaining the military history of this period. It was probably at Tchander. Hamilton's *Researches in Asia Minor*, i. 446. It was built by Justinian. Procopius, *De Aedif.* lib. v. c. 3, p. 98. Compare Cedrenus, 387; Scylitzes, 836, 847.

administrative fabric of the empire, even as then degraded, and he resolved to advance his fortunes by acting as general-in-chief for an emperor of his own creation. A similarity in the circumstances of his position taught him to imitate the policy of Ricimer¹, and he easily persuaded his prisoner, the Caesar, to assume the title of Emperor, and aid in dethroning his nephew.

Michael and his minister were now infinitely more alarmed by their own personal danger than they were concerned at the calamities of the subjects of the empire. An alliance was formed with Suleiman, who commanded the forces of his cousin the great sultan; and a formal treaty was concluded between the Byzantine emperor and the Seljouks in Asia Minor, which received the official ratification of Malekshah². The Emperor Michael conferred on Suleiman the government of the provinces of which the Seljouk Turks were then in possession; which was the phrase adopted by Byzantine pride to make a cession of that large portion of Asia Minor already occupied by the Mohammedans; and the Seljouk emir engaged to furnish the emperor with an army of Turkish mercenaries. The precise conditions of the treaty, or the exact extent of territory ceded to the Turks, are not recorded; and indeed the Byzantine writers mention the existence of this important treaty only in a casual way, though it laid the foundation of the independent power of the Seljouk sultans of Roum, of whom Suleiman was the progenitor, and whose dynasty long survived the elder branch of the house of Togrulbeg, who reigned as great sultans in Persia³.

This treaty was concluded in the year 1074, and a Turkish army immediately marched, with the rapidity that distinguished the military movements of the Seljouks, to Mount Sophon, where Oursel was encamped. The light cavalry soon drew Oursel into an ambuscade, and he was taken prisoner along with his phantom emperor. The wife of Oursel, however, who was residing at a neighbouring castle, in which he had laid up a considerable treasure, instantly paid the ransom

¹ Gibbon, chap. xxxvi. vol. iv. p. 292, edit. Smith.

² The passages alluding to this treaty are, Scylitzes, 861; Zonaras, ii. 290; Nicephorus Bryennius, 59; Anna Comnena, 5.

³ A list of the Seljouk grand sultans, and of the sultans of Roum or Iconium, is given in the Appendix to this volume.

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demanding by his captors, and the Norman chief, collecting his Franks, marched back to his old quarters in the Armeniac theme, in order to recruit his strength. The Emperor Michael, who gained possession of his uncle's person by paying the ransom demanded by the Turks, allowed him to retain his sight on his resigning all his political pretensions and adopting the monastic life. Alexius Comnenus was now sent to command the Byzantine troops against Oursel, and succeeded in reducing him to such difficulty that he attempted to form an alliance with a Turkish chief named Toutash, who was watching his movements. Alexius had, however, secured the fidelity of the Turk, by promising him a large ransom if he delivered Oursel into his own hands. The Frank leader was seized at a conference, and the intriguing Alexius returned to Constantinople with his prisoner, to bargain for wealth and honours for himself¹.

After the capture of Oursel, the Turks made the treaty with the emperor a pretext for encroaching on the possessions and plundering the wealth of the subjects of the empire; but all open warfare having ceased in Asia Minor, Isaac Comnenus was sent with an army to Antioch, to protect the Byzantine possessions in Syria from the tribes of Seljouks who had conquered Aleppo and Damascus. He was not more fortunate at Antioch than he had been at Caesarea; his army was defeated, his brother-in-law, Constantine Diogenes, the son of Romanus IV., was slain, and he himself wounded and taken prisoner. He was, nevertheless, soon after delivered from captivity by the inhabitants of Antioch, who paid the Turks twenty thousand byzants as his ransom².

The weakness of the emperor and the avarice of the minister invited several members of the aristocracy to profit by the general discontent, in order to mount the throne. Two military nobles of distinguished families took up arms about the same time in Europe and Asia. Nicephorus Bryennius, who had gained considerable reputation at Dyrrachium, assembled an army composed of Thracian Bulgarians, Mace-

¹ The avidity of Alexius to profit by any service he rendered to the emperor or the empire is portrayed by his son-in-law, Nicephorus Bryennius, 97.

² Nicephorus Bryennius (66) mentions the amount of the ransom. Constantine Diogenes had married Theodora, the sister of Isaac and the Emperor Alexius I.

donian Slavonians, Italians, Franks, Uzès, and Greeks¹. With this army he advanced to Constantinople; but he permitted his troops to plunder and burn the suburbs of the capital. This conduct produced so determined an opposition to his pretensions, that he was compelled to raise the siege and retire, under the pretext that the incursions of the Patzinaks rendered his presence necessary to protect the open country of Thrace. The proceedings of Nicephorus Botaneiates in Asia were even more injurious to the public welfare than those of Bryennius. He purchased the support of Suleiman, the sultan of Roum, by ratifying the treaty concluded with Michael, and abandoning an additional Christian population to the power of the Mohammedans, in order to obtain the assistance of a corps of Seljouk cavalry². Yet he was welcomed by the inhabitants of Nicaea as a deliverer with great rejoicings; and before he reached the Bosphorus he received the news that Michael VII. had been dethroned by a general insurrection, in which the senate, the clergy, and the people had with one accord taken part. The imperial pedant retired into the monastery of Studion with his son Constantine, and left the throne vacant for his successor³.

The history of the reign of Nicephorus III. (Botaneiates) may be comprised in a few words. He was an old idle voluptuary; the palace was a scene of debauchery, and the public administration, intrusted to the direction of two Slavonian household slaves, fell into utter disorder. The old emperor thought only of enjoying the few years he had to live, rather as a brute than a man; each member of the aristocracy was engaged in plundering the public treasury, or plotting to seize the empire; and the two ministers, whose very language proclaimed their foreign origin, pillaged the provinces by their agents, or left them to be overrun by the Turks or by rebels⁴. The infatuated Nicephorus moreover

¹ That the Byzantine troops called Thracians were Bulgarians, and those called Macedonians, Slavonians, admits of no doubt. Scylitzes (852-865) and Zonaras (ii. 294) clearly distinguish Thracians, Macedonians, and Romans (Greeks). The Italian corps that entered the imperial service, after the death of Maniakes in 1043, had been kept up by fresh recruits. Niceph. Bryen. 91.

² Compare Scylitzes, 857-861; Zonaras, ii. 290, with Niceph. Bryen. 80.

³ Michael VII. was made Bishop of Ephesus to prevent his ever regaining the throne; but so little was he feared that he was allowed to retain his sight and reside at Constantinople.

⁴ Scylitzes, 867; Zonaras, ii. 292; Niceph. Bryen. 97; Anna Comnena, 43,—all

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excited the disgust of his subjects by marrying Maria the ex-empress, though her husband, the dethroned Emperor Michael VII., was still living as Bishop of Ephesus and residing in the capital; but it was his wasteful expenditure of public money, and his fraudulent conduct in issuing a base coinage to supply his extravagance, which converted the contempt of all ranks into hatred, and caused his ruin¹.

Nicephorus III. reigned three years, and during that period no less than four rebels assumed the imperial title, besides Alexius Comnenus, by whom he was dethroned. Several Armenian princes in Asia Minor attempted to establish their independence; and two Paulician leaders took up arms in Thrace, and committed many cruelties, to revenge themselves for the persecutions they had suffered². The religious bigotry of the Greeks concurred with the disorganization of the government in accelerating the ruin of the empire.

The rebel emperor Bryennius had failed to take Constantinople from political incapacity, not from want of military force. As soon as Nicephorus III. was established on the throne, he sent Alexius Comnenus to attack the rebels with an army composed of Asiatic Christians, Franks, and Turkish cavalry. The two armies were equal in number, and neither exceeded fifteen thousand men. A battle was fought at Kalabrya, near the river Almyros, in which Bryennius was defeated and taken prisoner. He was then deprived of sight³.

mention the foreign origin, language, and manners of these slaves. Manasses (136) expresses the public feeling in the following verses:—

καὶ τὰ μὲν πράγματα χερσὶν ἐπίστευεν ἀνθρώπων
βαρβαρίζοντων τὴν φωνὴν μὴδ' ὀρθοῶρημονοῦντων,
κράτῃρα πανήμεριον ἱστάντων καὶ πινόντων.
οἷς ἦν τὸ γένος τρίδουλον, καὶ πάπποι καὶ πατέρες
τριβάρβαροι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βάρβαροι καὶ τὴν γνῶμην,
καὶ σκυθογλώσσους λαλιᾶς δυσφρέστους λαλαγούντες.

¹ Saulcy (*Essai de Classification des Suites Monétaires Byzantines*, 316) mentions a gold coin of Nicephorus so pale from alloy as to appear almost like silver; and Ducange (*Fam. Aug. Byz.* 159) mentions that the coin he published was of pale gold, and the author possesses one similar. Zonaras (ii. 298) mentions that the predecessors of Alexius I. had issued debased gold.

² Gaghiik, the last Bagratian king of Armenia, was assassinated near Cybistra in 1079. Adom and Abousal, sons of Sennacherib prince of Vasproukan, and Gaghiik prince of Kars, were murdered by the Greeks in 1080. Saint-Martin, i. 421; Chamich, ii. 158.

³ Zonaras (ii. 292) says Kalabrya was so called from its abundant fountains; but Strabo (vii. c. 6. p. 319) says that 'Bria' signified *city* in the Thracian

As soon as the country round Adrianople was pacified, Alexius was sent against the second rebel emperor, Basilakes, who had occupied Thessalonica, and was waiting the result of the contest between Bryennius and Botaneiates to fall on the victorious army. The forces under the command of Basilakes consisted of veteran Frank, Sclavonian, Albanian, and Greek soldiers, and his confidence in his own valour and military talents made him look on success as certain. Alexius, however, contrived to entrap him into a night attack on the imperial camp, which was eighteen miles distant from Thessalonica, on the banks of the Vardar. Basilakes was defeated, and when he attempted to defend the citadel of Thessalonica, he was seized by his own soldiers, and delivered to the emperor, by whose orders he was deprived of sight¹. Constantine Ducas, the brother of the dethroned Michael VII., was proclaimed emperor by the troops in Asia Minor; but his incapacity was soon so evident that his own partisans delivered him to Nicephorus III., who only compelled him to become a monk, and take up his residence in one of the monasteries in the islands of the Propontis.

Nicephorus Melissenos was the fourth rebel. He had strongly opposed the election of Botaneiates, and soon took up arms to dethrone him. His high rank, great wealth, ancient family, and extensive alliances among the aristocracy, rendered him a dangerous political rival². He was utterly destitute of noble ambition or patriotic feelings; and, to gratify his lust of power, was willing to degrade the Greek race and dismember the empire. In order to secure the assistance of a large body of Turks, he concluded a treaty

language, and we find in this part of Thrace Mesembria, Selybria, Poltyobria. [Calavryta is a similar modern Greek name for a place with abundant springs. In order to be certain of the etymology, we ought to know the date when the name was first given. The derivation and meaning of the names, both of persons and places, in the Byzantine empire is a great field of investigation, but for a satisfactory treatment of the subject a knowledge of at least the Slavonian, Wallachian, and Armenian languages is requisite, as well as of Byzantine and modern Greek. Ed.]

John, the brother of Nicephorus Bryennius, was pardoned, but was assassinated in the streets of Constantinople by a Varangian soldier he had once punished with severity. Nicephorus was considered the best tactician in the empire. Anna Comn. 191.

¹ Alexius Comnenus gained great wealth by appropriating to himself the treasures of Basilakes. Niceph. Bryen. 102.

² Melissenos had married Eudocia, the sister of Alexius Comnenus. Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 172.

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with their chiefs, by which he engaged to divide the cities and provinces his army should conquer with these enemies of his faith and nation. Suleiman, the sultan of Roum, took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him to gain possession of Nicaea and plunder Cyzicus. An imperial army endeavoured to regain possession of Nicaea, but was defeated, and that city remained in the hands of the Seljouk Turks until it was restored to the Byzantine empire by the first crusade¹.

The troubled state of the empire, and the age of Nicephorus III., rendered the nomination of his successor the great object of court intrigue, and it became known that the old man had selected his nephew Synadenos to be the future emperor. His procrastination in carrying his determination into effect caused his dethronement. The beautiful Empress Maria had expected, by her marriage with the aged Botaneiates, to secure the throne for her child, and the regency for herself, and she was now alarmed at the prospect of descending from the throne which she had occupied as the wife of two emperors, and which she expected to retain as mother of a third². She sought support from her relations. The marriage of Isaac Comnenus with her cousin Irene, an Alanian princess, and of Alexius, his brother, with Irene, the daughter of Andronicus Ducas, the cousin of her first husband, attached that influential family to her interest³. She now drew closer the bonds of union by adopting Alexius as her son. Court intrigues commenced, a conspiracy was formed, and the Sclavonian ministers, Borilas and Germanos, who had risen to power by studying the characters of the aristocracy, saw that the profound dissimulation of Alexius (which his daughter celebrates as political sagacity), joined to his popularity with

¹ The commander of the unsuccessful Byzantine army was the protovestiarios John, a eunuch, A.D. 1080.

² Maria was the daughter of the king of Alania, or Iberia; and the extreme beauty and grace of this foreign princess are celebrated by Anna Comnena, though she cannot conceal that spirit of envious calumny so peculiar to the Byzantine Greeks (74).

³ The marriage of Alexius with Irene Dukaina infused a tinge of Bulgarian blood into the imperial family of Comnenus; for Irene was the daughter of Maria, the daughter of Trojan, son of Samuel king of Achrida. Ducange erroneously makes Maria the wife of the Caesar John Ducas, the father of Andronicus. Yet he mentions that the daughter of Trojan was the wife of Andronicus. Again, he calls Irene the wife of George Palaeologos, confounding her with her sister Anna. *Fam. Byz.* 164, 165, 230; Anna Comnena, 54, 55; and Niceph. Bryen. 72.

the troops, rendered him the most dangerous man among the nobility¹. They proposed to arrest him and deprive him of sight; but the conspirators were informed of the danger in time to escape to Tzourulos, where Alexius and his friends joined an army assembled to act against Melissenos. The Caesar, John Ducas, who had quitted the monastic habit, George Palaeologos, a dashing officer, who married Anna, a younger sister of the wife of Alexius, and several of the ablest officers among the aristocracy, fled to the camp, which was moved to Schiza. As it was necessary to elect an emperor capable of commanding the army, the legitimate claims of Constantine, the son of Michael VII., were set aside, and Alexius was proclaimed emperor by the whole army. The rebels then marched to attack Constantinople; but as the land wall is about four miles long, the besiegers were unable to occupy the whole extent with their lines, and Alexius contented himself with forming his camp on the elevated land which overlooks the Propontis and the city. Romanus IV. had constructed a country palace in this sterile and exposed position, which enjoys the advantage of a healthy summer climate and an abundant supply of water. The spot was called Aretas².

Alexius had no time to lose. Melissenos had already advanced to Damalis, and had opened negotiations for a partition of the empire both with Nicephorus III. and the rebels. The imperial ministers urged their master to conclude a treaty with Melissenos, and then fall on the camp of Alexius with an overwhelming force. Procrastination, however, again ruined the affairs of the old emperor. A careful examination of the fortifications of Constantinople, which did not then present its existing aspect of a dilapidated rampart and half-filled ditch, convinced Alexius that there was no hope of taking the place by storm, and that if he entered the city, he must do so by treachery. The most exposed portions of the wall were guarded by native troops and

¹ Anna Comnena (49) says that Borilas aspired at becoming emperor himself. Even if this be a calumny, it affords evidence of the utter want of Greek nationality among the Byzantine nobility, otherwise a Slavonian slave could not have been accused by an imperial princess of such an attempt.

² Anna Comn. 61. This seems to have been near the spot occupied by the kiosk of the sultan and the great barracks at Daoud Pasha.

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Varangian guards, whose fidelity was proof against seduction; but a tower in the Blachernian quarter, commanding the Charsian gate, had been intrusted to German mercenaries, whose leader, Gilpracht, was bribed to betray his charge. At night, George Palaeologos was admitted, and on a given signal the rebel troops took possession of the towers adjoining the gate, and defiled into the streets of Constantinople, which was treated as if it had been taken by storm. The army, which hardly recognised any acknowledged leader, dispersed in quest of plunder, and the rebel emperor and his principal partisans were left almost alone in the square called Tauros, exposed to the danger of falling into the hands of the old emperor, had he possessed courage enough to make a vigorous effort in his own defence. The party of Nicephorus III. was still in possession of the palace, which had been converted into a strong citadel by Nicephorus II.; while the Varangians and the Chomatian legion, who occupied the city from the forum of Constantine as far as the Milion, stood ranged in order, ready to attack the dispersed bands of the rebels. Alexius was striving to bring forward his best troops, and a battle seemed inevitable. The capital was on the eve of being destroyed by the conflagrations with which each party would cover their operations, when the activity of George Palaeologos, who made himself master of the fleet, and the weakness of the old emperor, who abandoned his army and fled to St. Sophia's, terminated the contest, and saved Constantinople from ruin. Nicephorus resigned his crown, and retired into a monastery. Alexius entered the imperial palace, and the rebel army commenced plundering every quarter of the city. Natives and mercenaries vied with one another in license and rapine. Shops, warehouses, palaces of nobles and houses of citizens were pillaged, and no class of society was safe from the lust and avarice of the soldiers, who had thrown off the restraints of discipline, and showed as little respect for the inmates of monasteries and convents as for the inhabitants of shops and palaces.

This sack of Constantinople by the Sclavonians, Bulgarians, and Greeks in the service of the families of Comnenus, Ducas, and Palaeologos, who crept treacherously into the city, was a fit prologue to its sufferings when it was stormed by the Crusaders in 1204. From this disgraceful conquest of

Constantinople by Alexius Comnenus, we must date the decay of its wealth and civic supremacy, both as a capital and a commercial city. It was henceforth unable to maintain the proud position among the cities of the earth which it had held from the time that Leo III. repulsed the Saracens from its walls. New Rome, like old Rome, was destined to receive its deepest wounds from the dagger of the parricide, not from the sword of the enemy. Even Zonaras, a Byzantine historian, who held high office under the son and grandson of Alexius, points out with just indignation the calamities which attended the establishment of the family of Comnenus on the imperial throne. The power which was thus established in rapine terminated about a century later in a bloody vengeance inflicted by an infuriated populace on the last emperor of the Comnenian family, Andronicus I¹. Constantinople was taken on the 1st of April 1081, and Alexius was crowned in St. Sophia's next day².

¹ Zonaras, ii. 295. Anna Comnena (64) confirms the account. Zonaras sums up the evils suffered by the inhabitants of Constantinople in these words: *Τοιαῦτα σφίσι τὰ προεισῦδια γέγονε, τοιαῦτα τὰ εἰς τὴν βασιλίδαν τῶν πόλεων εἰσιτηρία, τοιαῦτα τὰ τῆς βασιλείας ἐπιβατήρια.*

² Anna Comn. 64. The city was taken Thursday before Easter of the fourth indiction in the year 6589 of the Constantinopolitan aera.

CHAPTER II.

THE DYNASTY OF COMNENUS, A.D. 1081-1185.

SECT. I.—*The Reign of Alexius I.*, A.D. 1081-1118.

Character of Alexius.—His court and government.—Pretenders to the throne, rebellions and seditions.—Adulteration of the coinage.—Religious differences and heresies in the Eastern Empire.—Bogomilians.—The empire invaded by the Normans.—Defeat of Alexius by Robert Guiscard.—Bohemund evacuates the empire.—Wars with the Patzinaks in Europe.—With the Seljouk Turks in Asia.—The Crusades.—Disputes of Alexius with the Crusaders.—Recovery of Nicaea.—Conduct of Alexius after the conquest of Antioch.—War between Alexius and Bohemund.—Wars with the Turks.—Death of Alexius I.

No ordinary talents were required to enable Alexius Comnenus to keep possession of the throne he had suddenly ascended, to the disappointment of many earlier claimants¹. Surrounded by the families of dethroned emperors, by a warlike nobility, and an army accustomed to rebellion, his position required even greater aptitude as a diplomatist and administrator than ability as a commander-in-chief². That

¹ The life of Alexius, by his daughter, Anna Comnena, is the principal Greek source for the history of his reign; and it is of value, though almost every page is vitiated by pedantry and moral blindness. The biography of an absolute sovereign, written by a princess in a servile court or a secluded convent, must be in some measure a work of imagination; and yet, amidst the imperial prejudices and unsuspected misrepresentations of Anna, her revelations concerning the thoughts and feelings of the most civilized court in Christendom often unconsciously reflect truths she did not herself perceive. Other authorities are, Zonaras, ii. 295; Glycas, 332; and Ephraemius, 149. Among modern works, Wilken, *Rerum ab Alexio I., Joanne, Manuele et Alexio II., Comnenis gestarum libri quatuor*, deserves attention. For the Norman wars, Guilielmus Apuliensis, lib. 4; Gaufredus Malaterra, lib. 3; and Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, tom. vi. For the history of the Crusades, see Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*.

² Two dethroned emperors, Michael VII. and Nicephorus III., and four sons of emperors who had received the imperial title during the reigns of their fathers,

Alexius was a man of courage cannot be doubted, though, even as a soldier, he trusted more to cunning and deceit than to valour and tactics. There was also a mixture of vanity, presumption, and artifice in his character, which indicates that he was a lucky adventurer, indebted in a great measure to the worthlessness of his competitors for his signal success. His talents, indeed, were chiefly employed in balancing the personal interests of those around him, in neutralising the effect of their vices, and in turning the vicissitudes of public events to his individual advantage. The mind of Alexius presents us with a Greek type, which becomes predominant as we advance in Byzantine history. The Roman traits, which had given a firmer political character to its earlier annals, were fast fading away, and under the dynasty of Comnenus they disappeared. Alexius never framed any permanent line of policy for improving the national resources, or performing the duties incumbent on the imperial government; his conduct was directed by temporary contingencies and personal accidents; in short, he was a politician, not a statesman. He never aspired beyond the game of personal intrigue, and in that game he acted without principle, mistaking deceit for wisdom, as his daughter, who records his actions, candidly testifies. In her courtly ignorance of the value of common honesty she recounts many anecdotes, which filial affection enlightened by a sense of honour would have taught her to conceal¹. Personal courage in the field and low cunning in the cabinet present so incompatible a union in a great historical character,

were then living at Constantinople. These four were Constantine Ducas (Porphyrogenitus), the son of Constantine X.; Leo and Nicephorus Diogenes, sons of Romanus IV. and Eudocia (Anna Comnena proves they were crowned, 256); and Constantine Ducas, son of Michael VII., who was for some time the titular colleague of Alexius. There were also several rebel emperors who had worn the crown and the red boots for a time, like the Caesar John Ducas, Bryennius, Basilakes, and Melissenos. The three blind calenders, kings' sons, formed a small party compared with this congregation of emperors.

¹ The corruption of the Byzantine court and the lax morality of the Eastern church are embalmed in Anna's eulogy of her father, which conveys to our minds a worse impression of his character than the conduct of his contemporaries warrants our forming. See the capture of the pretended Diogenes (p. 278), and the trick by which the chief of the Bogomilians was entrapped into an acknowledgment of heretical opinions while at dinner with the emperor. A secretary was concealed to take down his words, and when accused, the heretic owned his opinions and suffered firmly at the stake. Even Anna's account makes the Bogomilian a noble enthusiast, and her father a mean traitor: p. 487.

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that we are apt to consider the combination an anomaly of Byzantine society; but an impartial examination of the authentic memoirs of modern courts would convince us that a candid biography of many brilliant sovereigns, written by a daughter who thought only of displaying her learning and eloquence, might afford curious revelations concerning the moral obtuseness of other courts and greater princes.

In weighing the vices of Alexius we must not overlook his merits. When he ascended the throne, the empire was in a state of anarchy and rebellion—its territories were invaded by the Patzinaks, the Turks, and the Normans—yet he succeeded in arresting its partition; and at a later period, when Europe poured into his dominions innumerable hosts of crusaders, whose military force set all direct opposition at defiance, his prudence and administrative knowledge carried the empire through that difficult crisis in safety. His admirers may truly say that, by activity, courage, and patience, he conducted the government through a period of the greatest difficulty, and, like Leo III., saved the empire on the very brink of ruin; but the historian must add, that he made no attempt to reorganize the administration according to the exigencies of a new state of society, nor did he seek to infuse new vigour and moral principles into the decayed institutions of his subjects. Now, it was by doing these things, more than by defeating the Saracens, that Leo III. merited the title of the saviour and second founder of the Eastern Empire. Whether Alexius could by any practicable reforms have arrested the progress of the social and political evils which were destroying the Byzantine power, and enabled it to prolong its existence, is not a question which history can solve.

While Alexius was placing the imperial crown on his head, his followers were transferring the wealth of the imperial city to their knapsacks. But as soon as his prize was secured, he felt that, in order to retain possession of it, he must repress the disorders of the troops and assuage the indignation of the people. The soldiers were bribed with the little money which the extravagant administration of Nicephorus III. had left in the public treasury, to return to their standards and submit to discipline. As it was impossible to make restitution to the plundered citizens, Alexius sought to appease the general

indignation by addressing himself to the religious prejudices of the people. The Greek church, unlike the Roman, has generally been the servile instrument of princes. The emperor was sure of obtaining its pardon, which he hoped would prove effectual in appeasing the indignation of the laity. Those who had not suffered would be edified by the emperor's piety, and those who had been plundered would no longer venture to complain loudly. Alexius openly accused himself as the unfortunate cause of the disorders committed by the army, loudly expressed his sincere repentance, and humbly implored the Patriarch and the synod to impose on him a penance to efface the stain of his sin. The Greek clergy considered that Heaven would be appeased by the emperor sleeping on the floor of his chamber with a stone for a pillow, by his wearing a hair-cloth shirt, and by his eating only dry bread and herbs, and drinking nothing but water, for a space of twenty days. To Alexius, who was young, hardy, and temperate, this punishment was not very terrific; and when he found that the pardon of Heaven could be so cheaply purchased, he availed himself of his knowledge, when in great want of money after his defeat by Robert Guiscard, to seize the wealth of the clergy. But the church, though it pardoned the plunder of laymen without restitution, would not rest satisfied with personal penance alone when the interests of the clergy suffered.

The Byzantine court operated so powerfully in accelerating the decline of the empire, and in preventing any reform in the government, that it is necessary to notice its constitution at the accession of Alexius. Under the Basilian dynasty, eunuchs and slaves acted as generals and ministers, and the public administration was conducted, as it generally is in the absolute monarchies of Asia, like a private estate. But Isaac I. was raised to the throne as the leader of the aristocracy, and Alexius occupied the same position. In the interval between their reigns, the resources and power of the central government had been much diminished, and the lavish distribution of honours and pensions with which Alexius was forced to reward his partisans, imposed a check on his own power and a heavy burden on the public revenues. In order to attach the family of Ducas to the existing state of things, the young Constantine, son of Michael VII., received

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the title of Emperor as the colleague of Alexius, and John Ducas quitted the monastic habit and resumed his rank as Caesar. The Emperor Alexius and the family of Comnenus occupied the great palace and the assemblage of apartments clustered round it, which had been fortified by Nicephorus II. (Phokas), and towered proudly over the port Boukoleon and the hippodrome; while the Empress Maria, the widow of two living husbands, who had been driven from the throne into the monastery, resided with her son, the titular Emperor Constantine, and the family of Ducas, in the palace called Mangana, on the lower ground, towards what is now the Scraglio Point. The traitor Nicephorus Melissenos laid down his arms as soon as he saw his brother-in-law Alexius firmly seated on the throne, and received the rank of Caesar. The title of Augustus, in its Greek form Sebastos, was conferred on several nobles; but to observe some discrimination in the distribution, it was divided into four gradations, *sebastos*, *protosebastos*, *panhypersebastos*, and *sebastokrator*¹. New titles were invented to gratify inferior partisans, and every title, by insuring to its possessor a pension, swelled the imperial civil list, increased the burdens of the people, and encroached on the resources applicable to the maintenance of the army, the navy, and the judicial establishment. The profits of a career of court favour eclipsed the highest rewards that could be gained in the honourable service of the state during the longest life. Attachment to the personal interests of the emperor was held to be more important than official experience and talent in administration.

Though the personal position of Alexius at the commencement of his reign was controlled by the influence of the leading members of the aristocracy, he soon delivered himself from this restraint, and assumed despotic power. The admirable central organization of the administrative power

¹ Constantine Ducas wore the imperial robes, signed the imperial decrees, and was named after Alexius in the public prayers. He was betrothed to Anna Comnena, but died before they were married. The Roman empire of Germany at a subsequent period contested the pre-eminence in titular absurdities with that of Constantinople. The title of *protosebastos* or *archaugustos*, with the pension annexed to the dignity, was conferred on the doges of Venice, Domenico Silvio and Vital Faliero; and the latter was made king of Dalmatia, the title on which the doges founded their right to the sovereignty of the Adriatic. Aboukassim, sultan of Nicaea, was created *sebastotatos*, or most august. Anna Comn. 161, 174.

enabled the emperor to suppress most attempts at provincial independence, and the political ideas and social habits of the people favoured the imperial authority as much as the mode of conducting public business. The emperor's power was still the only guarantee against anarchy; it was, consequently, still popular, though it was no longer under the legal restraint which a firm and systematic administration of the Roman law had long imposed on the arbitrary acts of its inferior agents. After the time of Alexius, the firmest support of despotism in the Byzantine empire was in the minds and habits of the Greek people, who from this period became the dominant race at Constantinople.

The government of the Roman empire, as we have had occasion to observe, exhibited during its decline a strong tendency to congeal society into fixed orders and separate castes or classes. This tyrannical system had nearly destroyed the state and exterminated the population, when a great effort of the people and a series of reforming princes in the Iconoclast period saved the empire and modified its institutions into their Byzantine type. The effects of time became again visible at the end of the eleventh century; but at this latter period the spirit of conservatism pervaded the whole mass of society, and each individual citizen clung to the practice of fixed forms and existing usages with a tenacity that rendered any reform more difficult. A persuasion that everything was so perfect that it ought to remain stationary, infused as much self-conceit into the minds of the people as it did presumption into the policy of the emperor. This attachment to a stationary condition of society was carried to such a degree that the relics of old formalities and ceremonious usages were considered the essential duties of life in civil and ecclesiastical affairs. In this way the Greek race voluntarily circumscribed its intellect and restrained its reasoning faculties at the very moment when the nations of western Europe were boldly entering on a career of progress. Nor are we to suppose that all means of introducing improvement was shut out in the Eastern Empire, had the throne been occupied by an emperor of enlarged views. The respect universally entertained for the Roman law ensured the support of popular opinion to every measure of judicial reform, and the whole frame of society was thus open to amelioration. But to enter

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on the path of law and equity would have compelled the emperor and the ruling classes to make great fiscal reforms, and the patriotism necessary to make any considerable sacrifice of personal interest was utterly wanting in every class of Byzantine society at this period.

The throne which Alexius gained by intrigue and daring was considered by others as a lawful prize, and no sovereign had to contend with so many rebels. His first rival was a Byzantine monk, who presented himself to Robert Guiscard in Italy as the dethroned emperor Michael VII. This deception could only have imposed on a willing mind, for the real Michael could be seen at Constantinople by hundreds who knew his person. Michael was so generally despised that, even had he cast off his episcopal robes and appeared in the Norman camp, he would have found few of his former subjects inclined to replace him on the throne he had forfeited. In the year 1084, while Alexius was busily engaged with the Norman war, several senators and officers of the army engaged in a conspiracy, which was discovered before the leaders had enlisted many followers. As it was a matter of policy to conceal the importance of the plot, Alexius was satisfied with the banishment of the wealthiest culprits and the confiscation of their estates¹. In 1091, Ariebes, an Armenian, and Constantine Humbertopoulos, who had assisted Alexius in mounting the throne, engaged in a conspiracy, and were treated in the same way². John Comnenos, governor of Dyrrachium, son of Isaac, the emperor's elder brother, and Theodore Gabras, who governed Trebizond almost as an independent prince, with his son Gregory, who subsequently married Maria, the emperor's second daughter, were also accused of treasonable projects. The Turkish pirate Tzachas, who had rendered himself master of Smyrna, Chios, Mitylene, Samos, and Rhodes, assumed the title of Emperor in the year 1092, and inflicted a sensible wound on the vanity of Alexius, by appearing constantly in public with all the ensigns peculiar to an emperor of the Romans. In the same

¹ Anna Comn. 157.

² Constantine Humbertopoulos is supposed to have been the son of Humbert, one of the brothers of Robert Guiscard, who dissatisfied with his share of the Norman conquests in Italy, entered the Byzantine service. Ducange, notes to Anna Comnena, p. 245, edit. Paris; p. 31 of notes in the Ven. edit.

year the fiscal oppression of the Byzantine administration produced revolts in Crete and Cyprus, where the leaders of the insurgents urged the inhabitants to render themselves independent; but Karykas, the Cretan leader, was abandoned by his followers, and put to death on the first appearance of the imperial fleet; while Rhapsomates, after a feeble resistance, was captured in Cyprus, and order was restored in both islands¹.

These troubles were followed by an extensive conspiracy among the members of the imperial family, in which the ex-empress Maria and Michael Taronites, a brother-in-law of Alexius, took part. If we credit the narrative of Anna, Nicephorus Diogenes, son of Romanus IV. and Eudocia, undertook to assassinate Alexius. Nicephorus and his brother Leo, who was killed in a battle with the Patzinaks, had been crowned in their infancy, but after their father's captivity they were deprived of the imperial title, and confined in a monastery by the Caesar John Ducas and Michael VII. Nicephorus was admired for his handsome athletic figure, popular manners, skill in warlike exercises, generosity, and courage, so that whenever he appeared in public he was received by the people with friendly salutations. Such popularity is dangerous in a despotic government, yet it is said that he first excited suspicion at court by an open violation of etiquette, and by two very awkward attempts to murder the emperor. Anna, indeed, represents his conduct as that of a person verging on insanity. He was at last arrested and put to the torture, which, it was said, compelled him to reveal his accomplices. He and Katakalon Kekaumenos, who had commanded under Alexius at the battle of Kalabrya, lost their eyes; the fortune of Michael Taronites was confiscated, but the ex-empress Maria who was said to have participated in his plots, being the mother of Alexius by adoption, escaped all punishment. After the loss of his eyes, Nicephorus Diogenes devoted his time to study, and made great progress in geometry by means of figures in relief which were prepared for his use. The fate of Nicephorus affected public opinion so powerfully that an impostor, who assumed the character of Constantine, the eldest son of Romanus by

¹ Anna Comn. 248; Zonaras, ii. 298; Glycas, 333.

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his first marriage, was generally welcomed. Though Constantine had been killed twenty years before at the battle of Antioch, in which Isaac Comnenus, the emperor's elder brother, had been taken prisoner, the impostor found credit with many persons of rank in the capital. Alexius, in alarm, banished him to Cherson, from whence he escaped to the Komans, whom he induced to invade the empire. The hostile army advanced as far as Adrianople, when Alexius was released from the fear of this dangerous rebel by a Byzantine officer, who decoyed him into an ambushade and took him prisoner. He was deprived of sight ¹ (A.D. 1094).

While the armies of the Crusaders threatened Constantinople, no one ventured to intrigue against the government of Alexius, who was generally considered the only man capable of directing the state. But in 1106, when affairs appeared more tranquil, new competitors again attempted to seize the throne. Salomon, a senator of great wealth, but a vain literary coxcomb, who affected the character of a philosopher, engaged in a plot with four brothers named Anemas, descendants of the Saracen emir of Crete who had been sent as a prisoner to Constantinople by the Emperor Nicephorus III ². The plot was discovered; the wealth of the philosophic Salomon and several of his accomplices was confiscated. The four brothers, whose Saracen descent was not forgotten, were conducted through the streets of Constantinople mounted on oxen, the hair of their heads and beards torn out with pitch plaster, crowned with horns, and decorated with entrails. After this, they were imprisoned in a tower near the palace of Blachern, which retained the name of the Tower of Anemas until the city was conquered by the Turks. About the same time Gregory Taronites, who had acted as an independent

¹ Compare Anna Comn. 196, 256, 271, and Niceph. Bryen. 66. Constantine Diogenes, the eldest son of Romanus IV., was married to Theodora, the sister of Alexius, and the battle of Antioch happened towards the end of the reign of Michael VII., when the eldest child of Romanus and Eudocia could not have been more than twelve years old; correct, therefore, Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 173. That Romanus had a son who was old enough at the time of his death to think of revenge, must be inferred from the words of William of Apulia, lib. ii. p. 115, in Carusius, *Bibliotheca Regni Siciliae*, tom. i. :—

Namque sibi socios Romani filius addens
Armenos, Persas, etc.

² Leo Diaconus, 153, edit. Bonn. Anemas, the son of Kurup the emir of Crete, rose to high rank in the Byzantine army, and was killed fighting valiantly in the Russian war. Zonaras, 301.

prince in the government of Trebizond, was brought prisoner to Constantinople by his cousin John, and imprisoned in the same tower¹.

The following year (1107) a new plot was formed to murder Alexius by Aaron, an illegitimate descendant of the Bulgarian prince assassinated by his brother Samuel, king of Achrida. The emperor was encamped near Thessalonica, but the presence of the empress and her attendants rendered the execution of the plot difficult. Libels and satires were placed in the imperial tent, in the hope that Irene would be induced to quit the encampment. A search for the author of these libels brought to light the whole plot, yet Aaron was only banished, in consequence of his connection with the royal line of Bulgaria, whose blood flowed in the veins of the empress².

We are inclined to give Alexius credit for extreme moderation, when we find him condemning those who are said to have been convicted of plotting his murder merely to imprisonment and banishment; but as he condemned heretics to be burned alive, we are compelled to suspect that the accusation of having plotted against his life was in many cases a charge added to the real crimes of the culprit, merely to increase the public indignation, and that Alexius knew the charge was without foundation, though his daughter Anna readily adopted every prejudice against those who had shown hostility to her father's authority and person. The want of all political principle among the courtiers, and of all attachment to the government among the people, are, however, proved incontestably by these numerous conspiracies.

The unpopularity of Alexius among the people was caused by the severity with which the public taxes were collected, by the injustice of the monopolies he created for the profit of the fisc and of members of the imperial family, and by the frauds he committed in adulterating the coinage. This mode of cheating his subjects was carried to a greater extent by Alexius than it had been by any of his predecessors, and is one of the strongest symptoms of the decline in the government of the Byzantine empire. A government which systematically commits such frauds is utterly demoralized; and a people which is so weak as to submit to such oppression, has

¹ Anna Comn. 364.

² *Ibid.* 377.

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sunk into a hopeless state of degradation. Alexius paid the public debts in his own debased coinage, but he enforced payment of the taxes, as long as it was possible, in the pure coinage of earlier emperors¹. The ruin produced by these measures at last compelled him to adopt new regulations for collecting the land-tax; and the credit of his coinage became so bad throughout all the countries in Europe in which Byzantine gold had previously circulated, that the emperor was compelled, in all his public acts with foreigners, to stipulate that he would make all his payments in the gold coins of his predecessors, which were called Michaelate from the prevalence of those coined by Michael IV. and VII. The decline of Byzantine commerce in the Mediterranean may be traced to these measures of Alexius, which ruined the credit of the Greek merchants, and transferred a large quantity of capital from the cities of the empire to the republics of Italy.

Ecclesiastical animosities and religious persecutions contributed their share to increase the disorders in the empire. Though Alexius was both superstitious and hypocritical, his necessities, after the Norman war, induced him to assemble a servile synod of Greek ecclesiastics, who authorized him to employ the wealth accumulated as offerings in the churches for the public service. But this act was violently opposed by many of the clergy, and Leo, bishop of Chalcedon, went so far as to maintain that the government had committed sacrilege in melting down sacred objects which were entitled to the adoration of Christians. Alexius took advantage of his imprudence in attributing more than orthodox importance to these objects; and his opinions being condemned by a synod as heretical, he was banished to Sozopolis, where, however, the people regarded him as a saint. The general indignation soon forced the emperor to yield to public opinion, and he published

¹ Zonaras, ii. 298; Glycas, 333. Some of his gold coins were almost entirely composed of copper, and he melted down many ancient works of art to supply his mint. A very curious tariff for the collection of the public taxes has been published in the *Analecta Graeca* of the Benedictines, Paris, 1688, 4to, p. 316. It indicates that much confusion had arisen during the reign of Alexius in collecting the tribute and the surcharges of taxes, but it does not explain how this arose, nor in what way it was connected with the adulteration of the coinage. In the treaty with Bohemund for the evacuation of the Byzantine territory, signed at Deavolis in 1108, Alexius was obliged to stipulate that his payments should be made in byzants of the coinage of Michael. Anna Comn. 328.

a golden bull ordering restitution to be made for all the sacred plate already employed for the public service, and declaring it to be sacrilege for any one in future to apply church plate to profane uses¹.

Soon after this Constantinople was troubled by disputes concerning the orthodoxy of a professor of philosophy named Italos, from the native country of his father. Italos succeeded Psellos as the chief of the philosophers, and his lectures on the Platonic philosophy gained him so much popularity and influence as a teacher that the clergy became jealous. They soon discovered a taint of heresy in his opinions, and the Patriarch Eustratios Garidas, who supported him, was deposed. Niko-laos the Grammarian was appointed Patriarch, and Italos was compelled to recant publicly in the church of St. Sophia (A.D. 1084)².

The heresy of Italos afforded some mental occupation for the people of the capital, but it was followed by a Paulician rebellion, which inflicted many evils on the inhabitants of Thrace. Various Asiatics, generally tainted with heretical opinions, had been established in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis from the time of Constantine V., and had long been remarkable for their industry, and the vigour they displayed in conducting their local affairs. Their moral education was excellent, though their religious opinions were deficient in Grecian orthodoxy. Their lands were well cultivated and bravely defended, and their commercial dealings extended over a great part of western Europe. After the conquest of the Paulician state of Tephrike by Basil I., numbers of that sect had established themselves in Thrace, where other Asiatic colonists united with them³. When Alexius marched against Robert Guiscard, two thousand eight hundred of these Paulicians joined his army as the military contingent they were bound to furnish; but having lost three hundred men in

¹ Leunclavius and Freher, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, i. 124. This bull is dated A.M. 6590, in the fifth indiction, A.D. 1082; but Le Beau (xv. 174) conjectures, with great probability, that it ought to bear date in 1084. See Anna Comn. 156.

² Compare Anna Comn. 143 and 273; and for the works of Italos, see Schoell, *Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur*, iii. 421, and *Notices et Extraits des MSS. de la Bibliothèque du Roi de France*, vol. ix. pt. ii. p. 149.

³ A considerable addition was made to the Paulician colony about Philippopolis by John I. (Zimiskes), who transported many settlers into Thrace from the Chaldean and Armeniac themes. Anna Comn. 451; Zonaras, ii. 305.

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the defeat at Dyrrachium, the remainder, instead of rallying in the imperial camp, returned home. After the conclusion of the war, Alexius determined to punish them for this desertion, and to destroy their communal system. He established the imperial head-quarters at Mosynopolis¹, where he summoned the principal men of the Paulicians to his presence. By separating them from one another he disarmed the whole. A judicial sentence was then promulgated, depriving them of their property; and their families were expelled from their houses with great cruelty. It happened that a Paulician, who had been baptized during the reign of Nicephorus III., and had attained the rank of domestikos, heard that his four sisters had been driven from their home². Eager to avenge the cause of his family and countrymen, he seized a fortress called Veliatova, and plundered the property of the orthodox Greeks and Bulgarians to the very walls of Philippopolis. In the year 1086 he effected a junction with a body of Patzinaks which had crossed the Danube, and extended his expeditions over all Thrace. Pakuvian, the grand domestikos of the West, and Branas, were sent to arrest his progress, but the Byzantine army was completely defeated, and both its generals were slain. After this the Patzinak war insured impunity to their Paulician allies for a considerable period; but Alexius, towards the end of his reign, found time to think of converting these heretics. Many were established in a new town called Alexiopolis or Neokastron. Some affected to be converted by the arguments of the emperor, but others persisted in their hereditary heresies.

Partly on account of the aversion entertained by the provincial population to the imperial government, whose fiscal severity became from age to age more burdensome, and partly on account of national antipathies, roused into activity by the arrogance which the Greeks displayed as soon as they could assume the position of a dominant race, a very general desire

¹ Mosynopolis was the ancient Maximianopolis in the province of Rhodepe, ninety miles distant from Philippopolis.

² This Paulician domestikos is only mentioned by Anna Comnena under his nickname of Traulos, the Stammerer, from which it would seem that he spoke Greek with some hesitation, or with a foreign accent. Her own father was called also by the same nickname, from a real defect in his speech, though probably slight; and when Basilakes broke into his tent in the night attack, he shouted, 'Where is the Stammerer?' Anna says he had only a difficulty in pronouncing 'r.' Compare pp. 19 and 157.

was felt by the inhabitants of Thrace and Bulgaria to emancipate themselves from the ecclesiastical power of the Greek church. This sentiment had long supplied the Paulicians with a perpetual influx of votaries, and enabled them to increase in numbers while the population of the provinces around them was sensibly diminishing. Other heresies also derived a portion of their success from this general feeling of opposition to the central authority of the church and state.

The original constitution of the Eastern Church had been well suited to prevent the formation of heresies based on national feelings, for it admitted the formation of a separate ecclesiastical establishment in each nation, while its central government, by general councils, rendered the subdivision of the hierarchy into a number of independent churches highly advantageous both to the cause of morals among the priesthood and of religion among the people. The power of emperors and popes put an end to this early constitution of the church. The emperor enslaved the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Patriarch enslaved those Christians who remained in communion with the Greek church. Still, wherever a nation was politically independent, it wished also to be so ecclesiastically. Men may unite voluntarily to receive the dogmas of a common religion, but they cannot accept a foreign ecclesiastical establishment without some feeling of hostility to the foreign priesthood which invades their independence. This feeling gained so great strength in Bulgaria, as to render the Bulgarian hierarchy at last independent of the priesthood at Constantinople. Though the king and people of Bulgaria had adopted all the rites and ceremonies of the Eastern Church, and rejected the solicitations of the popes to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome, they nevertheless seized the opportunity, when it presented itself, to constitute their own ecclesiastical establishment as a national church, under a patriarch entirely independent of the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This was probably effected in practice long before it received its official recognition from the Byzantine emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople. At length, however, the victorious army of Simeon, king of the Bulgarians, was enabled to dictate terms of peace to the Emperor Romanus I. in the year 923, and one of the stipulations of the treaty appears to have been that the emperor and

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the Byzantine church should publicly recognize the primacy of the Bulgarians as a patriarch equal in authority to the other patriarchs of the Eastern Church. In virtue of that treaty, the Patriarch of Constantinople was compelled to acknowledge the complete independence of the Bulgarian church, and to admit the Patriarch of Bulgaria to all the ecclesiastical honours and rank held by the patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem¹. It is true that the conquest of Bulgaria by John I. (Zimiskes) put an end to the national independence and the patriarchal dignity in about fifty years; but neither the Emperor John nor his successors could eradicate the feelings of hostility to the ecclesiastical domination of the Greeks, which had sunk deep into the hearts of the Bulgarian and Slavonian population.

It is to the influence of these national feelings, rather than to the mystical religious doctrines which the Paulicians had brought with them from the East, that we must ascribe the growth of the sect called Bogomilians. Their name is derived from the Slavonian language, and the sect had its origin among the Slavonian population of Thrace and Bulgaria². It is not necessary to trace the first principle of their dissent from the Byzantine church to intellectual speculations, tending to harmonize the Oriental doctrines concerning the existence of good and evil as two distinct powers in the universe with the Gospel dispensation; but, on the other hand, there can be

¹ Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 175. The imperfect list of archbishops given by Ducange proves that the recognition of the patriarchal dignity in the head of the Bulgarian church was one of the stipulations of the treaty. See above, vol. ii. p. 311. Le Quien, in his *Oriens Christianus*, quite overlooks this independent position of the Bulgarian church from A.D. 923 to 972. When Samuel founded the Bulgaro-Slavonic kingdom of Achrida, he invested the metropolitan of his capital with patriarchal authority in his dominions. Some remains of this jurisdiction, though mixed with other changes, have been perpetuated to the present day. Rycart (*The Present State of the Greek Church*, p. 89) mentions that in his time eighteen bishops were under the immediate authority of the metropolitan of Achrida. The Archbishop of Ternovo received the patriarchal dignity by treaty A.D. 1234.

² There are two derivations of the name. In the Slavonian language, *Bog* is *God*, and *milui*, *have mercy*, and the name is taken to signify those who seek the Divine mercy. Bogumil, which signifies one beloved by God, is, however, by some considered the true derivation. Our knowledge of the tenets of the Bogomilians is chiefly derived from the *Panoplia Dogmatica*, a work composed by Euthymius Zygabenus, under the patronage of Alexius, as a general refutation of heretical opinions. There is an edition of this work published in 1710 in Vallachia, and a new one, edited by Dr. Gieseler, 1842. Neander's *History of the Christian Religion and Church* (iv. 552) contains a full account of this sect.

no doubt that the Paulicians and Catharists, who derived their religious sentiments directly from Oriental sources, transmitted some of their mystical tenets to the Bogomilians. Among the mass of the Slavonians in the Byzantine empire, however, the origin of heresy was simply hatred of the Greek church on account of its simony, aversion to the Greek ecclesiastics on account of their corruption, and a craving for some purer religious instruction than was offered by an established church, in which religion was suffocated by mechanical forms and unmeaning ceremonies. This is proved clearly by the sympathies which the Bogomilians manifested for the memory as well as the doctrines of the Iconoclasts, and their hostility to the adoration of the Virgin and of saints. At the same time, there is convincing proof that they adopted some of their heretical opinions from the Paulician and Euchite teachers, who never ceased to preach the doctrines of an Oriental theosophy throughout Thrace and Bulgaria during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

The Bogomilian heresy was propagated among the Slavonian population for some time before it excited the attention of the church at Constantinople; but at last its followers became so numerous as to alarm the Byzantine clergy. When the Emperor Alexius was fully informed of the progress the sect was making, he readily joined the Patriarch in rousing the prejudices of the orthodox against the new heresy. His politic spirit felt the importance of forming a close alliance with the clergy on a question where the interests of the church were more directly involved than those of the state; and he was eager to avail himself of a favourable opportunity of awakening passions in the minds of the people which would tend to divert their attention from the political errors, fiscal abuses, and lavish expenditure of the imperial government. The Bogomilian teachers had, however, made so little public display of their opinions, that they were only discovered by means of spies; and perhaps they might have escaped all notice in the political history of the time, had the Emperor Alexius not engaged in personal discussions with Basilios their leader; a controversy which the imperial theologian terminated by committing his inflexible opponent to the flames as a heretic. The conduct of Alexius in the whole transaction fixes a deeper stain on his

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character than any mystical speculation could reflect on his adversary.

A Bogomilian who was put to the torture by the imperial officers revealed to them that a monk named Basilios was regarded as the leader of the sect, and that he had selected twelve teachers to act as his apostles. When Basilios was brought before the emperor, his demeanour was modest and respectful; his figure was good, but his thin beard gave his withered countenance the air of an ascetic more than of an enthusiast. His manners and conversation made the emperor look on him as a worthy antagonist. The Emperor Alexius, as his daughter informs us repeatedly, prided himself more on gaining his ends than on choosing honourable paths. He received Basilios with an appearance of frankness, and enticed him into a religious discussion, which afforded the imperial theologian an opportunity of displaying the political cunning with which he could deceive a heresiarch who had deceived thousands. The learned Anna boasts that her father knew how to rub sweets on the rim of the cup he induced his antagonist to swallow, and how, with a dose of flattery, he purged the Bogomilian monk of his heretical opinions¹. 'I am anxious,' said the imperial hypocrite, 'to hear the opinions of your reverence, and learn all the arguments by which you have laboured to correct the vain superstitions of our clergy.' Basilios at this invitation candidly explained his opinions. It was afterwards asserted that the ascetic was betrayed by his vanity to listen to imperial flattery, but it seems more probable that he was misled by enthusiasm, and expected to make Alexius a convert to truth. He knew but little of the emperor. Roused by his subject, however, Basilios fully explained all his objections to the established church, and revealed the full extent of his heretical opinions, while an imperial secretary, concealed behind a curtain, committed his words to writing. When the discussion was terminated, the emperor drew aside the curtain and showed Basilios that he had been speaking with the patriarch and the most bigoted members of the senate and clergy as his audience. His conviction and condemnation as a heretic before the patriarchal

¹ Anna Comn. 487. Tasso has made this metaphor more famous than the Byzantine princess.

tribunal of Nikolaos the Grammarian followed as a matter of course, and as he refused to renounce his opinions, he was condemned to be burned at the stake. This sentence was passed about the year 1110, but it was not carried into execution until the year 1118; for Anna mentions that it was one of the last, and, in her opinion, one of the most glorious acts of her father's life to burn the heretic¹. Every solicitation was employed to induce Basilios to retract, and own himself a convert to the imperial arguments, but all was vain; and the courageous demeanour of the heretic induced the people to believe that he expected angels to descend from heaven to release him from the stake. The clergy, however, pretended that he was tormented in his cell by demons, who stoned him during the night for revealing their secrets². He was burned in the hippodrome, and suffered with the firmness of the noblest martyrs. The spectacle of a fellow-creature committed to the flames was so agreeable to the populace of Constantinople, that they shouted to the emperor to bring out more heretics to be burned; but Alexius prudently cut short the tumult by dismissing the assembly. On another occasion, the emperor ordered two fires to be lighted in the tchukanisterion for the purpose of burning other Bogomilians; but some, having shown a disposition to recant, were immediately released, and the others who remained firm in their opinions were remanded to prison³.

It is necessary to notice an example of the superstition of Alexius, in order to show how completely his mind was ruled by the spirit of false devotion prevalent in his age and nation. As Alexius was riding with his elder brother Isaac, before he ascended the throne, a reverend old man in the garb of a priest approached and whispered in his ear the words of the

¹ The date of these transactions is proved by Anna. She mentions that Nikolaos was Patriarch when Basilios was entrapped and condemned, and that his execution was her father's *ὑστατον ἔργον καὶ ἀθλον*, pp. 488, 492, 495. The Patriarch Nikolaos died in the year 1111. Compare Zonaras, 300, and Cuper, *De Patriarchis Constant.* p. 131, sect. 776.

² Anna says that she had been assured of the fact by one of the guards (489).

³ It became the fashion of the Greek church to accuse every one who wished to reform any of its abuses, of holding the heretical opinions of the Bogomilians. The Patriarch Kosmas Attikos, a native of Aegina, was deposed by a synod in the reign of Manuel, A.D. 1147, for defending a monk condemned as a Bogomilian. Kosmas is represented by Niketas as a model of virtue; but he admits that he was very passionate, for he imprecated curses on all his opponents, and prayed that the empress might never give birth to an heir. Niketas, 53.

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Psalmist, 'Advance prosperously and reign, because of truth, meekness, and righteousness.' He then exclaimed, 'O Emperor Alexius!' and suddenly disappeared. Both brothers sought the strange priest in vain; and though Alexius pretended to consider the apparition as an illusion of the imagination, his daughter asserts that in his heart he was persuaded that he had received a direct revelation from St. John the Evangelist, the son of thunder¹. On a later occasion, he gave a curious instance of his confidence in a belief that God habitually revealed his will to mortals. In the year 1094, when the Komans invaded the empire to support the pretended Diogenes, Alexius, in the presence and with the participation of the Patriarch Nikolaos, consulted the will of Heaven by depositing on the high altar of St. Sophia's two rolls inscribed with the questions whether the Komans were to be attacked or not to be attacked. A priest, ignorant of the contents of the two rolls, was ordered to approach the altar, after the Patriarch had performed divine service, and take up one of the papers, which was unfolded, and its contents read to the emperor. The communication thus obtained appeared to him an oracle of God, commanding him to march against the enemy².

When the emperor was so completely under the guidance of superstition, it is not surprising that his conduct was extremely inconsistent. At times the suggestions of reason and true religion could not fail to overpower his fanatical fancies. We find him, accordingly, at times favouring popular preachers whose avowed theme was the eulogy of some beloved saint, and at times persecuting these orators because their doctrines were suspected of heretical or seditious tendencies. At times he tolerated, and at times he persecuted astrologers; for these impostors frequently made the imperial crown one of the prizes which futurity allowed them to distribute. An Athenian astrologer was allowed to sell his

¹ Anna Comn. 59. The leading men of the Eastern Empire were said to be frequently honoured by revelations, and a supernatural world of saints and apparitions pervades Byzantine history, as one of gods and goddesses mixed with the heroic age of Greece. This weak condition of the human intellect in the middle ages must never be lost sight of, though it is apt to be forgotten, as no poetry records the visits of the saints in Greek society. Shakespeare has made Macbeth's witches immortal, but the visions of Greece are dull, and its saints dead—

'Verse echoes not one beating of their hearts.'

² Anna Comn. 59, 273.

predictions to the Constantinopolitans unmolested, while an Alexandrian was banished for mixing too much truth in his predictions. A hermit named Nilos, who had gained great popularity as a public preacher, was accused of heresy, and the emperor was led by his inordinate vanity to engage in personal controversy with the enthusiast; but the monk foiled his theological skill, and defied his earthly power by expressing his readiness to suffer martyrdom for the truth¹.

One of the earliest acts of the reign of Alexius was to conclude a treaty of peace with the Seljouk emir Suleiman, who acted in Asia Minor as if he were completely independent of the Grand Sultan Malekshah. The treachery of Nicephorus Melissenos had placed Suleiman in possession of Nicaea, and the Turks occupied several posts on the shores of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. Alexius, who required the whole forces of the empire to resist the invasion of Robert Guiscard, was compelled to purchase peace at any price. Under such circumstances, it was only to be expected that the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople could be kept free from the Turks, and accordingly the boundaries of the Roman empire in Asia Minor were by this treaty reduced to very narrow limits. The territory comprised only a small strip of land immediately opposite the capital, extending from the mouth of the river Sangarius to the head of the gulf of Nicomedia, and the coast of the sea of Marmora, from the little stream called Drako, which falls into the gulf of Nicomedia, westward to the city of Prusa. Already the

¹ Professor Ross has published, from a copy made by a Greek teacher named Daniel, the charter under the golden seal or golden bull of the Emperor Alexius, granting the island of Patmos to the monk Christodoulos for the foundation of the monastery of St. John. This document contains a curious enumeration of the various fiscal exactions to which the subjects of the empire were liable. The date is A.D. 1088, for the Constantinopolitan era of the world counts only 5508 years before the birth of Christ—not, as Ross supposes, 5516. Ross, *Reisen auf den Griechischen Inseln des Aegäischen Meers*, ii. pp. 135, 179. The monarchy established by the three powers in Greece to represent European civilization might have rendered some service to the history of the Greek race by publishing the forty or fifty original golden bulls and grants which Ross mentions as existing at the monastery of Patmos in 1841. [The Emperor Alexius I. is the reputed founder of two monasteries on Mount Athos, Pantocratoros (the Almighty) and Cutlumusi. The name of Cutlumush occurs in the Byzantine annals as that of a Turkish commander in the service of Nicephorus Botaneiates (Scylitzes, 861; Zonaras, ii. 290). Alexius also rendered the Athos communities independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Gass, *De claustris in Monte Atho sitis*, p. 12). Ed.]

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mountains of the Turkish territory were visible from the palace of Alexius and the dome of St. Sophia; but the Crusades were destined to repel this first torrent of Turkish invasion from the shores of Europe for several centuries¹.

The spirit of enterprise which, under the guidance of religious enthusiasm, carried the bravest warriors of western Europe as Crusaders to the East, had, in the preceding generation, produced the conquest of England and southern Italy by the Normans. These conquests raised their military reputation and self-confidence to the highest pitch; and Robert Guiscard, who was lord of dominions in Italy far superior in wealth to the duchy of Normandy, hoped to eclipse the exploits of Duke William in England by conquering the Byzantine empire. But as he knew that he must expect a more prolonged resistance than England had offered to its conqueror, he sought a pretext for commencing the war which would conceal his own object, and induce a party to take up arms against the government he was anxious to overthrow. His daughter Helena had been betrothed to Constantine Dukas, the son of Michael VII., and was still so young that she was residing in the imperial palace at Constantinople, to receive her education, when Michael was dethroned. Nicephorus III. sent the child to a convent, and Robert stood forward as the champion of Michael's right to the throne from which he had been expelled. Under the cover of this pretext, the Norman expected to render himself master of Constantinople, or at all events to gain possession of the rich provinces on the eastern shore of the Adriatic.

The preparations of Robert Guiscard were far advanced when Alexius ascended the throne. To inflame the zeal of his troops, he persuaded Pope Gregory VII. that a Greek monk, who had assumed the character of Michael VII., was really the dethroned emperor, and thus induced the Pope to approve of his expedition, and to grant absolution to all the invaders of the Byzantine empire, as if they had been about to commence a holy war². The soldiers were impressed with a conviction of the justice of their cause at its outset, and

¹ Anna Comn. 96.

² Greg. VII. *Epist.* viii. 6, A.D. 1080. Anna (28) and Gaufredus Malaterra (iii. c. 13, in Carusius, i. 210) both agree concerning the imposture of the monk and the ambitious projects of Robert.

when the imposture of the Greek monk was generally known they were inflamed with hopes of plunder and glory.

In the month of June, 1081, Robert Guiscard sailed from Brindisi with a well-appointed fleet of a hundred and fifty ships, carrying an army of thirty thousand chosen troops. His first operation was to render himself master of the rich island of Corcyra (Corfu), which then yielded an annual revenue of fifteen hundred pounds' weight of gold to the Byzantine government. He then seized the ports of Butrinto, Avlona, and Kanino, on the mainland, and laid siege to the important city of Dyrrachium, the strongest fortress on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and the capital of Byzantine Illyria. It was fortunate for the empire that George Palaeologos, one of its bravest officers, had entered the place before Robert commenced the siege.

Alexius hastened to the relief of Dyrrachium with as large an army as it was in his power to assemble. He had vainly endeavoured to raise up obstacles to Robert's expedition, but he still hoped that the Emperor of Germany, Henry IV., would cause a serious diversion in his favour by attacking the Norman dominions in Italy. To induce the German emperor to do this, Alexius paid him a subsidy of 144,000 byzants, and sent him many valuable presents; but Henry was too deeply engaged in his contest with Pope Gregory to spare either time or troops to act against the Normans in southern Italy, and the Byzantine empire gained little by his alliance¹. The Venetians proved more valuable allies. Alexius summoned them to his assistance, reminding them that they were bound to aid the empire by the ties of their ancient allegiance; and he engaged to pay them for their

¹ Anna (94) gives an interesting letter from her father to Henry. The presents were a hundred blattia or pieces of purple silk, a gold cross set with pearls as an ornament for the neck, a gold box enclosing the relics of various saints, whose names were inscribed on the respective fragments, a vase of sardonyx, a bowl of crystal, a gold ornament containing a protective charm against thunder, and parcels of the richest essences. Two hundred and sixteen thousand nomismata were also promised to be paid as soon as Henry entered Lombardy, as the Byzantines called southern Italy. It is remarkable that Alexius mentions that the subsidy was paid in silver coin of the old Roman standard. This is a proof, among many others, that Byzantine silver was by no means rare in ancient times. Alexius could have found no difficulty in procuring gold, as it formed the standard currency of the Byzantine empire. It is probable that the Emperor Henry required the payment to be made in silver as being better suited to meet his military expenditure.

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services, to make good any losses of ships which they might sustain by the war, and to concede to them many valuable commercial privileges at Constantinople and in the principal cities of the empire¹. The interests of the Venetians bound them to the cause of the Byzantine government at this time. They were alarmed lest their lucrative trade with Greece and the Levant should be placed at the mercy of the rapacious Normans, in case Robert Guiscard should succeed in gaining possession of the entrance of the Adriatic. They plunged, therefore, into the war, without hesitation or reserve.

The Doge Dominic Sylvio sailed from Venice with a powerful fleet to attack the Normans before the Emperor, Alexius could collect his army and march to the relief of Dyrrachium. The Norman fleet, which was commanded by Bohemund, the illustrious son of Robert Guiscard, suffered a complete defeat, and the communications of the invading army with Italy were cut off. This difficulty only excited Robert to press the siege with additional vigour. He employed every device then known for the attack of towns. Towers of wood were prepared in frame: battering-rams were used to shake the walls, and balistas to sweep the defenders from their summits. But the fortifications of Dyrrachium were too solid to be seriously injured by the feeble machines the Normans had prepared. The immense blocks of stone that formed their foundations were the work of the ancient Greeks who first colonized Epidamnus, and the more modern superstructure, which was flanked at intervals by towers rising eleven feet above the curtain, was so broad that four horsemen could ride abreast on its summit².

The mode of attack generally most successful in that age consisted in filling up the ditch, and pushing forward a high wooden tower close to the walls. This structure moved on rollers, and was furnished with a drawbridge, which, reaching the rampart of the place, enabled the storming party to engage its defenders hand to hand. Robert at first attempted

¹ This treaty is dated 1082, and is cited in a charter of Manuel I. dated 1142. *Urkunden zur ältern Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levant*, by Tafel und Thomas, i. 113. Anna Comnena (161) refers this treaty to the war with Bohemund in 1108. She gives the conditions, which are very interesting, as they laid the foundations of the Venetian mercantile colonies which settled in the Byzantine empire.

² Anna Comn. 384.

to take Dyrrachium by escalade, and for that purpose brought up the usual battering machines as close as possible to the body of the place, but all his attacks were repulsed. Showers of stones broke his scaling ladders, and torrents of burning naphtha and Greek fire burned the tortoises and pavisses of the assailants, while Palaeologos, in several desperate sallies, destroyed the greater part of the battering-rams and balistas. The only hope of taking the place before the arrival of the emperor was at last centred on a mighty wooden tower which Robert Guiscard constructed from the timbers of his ships which the Venetians had rendered useless. This fabric, higher than the towers of Dyrrachium, was built out of reach of the flaming missiles of the besieged, and well protected against their sallies. The interior consisted of a broad staircase, to enable companies of armed men to mount in close order to the summit, whence a drawbridge hung suspended to fall on the ramparts of the enemy. When this tower was completed, an inclined plane and wooden tramway brought it close to the edge of the ditch with as much ease as a ship glides from the stocks into the sea. But Palaeologos and his engineers had watched the progress of the work with attention, and before the mighty tower was put in motion, a framework of masts and yards was constructed on the tower of the city against which it was directed. The appearance of a slender scaffold to resist their mighty tower only excited the contempt of the Normans, and the monster advanced slowly to the very edge of the ditch without any opposition from the besieged. Five hundred chosen men, in complete armour, were ready to rush on the drawbridge, and already crowded the staircase, when the order was suddenly given to halt. The long masts and yards on the city tower had already descended, and wedged the drawbridge firmly against the body of the structure, where it served as a door to enclose its occupants, and prevent them from making any use of their arms. At the same instant an immense quantity of combustible materials was projected from the walls, and the tower was in a short time enveloped in flames and smoke, while the whole attack was terminated by a vigorous sortie, which enabled Palaeologos to destroy its blazing relics.

In the middle of October, Alexius at last approached Dyrrachium. He had been joined on his march by Pakurian,

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the grand-domestikos, with the European troops stationed at Adrianople, and by Bodin, king of Servia, who brought an auxiliary force of active Sclavonian mountaineers to aid the heavy Byzantine infantry¹. The imperial army was composed of so great a variety of troops that the enumeration of its different corps and nations affords us interesting information concerning the military condition of the empire, just before it was visited by the great armies of the Crusaders. The legion of the guards, which usually did duty on the outer walls of the great palace at Constantinople, was commanded by Constantine Opos. The Macedonian legion, recruited in great part from the Sclavonian population of that province, was under the orders of Antiochos. The Thessalian, composed of Greeks, was commanded by Alexander Kavalilas. The contingent of Turkish troops, from a colony settled near Achrida, to overawe the Sclavonian population, and keep open the communication with the Adriatic by the Via Egnatia, was led by Tatikios, an active and able soldier, son of a Saracen who had been taken prisoner by John Comnenus, the emperor's father². The body-guard called Vestiarites was commanded by Panukometes; the Frank mercenaries by Constantine Humbertopulos, a nephew of Robert Guiscard; and the Varangians by Nampites. A corps of two thousand eight hundred Paulicians, from the colonies in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis, had also joined the imperial army, under their own leaders, Xantas and Kuleon. The military proceedings of Alexius, when he

¹ Pakurian, and Branas his lieutenant-general, were both Armenians. Chamich gives their names, Bakourian and Varaz. *History of Armenia*, ii. 166.

² Whether these Turks, as Anna calls them, were remains of the Persians established in the empire by Theophilus two hundred and fifty years before the time of Alexius, or more recent colonies of Uzes or other Turkish tribes which had invaded the empire from the north, cannot be determined with certainty. Compare Anna Comnena (109) with the note of Ducange, and Codinus, *De Officiis*, 66, and the note Βαρδαρίωται, 75. Tatikios was grand primikerios, or chief of the household. He was a great favourite of Alexius, with whom he had been educated. [Rambaud (*L'Empire Grec au dixième Siècle*, pp. 214, 215) determines that the original colony established by Theodosius was Turkish, and that Codinus' statement that they spoke Persian arose from the names of Persian and Turkish being used synonymously in his time. They were converted to Christianity in the ninth century, and from them proceeded the second colony which existed in the neighbourhood of Achrida. From the original settlers the Axios is supposed to have received its modern name of Vardar (Schafarik, *Slawische Alterthümer*, ii. 124). Pouqueville (iii. 74) states, though somewhat vaguely, that he found this colony still existing, and saw fragments of a translation of the Gospels in their language. Ed.]

reached the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium, were very injudicious. The position of the Normans was extremely dangerous, hemmed in on one side by the numerous army of the emperor, and exposed on the other to constant attacks on the part of an active garrison. Their foraging parties were daily destroyed by the Dalmatians and Albanians, so that, if Alexius had taken up a strong position, and thrown out his light troops all round the Norman camp, he would soon have destroyed their cavalry, and reduced them to capitulate¹. But envy was one of the most active agents in Byzantine society, and the emperor envied the military glory acquired by Palaeologos, and resolved to eclipse it.

The first measure of Alexius betrayed the meanness of his disposition. He ordered Palaeologos to quit Dyrrachium, in order that he might confer with him in the imperial camp, and he thus relieved Robert Guiscard from an active enemy in his rear on the day of battle. Then in opposition to the advice of all the most experienced officers in his army, he decided on risking a general engagement, though it was evident that this rash proceeding offered the enemy the only chance for safety that now remained. The battle which took place was as disgraceful to the Byzantine arms as to the emperor's judgment. Alexius commanded the centre in person; his brother-in-law, the Caesar Nicephorus Melissenos, who put the Turks in possession of Nicaea, commanded the right wing, and Pakurian the left. The Varangian guard, having quitted their horses in order to make a display of their valour, led the van on foot. For some time the attack of the Varangians on the Norman line, was completely successful, and one wing of Robert's army was broken. A part of the cavalry was forced back to the sea-shore, where the Venetians began to assail it from boats. But Robert regained the advantage by promptly bringing up a fresh division of his troops to attack the flank of the Varangians, who were compelled to retreat to a church in order to make a stand against the Norman cavalry. In the mean time, after a short engagement, the rest of the Byzantine army was broken and fled. Several nobles of the highest rank perished on the

¹ Anna (166) defends the conduct of her father, but she only proves his imprudence, by pointing out the importance of the Albanian population round Dyrrachium at this period.

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field, and the emperor himself was slightly wounded, and compelled to fly without a follower¹. The King of Servia remained an idle spectator of a battle which he probably considered as an act of imperial folly, and retired from the field as soon as his allies were defeated. The vanquished lost about six thousand men; but from the loss of the military chest and baggage, and the defective arrangements adopted by Alexius in his confidence of victory, many corps dispersed, and could never be brought back to their standards. The Paulicians, who had behaved with courage and lost three hundred men, finding that they had no hope either of plunder or pay, returned home, in spite of all the exertions of the emperor to detain them.

After the battle, Palaeologos found it impossible to enter Dyrrachium; but Alexius succeeded in transmitting orders to the garrison, appointing an Albanian general named Komiskorta governor of the place, and intrusting the custody of the citadel to the Venetians. In the month of February 1082, a Venetian, who guarded one of the towers, betrayed the city to Robert, who had previously put his army into winter-quarters at Glabinitzza and Joannina, in order to escape the severe cold of the winter farther north. Alexius collected the remains of the Byzantine army at Deavolis, and repaired himself to Thessalonica, where he passed the winter collecting a second army; which he was enabled to do, as he had replenished his military chest from the church plate of the richest cathedrals and monasteries in his dominions. The affairs of Italy, before the opening of the second campaign, fortunately compelled Robert Guiscard to quit Illyria, and leave his son Bohemund in command of the Norman army.

The progress of the Normans was arrested by the number of fortified towns in Illyria and Epirus, most of them the remains of Hellenic cities or Roman municipalities, whose strong walls secured them against any attack short of a regular siege. The whole summer of 1082 passed without any operation of importance, and Bohemund established his

¹ The emperor was pursued by the Normans as far as a steep ascent and dangerous pass called Kake Pleura, below which the river Charzanes flowed. Anna tells us her father performed prodigies of valour. He crossed the river, rested at another pass called Barbagora, and after wandering two days in the mountains, reached Achrida: p. 118.

army in its old winter-quarters at Joannina. In the spring of 1083, Alexius had collected an army so powerful that he again marched forward to attack the Normans. In order to break the terrible charge of their cavalry, which no Byzantine horse could resist, the emperor placed a number of chariots before his own troops, armed with barbed poles extending in front like a line of lances, and in these chariots he stationed a strong body of heavy-armed infantry. Bohemund, however, on reconnoitring this strange unwieldy defence, broke up his line of cavalry into two columns, and, leaving the centre of the Byzantine army with the chariots unassailed, fell with fury on the extremity of the two wings. The resistance was short, and the Emperor Alexius again fled with precipitation to Achrida, where Pakurian assembled the fugitives. Bohemund considered it of more importance to the success of his enterprise to render himself master of Arta, than to pursue the beaten army. While he was engaged besieging Arta, Alexius, before the end of autumn, collected troops sufficient to risk a third battle to relieve the besieged city; but he was again defeated by Bohemund, and, seeing his inability to contend with the young Norman in the field, he left Arta to its fate, and retired to Constantinople.

The Normans soon overran all Epirus, and invaded Macedonia, extending their incursions as far as Skopia; but they failed to reduce the citadel of Achrida, though they gained possession of the town. Bohemund, finding that he was unable to take Ostrovos and Berrhoea, could not venture to advance into the plain of Thessalonica, though he penetrated by Vodena as far as Moglena. He therefore turned southward and proceeded by Pelagonia and Kastoria into Thessaly, where, after making himself master of Tricala and Tziviskos, he laid siege to Larissa, in which he intended to establish his winter-quarters. This city, however, was defended by Leo Kephalas with great obstinacy; and Alexius, having procured a subsidiary force of seven thousand Turkish light cavalry from Suleiman, the Sultan of Nicaea, again took the field in the spring of 1084. After passing Mount Kellia, he quitted the high-road, and, diverging to his left, descended by the southern side of Ossa, having avoided the vale of Tempe. Passing Exeban, a Vallachian village near Andronia, he encamped at Plavitza, on the banks of a stream of the same

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name¹. From thence he advanced by the gardens of Delphina to Tricala, from which the Normans had retired. He there learned, by a letter from Leo Kephalas, that Larissa was reduced to the last extremity, and must surrender unless it received immediate succour. Alexius immediately formed his army into two divisions, and advanced to engage the Normans before Larissa. His preparation for a battle was on this occasion made with considerable skill. The principal division of his forces, with which he left the imperial standard, was ordered to engage the enemy with caution, and, after some fighting, to retire in order to the pass of Tempe, called then Lykostomion, or the Wolf's Mouth, where they would be protected by the nature of the ground from further pursuit. Alexius, with the other division, at the same time marched with a chosen body of men through the pass of Livatanino, and, avoiding Reveniko², took post at Allage, where he lay concealed until Bohemund should have pursued the other division of his army to a considerable distance. When his stratagem proved successful, he issued from his concealment, and stormed the Norman camp. This exploit was facilitated by a body of archers, who were instructed to direct their arrows against the horses of the Normans as they were forming to make a sally. The wounded horses became unmanageable, and the dismounted Normans, though terrible on horseback, were almost helpless on foot on account of the weight of their armour, and the inverted points of their boots, which impeded their motions. Bohemund, believing that he had again defeated the emperor, was boasting that he had driven him into the wolf's jaws, when a messenger arrived with the news that his camp was lost and Larissa relieved. He immediately galloped back with all his knights, but he found Alexius already so strongly entrenched in the camp that there was no hope of recovering it. Still the Byzantine army feared the

¹ This notice of the Vallachians, as composing a part of the population of Thessaly in the year 1084, is the earliest mention of their establishments in a district where they were soon after so numerous that the south-western parts of Thessaly received the name of Great Vallachia. Anna Comn. 137: Benjamin of Tudela, edit. Asher, i. 48.

² This Reveniko is evidently not the Rabenica mentioned by Benjamin of Tudela, as between Thebes and Zeitouni, which is the Ravenique where Henri de Valenciennes informs us that the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, Henry of Flanders, held his parliament. Rabenica, or Ravenique, must have been situated within a day's journey of Zeitouni. See Tafel, *Thessalonica*, p. 488.

Norman lance too much to venture on an engagement in the plain; but next day Bohemund, seeing that he was in danger of being cut off from his resources, retreated to Kastoria. As soon as the Norman army was cut off from plunder, and lost all hope of making further conquests, it began to display a mutinous spirit. Bohemund was forced to return to Italy, to obtain supplies of money and fresh troops, and Brienne, the constable of Apulia, who commanded in his absence, was compelled to surrender Kastoria to the Emperor Alexius, and engage not to bear arms against the Byzantine empire¹.

While Bohemund was carrying on the war against the Emperor of the East, Robert Guiscard drove the Emperor of the West out of Rome; and after vanquishing Henry IV., plundered the Eternal City like another Genseric. He was now ready to resume his schemes of ambition in the East. Collecting a powerful fleet to carry over his victorious army into Epirus, he defeated the combined fleets of the Byzantine empire and the Venetian republic in a great naval battle, and raised the siege of Corfu, which the allies had invested. According to Anna Comnena the united fleets lost in this engagement thirteen thousand men. But in the month of July 1085, Robert died in the island of Cephallenia, and with him perished all the Norman projects of conquest in the Byzantine empire. Dyrrachium was recovered by Alexius with the assistance of the Venetian and Amalfitan merchants established in the place. The services of the Venetians in this war were rewarded, as has been already noticed, by the concession of many commercial privileges; and the merchants of Amalfi were allowed to enjoy the same advantages, but were obliged to place themselves under Venetian protection, and pay dues to the Venetian corporation. The Venetians were so displeased with their doge, Domenico Silvio, to whose negligence they ascribed their defeat by the Normans, in a

¹ Nothing can prove the superiority of the Normans over the Byzantine Greeks more decidedly than the praise conferred by Anna on her brother-in-law Nicephorus Euphorbenus. She says, that when he appeared on horseback, brandishing his lance, and covering himself with his shield, he resembled a Norman, and not a Roman or Greek: p. 277.

Brienne was the son of Redon count of Penthievre, and grandson of Alan third Duke of Bretagne. He had served under William the Conqueror at the battle of Hastings, and after his capitulation in Macedonia, returned to Brittany. This family of Brienne had no connection with the Byzantine family Bryennios.

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naval battle, that he had been deposed, and Vital Faliero appointed doge in his stead. On Faliero the Emperor Alexius conferred the title of Protosebastos, to which he attached a considerable pension, and the title of the republic to the sovereignty of Dalmatia and Croatia was formally recognised. From this time the doge appears to have styled himself lord of the kingdoms of Dalmatia and Croatia¹.

It was fortunate for Alexius that neither the Patzinaks nor the Seljouk Turks availed themselves of his defeats during the Norman war to attack the empire. Their united efforts would, in all probability, have destroyed the Byzantine empire, and might have exterminated the Greek race. The dominions of the Patzinaks at this time extended along the northern bank of the Danube, from the Carpathian Mountains to the shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof. Over these extensive plains the nomade Patzinaks wandered as lords of the country, amidst a numerous fixed population of Slavonians and Vallachians. It seems at variance with our modern theories concerning the great superiority which civilization is supposed to confer in the arts of war and government, to find the Patzinaks carrying on the administration of their extensive dominions from a movable camp of waggons, and displaying a degree of military and political skill which rendered them for several generations formidable enemies to the Byzantine empire. But it requires no very profound knowledge of history to perceive that military superiority often exists distinct from social civilization, that literary cultivation affords no guarantee for national wisdom or courage, and that theological learning is no proof of individual virtue.

During the Norman war the Patzinaks were themselves attacked by a new horde of Komans. But when the tyranny of Alexius drove the Paulicians into rebellion, a union was formed between large bodies of Patzinaks and Komans, who invaded the empire under the guidance and with the assistance of the persecuted Paulicians. Their success in defeating the Byzantine army under the grand-domestikos Pakuvian has been already noticed². In the following spring, A.D.

¹ Anna Comn. 161; And. Dandolo, ix. c. 8, in Muratori, tom. xii.; Marin, *Storia civile e Politica del Commercio de' Veneziani*, ii. 211, 295; Lucius, *De Regno Dalmatiae*, lib. iii. c. ii. p. 111.

² See above, p. 65.

1087, a fresh army of eighty thousand men ravaged Thrace under the command of Tzelgu, but these invaders were at last defeated by Nikolaos Maurokatakalon, and their leader slain¹. The Byzantine army soon after proved again unfortunate; and in the following campaign the emperor, in order to recover the ground lost, crossed the range of Mount Haemus by the central pass called the Iron Gates, in opposition to the counsels of Nicephorus Bryennius, his blind rival, who, when he heard of the imprudent determination of Alexius, observed, 'Well! on the other side of the mountains it will soon appear who is best mounted².' The emperor pushed forward as far as Dorostylon, but was there met by the Patzinaks and completely defeated. The enemy made such good use of their victory that they pursued the imperial troops over Mount Haemus, and wintered in the valley of the Hebrus, about seven leagues from its mouth, in the neighbourhood of Kypsele and Taurokomon.

In the spring of the year 1089 the Patzinaks advanced to the vicinity of Constantinople, and the whole campaign was passed in a variety of movements, which led to no certain result except that the barbarians ravaged the country between Adrianople and the capital without sustaining any serious loss. The Princess Anna recounts an occurrence during this campaign which places in a strong light both the weakness of her father and the extreme difficulty of his position. A Patzinak chief named Neantzes, having deserted his countrymen, became a great favourite with the emperor³. But Alexius having laid a plan to surprise the Patzinak army by a sudden attack, a soldier discovered that Neantzes contrived to hold a parley with some of his countrymen, and from his knowledge of their language he was satisfied that the deserter was a double traitor. He immediately

¹ Anna Comnena (188) says that, besides Sauromates and Scythians, by which she means Patzinaks and Komans, there was a strong body of Dacians or Vallachians in this army, commanded by a leader named Solomon. Benjamin of Tudela remarks on the frequency of Jewish names among the Vallachians, i. 48. The Komans or Kumans are supposed to be the Polovtsi of Russian history.

² Anna Comn. 191.

³ Anna Comnena, when she recounts the treacherous conduct of Neantzes, forgets that she had praised the barbarians shortly before for not making a trade of treason like the Byzantine Greeks. She probably thought that Neantzes had always been faithful to his countrymen, and was a spy rather than a traitor. Compare p. 190, Οὐδὲ διπλοῖς ἐμερίσθησαν λογισμοῖς, κ.τ.λ., and pp. 210, 211.

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repaired to the emperor's tent and denounced Neantzes. The Patzinak was summoned to answer the charge, but as soon as his accuser had concluded his narrative, Neantzes drew his sabre, and before any one could interpose, he slew his accuser in the emperor's presence. Yet, either from timidity or suspicion, the emperor overlooked this insolent act of rebellion; nay, he had even the baseness to attempt to conceal his natural indignation, by making Neantzes a present of one of his own horses. The Patzinak, who knew well that his conduct was unpardonable, used the emperor's horse to make his escape to his countrymen¹.

Though Alexius could gain no advantage of any importance over the Patzinaks in the field of battle, and was forced to leave all Bulgaria and the greater part of Thrace exposed to their devastations, he nevertheless contrived to destroy considerable numbers of their cavalry in different skirmishes, and his daughter loudly celebrates these partial successes. On one occasion he was besieged at Tzurulos. A rapid but smooth slope lay before the town like a long glacis. Along the top of this slope the emperor ranged all the wheels of his baggage-waggons attached to their axles, and when the Patzinak cavalry had charged half way up the slope, to capture the baggage, the wheels of the waggons were let loose to run down on them. When the Patzinaks broke their ranks to escape this new mode of attack, the Byzantine troops sallied out of the place and inflicted on them a serious loss². By such exploits the emperor could not have expected to destroy the invading army and the Patzinaks who maintained their ground in the empire and wintered at Bulgarophygia and Nizitza.

In the spring of the year 1090 the emperor took up his position at Choïrobacches, and the Patzinaks encamped before the place. They were so strong that they were able to detach a body of six thousand cavalry to plunder the country within ten miles of Constantinople; but their confidence inspired neglect, and the emperor seized an opportunity to surprise their camp before Choïrobacches, and put a considerable number of their troops to the sword. He then disguised his own cavalry by making use of the standards

¹ Anna Comn. 212.² Anna Comn. 215.

of the Patzinaks, and in this way he destroyed many of their troops who were returning from plundering in the vicinity of Constantinople. But the enemy's force was not broken by this victory, and their innumerable light horse continued to ravage every corner of Thrace. The inordinate vanity of Alexius, nevertheless, induced him to celebrate this trifling advantage (though it was insufficient to protect the country round his capital from hostile attacks) by a triumphal procession back to Constantinople. The advanced guard of his army wore for the occasion the dress and carried the arms of Patzinaks, as if the emperor was prouder of his own stratagems than of the valour of his army. The prisoners followed, each led by a peasant; then came a body of soldiers, bearing aloft the heads of the slain on their lances; and after this display, the emperor, surrounded by his household and usual body-guard, with the imperial standards, and followed by the trophies of his success. The pageant excited the spleen of Nicephorus Melissenos, who characterized his brother-in-law's vanity with more justice than his brother-in-law had treated his treason. Melissenos sneered at the emperor's victory, as bringing joy to the empire without gain, and grief to the Patzinaks without loss¹.

Alexius, however, at last succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Komans, by which these barbarians engaged to send a large army to co-operate with him in Thrace. In order to prepare for a great effort, Nicephorus Melissenos was sent to assemble the armed peasants of Thrace and Macedonia called Vlachs, and join the regular forces of the empire, which the emperor conducted in person to Enos. The imperial army was there increased by the arrival of the Komans, who were about forty thousand strong; and the Patzinaks, who had concentrated all their troops, found themselves hemmed in between two hostile armies. A great battle was fought at a place called Lebounion, in which the barbarians, who had so long ravaged Thrace, were completely defeated on Tuesday the 29th of April 1091². The number of prisoners who were

¹ Anna Comn. 225.

² The chronology of the Patzinak war has some difficulties, as Anna Comnena is too rhetorical to be very precise in dates; but as Tuesday was really the 29th of April in the year 1091, there seems no doubt the battle was fought in that year. Anna Comn. 233. Wilken (*Rerum ab Alexio I., Joanne, Manuele et Alexio II.*,

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captured by the Byzantine troops was so great that fear induced the soldiers to put many to death during the night after the battle. The remainder, with the families captured in their camp, were established as colonists at Moglena, where they long continued to supply recruits to the imperial armies¹. The Komans, distrusting the treachery of Alexius, hastened to regain their own seats beyond the Danube, with the booty and prisoners they had secured. A few who remained behind were rewarded by Alexius with additional presents, to secure the goodwill of their nation².

The wars carried on by Alexius with Bodin king of Servia, and Balcan prince of Dalmatia and Rascia, though they occupied a considerable force at different times, exerted too little influence on the general condition of the Byzantine empire to be noticed in detail.

On the other hand, the fortunes of the Seljouk Turks influenced the course of European history. We have already seen that their conquests in Asia Minor were facilitated by two causes—by the destruction of the Christian population and the treachery of the Byzantine aristocracy. Their incessant plundering incursions systematically exterminated the agricultural classes who dwelt beyond the immediate protection of fortified towns; while the disgraceful cessions of territory they obtained from emperors and rebel chiefs yielded them the possession of as many provinces as they conquered. History records few periods in which so large a portion of the human race was in so short a period reduced from an industrious and flourishing condition to helplessness and poverty. Yet the details of this great catastrophe are almost utterly neglected by the Byzantine historians, though its causes can be directly traced to the proceedings of the

gestarum libri quatuor, p. 268) places it in 1088, and differs in his whole chronology of the war from the received reckoning.

The Vlachs mentioned by Anna Comnena may have been nomade shepherds, for the word even then may have been used as at present in this sense, without any intention to indicate the Vallachian race. Anna Comn. 226. The Bulgarian peasantry were armed by Alexius with helmets of silk. Anna Comn. 231. [The name Vlachs first occurs in the reign of Basil II., when a Bulgarian chieftain, named David, was murdered by persons of that race (Cedrenus, ii. p. 435): see Roesler, *Römänische Studien*, p. 107. We next hear of them in 1027, when they are mentioned by Lupus Protospatha as serving in the Byzantine army, which was then sent out to conquer Sicily. Thunmann, *Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der östlichen europäischen Völker*, p. 351. Ed.]

¹ Zonaras mentions this Patzinak colony, ii. 299.

² Anna Comn. 235.

imperial administration and the conduct of the leading members of the aristocracy. Family prejudice and courtly blindness concealed from the minds of the Prince Nicephorus Bryennius and his spouse, the Princess Anna, the decline of human society which was the work of their own relations; and national prejudices, combined with political servility, rendered other Byzantine writers more anxious to conciliate patrons by liberal eulogies than to trace the causes of the calamities they witnessed by a searching investigation of the truth.

It has been already noticed that the defeat of the Emperor Romanus IV. by Alp Arslan left all Asia Minor exposed to the ravages of the Seljouks, who even then pushed their plundering incursions as far as Nicaea and Nicomedia. Shortly after, Suleiman, the son of Koutoulmish, was intrusted with a subordinate sovereignty in Asia Minor by the Grand Sultan Malekshah, and became the founder of the Seljouk sultanat of Roum. The dominion of Suleiman over the greater part of Asia Minor was recognised by a treaty with the Byzantine empire in 1074, when Michael VII. purchased the assistance of a Turkish auxiliary force to suppress the rebellion of Oursel and his own uncle John Dukas. Nicephorus III. ratified the treaty concluded with Michael VII., augmented the power of the Turks, and abandoned additional numbers of Christians to their domination, to gain their aid in dethroning his lawful prince; and Nicephorus Melissenos, when he rebelled against Nicephorus III., repeated a similar treason against the traitor, and, in hopes of gaining possession of Constantinople, yielded up the possession of Nicaea to Suleiman, which that chief immediately made the capital of his dominions. It must not be forgotten that the hatred which a considerable portion of the Christian population bore to the Byzantine government, on account of the oppressive nature of its financial administration, and to the Greek church on account of its rapacity, simony, and cruelty, greatly facilitated the consolidation of the Seljouk power. The overthrow of the Iconoclasts and the destruction of the Paulicians were victories of the Greek race and church over the native Asiatics, which were neither forgotten nor forgiven. The strict centralization of power under the emperors of the Basilian family, also accelerated the disunion in a population destitute of

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homogeneous elements, by leaving the native population solely dependent on foreign governors for defence, protection, and justice. Thus, by too strict a centralization of the executive power, the ordinary duties of government were often neglected in distant provinces, and the people began to desire the establishment of a more powerful local administration. This desire had produced a tendency towards the formation of several independent principalities in Asia Minor even before the conquests of the Seljouks; and one of the states which had its origin shortly after the defeat of Romanus IV., the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, long defied the Turkish power. In the time of John I. (Zimiskes), individual nobles possessed enormous estates, which were chiefly devoted to pasturage, and the diminution of the Christian population had commenced from internal causes of decay in the Byzantine empire before the Seljouk invasions¹. The nomade Turks consequently, partly on account of this want of inhabitants, and partly on account of the void created by their own devastations, colonized the country to a wonderful extent, and in the course of a single generation formed the majority of the inhabitants of Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Galatia. And in this rapid colonization of the country by the Turks, we must seek for the explanation of the obstinate and effectual resistance which these countries were able to offer to the Crusaders, though they had been so recently conquered by the Moham-medans. The Turks in Asia Minor acted a part not unlike that which the Goths had acted in the history of the Western Empire, but a radical difference of race, language, habits, and religion between the Turanian and Aryan nations seems to have prevented the same assimilation of the invaders with the older inhabitants of the country, and their separation still continues after nearly eight centuries of constant communication in many provinces and cities, and long subjection to the same governments.

When Alexius ascended the throne, the Seljouk conquests in Asia Minor were still considered as a portion of the

¹ Compare the preceding volume, p. 306. This system of *latifundia*, the over-accumulation of landed property in the hands of a few individuals who acquire a monopoly in the productions of the soil, is one of the political as well as social evils which arise from an undue preponderance of capital over labour, and it proves that free labour is quite as necessary to the prosperity of a state as free trade.

dominions of the Grand Sultan Malekshah, the son of Alp Arslan, and Suleiman, the sultan of Nicaea, was only his lieutenant, though as a member of the house of Seljouk, and as cousin of Malekshah, he was honoured with the title of Sultan¹. The prominent position which his posterity occupied in the wars of the Crusaders, their long relations with the Byzantine empire, and the independent position they held as sultans of Iconium, have secured to them a far more lasting place in history than has been obtained by the superior but less durable dynasty of the grand sultans. But at the commencement of the Seljouk domination in Asia Minor, there were other emirs who commanded extensive provinces in Asia Minor with as much independence as Suleiman. Of these, Elchan, who possessed Cyzikus; Tzachas, who acted the pirate at Smyrna; and Charatike, who seized Sinope, are particularly mentioned; while Artuk and Tutak are recorded as having held the command of large armies for particular objects. Toutoush, the brother of Malekshah, who acted as governor at Damascus, became the founder of the third, or Syrian dynasty of Seljouk sultans².

The treaty by which the river Drako was declared the boundary between the dominions of Alexius and Suleiman has been mentioned, and the assistance which the Turkish cavalry afforded to the Byzantine empire in the war with the Normans. But as no limits were placed to the progress of Suleiman towards the south, he did not consider himself bound to refrain from the conquest of Antioch, though that city still nominally formed part of the Byzantine empire. Philaretos the Armenian, who commanded under Romanus IV. at the unfortunate battle of Manzikert, after passing through many vicissitudes, still governed Antioch, which he held rather as an independent prince than as an officer of the imperial government; but, like most of the Christian princes who continued to keep possession of cities and districts surrounded by the Turkish conquests, he acknowledged allegiance to the Emperor

¹ Anna Comnena (169) mentions the dependence of Suleiman on Malekshah, and that his sons were retained as hostages at the court of the grand sultan: p. 180.

² The sources of Seljouk history are few, scanty, and discordant. The Byzantine writers require to be compared with Oriental authorities, which are neither numerous nor authentic. Wilken (c. 11. p. 224) has given a clear review of the authorities; and Hammer, De Guignes, and d'Herbelot supply additional facts.

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of Constantinople. When, however, he was informed of the successful termination of the Norman war, he feared that Alexius would be able to deprive him of his power in Antioch; and to secure his position, he resolved to embrace the Mohammedan faith, and maintain his independence by means of Turkish mercenary troops. His son, pretending that he wished to prevent his father's apostasy, by rendering it unavailing, fled to Suleiman at Nicaea, and offered to put that prince in possession of Antioch. Suleiman hastened to Antioch, and, arriving unexpectedly, rendered himself master of the city under the guidance of the treacherous son of Philaretos. This conquest involved Suleiman in war with the Emir of Aleppo and with Toutoush, the brother of Malekshah, by whom he was completely defeated in the neighbourhood of Aleppo; and it is said that, to avoid falling into the hands of his enemies, he committed suicide, which is a strong proof that the manners of the Seljouk Turks were not yet completely disciplined to the principles of the Koran (A.D. 1086¹).

This civil war between two of his near relations and most powerful officers drew the attention of Malekshah to the affairs of Asia Minor. Aboukassim, who had been intrusted by Suleiman with the direction of the administration at Nicaea when he departed on his expedition to Antioch, attempted to maintain himself in a state of independence. Malekshah, in order to secure the assistance, or rather the neutrality, of the Byzantine empire while he reduced his rebellious vassals to order, concluded a treaty with Alexius, by which the empire recovered several maritime cities from the Turks. But whatever engagements Alexius entered into with Malekshah, he showed himself always ready to treat with Aboukassim, if by so doing he could gain some immediate advantage; and, according to the testimony of his daughter, he obtained possession of Sinope by cheating the grand sultan, and of Nicomedia by a fraudulent violation of

¹ Anna Comn. 169; Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, tr. Hellert, i. 28. Suicide has always been rarer among the Mohammedans than among the Christians. The law of Christ, being more spiritual than that of Mohammed, has received less implicit obedience from the bulk of its votaries, whose social civilization has not yet been elevated to its doctrines. The Greek and Roman churches attempted to correct what they seem to have imagined was a deficiency, by introducing a good deal of material devotion.

the hospitality he had offered to Aboulkassim¹. He, however, conferred on that Mussulman the rank of Sebastotatos; and when Nicaea was besieged by the troops of Malekshah, he sent a Byzantine corps under Tatikios to aid in its defence, but with secret orders to gain possession of the place for himself should the treachery appear practicable. Aboulkassim, at last, finding that his own resources were insufficient to maintain his independence, preferred throwing himself on the generosity of Malekshah to intrusting his fortunes to the aid of so faithless an ally as Alexius proved to all persons and on all occasions. He was soon after slain by his enemies, and his brother Pulchas was compelled to surrender Nicaea to Kilidji-Arslan, the son of Suleiman (A.D. 1092).

The Turkish chief who attacked the empire with the greatest energy during the reign of Alexius was Tzachas, the emir of Smyrna. He had been a prisoner at Constantinople during the reign of Nicephorus III., and by entering the Byzantine service had gained the rank of proto-nobilissimus. When Alexius mounted the throne, and the imperial patronage was monopolized by the native aristocracy, Tzachas, seeing he had nothing more to hope from the Byzantine government, assembled a fleet of forty decked vessels, called *agraria*, and by a series of bold and successful enterprises rendered himself master of Clazomenae, Phocaea, Chios, Samos, and several smaller islands. His power increased so steadily that in the year 1090 he defeated the Byzantine fleet under the command of Niketas Kastamonites. For two years he carried on war with the naval forces of Alexius; and having made Smyrna the capital of his dominions in the year 1092, he assumed the title of Emperor, adopting all the insignia of the imperial rank used by the sovereigns of Constantinople, and by so doing inflicted a deeper wound on the heart of Alexius than it received from any loss of territory². Though

¹ Anna Comnena, who delights in recounting the diplomatic tricks of her father, compares him with Alcibiades, whom she confounds with Themistocles. Aboulkassim was induced to visit Alexius for the purpose of arranging a treaty of alliance against Malekshah. Compare Anna Comn. p. 174, and Thucydides, i. 90.

² Anna Comnena (250) speaks of the fleet of Tzachas as composed of dromons, biremes, and triremes; but these classic appellations give us no accurate idea of the vessels in use at this period. It is very doubtful if any were constructed with more than two tiers of oars; but, on the other hand, sails were better constructed, and more generally used in ships of war than in ancient times.

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Tzachas was at length defeated by John Dukas, the brother of the empress, and lost Samos and several other islands, he was still strong enough to besiege Abydos in the year 1093. But Alexius succeeded in inspiring Kilidji-Arslan, who had married Tzachas' daughter, with distrust of his father-in-law; and if we believe Anna, the Sultan of Nicaea was induced by the calumnies of the emperor to assassinate Tzachas with his own hand at a festival. This crime strengthened the alliance between the suborner and the murderer. But many of the Seljouk tribes beyond the Sangarius were sufficiently independent to pay little attention to the treaties of Kilidji-Arslan, and frequently infested the territories of the empire by their incursions. To protect the neighbourhood of Nicomedia, which was now the frontier city of the diminished empire, Alexius cleared out an ancient canal between the lake of Sophon and the gulf of Astacus, which was said to have been originally constructed by the Emperor Anastasius as a defence to the Asiatic territory in the immediate vicinity of his capital, when he fortified its contiguous district in Europe by constructing the great Thracian wall from the Euxine to the Propontis¹. Alexius erected also a fortress called the Iron Tower, in which he placed a garrison to defend the canal. The lake and the lower course of the river Sangarius required only a few guards to serve as an effectual barrier against the plundering incursions of the Turkish nomades. About the time this work was completed, reports reached Constantinople of the great preparations which the western nations of Europe were making to deliver Jerusalem from the Turks. Alexius was not without alarm at the multitudes which threatened to enter his dominions; but he hoped that the aid of the Franks would enable the Byzantine empire to recover some portion of its ancient power and dominion in the East.

The influence of the Crusades on the progress of European civilization, and the change they produced in the relative

¹ Anna Comnena (282) calls the lake Vaanes; the present Turkish name is Sabanja. Remains of the canal are still visible. Ainsworth's *Travels in Asia Minor*, i. 26. There is an interesting letter of Pliny to Trajan, proposing the construction of this canal, which had been commenced by one of the Bithynian kings. Lib. x. ep. 50. The traces of the great wall of Anastasius in Europe have almost entirely disappeared. Evagrius says it was at the distance of two hundred and eighty stades from Constantinople, and extended four hundred and twenty stades from sea to sea. *Hist. Eccles.* lib. iii. c. 38.

condition of the governments and people in the western nations, offers too wide a field even for cursory notice, in a work which confines its investigations strictly to the political history of the Byzantine empire. I must, therefore, confine my observations on the Crusades to their effects on the government of Constantinople, and on the condition of the Greek Christians. These effects were very different from those which they produced on the Latin nations. In the West, we can trace the germs of much social improvement to the immediate results of the Crusades; but in the East, during the whole period of their continuance, they were an unmitigated evil to the great body of the Christian population. For a time, religious feelings induced the leaders to behave to the Byzantine empire with some respect, as it was a Christian state; but when ambition and fashion, rather than religious feeling, led men to engage in the holy wars, the Eastern Christians suffered more from the Crusaders than the Mohammedans. It is our task, therefore, to view the Crusades chiefly as the irruption of undisciplined armies seeking to conquer foreign lands, and to retain possession of their conquests by military power; and in this light these celebrated expeditions effected so little in comparison with the forces they brought into the field and with the military pretensions of their leaders, and the government of their Eastern conquests was so ruinous and unjust, that the character of the Western Europeans was for many ages regarded by the Eastern Christians with feelings of contempt and hatred.

Like all the great movements of mankind, the Crusades must be traced to the coincidence of many causes which influenced men of various nations and discordant feelings, at the same period of time, to pursue one common end with their whole heart. Pilgrimages to Jerusalem, which from being felt as a duty became at last a fashion, and commercial relations, which a great and recent progress in society converted into a necessity, suddenly received a check from the Turkish conquerors of Palestine at a period when social changes in western Europe placed new obstacles in the way of national emigrations and conquests, like those of the Danes and Normans. The impulse to great enterprises was still active, and foreign employment could alone avert internal

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revolutions. Thousands of warriors (and in that age, even the merchant, the artisan, and the priest bore arms) were fretting in forced inaction, and ready to rush into any enterprise that offered a field of conquest, when religious zeal suddenly concentrated every impulse in a desire to deliver the tomb of Christ from the hands of infidels who slew pilgrims and plundered merchants. Unity of action was created as if by a divine impulse. The movement was facilitated by the circumstance that Europe began to adopt habits of order just at the time when Asia was thrown into a state of anarchy.

Great numbers of pilgrims had always passed through the Byzantine empire to visit the holy places in Palestine. We still possess an itinerary of the road from Bordeaux to Jerusalem, written in the fourth century for the use of pilgrims¹. Though the disturbed and impoverished state of Europe, after the fall of the Western Empire, diminished the number of pilgrims, even in times of the greatest anarchy, many passed annually through the Eastern Empire to Palestine². The improvement which dawned on the western nations during the eleventh century, and the augmented commerce of the Italians, gave additional importance to the pilgrimage to the East. About the year 1064, during the reign of Constantine X., an army or caravan of seven thousand pilgrims passed through Constantinople, led by the Archbishop of Mentz and four bishops. They made their way through Asia Minor, which was then under the Byzantine government; but in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem they were attacked by the Bedouins, and only saved from destruction by the Saracen emir of Ramla, who hastened to their assistance. These pilgrims are reported to have lost three thousand of their number, without being able to visit either the Jordan or the Dead Sea³. The invasions of the Seljouks increased

¹ Printed in *Vetera Romanorum Itineraria*, by Wesseling, Amsterdam 1735, quarto; in the third volume of Chateaubriand's *Voyage à Jérusalem*; and *Itinerarium Antonini Augusti et Hierosolymitanum*, ex libris MSS., edit. G. Parthey et M. Pinder, Berlin.

² Various pilgrimages during this period are mentioned by Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, vol. i., 'Pièces Justificatives,' No. iv.

³ Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, i. 67, who refers to *Annalium Baronii Epitome*, pars ii. c. 5. p. 432. The Russians also visited Jerusalem as pilgrims in the eleventh century. Karamsin, *Histoire de la Russie*, trad par St. Thomas et Jauffret, ii. 185.

the disorders in Palestine. The prosperity of the pilgrims suffered as well as their piety. The Easter fair of Jerusalem was of importance to most European nations. Genoese and Pisan fleets traded to Palestine before the Crusades, and the merchants of Amalfi had already founded that glorious hospital of St. John, whose servants became a bulwark of Christianity in Rhodes and Malta¹. At the time of the first crusade, the fleets of the Italian states would have sufficed to transport large armies to Palestine, had conquest been the sole object of the Crusaders; for we have seen that, in a single battle with Robert Guiscard, Venice could lose a whole fleet, with thirteen thousand men on board, without receiving a mortal wound².

In the year 1076 the Seljouk Turks took possession of Jerusalem, and immediately commenced harassing the pilgrims with unheard-of exactions. The Saracens had in general viewed the pilgrims with favour, as men engaged in fulfilling a pious duty, or pursuing lawful gain with praiseworthy industry, and they had levied only a reasonable toll on the pilgrims, and a moderate duty on their merchandise; while, in consideration of these imposts, they had established guards to protect them on the roads by which they approached the holy places. The Turks, on the contrary, acting like mere nomades, uncertain of retaining possession of the city, thought only of gratifying their avarice. They plundered the rich pilgrims, and insulted the poor. The religious feelings of the Christians were irritated, and their commerce ruined; a cry for vengeance arose throughout all Europe, and men's minds were fully prepared for an attempt to conquer Palestine, when Peter the Hermit began to preach that it was a

¹ Genoa, within thirteen years from the commencement of the Crusades, sent seven large fleets to Palestine. The Pisan fleet on the Syrian coast is mentioned by Anna (336); the hospital, by William of Tyre (xviii. p. 934, in Bongars' *Gesta Dei per Francos*).

‘Then in Palestine,
By the wayside, in sober grandeur stood
A hospital, that night and day received
The pilgrims of the West; and when ’twas asked,
Who are the noble founders? every tongue
At once replied, The merchants of Amalfi.’

ROGERS' *Italy*.

Such were the services of commerce to the cause of civilization in the middle ages. It did more for mankind than the spirit of chivalry.

² Anna Comn. 161.

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sacred duty to deliver the tomb of Christ from the hands of the Infidels.

Pope Gregory VII. was the first pontiff who attempted to excite the European nations to attack the Mohammedans as a religious duty. The Emperor Michael VII. entered into communications with the Papal See, for the ostensible object of uniting the Greek and Latin churches, but principally with the hope of obtaining military succours against the Turks. In 1074, Gregory, moved by the danger to which Christianity was exposed by the rapid progress of the Seljouks, called on the Christians of Europe to take up arms against the Mohammedans, and proposed to lead the troops himself to Constantinople¹. Many prepared to accompany the Pope at that time; but the state of Europe, and the various political projects in which Gregory involved himself, rendered this first project of a crusade abortive. Unfortunately, too, the Pope did more, by his violent interference in the affairs of the Eastern Empire, to estrange the Greeks, than either the exigencies of Byzantine policy or the hopes of assistance could afterwards efface. In the year 1078, among the numerous excommunications, anathemas, and execrations which Gregory launched at emperors, bishops, and princes, he thought fit to excommunicate Nicephorus III. Whether this was done because Nicephorus failed to pay an annual subsidy of 24 lb. of gold, granted by Michael VII. to the monastery of Mount Cassino, or because he married the Empress Maria when Michael was compelled to descend from the throne and become a priest, the step was equally impolitic; as so violent and unwarranted an attack on the independence of the empire, by a foreign priest, was sure to unite the Greek clergy and people in opposition to the papal pretensions². Victor III., moved by the spirit which then inspired the court of Rome to assume the direction of European policy, urged the maritime states of Italy to attack the Mohammedans. Like his predecessor Gregory VII., he promised remission of sins to all who engaged in this holy war. The Pisans

¹ Compare Greg. VII. *Epist.* i. 46, 49; ii. 37; and *Grégoire VII. et son Siècle*, par Voigt, trad. par Jager, 2nd edit. p. 263. Perhaps this honour ought to be conceded to Sylvester II. (Gerbert), who had himself made the pilgrimage, and who incited the Pisans to attack the Mussulmans in Africa. See his letter, *Historiens des Gaules*, x. *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, i. 70.

² *Grégoire VII. et son Siècle*, par Voigt, 501; Leo Ostiensis, iii. c. 46.

and Genoese, eager to attack the Saracen pirates who infested the Italian seas, finding that the papal exhortations secured them a supply of volunteers, fitted out their fleets and invaded Africa, where they met with some success, and from whence they carried off considerable booty¹. Every year brought the hostility of the Christians to the Mohammedans more prominently before the public. Peter the Hermit began to preach, and at last, in 1095, Pope Urban II. assembled a council at Placentia, where ambassadors from Alexius presented themselves to solicit assistance, and enrol some of the distinguished soldiers of the Franks in the service of the Eastern Empire². At the council of Clermont, which was held a short time after, many princes took the cross, and the religious enthusiasm spread with such fervour among the people that many assembled without loss of time, and commenced their march to deliver Jerusalem.

The conduct of these first bands of Crusaders produced a very unfavourable impression on the inhabitants of the Byzantine empire. Only a part of the expedition consisted of soldiers, and even these troops paid little attention to the orders of Walter the Pennyless, a soldier of some military experience, who was the nominal leader of the army. The majority consisted of pilgrims without arms, order, or discipline, followed by crowds of women and children. Few had made adequate preparation for the journey, or possessed any knowledge of the difficulties they must necessarily encounter, and all were without the requisite pecuniary resources. They had hardly entered the Byzantine empire before their money was exhausted, and they then began to plunder the Bulgarian villages, and carry off the provisions and cattle of the inhabitants, as if they had been in an enemy's country. This conduct roused the fury of the peasantry, accustomed to war by the incessant plundering incursions of the Hungarians, Patzinaks, and Komans, who fell upon the dispersed

¹ Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, i. 85, 566.

² A letter of Alexius to Robert count of Flanders, who visited Constantinople in 1088, on his way back from Jerusalem, and who, in the following year, sent the emperor five hundred horsemen and one hundred and fifty of the war-horses of Flanders, is cited by Western writers as an invitation to the princes assembled at the council of Placentia, but this letter is of an earlier date. Its authenticity, however, in its present form, is extremely doubtful. The letter is given by Guibert, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, lib. i. c. 4 (Bongars, p. 475). See the notes of Ducange to Anna Comn. p. 335, edit. Paris.

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bands of the Crusaders, and would in all probability have destroyed the whole expedition, had not the imperial officer who commanded at Naissos saved the greater part, supplied them with rations, and sent them forward to Constantinople. But hundreds of the unarmed pilgrims, and of the women and children, were seized and sold as slaves to pay for the ravages committed by the plunderers. A still more numerous body of pilgrims soon followed, under the personal guidance of Peter the Hermit himself. Though supplied with provisions by the governor of Naissos, this body committed such disorders that at last it was attacked by the garrison of Naissos, and only seven thousand reached Constantinople with Peter. These first divisions of the Crusaders were not so numerous or powerful as to excite any alarm in Alexius, who had often encountered more numerous armies of Patzinaks, Komans, Turks, and Normans; and as he expected to profit by their services, he received Peter the Hermit with kindness, and supplied his followers with provisions. But the ravages committed by these undisciplined bands in Servia, Bulgaria, and Thrace sowed the seeds of a deep-rooted hatred of the western nations in the hearts of the Slavonian and Greek subjects of the Byzantine empire. The bitter fruits of this antipathy will be often apparent in the following pages of this history.

The followers of Walter the Pennyless and Peter the Hermit were soon swelled into a considerable army by fresh arrivals at Constantinople. They were transported over to Asia by the Byzantine fleet, where their imprudence and want of discipline quickly caused their ruin. The various nations composing the army formed separate bands, and their desultory attacks on the Turks led to numbers being cut off in detail. The main body marched to attack Nicaea, and was completely defeated in a battle, from which only three thousand men escaped into the Byzantine territory.

The great army of the first Crusade only began to march eastward about the time this advanced guard was destroyed. In the summer of the year 1096, the chivalry of Flanders, Normandy, and France began to move towards Constantinople by various routes. Hugh of Vermandois, brother of Philip I. king of France; Robert II. duke of Normandy; Robert count of Flanders; Stephen count of Blois and

Chartres, with some other independent leaders of inferior rank, took the well-known road through Italy, where they passed the winter. Bohemund, now Prince of Tarentum, caught something of their religious enthusiasm, which he ingrafted on his own private schemes of personal ambition and rapacity; but he was accompanied by his kinsman Tancred, one of the noblest characters of the crusade. Hugh of Vermandois, proud of everything—of his high birth, of his having received a consecrated banner from the Pope, and of his tall person—was impatient to reach Constantinople before any of his comrades, hoping to impose on the Byzantine court by his grandeur. Embarking at Bari with a small suite, he landed in the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium¹. He soon learned how little respect the Greeks entertained either for the piety or splendour of crusading princes. John Comnenus, the emperor's nephew, was governor of Dyrrachium, and as he was well informed of the views of the imperial court, he detained the great Hugh until he should receive orders from the capital. When Alexius heard that the man of highest rank among the Crusaders was in his power, he began to speculate in what manner he could turn the accident to the greatest advantage. He sent Butumites, an officer of rank, to conduct the Count of Vermandois to Constantinople with becoming honour; and though he really detained him as a hostage, he received him with distinction, and endeavoured to gain his goodwill, in which he soon succeeded. Hugh of Vermandois, notwithstanding his presumption and the pride of the royal blood of France, was

¹ Anna (288) says that the greater part of Hugh's followers were lost in a storm, and that the vessel in which he embarked was shipwrecked between Palos and Dyrrachium. It may be observed that it is often impossible to reconcile the account of Anna with the narratives of the Western historians of the Crusades. On this subject Wilken and Michaud must be consulted; but two examples of events unnoticed by the Western writers deserve notice, as both seem founded on fact, however much Anna may have erred in details. She mentions a Count of Preventz, who sailed from the south of Italy, and fought a naval engagement with the Byzantine fleet at the entrance of the Adriatic: p. 290. Ducange is undoubtedly wrong in supposing she meant Raymond count of St. Gilles and Toulouse, who sometimes took the titles of Duke of Narbonne and Count of Provincia, afterwards Provence. Anna calls Raymond *Σαγγελής*, and speaks of him with great respect. She also mentions a Count Raoul, who arrived at Constantinople after Godfrey had crossed to Asia. The Western writers know nothing of this leader, though she says he had an army of fifteen thousand men: p. 298. That she exaggerates numbers on all occasions there is no doubt. This count, with his army, was transported to Palestine by the Byzantine fleet, according to Anna.

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the first leader of the crusade who was induced to do homage and swear fealty to the Greek emperor. But the circumstance of his arrest, and the degradation of his homage, spread distrust through the army, that was under the guidance of Godfrey of Bouillon¹.

Godfrey, the future king of Jerusalem, conducted the most warlike if not the most numerous body of the Crusaders. Though attended by irregular bands, who committed great disorders in Hungary and Bulgaria, he maintained such discipline among his regular troops that his cavalry arrived at Philippopolis in good condition. He there learned that the brother of the liege lord of most of the crusading barons was a prisoner at Constantinople, and he sent an embassy to demand his immediate release. Alexius' refusal to comply with this demand was the signal for commencing hostilities. Godfrey advanced by Adrianople and Selymbria, laying waste the country and pillaging the inhabitants, until he reached the walls of Constantinople. Alexius, alarmed at the energy and numbers of his enemies, sent Hugh to the camp of the Crusaders, and peace was restored, but confidence could not be so easily re-established².

It was about Christmas, 1096, that this division of the army reached the Bosphorus. Its hostile attitude, and the news that Bohemund, his ancient enemy, was approaching with another division more numerous than Godfrey's army, increased the alarm of Alexius. The emperor now exerted all his ability, and used every machination of flattery, force, and bribery, to induce the leaders of the Crusaders to do homage to the Eastern Empire and swear fidelity to his person as emperor, as the best security against the evil designs of Bohemund, whom he regarded as the heir of his father's ambitious projects. It was with considerable difficulty that

¹ Anna (263) excuses the unjust conduct of her father to Hugh, by saying he wrote an insolent letter, of which she gives a paraphrase on which little dependence can be placed. Hugh was called 'the great' merely on account of his size, and it would be more correct to say 'long' Hugh.

² At the time of the first crusade the Byzantine troops made no use of crossbows, and Anna (291) describes them as a terrible weapon. By a decree of the second Council of the Lateran, A.D. 1139, the crossbow was forbidden as too mortal a weapon. Princes, nobles, and bishops then considered war an amusement, that ought not to be rendered too dangerous for the aristocracy; and they saw with grief that the quarrel of a crossbow, like the bullet of a rifle, had no respect for a damascened cuirass. Richard Cœur-de-Lion again introduced the deadly weapon, and was slain by it.

Godfrey was persuaded by Hugh of Vermandois to consent to this measure, but at last a treaty was concluded between Alexius and the Crusaders. On the one hand, the emperor engaged to assist the Crusaders to recover the Holy Sepulchre, to supply them with an auxiliary force, to protect all pilgrims who passed through his dominions, and to take care that the armies of the Crusaders should be amply supplied with provisions, in open markets, at reasonable prices. On the other hand, the leaders of the crusade promised to commit no disorders in the empire, to treat Alexius as their liege lord while within his dominions, to deliver up to him all the cities which had recently belonged to the empire as soon as they recovered them from the Turks, and to do him homage and swear fidelity to his throne. The word of an emperor was regarded as a sufficient guarantee for the faith of Alexius; but the princes of the crusade, being already the liegemen of other sovereigns, took an oath of fidelity, and did homage to Alexius, in regular form, to the extent of the engagements contracted by their treaty. On the nature and extent of these engagements, it is probable that the contracting parties, even at the time, placed a different interpretation, and they have been the subject of a good deal of discussion since.

Bohemund would have avoided doing homage and swearing fealty to Alexius if possible; but he perceived that he must follow his companions, and endeavour to profit for the time by the favour of Alexius, rather than appear openly as his enemy. Still, both he and Alexius for some time could not refrain from acting on feelings of mutual suspicion and jealousy, which led them into serious political errors; indeed, the hostile feelings and intriguing ambition of Bohemund rendered his presence in the crusading camp no small addition to the numerous causes of quarrel which occurred between the Greeks and the Crusaders. Fortunately for Alexius, the alliance he had contracted with Robert the Frison in 1088 secured him the friendship of his son Robert count of Flanders, one of the most powerful and valiant leaders of the expedition, whose influence in some degree counteracted the intrigues of the crafty Norman¹.

¹ Robert, called the Jerusalemite, succeeded his father, Robert the Frison, as Count of Flanders in 1093. His possessions and his alliances were so various,

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It was with the greatest difficulty, and not without actual hostilities with Godfrey, that Alexius succeeded in persuading the leaders to transport their troops over to Asia. All wished to enter Constantinople, and none wished to quit it. Its luxuries and amusements so enchanted the young warriors of the West, that they would fain have postponed their vows to the pursuit of pleasure. Godfrey, with the first division of the army, did not cross the Bosphorus until the middle of March 1097. Bohemund, Robert count of Flanders, Robert duke of Normandy, Stephen count of Blois, and Eustace count of Boulogne, followed one another in succession, and after doing homage to Alexius, and receiving valuable presents from him, collected all their followers in Asia¹. Raymond count of St. Gilles and Toulouse was the last of the chiefs who joined the army. He had been the first to take the cross, but his preparations occupied much time, for he made a vow never to return to his rich domains, having resolved to spend the rest of his life in the East as a Christian soldier. Could he have foreseen that the power of his family and the wealth of his subjects were soon to become the spoil of another crusade, what would have been the bitterness of his feelings? Raymond collected so large an army that he deemed it prudent to avoid as much as possible the routes of those who preceded him. His own line of march was, nevertheless, very ill chosen. After passing through the north of Italy, instead of descending the valley of the Save, he proceeded from Friuli through Dalmatia. The country was destitute of roads, and thinly peopled; the inhabitants were poor, and avoided the strangers, concealing their cattle and provisions in sequestered valleys. Hostilities took place; Raymond put out his prisoners' eyes and cut off their hands and noses to intimidate their countrymen, and as this savage conduct frightened away those who might have approached his army as traders, increased his difficulties².

that he did homage to the kings of France and England, and to the emperors of Germany and Byzantium, on different grounds.

¹ It was perhaps fortunate for Alexius that Godfrey's disputes with him were terminated, and that he crossed over to Asia before the arrival of Bohemund. Albertus Aquen. ii. 14, in Bongars, 202. Alexius made Bohemund the present of a palace without the walls, near the church of Cosmas and Damianos (the Ss. Anargyroi), which was afterwards generally called by the Franks the Castle of Bohemund. William of Tyre, ii. 8, in Bongars, 656.

² Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*, vi. 43. The mode in which Bohemund

At last he reached Scodra, where he was met by Bodin king of Servia, but the poverty of the country was so great that no adequate supplies of provisions could be obtained; and this army of Crusaders, though better prepared for their journey than any other, suffered greater hardships. Even after reaching Dyrrachium, as they had to march over ground traversed by their predecessors, they were compelled to fight their way through the Albanian, Sclavonian, and Bulgarian population of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace.

The conduct of Alexius to Raymond was at first extremely haughty and imprudent. Raymond left his troops at Rhedestos, and repaired to Constantinople to wait on the emperor; but his refusal to do homage like the other princes offended the vanity of Alexius, who, thinking the troops of the count were exhausted by fatigue, cut off their supplies of provisions, and sent armed men to harass them in their quarters, hoping by these measures to force Raymond to do homage. The Count of St. Gilles was neither to be moved by fear of the emperor nor by the solicitations of the other Crusaders. He declared that he had not taken the cross to enter the service of any earthly sovereign, but that if the Byzantine emperor would place himself at the head of the expedition, he was ready to obey his orders. The proceedings of Alexius threatened war, and it required all the prudence of Godfrey and Robert of Flanders to prevent the indignation of Raymond letting loose his army on the environs of Constantinople. Bohemund, gained over for the time by the liberality of Alexius, went so far as to tell the Count of Toulouse that, in case of hostilities breaking out, he should hold it his duty to serve Alexius as his liege lord. This threat the haughty Raymond never forgave. The other leaders at last arranged the quarrel. Raymond swore to observe the treaty entered into by the other Crusaders, and never to undertake anything against the life or the honour of Alexius, but he refused to

treated the country was not likely to insure Raymond a friendly reception. The historians of the crusade call the country between the Adriatic and Thessalonica very often Bulgaria. They sometimes talk of burning the towns belonging to the heretical subjects of Alexius with perfect indifference. The proceedings of Bohemund are thus recounted: 'Egressi de Castoria intravimus Pelagoniam in qua erat quoddam haereticorum castrum, quod undique aggressi sumus, moxque nostro succubuit imperio: accenso itaque igne, combussimus castrum cum habitatoribus suis, scilicet haereticorum congregatione.' *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*, i. 4, in Bongars, 3.

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do him homage. A more intimate acquaintance with the honourable though haughty character of the count showed the emperor the impolicy of the quarrel. He perceived that no projects of worldly ambition caused the refusal of Raymond, nor could power ever be held by a Crusader less inclined to seek wealth and conquest at the expense of the empire. He found that the word of Raymond was as good a guarantee as the oath of others, and he then endeavoured, by every means in his power, to gain the good opinion of one he had received in the beginning so ill. As Raymond, though severe and haughty, was frank and loyal, he soon forgave the hostilities of Alexius, but he never pardoned the insolent threat of the upstart Bohemund¹.

The conduct of Alexius towards the Crusaders was certainly deficient both in candour and prudence, but he had a very difficult part to act; and it must be admitted that all his fears and distrust were fully justified by the rapine of the private soldiers, who plundered his subjects, and the insolence of the chiefs, who insulted his authority. The memorable anecdote of the insolence of a petty French chieftain, who has been supposed by Ducange to have been a count of Paris, and who rudely seated himself on the imperial throne at a solemn audience, is familiar both to the readers of history and romance. His conduct must have appeared to the Byzantine courtiers an act of high treason deserving death, and it was regarded by the princes of the crusade as marked by intolerable rudeness and brutality². The Franks and Greeks were at this time in social conditions which rendered it impossible for them to associate together without feelings of mutual contempt. The narration of Anna Comnena enables us to contrast the experienced anility of the Byzantine court with the mental inanity of the Western aristocracy. She complains, with great reason, of the presumption, vanity, and loquacity of the chiefs, who, considering themselves entitled

¹ Anna Comn. 305; Raimond de Agiles, *Historia Francorum*, in Bongars, 141. Alexius, however, had good reason to distrust Raymond until he knew him, for the historian Raimond mentions that the Count's army took and plundered the city of Rossa—'Paulisper nostra solita patientia displicuit.'

² This count is a more prominent person in modern times than he was in his own day. It is very doubtful who he really was, but it appears that he was mortally wounded at Dorylaeum. Compare Anna Comn. 300, 317; the note of Ducange, p. 362; and Albertus Aquensis, *Hist. Hieros.* ii. 39, in Bongars, 211.

by their rank to converse with the emperor, compelled him to sacrifice hour after hour of his valuable time listening to their pretensions and solicitations. Alexius knew that these men were independent chiefs, and he was anxious to avoid giving them offence, for their power so often exceeded their judgment that the neglect of a childish demand or the irritation of an unintentional slight might plunge his empire in a dangerous and bloody war. The personal behaviour of Alexius was more judicious than his political system. He did everything to conciliate the nobles, and his patience, good-humour, and liberality overcame many difficulties, but his health suffered from the fatigue of the interminable audiences he gave the leaders amidst the toils of his other occupations. The silly loquacity of men who wasted their days in idle talk and vain boasting made a very unfavourable impression on the Byzantine nobles, whose social intercourse retained much of Roman gravity, formalized by Oriental ceremony. The chiefs of the crusade also displayed an unseemly eagerness to obtain money and presents from the emperor. Tancred, the flower of Norman chivalry, openly expressed his disgust at the rapacity of his companions. When solicited to do homage to Alexius, which he would fain have avoided, he could not repress his sneers at their venality. Looking one day at the magnificent tent of the emperor, which all were admiring, Tancred exclaimed, 'If Alexius would give me that tent full of money, and as much more as he has given to our princes, I might think of doing him homage¹.'

The feudal nations and the subjects of the Byzantine empire formed different estimates of the exigencies of society. Political order, security of property, and the supremacy of the judicial administration were, in the opinion of the Eastern

¹ Anna Comn. 294, 316. Wilken, *De rebus a Comnenis gestis*, 349, who refers to Radulphus Cadomensis, whose work, *Gesta Tancredi*, has been printed by Martenne and Durand, *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, tom. iii. 108; and by Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, tom. v. 285. See Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*, vi. 313, 383. Anna Comnena speaks of the endless talking of the Franks, γλωσσολγία, at p. 436, where she gives an interesting account of the annoyance their conduct caused to Alexius. She represents the proud chivalry of the West as a mob of overgrown children, who talked incessantly without any idea of the value of time, and as barbarians who were ruled by their passions without any sense of the duties of their position. The conduct of the Crusaders in war, which was a subject they pretended thoroughly to understand, proves that the judgment of the princess was not too severe.

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Christians, the true objects of government. Personal independence, and the right of each noble to redress his wrongs with his own sword, were the most valuable privileges of freemen, in the opinion of the Frank nations. The authority of a central administration, which made the most powerful noble submit to the law, was regarded by the feudal barons as an intolerable despotism; while the right of private war, as it existed in western Europe, was considered by the Greeks as a state of anarchy suitable only to a society of lawless bandits. Nor were the feelings of the Eastern and Western clergy towards one another calculated to infuse any addition of Christian charity into the intercourse of the Greeks and Franks¹. The unfounded and arrogant pretensions of the popes excited the opposition of the Greek church, and were ably exposed by its more learned members. The general ignorance of the Latin clergy raised feelings of contempt, which were changed into abhorrence when the Greeks beheld men calling themselves bishops clad in coats of mail, riding through the streets on fiery chargers, and returning from battle covered with blood². On the other hand, the Latin priests despised the Eastern clergy as a time-serving and slavish body, utterly unfit to uphold the dignity of the priesthood, and they condemned those doctrines as heretical which taught that the clergy were bound to submit to the civil magistrate. In addition to these incongruities, the rival nations mutually reproached one another as insolent, false, and treacherous.

One of the primary causes of the quarrels between the Crusaders and the subjects of the Byzantine empire arose from the attempts made by the government and its officials to make unfair profits in selling provisions to the strangers. The financial administration of Alexius was remarkable for

¹ I use the appellation Frank in the way it is generally used by the Eastern nations, as including all the western Europeans.

² The warlike habits of the Latin clergy justly excited the indignation of all true Christians. Richard Cœur-de-Lion, finding the Bishop of Beauvais, whom he had taken prisoner in battle, a troublesome antagonist, demanded a large ransom for his deliverance. The Pope sent to intercede for his beloved spiritual child. Richard, in reply, sent the armour of the Christian pastor all stained with blood to Rome, and it was presented to his holiness, who was asked if he recognised his son's coat. As a proof of the great rarity of the precious metals in Normandy as compared with Constantinople, it is worthy of notice that the bishop's ransom was only two thousand marks of silver. The mark was then two-thirds of a pound weight. Rapin's *History of England*, iii. 142, 8vo edit.

its rapacity and bad faith. He had cheated his own subjects by issuing debased coin in payment of his debts, and enriched his treasury by oppressive monopolies. He attempted the same system with the Crusaders; but when he beheld the armies they assembled under the walls of Constantinople, he saw the necessity of laying aside his previous practice, and attempted, by a liberal distribution of money and provisions, to efface the memory of his earlier frauds. For a time the crusading army appeared no better than a host of Byzantine mercenaries; the imperial paymasters carried bags of gold byzants to the leaders, and distributed quarter byzants, or tetartera, among the inferior officers and men¹.

The first warlike operation of the Crusaders against the Turks was the siege of Nicaea, a city which, by the terms of their treaty with Alexius, they were bound to restore to the empire. The Byzantine army was so much inferior to that of the Crusaders in number, that the emperor deemed it prudent to watch the siege from a camp at Pelekanon, without taking part in the attack. His general, Tatikios, joined the besiegers with two thousand light cavalry; and a number of boats were transported on waggons from Kios to the Ascanian lake and filled with Byzantine troops, under the command of Butumites, to blockade Nicaea on the side towards the lake². The Sultan Kilidji-Arslan was defeated in an attempt to raise the siege, and the inhabitants, seeing that they could not long resist the incessant assaults of the Franks, entered into secret arrangements with the Byzantine troops on the lake, and admitted them into the city on receiving a charter from the emperor promising that the lives and property of the Turkish inhabitants should be respected. By this treaty the Byzantine forces entered the city unknown to the Crusaders, who were informed of its surrender by seeing the Byzantine ensigns displayed on the walls. Many of the besiegers were enraged at being thus deprived of the plunder of the first Mohammedan city they had attacked. Alexius, however, pacified the discontent by dividing great

¹ The Byzantine coinage consisted of gold byzants, or nomismata, of the semissis or half, the tremissis or third, and the *τεταρτηρόν* or quarter. These are all mentioned by historians, and to be found in all collections. The specimens I possess weigh respectively 33 grs., 23 grs., and 17 grs., for the half, third, and quarter.

² Kios is called also Kibitos, by the Latins Civitot, now Ghio or Ghiumlek.

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part of the public property that fell into his hands among the Crusaders, and furnishing them with abundant supplies of provisions, to enable them to hasten forward through Asia Minor¹. The emperor at the same time placed a strong garrison in Nicaea, and enrolled in his service many Franks who were without the means of continuing their journey.

The crusading army quitted the neighbourhood of Nicaea about the end of June, and reached Antioch on the 21st October 1097. The country through which they passed had long been the ordinary line of march for the Byzantine armies, and an excellent road for the transport of baggage and provisions existed only thirty years before, when Romanus IV. (Diogenes) commenced his unfortunate war with Alp Arslan; but the country was now everywhere depopulated, the roads had become impassable, the bridges were broken down, the cisterns ruined, and the wells filled up. The assistance of the petty Armenian princes in Cilicia and Mount Taurus proved of more use to them than the alliance of Alexius². Never, perhaps, had any country fallen so rapidly from civilization to barbarism, or changed the great body of its inhabitants, its language, religion, and mode of life so completely as Asia Minor in the latter half of the eleventh century. A single generation accomplished what a thousand years have often in other circumstances failed to effect. But the Crusaders, in defiance of sufferings and opposition, advanced steadily, if slowly, storming every city that refused to assist them. At Germanicia, Baldwin, the

¹ There exists a letter of Stephen count of Blois and Chartres to his wife Adela, the daughter of William the Conqueror, dated from Nicaea, which praises the conduct of the Emperor Alexius, and declares that through his care the camp was abundantly supplied with provisions during the siege. He mentions also how Alexius distributed the booty taken in the city. This testimony of an enlightened prince ought to be weighed against the declamation of prejudiced monks. See Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*, vi. 357; Mabillon, *Museum Italicum*, tom. i. pars ii. 237.

² Constantine I. was then king of Cilician Armenia, and resided at Vahtak on Mount Taurus. Chamich. *History of Armenia*, ii. 169. The Crusaders stormed Tarsus, which seems to have been in the hands of the Mohammedans; but the Armenian historians say it was governed by Ochin, an Armenian in the Byzantine service, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Dyrrachium. Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xv. 141, 348 note. The treaty between Alexius and Bohemund in 1108 implies that Tarsus formed part of the Byzantine empire, but Bohemund might consider this as a consequence of its conquest from the Crusaders, by Monastras, the general of Alexius. Anna Comnena, 340, 413.

brother of Godfrey, quitted the grand army, which continued its march to Antioch, and moved eastward to take possession of Edessa, a city which still acknowledged allegiance to the Byzantine emperor. It surrendered to Pouzan, one of the generals of Malekshah, in the year 1087, but during the contests of the Turks and Saracens in the north of Syria it had recovered its independence. Baldwin now sullied the honour of the Franks by exciting the people to murder their governor Theodore and rebel against the Byzantine authority; he then took possession of the place in his own name, and founded the Frank principality of Edessa, which lasted about forty-seven years¹. This was a direct violation of the treaty with Alexius.

Antioch was besieged for seven months. It was winter, and the sufferings of the Crusaders were so great that many deserted the army. Tatikios retired with the Byzantine auxiliaries to Cyprus. Robert duke of Normandy went off to Laodicea, and it required three citations of the chiefs to recall him to his duty. William viscount of Melun, and Peter the Hermit himself, attempted to escape to Europe, but were brought back to the camp by Tancred². At length Antioch was taken by the treachery of an officer, who admitted Bohemund into one of its towers. The departure of the Byzantine contingent served as a good pretext for refusing to cede the city to Alexius, who had neither afforded them assistance during the siege, nor attempted any diversion in their favour when they were placed in a very critical position immediately after gaining possession of the city. Alexius was advancing with a considerable army in the spring of 1098, in the hope of securing Antioch to himself, but on reaching Philomelium he heard that it had already surrendered. At the same time he was informed that an immense army, under Kerboga, the emir of Mossoul, was about to make an attempt to recover the place. Several deserters from the crusading army, and particularly Stephen count of Blois and Chartres, brought alarming accounts of the magnitude of the Turkish army,

¹ Edessa was retaken by the Mohammedans under Zenghi, son of Aksankar, the father of Nouredin, at the end of 1144 or beginning of 1145. *Élégie sur la prise d'Edesse, par Nersès Klaietsi, Patriarche d'Arménie, ouvrage publié en Armenien par la Société Asiatique*: Paris, 1828.

² Michaud, i. 266.

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and of the unprepared condition of the Crusaders. These reports induced Alexius to make a precipitate retreat to Constantinople; and in order to retard the progress of the Turks, whom he imagined were already pursuing his army, he invited all the Christians in Phrygia to retire with their families and property into the provinces of the Byzantine empire, and thus save themselves from the inroads of the Mohammedans. The result of Kerboga's expedition was very different from what the emperor expected. The Crusaders defeated the Turkish army, and Bohemund became prince of Antioch rather by his own intrigues than in consequence of any regular concession on the part of the leaders of the crusade.

As Alexius had employed the summer of 1097 in recovering possession of Smyrna, Ephesus, Sardis, Philadelphia, and many other cities on the west coast of Asia Minor¹, the Crusaders determined to ask some explanation of his neglecting to make a diversion in their favour when they were attacked by Kerboga. Hugh of Vermandois and Baldwin of Hainault were sent to Constantinople as ambassadors for this purpose, and to invite the emperor to join the army and march at its head to Jerusalem; on that condition they offered to put him in possession of Antioch and all their other conquests. But in case of his refusal, the ambassadors were instructed to declare that, Alexius having failed to perform his engagements, the treaty was annulled and the Crusaders renounced the fealty they had sworn. All this was strictly in accordance with feudal usages, and Alexius had no reason to complain of the proceeding. The mission proved every way unfortunate. Baldwin was never heard of, and was probably murdered by the bands of brigands who infested Asia Minor. Hugh of Vermandois, finding Alexius occupied with other business, and not likely to afford his companions any assistance, abandoned their cause, and returned to France.

It is not surprising that Alexius declined joining the Crusaders. He knew that he was not likely to be obeyed,

¹ Laodicea in Phrygia was allowed to govern itself by its own magistrates without being subjected to the oppression of an imperial prefect. Its advanced position rendered it necessary to animate the spirit and conciliate the goodwill of the inhabitants. Anna Comn. 324.

and he might doubt whether he would be able to force Baldwin and Bohemund to surrender their conquests. His own absence from Constantinople might also be attended with danger, in an empire where pretenders to the throne were constantly starting up, and where feelings of loyalty and hereditary right were almost unknown. Besides this, the arrival of fresh bands of Crusaders required the presence of a considerable military force, under his immediate direction, to protect Constantinople and the environs¹. Armed pilgrims, who considered that by taking the cross they had purchased absolution for every crime, could only be restrained from plundering the emperor's subjects by fear of the consequences; for we must not overlook the fact, that the Crusaders began about this time to drain off poverty and crime from the western nations of Europe, somewhat as emigration and transportation have performed a similar service for Great Britain. It was also a matter of greater importance to the security of the Byzantine empire that the Turks should be expelled from Bithynia and Phrygia than from Syria and Palestine.

Unfortunately, Alexius was more eager to gain some diplomatic advantage over the Latins than to promote the prosperity of his subjects and consolidate the strength of the empire. He sent an embassy to the leaders of the crusade, which found them encamped before Archas. His ambassadors demanded that all the towns they had conquered in Syria should be surrendered to the imperial officers. The princes of the crusade, already disgusted with the cowardly manner in which he had deserted their cause before the battle with

¹ During the years 1098 and 1099, a continual stream of armed pilgrims traversed the Byzantine empire. Sueno the son of the King of Denmark, Edgar Atheling with a body of Anglo-Saxons, and Fergant with a band of Celts from Bretagne, followed the Crusaders before the conquest of Jerusalem. Sueno perished in Asia Minor with a body of cavalry before he joined them. Other armies followed. Eudes duke of Burgundy, Stephen count of Blois (who returned to redeem his honour), the count of Blandras (Biandrate), Anselm archbishop of Milan, Conrad constable of Henry IV. of Germany, the Counts of Nevers and Bourges, William count of Poitiers, the Duke of Bavaria, and Hugh of Vermandois (who, like Stephen of Blois, was driven back by shame), all came attended by numerous bodies of troops, which sometimes united to form armies. Their own historians record the disorders they committed. The Greeks and Bulgarians who dwelt in the open country on their line of march were plundered. To the horror of the Eastern Christians engaged in agriculture, these pilgrims devoured working oxen during Lent: and to the terror of the Byzantine courtiers, they insulted the imperial power under the walls of Constantinople. Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*, vi. 67.

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Kerboga, and no longer standing in need of his assistance, since they had opened communications with the fleets of the Italian republics, treated his ill-timed demand with scorn, and dismissed his envoys with reproaches. Nevertheless the emperor gained possession of the city of Laodicea in Syria, which, however, he soon lost. The inhabitants of Laodicea had thrown off the Turkish yoke, with the assistance of a Flemish pirate named Guymer, about the time the Crusaders took Antioch. The Byzantine fleet soon after landed a garrison, and Guymer, who was endeavouring to establish himself as an independent prince, was thrown into prison. But the Crusaders, on their march from Antioch to Acre, compelled the Byzantine garrison to abandon Laodicea and, retire to Cyprus, leaving Guymer at liberty. Raymond of Toulouse, who was left in possession of the city, surrendered it to the officers of Alexius, rather than allow it to be occupied by his enemy Bohemund. Andronicus, the Byzantine governor, however, was unable to retain possession of it for any length of time. Tancred soon laid siege to it, and compelled it to capitulate¹.

In the mean time the Crusaders, who continued to arrive at Constantinople, gave Alexius almost as much trouble, and threatened the empire with as great danger, as the expedition under Godfrey. Jerusalem was already in the hands of the grand army, when a body of Lombards, accompanied, but certainly not commanded, by their archbishop, entered Bulgaria. Their conduct was more lawless than that of the followers of Walter the Pennyless and Peter the Hermit. They remained some time in the environs of Constantinople, waiting the arrival of a number of French and German pilgrims who were known to have taken the cross. Their insolence alarmed Alexius, who insisted on their passing over into Asia before new bands arrived, as it would be impossible to furnish all with provisions. With this requisition they refused to comply, and it was necessary to compel them by force. Hostilities broke out; the Lombards resisted the Byzantine troops and attempted to storm the quarter of

¹ Guymer of Boulogne, called also Vinemar, had commanded a piratical fleet of Flemings and Hollanders in the Mediterranean for ten years. He first communicated with the Crusaders at Tarsus. It was at Laodicea that Edgar Atheling joined the Crusaders. Michaud, i. 232, 364.

Blachern, and it was with great difficulty that the Archbishop of Milan and Raymond of Toulouse succeeded in re-establishing order, and persuading them to cross the Bosphorus. They were soon after joined by the Count of Blois and the Constable of the Emperor of Germany. The brilliant appearance of their camp, which was soon filled with wealthy nobles, raised the confidence of the Lombards to the highest pitch. They spoke with contempt of the exploits of the first army which had taken Jerusalem, and, scorning to follow in the track of others, they determined to march to Bagdad and destroy the caliphate. Raymond of Toulouse was appointed their leader, but he had little power over the disorderly Italians. Alexius, however, supplied them with five hundred Turkopuls to serve as guides,—an admirable species of light cavalry, but whose origin made them an object of suspicion to the Crusaders¹.

This army took Ancyra without difficulty, and crossed the Halys without order or precaution, plundering the inhabitants indiscriminately whether they were Christians or Mohammedans. On one occasion the inhabitants of a town came out to meet them in solemn procession, headed by their priests, bearing the crucifix and pictures of their protecting saints. Some acts of hostility had taken place in the neighbourhood, and the dress of the Greek priests being different from that of the Latin clergy, the Crusaders would not listen to a word of explanation, but immediately massacred the peaceful citizens and the ministers of religion. Their brutal conduct and want of discipline caused their ruin. Before they reached Amasia they were surrounded by the Turks, their foraging parties were cut off; they could obtain no information, for the Christians feared them more than the Turks. They were at last attacked and completely defeated. A few only of the leaders escaped, by having maintained some discipline among their personal followers. Raymond, who had long foreseen the inevitable issue of the enterprise, saved himself with the Turkopuls by a precipitate flight.

¹ These Turkopuls were generally the offspring of a Turkish and Christian parent, or else Christian Turks who were settled as colonists in the Byzantine empire, many of whom were descendants of those Turks who had entered Europe from the north of the Black Sea. But at a later period they were generally the offspring of Seljouk Turks, and their importance proves the rapidity with which the Turkish population displaced the Greek in Asia Minor.

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This unfortunate expedition was followed by others equally disastrous. The Count of Nevers, with a large army, was defeated; and he himself, with a few others, reached Antioch on foot. The Count of Poitiers and Hugh of Vermandois made their line of march a scene of disorder and devastation. Before they reached Adrianople they were involved in hostility with the Bulgarian and Sclavonian subjects of the empire, and with the Patzinak and Koman mercenaries in the Byzantine service. The imperial troops were defeated, the governor of Adrianople was taken prisoner, and Alexius was compelled to make every concession they wished, in order to facilitate the progress of these furious pilgrims, and allow them to expend their vigour in contests with the infidels. This army reached Phrygia during the season of the great heats. The harvests were already removed, the forage exhausted, the wells on their road filled up, and the cisterns emptied. Disaster and defeat followed in quick succession. At last their camp was captured and the army dispersed. Hundreds of ladies had joined this band, which it was supposed would make their pilgrimage a triumphal procession, under the leading of the great Hugh: these ladies now became slaves of the Mussulmans, and for many years the slave-markets of Bagdad and the harems of the East were supplied with noble ladies, whom the defeats of the Crusaders were continually consigning to perpetual slavery. Hugh of Vermandois escaped to Tarsus, where he died of fatigue, and the Count of Poitiers reached Antioch with only six attendants. The Latins would not allow that their disasters were caused by their own misconduct and imprudence; they persisted in attributing all their misfortunes to the treachery of the Greeks; and though Alexius delivered many from captivity, the Crusaders generally regarded him as an enemy¹.

The personal jealousy of Alexius and Bohemund became the immediate cause of war between the Greeks and Latins.

¹ Alexius released Conrad, the constable of Henry IV. emperor of Germany, who had fallen into the hands of the Sultan of Egypt. He also obtained the freedom of Harpin viscount of Bourges, who was a prisoner at Bagdad, by threatening to imprison all the Turkish merchants in the Byzantine empire if he were not released. This shows that the grand sultan and Alexius still considered they were at peace, and that commercial relations were carried on by their subjects. Michaud (i. 489) says that Harpin died in slavery; but the authority of Le Beau and *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates* (iii. 210, 4to. edit.) is to be preferred. On his return to France he retired into the monastery of Cluny.

Alexius could not forget his defeat in Epirus, and he sought revenge by endeavouring to expel Bohemund from Antioch. Nothing could be more ill-judged, for the city was too distant from the centre of his power to be a possession of any value, and the conquest was sure to involve him in hostilities with the Crusaders. In the year 1103 Bohemund was taken prisoner by the Emir Danishmend, who had formed a principality embracing Sebaste and the country round¹. Alexius, hoping to gain possession of Antioch, offered to purchase Bohemund from Danishmend; but Kilidji-Arslan claiming the prisoner, as representative of the grand sultan in Asia Minor, Danishmend, to secure some profit to himself, released Bohemund on receiving immediate payment of a sum of money, and a promise of support should either Alexius or Kilidji-Arslan attack him. Alexius, foiled in his attempt to make Bohemund his prisoner, attacked Antioch, and the Byzantine empire was thus rashly brought into collision with the Crusaders. The Greeks, already involved in a contest of commercial interests with the maritime states of Italy, were, by their hostilities with the Crusaders, excluded from a considerable portion of the trade of the Mediterranean at a time when it was receiving a great extension. The Byzantine army, commanded by Butumites and Monastras, advanced from Cilicia, but gained no advantage. The imperial fleet, on the other hand, commanded the sea, and reduced Bohemund to the greatest difficulty. He, however, succeeded in forming an alliance with the Pisans, who sent a fleet to his aid². Part of the Pisan force was detached to plunder Corfu, Cephalenia, Leucadia, and Zante³. The main body fell in with the Byzantine fleet between Rhodes and Patara. The Greeks were commanded by Tatikios and Landolph, a Lombard officer of great naval experience; their vanguard was led by

¹ Danishmend, in Persian, the 'son of the learned man.' His father had been a schoolmaster among the Turkomans, where probably very little learning was required. Michaud, *Bibliographie des Croisades*, vii. 271. By other writers he is called an Armenian apostate. *Notices et Extraits des MSS.* ix; Le Beau, xv. 368.

² Anna Comnena says the Pisans fitted out nine hundred ships: p. 335.

³ A large Genoese fleet had visited the coast of Syria in 1098, before the taking of Jerusalem. In 1099 a Venetian fleet of two hundred sail fell in with a Pisan fleet, both on their way to Syria. An engagement took place near Rhodes, in which the Pisans were defeated and lost twenty ships, though the two republics were at peace; so piratical and warlike were the mercantile expeditions of the age.

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Perichytnes, a Peloponnesian noble, who traversed the whole Pisan fleet, sending out streams of Greek fire from both sides of his vessel ; but he was not seconded with promptitude, and the engagement, though advantageous to the imperial forces, reflected little honour on the Greek navy¹. A storm proved more injurious to the Pisans than the battle, and only a small part of their ships gained the port of Laodicea. The Byzantine army occupied Seleucia and Korykos, near the mouth of the Kalykadnus, and repaired the fortifications of these towns. A naval division on the station completely commanded the channel between Cilicia and Cyprus, and excluded the allies of Bohemund from shelter on the Asiatic coast, so that the Prince of Antioch was closely blockaded during the winter, when the navigators of the time feared to venture into the open sea to the south of Cyprus.

In 1104 a Genoese fleet, engaged in conveying pilgrims and merchandise to the East, was instructed to assist the Prince of Antioch, with whose dominions the Genoese had established commercial relations. The Genoese succeeded in avoiding the Byzantine fleet. The Greek admiral in the mean time captured the city of Laodicea, but could not take the citadel, though it was only defended by one hundred cavalry and five hundred infantry. The army in Cilicia, under the command of Monastras, having received considerable reinforcements, attacked the Normans with vigour, and captured Tarsus, Adana, and Mopsuestia (Mamistra). The result of the campaign convinced Bohemund that without fresh troops he could not make head against the forces of the Byzantine empire ; but it was no longer an easy matter for succours to escape the Greek cruisers². Bohemund, seeing that his own presence would be necessary to obtain adequate assistance from the West, resolved to risk everything in order to effect a passage through the Byzantine fleet. To deceive any spies the emperor might have placed in Antioch, he spread a report of his own death ; and Tancred assumed the direction of the government of Antioch. A coffin was then prepared in which he could conceal himself, and in this way he was embarked at the

¹ Anna calls Perichytnes a count of the Byzantine fleet : p. 336.

² The armies of the Frank principalities in Syria soon began to be recruited among the native Christians. Armenians formed no inconsiderable part of Tancred's troops. Anna Comn. 349.

port of Suda, in a vessel of which all the equipage were dressed in mourning. The Princess Anna adds that a dead fowl was shut up with him in the coffin; that even in case the vessel should be visited by the Greek officers, they might be deterred from opening the coffin by the offensive odour. 'I must acknowledge,' says the learned lady, 'that there is nothing capable of overcoming the obstinacy with which the barbarians pursue their plans¹.' Bohemund reached the coast of Italy in safety, but a contrary wind delayed him at the entrance of the Adriatic until his provisions and water were exhausted. He ventured to visit Corfu in order to obtain refreshments and purchase provisions; and the governor, not possessing a sufficient force to attack this redoubted enemy of the empire, permitted the communication. On quitting Corfu, Bohemund sent this message to the Byzantine governor—'Inform your master that the Prince of Antioch has arisen from the dead, and will soon give proofs of his vitality.'

Bohemund hastened to Rome in order to persuade the Pope to aid him against the Emperor Alexius. Pope Pascal II., who adopted all the ambitious schemes of Gregory VII., and strove to establish the papal domination over all Christian princes, approved of the projects of the Norman. Bohemund then visited France, to collect troops for a crusade against the Byzantine empire. He was received with great honour. Philippe I. of France gave him his daughter Constance in marriage², and this alliance alarmed Alexius to such a degree that he forgot his imperial pride so far as to write letters to the republics of Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, refuting the injurious reports which Bohemund had spread concerning his conduct, and declaring that it was a disgraceful calumny to call him an enemy of the Christians and a traitor to the Crusaders. As a proof of the calumnious nature of Bohemund's accusations, he immediately obtained the release of three hundred knights who were prisoners at Cairo³.

Alexius made every preparation to encounter this crusade against his empire. He formed a camp at Thessalonica in the autumn of 1105, and sent his nephew Alexius Komnenos

¹ Anna Comn. 341; Zonaras, 303.

² Constance was a kind of widow. She had been separated from Hugh count of Champagne on the plea of relationship.

³ Anna Comn. 346.

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to take the command at Dyrrachium, and put that important place in a good state of defence. Isaac Kontostephanos was also sent into the Adriatic with a powerful fleet assembled in the ports of the Aegean Sea. Bohemund was not ready to invade the empire until the autumn of 1107. In the mean time Kontostephanos made an attempt to surprise Brindisi, in which he failed. The Normans on this occasion captured a few of the mercenaries of Turkish race who served in the Byzantine armies. These prisoners may have been Patzinaks, Uzes, Komans, or Turks of the colony at Achrida, and were probably Christians; but their dress and arms were different from anything in use throughout the west of Europe, so that Bohemund presented them to the Pope, as a convincing proof that the emperor of Constantinople was in close alliance with the enemies of Christianity. Bohemund, with his usual skill, availed himself of an opportunity to cross the Adriatic when the Greek fleet had retired to Chimaera. He left the port of Bari with two hundred transports and thirty war-galleys; and arrived safely at Avlona on the 9th October 1107, where he landed his army. The cavalry alone amounted to five thousand¹.

This army resembled that with which William the Conqueror subdued England. It was composed of experienced military adventurers, whom the hope of a richer conquest than that of England had assembled under the banner of the Prince of Tarentum and Antioch. But, fortunately for the Byzantine empire, instead of fighting a battle immediately on its landing, it was compelled to pass the winter before the walls of Dyrrachium. The strength of that fortress, and the ample supplies with which it had been furnished, saved Alexius from the necessity of giving battle until it suited his convenience; and he had every advantage in his favour². Bohemund's warriors remained idle, while his engineers were preparing movable towers, tortoises, and battering-rams;

¹ Twelve of Bohemund's ships were of a fine class of piratical vessels then in use, with two banks of oars. These occupied the centre; and Bohemund stationed himself with them, ready to hasten to any quarter that might be assailed. His ordinary galleys had a hundred oars, and two men to each oar. Ducange, notes to Anna Comn. 390.

² Many of the cities of the Byzantine empire at this time were still embellished with classic monuments. Bohemund's camp was to the east of Dyrrachium, opposite a gate adorned with an equestrian statue in bronze. Anna Comn. 380. Other monuments of ancient art also remained in the city. Ibid. 99.

and in the mean time Alexius assembled his army at Thessalonica. The Byzantine court was the real cause of the ruin of the Eastern Empire; its expenses were so great that every branch of the public service was paralyzed to supply its expenditure, which was so lavish as to render money always scarce in the treasury at Constantinople. The emperors had long been in the habit of disbanding a considerable part of the native troops at every cessation of active hostilities, in order that Caesars and Sebasts might be maintained in becoming pomp; and court influence, not length of service, decided what officers and troops were to profit by the arrangement. The vanity of Alexius, the necessity he was under of conciliating several powerful aristocratic families, and the exigencies of his numerous relations, had always prevented his reducing the expenses of the court within reasonable bounds; and while the pomp and magnificence of his court at Constantinople surpassed every other in Europe, we find him constantly commencing his military operations with new armies enrolled for the occasion. This circumstance is alone sufficient to explain why his continual wars were productive of such trifling results. Alexius had considered it politic to form an aristocratic guard, consisting of two thousand chosen youths, who were trained with care to military exercises and instructed in military science. Of these archontopuls, three hundred were sent forward, as soon as Bohemund landed, to secure the passes between Achrida and Dyrrachium¹.

At the approach of spring, Bohemund began to push forward his works. His ships being useless in consequence of the superiority of the Byzantine fleet, he destroyed them, and employed the timber in the construction of his towers and military engines; but the interruption of his communications with Italy soon proved disastrous to his army. The country round Dyrrachium had been laid waste in the preceding war, and was now either depopulated, or well protected by fortified towns and castles, in which the cultivators had secured their property. From these posts Byzantine troops watched the movements of every forager,

¹ Anna informs us that three hundred of these archontopuls were slain in an attack on the fortification of waggons of the Patzinaks in the campaign of 1090, and considers the loss a serious one. Anna Comn. 204.

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and rendered it difficult for the besieging army to obtain the smallest supplies of provisions. On the other hand, the magazines of Dyrrachium were abundantly furnished both with provisions and military stores, the garrison was numerous and in high spirits, the ramparts were well garnished with military engines, and the governor was active and popular. Bohemund assaulted the place in vain; he advanced his towers and battering-rams, which were of extraordinary size, up to the walls, and he worked mines under the foundations; but his assaults were repulsed, his towers and battering-rams were reduced to ashes, and his miners were suffocated at their work¹.

Alexius advanced as far as Deavolis, which commands the most important and easiest pass over the great range of mountains between Epirus and Macedonia to the south of Achrida². Experience had convinced him that his mercenaries and militia were unable to resist the Normans in the open field; so he determined to remain in his camp, and direct a series of desultory operations for wearing out the strength of the invaders. His love of intrigue showed itself in a mean artifice he used to spread distrust in the camp of Bohemund. Letters, addressed by the emperor to several of the Norman leaders, in which he pretended to have received information concerning the plans of Bohemund, were sent in a way that they fell into that prince's hands. The artifice appears not to have deceived the crafty Norman, who was more inclined to suspect the perfidy of Alexius than of his companions. He communicated the letters to his officers, and left every one in the command of the positions they had previously occupied. If this anecdote of imperial policy had been communicated to us in some Frank chronicle written by a prejudiced monk, we might have doubted its accuracy, and suspected the writer of having given a calumnious colouring to the incident; but the fact is attested by the

¹ The Byzantine miners used a preparation of resin and sulphur, which they blew out of long pipes into the faces of the Franks, and thus expelled them from the mines. Anna Comn. 383.

² Devol is the modern name of Deavolis. It is situated on a river of the same name, which falls into the Apsos five miles below Berat. The pass is now called the Boghaz of Tzangon. Achrida and Deavolis were the two cities which commanded the two roads leading from the Adriatic to Thessalonica. Anna Comn. 126, 386.

beloved daughter of the imperial diplomatist, and affords us a valuable portraiture of the moral obtuseness of the Byzantine court, for Anna Comnena never suspected that she was holding up her father's conduct to the contempt of every honourable man¹.

The prudence of Alexius soon placed Bohemund in great difficulties. The mountain passes were all fortified with strong intrenchments. Avlona, Yericho, and Canina were occupied by Michael Kekaumenos; Petroula by Alexander Kavasilas; Divri by Leo Nikerites; and the Kleisoura, or passes of Albania, by Eustathios Kamytzes. But the population of the country, which consisted in great part of Albanians, hardly viewed the Byzantine troops with more favour than the Norman; and when Bohemund paid his guides well, he was enabled at times to send out foraging expeditions to a great distance with considerable success. While the war was thus prosecuted on shore with very little effect, the negligence of Kontostephanos and the Byzantine nobles on board the fleet, who ran into port when the sea became stormy, enabled the Italians to send a large convoy with provisions and reinforcements to Bohemund. At length, however, Maurokatakalon having superseded Kontostephanos in the command of the fleet, and the Patzinak, Turkish, and Alain cavalry having posted themselves nearer and nearer to the Norman camp, Bohemund found his army reduced to a state of absolute famine, and made propositions of peace to the governor of Dyrrachium. These proposals were transmitted to the emperor, who still occupied his camp at Deavolis; and Alexius required that Bohemund should visit him in person to settle the terms of the treaty.

Two princes less deserving of trust could hardly have engaged in a negotiation; but after numerous precautions and mutual guarantees, their interests induced them to come to terms, and peace was concluded in the month of September 1108. Bohemund and his principal officers signed an act containing the obligations imposed on them, while Alexius, in order to preserve all his imperial superiority, only ratified these conditions, and made the concessions required on his part in the form of a golden bull². By this treaty, the

¹ Anna Comn. 387.

² Anna (406) gives the act signed by Bohemund at full length; but omits the

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stipulations of the alliance between the Crusaders and Alexius concluded in 1107 were annulled, in as far as they were applicable to the relations between the emperor and the Prince of Antioch. Bohemund again declared himself the liegeman of Alexius, and of his son John Porphyrogenitus, and bound himself to make war against all the enemies of the emperor who were not invulnerable like the angels, nor endowed with bodies of iron. He engaged to hold his principality in Asia as a fief of the Byzantine empire, and to surrender any place he might take in future which had in old time belonged to the Byzantine emperors. He bound himself to make war on Tancred in case he should not cease all hostility in Cilicia, and promised immediately to surrender the whole coast between the Cydnus and the Hermon, and the cities of Laodicea, Gabala, Valanea, Marathos, Tortosa, and Antarados in Syria, and to accept the investiture of the principality of Antioch from the emperor by a golden bull. The limits of his principality were defined as extending to Germanicia, with the exception of the country in the possession of the two Armenian brothers, Leo and Theodore, princes of the house of Reuben, who were subjects of the Byzantine empire. A pension of two hundred talents or pounds' weight of gold, in byzants of the coinage of the Emperor Michael, was granted to Bohemund, who swore never to separate his interests from those of Alexius and his son John; but to observe all the stipulations of the treaty by the passion of our Saviour—by the Gospel which has subdued the world—by the crown of thorns—and by the nails and lance which pierced the body of the Redeemer¹. After this termination of his ambitious schemes of conquest, the Norman prince hastened back to Italy, leaving his army to winter in Epirus, where Alexius promised to supply them with provisions. In the following spring many entered the Byzantine service, some proceeded to Jerusalem, and some returned to Italy. Bohemund, though compelled to remain

golden bull, which echoed its contents in some degree. Albert Aquensis (lib. x. 39, in Bongars, 354) mentions this expedition of Bohemund.

¹ This pension would amount to 14,400 byzants. The adulteration of the coinage by Alexius and Nicephorus III. rendered it necessary to exclude the money of these emperors from all payments, as a guarantee for receiving the full value. The usage was general in the East, and it must have tended to lessen the reputation of Alexius. Compare William of Tyre, xi, 2, in Bongars, 802.

quiet for some time, was collecting another army, either for the purpose of extending the limits of his principality of Antioch, or of seeking to avenge his defeat, when death put an end to his schemes in the month of February 1111¹.

The indefatigable energy of Alexius deserves the highest praise. As soon as he had put an end to the war with Bohemund, he turned all his attention to the affairs of Asia Minor; but in the conduct of the war, and in the policy of his civil administration, he allowed his ambition to blind his judgment. Instead of confining his operations to the country nearest to Constantinople, and to the Aegean Sea, he engaged in hostilities with Tancred and the Crusaders on the coast of Syria, leaving the Turks in undisturbed possession of the greater part of the intervening country, though the condition of the Seljouks at the time rendered it probable that a combined attack of the Franks and Greeks might have expelled them from the whole country between Constantinople and Antioch. The brave Sultan of Iconium, Kilidji-Arslan, perished in the year 1106. His sons Melek and Massoud succeeded to his dominions, and Melek, the eldest, ruled the western part of Asia Minor. But though a brave soldier, his administration was weak, and many of the Turkish provincial governors assumed an independent position, and were called Sultans². During the ten years that Melek reigned, the Seljouk dominions were a scene of intestine war. Alexius acted with no great energy against the Turks at this period, but during their civil war he succeeded in getting possession of the whole coast of Asia Minor from the Hellespont to Attalia. He repaired the walls of Adramyttium, which had been destroyed by Tzachas, and endeavoured to make it a flourishing commercial city, as it had formerly been, by repeopling it with the inhabitants of the surrounding country. This was perhaps not the most likely way to restore prosperity to Adramyttium, but the reparation of the fortifications excited the jealousy of the nomade Turks in the province, and they assembled a

¹ This date is given in *Falconis Beneventani Chronicon* (Carusius, i. 303), for February 1110 is really 1111, the Normans commencing their year in March. William of Tyre (Bongars, 799) mentions that he employed the summer of 1110 in collecting a new army.

² Anna calls Melek, Klitziasthlan (Kilidji-Arslan, his father's name), and also Saisan, a Greek corruption of Shahi-Shahan, or Shah of Shahs. Ducange, Notes to Anna, 414, 460.

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large force to attack the new colony. They were completely defeated in an engagement, and the Greeks captured their camp, with their wives and children. The inhuman cruelty with which the Christians treated their prisoners on this occasion roused the fury of the whole Turkish nation, and gave an energy to their military operations against the Byzantine territory which checked all the plans of the emperor for its improvement¹. Hassan, the emir of Cappadocia, invaded the empire at the head of twenty-four thousand men, resolved to exact a bloody vengeance for the carnage at Adramyttium. The prudence of Philokales, the governor, who had rebuilt Adramyttium, and happened to be at Philadelphia on his way to assume the command of Attalia, saved the coast of western Asia from ruin. Hassan, not expecting to meet with any opposition in the field, formed his army into three divisions, in order to extend the sphere of his ravages. These divisions were directed against Sardis, Smyrna, and Pergamos; but the Byzantine troops under Philokales, issuing from Philadelphia, successively defeated two divisions, and compelled the third to abandon the attack on Pergamos, and save itself by a precipitate retreat.

The progress of the Turkish war was interrupted by the hostilities Alexius carried on with Tancred, which involved the empire in a maritime warfare with the Genoese and Pisans, whose piratical expeditions against the islands and coasts of the Aegean proved ruinous to the commerce of the Greeks. In the year 1112, while the emperor was encamped in the Thracian Chersonesus preparing to send a fleet against the Latins, five Genoese galleys entered the Hellespont and plundered the neighbourhood of Abydos. Four, it is true, were captured by the Byzantine fleet, but one escaped to encourage its countrymen to new acts of piracy².

The imposing force Alexius had assembled in Asia Minor enabled him to conclude a temporary peace with Sultan Melek in the year 1112, yet, as the conditions of the treaty are not recorded by his daughter, it seems probable that no cession of territory was made³. New armies of Turks arriving in Asia Minor from the frontiers of Persia, and Melek

¹ Anna owns that the Greeks amused themselves by throwing the children into boiling water: p. 420.

² Anna Comn. 430.

³ Ibid. 432.

exercising no very extensive authority over the Seljouk chiefs, the sultanat of Iconium was soon again involved in hostilities with the Byzantine empire. Bithynia, Mysia, the Troad, and the coast of Paphlagonia were ravaged by the Seljouks in successive campaigns. Brusa, Apollonias, and Cyzikos were taken and plundered, the governor of Nicaea was defeated and made prisoner, the inhabitants abandoned the cultivation of the open country, and either emigrated to Europe, or clustered round castles in which they could quickly seek protection, or else formed their dwellings in places difficult of access, where they could escape the search of invading armies. These places of refuge and concealment, called Kataphygia, now began to assume a certain degree of political importance. The imperial troops often defeated the invaders, but new bands of Turks and Turkomans daily extended the field of their devastations¹.

The last campaign of Alexius was in the year 1116. The Sultan of Iconium assembled a large army, composed not only of his own troops and those of the emirs who acknowledged his authority, but also of an army of auxiliaries sent to his assistance by the Sultan of Aleppo. The Turks expected to carry their ravages as far as the shores of the Bosphorus, and to retake the cities which the Crusaders had conquered. Alexius determined to avert the danger by carrying the war into the heart of the dominions of Melek before his preparations were completed. After defeating a body of Turks on the banks of the Rhyndacus, near Lopadion, and clearing the neighbourhood of Nicaea from their nomadic hordes, the emperor advanced by Dorylaeum to Santabaris. Here the army was divided into three columns. One, under Stypeiotes, was detached to the left, in order to attack the Turks who had assembled at Amorium, and, falling in with the enemy at Poimanenon, it gained a complete victory. The second division, under Kamytzes, was sent forward to drive back a Turkish force stationed at Polybotos. When this service had been performed, the main body of the army, under the command of the emperor in person, advanced to Kedrea, on the road to Polybotos. Finding, however, that the sultan had carried off all the provisions from the surrounding country, the emperor was under the necessity of retiring. To pretend

¹ Anna mentions the Turkomans as a distinct tribe, 442.

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that his retreat was dictated by the command of Heaven, he performed a ceremony worthy of his superstition and hypocrisy. Writing on two papers the questions whether he should advance to attack Iconium or stop at Philomelion (Ak Sheher), he deposited his interrogatories on the altar of a church in which he passed the night in prayer. In the morning the priest entering took up one of the papers, and announced that the will of Heaven had fixed Philomelion as the limit of the campaign. In the mean time all the Turkish hordes were hastening to the scene of warfare. A strong body advancing to join the Emir Monolykos, by crossing the bridge over the Sangarius at Zompi (Tchander), was defeated by a Byzantine corps, under Bardas, in the plain of Amorium; but to this corps Alexius was compelled to detach reinforcements, to enable it to preserve its advantage over the enemy. The emperor then advanced to Mesonacta, near the Lake of the Forty Martyrs, and continuing his advance, soon reached Philomelion, which he took at the first assault. After ravaging the possessions of the Turks, and summoning the Christians who desired to escape from their Kataphygia to retire under the escort of his army, he commenced his retreat in the most deliberate manner, arranging his order of march so as to afford effectual protection to the immense number of Christian families and enormous quantity of spoil that accompanied his troops. The forces of Melek and Monolykos hung on his flanks and rear, and compelled him to fight a battle in the plain of Polybotos; but they were defeated with loss, and Alexius continued his retreat to Ampous. The subsequent attacks of the Turks were equally unsuccessful, and at last the sultan sent proposals of peace to the emperor. A meeting between Alexius and Melek, who came attended by the old warrior Monolykos, took place between Augustopolis and Acroinion, at which the terms of a treaty were arranged. What these terms were we are not informed; but the emperor succeeded in bringing all the Christian emigrants, with their families and property, safe into the Byzantine territory. Melek perished shortly after, the victim of assassination and fratricide. His brother Massoud, who was his murderer, succeeded him on the throne of Iconium¹.

¹ Anna Comnena gives a long account of the operations of this campaign,

Violent attacks of gout, accompanied by increasing weakness, warned Alexius of his approaching end. Near the conclusion of his reign he gained great popularity by burning the Bogomilian heresiarch Basil, and by founding a splendid hospital and orphan asylum.

The deathbed of Alexius affords a melancholy picture of the effects of his duplicity in the bosom of his own family. It seems like a satire on his reign. His habitual distrust of all men induced him to make his wife and his learned daughter his chief companions, and to employ them in aiding him to perform the routine duties of the imperial administration. The Empress Irene and the Princess Anna proved apt pupils in the school of political intrigue. They deluded themselves into the belief that they understood the whole art of government, and proposed that Anna's husband, the Caesar Nicephorus Bryennios, should share the task of government with them. To effect this, Irene endeavoured to persuade Alexius to nominate the Caesar his successor, though his eldest son John had been invested with the imperial title for twenty-six years. The empress entertained an aversion for John, whose short and ugly figure showed to little advantage in the pageants of the court, while his love of truth and frank character appeared to her a proof of rudeness and stupidity. During the last illness of the emperor she frequently pressed him to declare Nicephorus his successor; but Alexius, who was well acquainted with his son's talents, listened patiently to her advice without following it. When his end approached Irene took more daring measures to secure the realization of her wishes. The palace was filled with her creatures, the Varangian guards on duty were gained over, and preparations were made to dispute the title of John to the throne. In the mean time John, who had watched all his mother's intrigues, took prompt and decided measures for securing his succession, without bringing matters to an open rupture. While the

pp. 460-481. Zonaras says a few words, ii. 306. Monolykos is probably the corruption of some Turkish name; but the Greeks caught at the word, for they say that if the first litter of a she-wolf consists of a single male cub, it will become a most powerful and redoubtable animal, carrying off more sheep than a dozen ordinary wolves. Men have often been proud of titles borrowed from beasts—Richard Cœur-de-Lion, William the Lion, and the Tiger Earl, not to mention less renowned animals.

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empress was absent from his father's bedside, he entered his chamber and drew the imperial signet from his finger; an act of which the dying emperor perfectly understood the import, and of which, consistent with his habitual dissimulation, he said nothing to the empress on her return. John immediately employed the signet to assume the direction of the public administration—the treasury, the army, and the fleet. He then hastened to the palace, where the Varangians for a time disputed his authority, and he had some difficulty in avoiding a collision between these foreign guards and the people who supported him; but at length he gained possession of the great palace, which was the citadel of Constantinople. The empress, finding that all her schemes were thus rendered abortive, rushed to the apartment of her dying husband and accused her son of treason, urging him to declare another successor; but Alexius only raised his hands and eyes to heaven, to indicate that his concerns on earth were terminated, and that his thoughts were now directed to another world. The empress, interpreting the gesture according to the emperor's habitual system of duplicity, supposed the movement was made to avoid giving a direct answer, and as she gazed on the dying emperor exclaimed, 'You die as you have lived, a hypocrite¹.'

The Emperor Alexius died in the year 1118, aged seventy, having reigned thirty-seven years, four months and a-half².

¹ The latter pages of Anna Comnena's work are in a very imperfect state, but Zonaras and Nicetas give us a full account of his death-bed. Zonaras (ii. 309) sums up his character more favourably than Anna draws it, with all her flattery and filial veneration. Anna on one occasion allows her malice against her brother the Emperor John full scope; but she calumniates him when she says that the successor of Alexius threw the affairs of the empire into confusion—ἀβελητηρία τῶν διαδεξαμένων τὰ σκήπτρα: p. 433.

² See the last note of Ducange; Anna Comn. 425; and Nicetas, 6. After the death of the Emperor Alexius, the Empress Irene retired into the monastery of the all-gracious Virgin, which she had rebuilt and endowed, where she became a nun under the name of Xenia. A copy of the Typicum, or rules of this monastery, prepared under the eye of the empress, and signed with her own hand in red ink, was published by the Benedictines Pouget, Loppin, and Montfaucon, in a volume entitled *Analecta Graeca*: Paris, 1688, 4to. It contains some curious information.

SECT. II.—*The reign of John II., A.D. 1118–1143*¹.

Character of John II.—Conspiracies of Anna Comnena and Isaac.—Policy of John's reign—Wars with the Patzinaks, Servians, and Hungarians.—With the Turks, Armenians of Cilicia, and Latins of Syria.—Death of John II.

John Comnenus was the most amiable character that ever occupied the Byzantine throne. He was stainless in his private conduct, frank, merciful, generous, prudent, active and brave, economical without avarice, and pious without superstition. Even the Latins bear testimony to his virtue², while the love of his own subjects is declared by the singular exception his government offers of exemption from rebellion and sedition. The only traitors during his reign, which lasted almost a quarter of a century, were members of his own family. The moral and political feelings of his sister and brother appear to have been corrupted by their father's duplicity and their mother's ambition.

The position of John when he mounted the throne was one of some difficulty and danger. His virtues alarmed the courtiers, and were almost unknown to the people. He was consequently compelled to secure his authority by administrative arrangements and military power, and to do this without any effusion of blood was his first care. To avoid all chance of collision with the members of the conspiracy organized by his mother, he never quitted the great palace until he was assured that all his commands for preserving order in the capital and its immediate vicinity had been carried into execution. During this interval his father's funeral was celebrated; and though he took care that the ceremony should be performed with imperial pomp, he did not venture to be present³.

¹ John Comnenus appears to have first received the nickname of Maurojoannes (black John) from his dark complexion (William of Tyre, xv. 23, in Bongars, 885); but the love of his subjects changed it into Kalojoannes, which, in the mouths of the people, meant John the Good, not Handsome John.

The original writers concerning the reign of John II. are Cinnamus and Nicetas, who have left short summaries of its events. The principal object of both these historians was to write in detail the history of the periods in which they had borne a personal part, though Nicetas enters into the reign of Manuel at some length.

² William of Tyre, xii. 5; xv. 23, in Bongars, 819, 885.

³ Nicetas, 6.

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The selfishness of his own relations, and the treachery of the Byzantine aristocracy, made a deep impression on his mind. Though they never destroyed his feelings of family affection, nor infused any tinge of melancholy into his equable disposition, they led him, at an early age, to seek elsewhere for a friend. A Turkish lad, remarkable for his personal grace and amiable disposition, fell into the hands of the Emperor Alexius at the capture of Nicaea, and was placed as a domestic slave and personal companion with his son John Porphyrogenitus, who was nearly of the same age. The two youths were educated together, and became sincerely attached to one another. In Axouchos John found the frank character and the love of truth which he sought in vain among his own relations and the Greek courtiers. Years ripened the youthful friendship into mutual respect. Axouchos showed himself a man of talent as well as of courage and virtue; and John, seeing that the fidelity of all his father's ministers had been tampered with by his mother, made the Turkish slave his prime-minister. Axouchos proved himself worthy of the high post; but whatever may have been the amount of his virtues, the very circumstance that the people regarded the appointment of a slave to the rank of minister as a boon to humanity, must be taken as a proof of the oppressive conduct of the aristocracy, the corruption of the general administration, and the want of wise institutions in the empire and of right feelings in the people.

The government of John II. was disturbed by no internal troubles. Two conspiracies occurred during his reign; one headed by his literary sister Anna, and the other by his brother Isaac, but both proved abortive. The Princess Anna induced several members of the imperial family to join in a plot for placing the crown on the head of her husband Nicephorus Bryennios. For the success of her plan it was necessary that her brother should be murdered, or that his eyes should be put out; and when her more humane husband testified some reluctance to proceed with the plot, the learned princess expressed her contempt for his feminine weakness, as she termed it, in very strong terms, contrasting it with what she considered her own manly inhumanity. The conspiracy was revealed, and John thought it necessary to confiscate

his sister's wealth in order to check her future intrigues. He bestowed her palace, which was richly and luxuriously furnished, on Axouchos; but that minister, who thought more of performing the duties of his situation for the emperor's advantage than of enriching himself by imperial favour, suggested that it would be more politic to restore the palace to Anna. John felt the prudence as well as the justice of his minister's advice, and replied, 'I should, indeed, be unworthy to reign, if I could not forget my anger as readily as you forget your interest.' Anna was reinstated in her palace.

Isaac, the only surviving brother of the emperor, was always treated with the greatest kindness and the highest honour. But it would appear that his capacity and disposition prevented his being intrusted with as great a share of political power as he wished, and, dissatisfied with his position, he fled to the court of the Sultan Massoud at Iconium, accompanied by his eldest son John. During this voluntary exile he led many predatory incursions into the Byzantine empire, but at last, finding himself both poorer and more neglected at Iconium than he had been at Constantinople, he made his peace with his brother, and was reinstated in his former wealth and rank¹. The conduct of his son John, however, soon caused a new alienation of feeling between the brothers. John accompanied the emperor his uncle at the siege of Neocaesareia. The emperor observing that an Italian knight, highly esteemed for his valour, happened to be dismounted, ordered his nephew to remount him on an Arabian horse he was riding, adding, 'You have other excellent horses at hand.' The pride of the young prince was hurt, and he turned to the Italian, saying, 'Take some other horse, and try if you can make me quit my saddle with your lance.' A look of the emperor, however, made him think it wise to dismount and surrender his horse. Shortly after he rode off, joined the Turks, with whom he had formerly lived, and embraced the Mohammedan religion. His father Isaac also appears to have engaged in some plots, concerning the details of which we have no information, but

¹ Nicetas, 21.

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he was banished to Heracleia in Pontus towards the end of John's reign¹.

The historical records of the reign of John II. are very imperfect, and relate only to his warlike enterprises. Hence it has been supposed that he was either too strongly biassed in favour of military fame, or that he considered success in war as the surest means of increasing the power and restoring the prosperity of the empire, overlooking the necessity of infusing new vigour into the social organization of the motley population of the Byzantine provinces, and of reforming the gross abuses of the fiscal administration. There can be no doubt that the general opinion of the age viewed military success as the true preservative against all political evils, and the emperor's popularity with the inhabitants of Constantinople must have been considerably increased by the conviction that such was his opinion. The material prosperity of the people of Constantinople was closely identified with the augmentation of the imperial dominions, and only indirectly influenced by the general well-being of the rest of the empire. This identification of prejudices and interests between the inhabitants of the capital and the rulers of the state is one of the usual results of strict administrative centralization, and its basis is generally laid by some sacrifice of the interests of the people in the provinces for the profit of the crowds congregated in the vicinity of the sovereign. Rome and Constantinople, by their public distributions of provisions and expensive public amusements, afford proofs of this fact quite as strong as any Eastern despotism, and modern Europe offers something similar in the state of Paris.

The superiority assumed by the Byzantine armies whenever John appeared in the field, proves that he was an able general as well as a brave soldier. His troops showed perfect

¹ Nicetas, 24; Cinnamus, 18. Isaac Comnenus was the progenitor of the emperors of Trebizond. His son John, who became a Mohammedan, is said by Nicetas (p. 7) to have married a daughter of Sultan Massoud. Some writers have considered him as the progenitor of the Othoman sultan, but this is an idle fable. His brother Andronicus, the Emperor of Constantinople, was the ancestor of the Grand Komnenoi of Trebizond. Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 189. As far as the chronology of these events can be determined, it seems that Isaac and his son returned to Constantinople with the emperor in the year 1138, that his son fled again to the Turks in 1139, and that the conspiracy of Isaac was planned in 1142, after the Emperor John had quitted his capital for the last time. Compare Nicetas, 21, with Le Beau, xvi. 46; Wilken, *Rerum ab Alexio*, etc., 514.

confidence in his military skill, even when his operations proved unsuccessful; and he used their services with that daring energy which marks the existence of the highest military qualities in a leader. His enterprises were at times foiled; but neither failure nor retreat ever produced discontent in his army. His opinions concerning the constitution of the force under his command were those of a professional soldier, not of a patriotic general nor of a feudal monarch. The native militia of the Byzantine provinces, and the nobles of the empire, who were in the habit of returning to pass the winter, after each campaign, in their domestic quarters, were a force on which he placed no reliance; to use his own phrase, he desired soldiers whose thoughts were concentrated in a military life, and who were ready at every season and for any enterprise he might command¹. This naturally led to a preference of mercenary troops, and his choicest army appears to have been composed of comparatively few Byzantine subjects; its principal divisions consisting of Macedonians, which doubtless means Slavonians and Bulgarians, of Scythians, which signifies Patzinaks and Komans, of Turks, of veterans, and of guards². His military policy was pursued with skill and energy; the plan of each campaign was well conceived and ably executed; he gained for himself great renown, and he made the Byzantine armies a terror both to the Turks and Franks. But there appears to have been a want of political system in his Asiatic wars, and he expended too much of the military resources of his dominions on distant expeditions to Syria, and unnecessary attacks on Armenian Cilicia, from which no permanent advantage could be expected. It cannot be doubted that, even during his victorious reign, the social condition, and perhaps the numerical population, of the empire continued to decline; and before a generation elapsed from the death of his son Manuel I., the Byzantine empire was overthrown, and a Flemish count occupied the imperial throne.

The private conduct of the Emperor John indicates that he

¹ Nicetas, 22.

² Nicetas, 20. An anecdote of Alexius I. proves that Macedonian was equivalent to Slavonian, Bulgarian, or something nationally inferior to the Roman or Greek of Byzantium. When Alexius was pressed by his wife to declare Nicephorus Bryennios his successor, he said, the world would laugh him to scorn if he made a Macedonian emperor of the Romans. Nicetas, 5.

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viewed with regret the internal evils which weakened the moral and political energy of Greek society; for we must now observe that the Byzantine empire had assumed a Greek character. Yet we have no reason to suppose that he adopted any measures to root out the administrative abuses or reform the social state of his dominions. The undertaking may have appeared to him one in which the power of government could effect very little; and he may have thought that Divine Providence alone could bring about the revolution in men's thoughts and conduct necessary to produce any effectual improvement. Many persons even at the present day may be of the same opinion, and ask, with reference to our time, what Catholic emancipation, municipal and parliamentary reform, improved central administration, and free trade, could have effected towards improving the general condition of the inhabitants of the British empire, without an extensive emigration, and the accidental discovery of gold in California and Australia, events with which Government had certainly very little connection. But to these persons it may be replied, that unless the previous changes had placed the social and political condition of all British subjects on a harmonious scale, the subsequent events might have increased many evils which they have contributed to diminish. And thus it is not impossible, that if John had endeavoured to improve the administration of justice in the provinces, to relieve trade from monopolies, to secure the fruits of their labour to the agriculturists, and to diminish the burden of fiscal oppression on his people, his reign might have opened a new era of prosperity to the Greek nation. Perhaps, like Leo III., he might have ranked as a restorer of the Eastern Empire under a Greek phase.

At both these periods the Mohammedans had overrun Asia Minor and threatened Constantinople. In both cases they were driven back, and the empire gained time to reorganize its resources. In the first instance, however, the victory was gained by Leo and the Byzantine army; but in the second, the advantage was derived from the accidental passage of foreign Crusaders. We have seen in the preceding volume with what political prudence Leo profited by his military successes. He boldly forsook the beaten track of Roman conservatism, and created the Byzantine empire by reforming

the whole circle of the imperial administration; and by so doing he infused new life into Christian society. The inhabitants of the Eastern Empire, who appeared to be on the eve of extinction when he mounted the throne, increased rapidly in numbers and wealth before his reign was concluded; while the scheme of policy he traced out for his successors, gave three centuries and a half of prosperity to the Byzantine empire.

When Alexius Comnenus seized the throne, the Byzantine administration required to be once more reformed. New evils had again depopulated the empire and enfeebled the government. Everything was falling to decay. The systematic administration of the empire, which had preserved the fabric of the imperial power in many periods of difficulty, was now swept away, and replaced by temporary expedients and arbitrary counsels. The emperor had become more despotic as his instruments of government became weaker and his officials more incapable. The expenses of the imperial court now absorbed the greater part of the revenues of the state; and the army and navy were diminished and neglected, while princes, courtiers, and chamberlains were multiplied and honoured. The civil, financial, and judicial administration was treated as a field for enriching those favoured by the emperor and by the emperor's favourites. The Roman law, which for ages had formed the bulwark of individual rights and the basis of public prosperity in the Eastern Empire, no longer protected the persons and the property of the people against the rapacity of the imperial officers. Ever since the death of Basil II., the public property of the state had been visibly going to ruin. Roads, bridges, aqueducts, ports, public warehouses, and city fortifications, arsenals, warlike machines, and ships, were everywhere becoming unserviceable. Even cisterns, wells, farm-houses, plantations, and other signs of rural civilization, were disappearing over extensive districts. Colonies of nations in the rudest state of civilization, like the Turks, Patzinaks, and Komans, to whom the cultivation of gardens, vineyards, olive-grounds, silk, and plants used in manufactures was unknown, were established on sites once occupied by populous cities. A little grain was raised in the enclosures of ruined gardens, while sheep pastured through abandoned vineyards, orchards, and olive-groves. It is evident

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that agricultural industry must have been sadly degraded, and the depopulation of the empire must have made great progress, before the Emperor Alexius could have found vacant lands in the rich plains about Thessalonica and Philippopolis for the colonies he planted at Moglena and Alexiopolis¹.

The policy of the Emperor John, with reference to the agricultural population in Asia Minor, was not very enlightened. He ruined a flourishing class of Christian agriculturists, who maintained some local independence by paying taxes to the Turks, in order that he might diminish the revenues of the Sultan of Iconium. These Christians were compelled by the emperor to abandon a country where they were living contentedly in the midst of that social comfort which is produced by the employment of labour and capital on landed property during a long succession of ages, in order to colonize desolate districts where the capital which had once been employed on the land was already annihilated.

It is not difficult, even at this distance of time, to point out the measures which ought to have been adopted in order to arrest the decline and depopulation of the empire; but how far the adoption of these measures would have tended to improve the moral condition of the Greek nation must, of course, remain problematical; and without a great improvement in the moral rectitude and political energy of the Greeks at this period, no exertions of the central administration would have sufficed to save the Byzantine empire. The first task was to root out the all-pervading corruption of court influence. Without this, there was no possibility of restoring the systematic and equitable administration of justice. All the benefits which Roman law had conferred on society for so many ages were now nullified by the despotic power of inferior officials; and as long as the expenditure of the court absorbed the greater part of the public revenues, no effective system of administrative control could be framed to check the abuses of the agents of the court in the provinces. The secondary measures were, to sweep away all the monopolies and privileges which were ruining Greek commerce, and to reform the fiscal exactions which were annihilating all

¹ Zonaras, ii. 299; Anna Comn. 456.

capital invested in agriculture. Had such measures of improvement been perseveringly pursued during the quarter of a century that John reigned, the Byzantine empire might perhaps have escaped its impending ruin, and the Greek race its subsequent debasement.

The Emperor John II. was engaged in constant wars; but the inhabitants of the empire enjoyed during his reign a degree of internal security to which they had been long strangers. No armies of plunderers ravaged Thrace, Macedonia, Bithynia, and Ionia; and the Greeks especially were secured from all hostile attacks, and were afforded an opportunity of recovering their former commercial and manufacturing activity. The Patzinaks, the Hungarians, and the Servians, indeed, ventured at different times to invade the north-western provinces of the empire; but they were soon repulsed, and permanent peace was established.

In the autumn of 1122, the Patzinaks, who had remained quiet ever since their defeat in 1091, crossed the Danube in great force, and spread over the country north of Mount Haemus. The emperor established a camp at Berrhoea to cover the passes, and passed the winter with the army. At the approach of spring, the Patzinaks advanced to force the passes, but were completely defeated, and even the barrier of waggons, which served as an intrenchment to their encampment, was broken through by the Varangian guard with their battle-axes. This victory terminated the war, and it was long commemorated as a feast by the Byzantine church. The most robust of the prisoners were draughted into the imperial army—some were sold as slaves for the profit of the victorious soldiers, and many were settled as colonists on waste lands in the European provinces, where their descendants were still dwelling at the time of the Latin conquest¹.

A war with the Servians ended in their complete defeat, and the Servian prisoners were established as colonists on waste lands in the neighbourhood of Nicomedia².

Hostilities broke out between the emperor and Stephen king of Hungary, in consequence of John II., whose wife was a Hungarian princess, protecting Bela, who was regarded

¹ Nicetas, 11; Ephraemius, 163; Cinnamus, 3.

² Nicetas, 12; Cinnamus, 6.

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as the rightful heir to the Hungarian throne¹. Stephen took Belgrade, which he destroyed, and employed the materials to construct a new town called Zeugmin (Semlin) on the northern bank of the Save. The Hungarian army marched forward to Triaditza, and the emperor established his headquarters at Philippopolis, where, with a strong body of Italian heavy and Turkish light cavalry, he shut up the passes, and waited until he was informed that his flotilla had entered the Danube. He then crossed Mount Haemus, and, driving the Hungarians before him, effected a junction with his flotilla, and defeated a powerful Hungarian army near the fort of Chram. He established a garrison in Branitzova, and returned to Constantinople. The Hungarians, taking the field during the winter, recaptured Branitzova, and the emperor was obliged again to place himself at the head of his army; but both parties, after some severe fighting, became convinced that nothing was to be gained by continuing the war, and peace was concluded, in which the Servians, and perhaps the Venetians, were comprised².

Previous to this time, the Venetian republic had generally been a firm ally of the Byzantine empire, and, to a certain degree, it was considered as owing homage to the Emperor of Constantinople. That connection was now dissolved, and those disputes commenced which soon occupied a prominent place in the history of Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Crusaders in Palestine had opened a new field for the commercial enterprise of the Venetians, and in a great measure changed the direction of their maritime trade; while the frequent quarrels of the Greeks and Franks compelled the trading republics of Italy to attach themselves

¹ Stephen II. was the son of Coloman, who put out the eyes of his brother Almus and nephew Bela to secure the throne to Stephen, for the brother in Hungary succeeded before the son. Coloman and Almus were sons of Geisa I., the elder brother of Ladislas, the father of the Empress Irene, John's wife. *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates* makes Irene (Pyriska) daughter of Geisa I. But as Geisa died in 1077, and she was married during the reign of Coloman in 1104, when John was sixteen years of age, it is impossible to place her birth earlier than 1088. Cinnamus says she was the daughter of Ladislas; but he errs in making Almus and Stephen also sons of Ladislas (p. 4). Bela, though blind, succeeded to the throne of Hungary on the death of Stephen. The series of Hungarian kings is—Geisa I., from 1075 to 1077; Ladislas, to 1095; Coloman, to 1114; Stephen II., to 1131; Bela II., to 1141.

² Compare Cinnamus, 4, and Nicetas, 13. It is very difficult to ascertain the chronology of these events, but they seem to have occurred between 1124 and 1127.

to one of the belligerent parties, in order to secure a preference in its ports. For a short time, habit kept the Venetians attached to the empire; but they soon found that their interests were more closely connected with the Syrian trade than with that of Constantinople. They joined the kings of Jerusalem in extending their conquests, and obtained considerable establishments in all the maritime cities of the kingdom. From having been the customers and allies of the Greeks, they became their rivals and enemies. The commercial fleets of the age acted too often like pirates; and it is not improbable that the Emperor John had good reason to complain of the aggressions of the Venetians. Hostilities commenced; the Doge Domenico Michieli, one of the heroes of the republic, conducted a numerous fleet into the Archipelago, plundered the island of Rhodes, and wintered at Chios. Next year he continued his depredations in Samos, Mitylene, Paros, and Andros. Modon was also taken and occupied by the Venetians, to serve them as a harbour of refuge on their voyages to and from Syria. The events of this war are hardly noticed by any Byzantine writer. They were insignificant in the history of the empire, though they appeared of vast importance to the republic of Venice. Peace was re-established by the emperor reinstating the Venetians in the enjoyment of all the commercial privileges they had enjoyed before the war broke out¹.

The attention of the Emperor John was early directed to the affairs of Asia, but he employed the forces of the empire too often rather to extend the authority and increase the fame of his government than to consolidate the prosperity of his dominions. He left the power of the Turks almost unbroken, while he wasted the wealth and strength of the empire in

¹ Compare Cinnamus, 164; Nicetas, 13; Fulcher Carnotensis, c. 52, in Bongars, 431, with Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, i. 148. This war must have been contemporary with the Hungarian; and the expression of Nicetas seems to indicate that the Venetians were included in the treaty of peace with the Hungarians and Servians. The epitaph of Domenico Michieli is given by Moresini, *L'Imprese et Espedizioni di Terra Santa*, 78; it was in the church of St. George, and the first two lines were—

‘Terror Graecorum jacet hic, et laus Venetorum
Dominicus Michael, quem timet Emmanuel,’ etc.

Anno Domini 1128. Now, as Manuel appears to have been born in 1122, and ascended the throne in 1143, this epitaph must have been the production of a later time, when the exploits of the doge were vaguely magnified by posterity. The golden bull of the Emperor John II. is dated August 1126. Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, i. 95.

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harassing the Armenians of Cilicia and the Franks of Antioch. Two of his early campaigns (A.D. 1120 and 1121) were devoted to regaining possession of Laodicea and Sozopolis, and clearing the country between the Maeander and Attalia from Turkish garrisons and encampments. After the termination of the Hungarian war, John again placed himself at the head of his army in Asia Minor. Three campaigns were devoted to re-establishing the Byzantine authority on the southern coast of the Black Sea ; yet with so little permanent effect that towards the end of his reign, an alliance between Mohammed the successor of Danishmend, on whom the Turks of Paphlagonia and Pontus were dependent, and Massoud the sultan of Iconium, forced the emperor to form a winter camp on the banks of the Rhyndacus to protect Bithynia ; A.D. 1139¹.

The emperor reduced the Armenian principality of Cilicia to complete dependence on the government of Constantinople before the year 1137; but this conquest was not effected without great exertions and considerable loss, while the hatred of the Greeks which it roused in the breasts of the warlike Armenian population of the Cilician mountains favoured the progress of the Turks. Leo, the sovereign of Armenian Cilicia, after carrying on war for some time with the Turks of Antioch, concluded peace with them, and endeavoured to gain possession of Seleucia, the frontier fortress of the Byzantine empire, and a city of considerable commercial importance. The Emperor John appeared in person, at the head of a powerful army, to punish the Armenian prince, and compel his ally the Prince of Antioch to do homage to the empire, according to the treaty with Bohemund. Tarsus, Adana, and Mopsuestia were soon reduced by the operations of the Byzantine engineers ; but Anazarba and Vahkah, where the natural strength of the position opposed great obstacles to an attack, were only taken by the perseverance of the emperor after an obstinate resistance. Leo and his family sought refuge and concealment in the fastnesses of Mount Taurus, but were captured and imprisoned at Constantinople. Leo died in captivity : on some suspicion of treason the emperor ordered the eyes of his son Reuben to be put out, and the

¹ Cinnamus, 21 ; Nicetas, 22, 24.

Armenian prince died of the operation ; but the other son of Leo, named Thoros, returned to Cilicia after the death of John, and re-established the Armenian kingdom¹.

After the reduction of Cilicia the emperor compelled the Prince of Antioch to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Byzantine empire. The reigning prince was Raymond of Poitiers, who married Constance the infant daughter of Bohemund II. Constance had been proposed by the people of Antioch to the Emperor John as a wife for his youngest son Manuel, but from some unknown cause he had refused the match. The people of Antioch, and indeed all the inhabitants of the Syrian cities, were extremely hostile to the administrative and judicial authority assumed by the Byzantine clergy ; they were, consequently, warmly opposed to the emperor's pretensions to the sovereignty over Antioch. Raymond, however, knew that his forces were insufficient to oppose the army of John. When, therefore, he was summoned to do homage as a vassal and prepare to receive the emperor, he solicited an interview. At this meeting it was stipulated that Antioch should remain under the existing administration, civil and ecclesiastical, but that Raymond was to hold the principality as a dependence of the Byzantine empire, and do homage to John as his sovereign. On the other hand, the emperor engaged to unite his arms with those of the Prince of Antioch and the Count of Edessa, to drive the Turks out of Aleppo, Shizar, Hama, and Hems, the investiture of which he promised to confer on the Prince of Antioch².

The following campaign (A.D. 1138) was carried on against the Turks in Syria, while the Seljouks of Iconium were left unmolested in the rear of the Byzantine army. This appears to have been a very ill-judged enterprise. It added to the renown of the emperor and displayed the superiority of his army, but it conferred no advantage on his empire. Piza, a strong fortress on a rock near the banks of the Euphrates, was taken, and given up to Joscelin, count of Edessa. But the emperor could make no impression on Aleppo, though he extracted a large sum of money from Shizar. His two allies,

¹ Cinnamus, 8 ; Nicetas, 15 ; Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xvi. 24. Saint-Martin's edit., continued by Brosset. This war happened in the year 586 of the Armenian aera, the fifteenth of Leo's reign. Chamich, ii 189.

² Cinnamus, 10 ; Nicetas, 18 ; William of Tyre, xiv. 24, in Bongars, p. 866.

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Raymond and Joscelin, gave him no assistance, and the manner in which they spent their time in feasting and gambling disgusted the emperor, who felt little anxiety to extend their dominions. He saw that unless he could make Antioch his place of arms, and the head-quarters of his army during the winter, there would be great difficulty in making any permanent conquests in Syria. He therefore proposed to Raymond to admit the Byzantine troops into Antioch. The proposition alarmed both the prince and the people; and after the Emperor John had entered the place to treat of the arrangements which it would be necessary to make, a popular tumult arose, which compelled him to withdraw, and he retired with his army from Syria to wait for a more favourable opportunity.

While the emperor had been pursuing his schemes of ambition in the south, the Turks ravaged the country along the banks of the Sangarius, and he was occupied, during the summer of 1139, with an expedition into Paphlagonia and Pontus, during which he advanced as far as Neocaesarea. In this campaign his youngest son Manuel distinguished himself by his valour, and his nephew John fled to the Turks, as has been already mentioned. In winter the army was encamped on the banks of the Rhyndacus, to protect the rich plains of Bithynia.

Instead of prosecuting the war in Pontus, the emperor prepared a powerful army, at the head of which he proposed to march to Jerusalem and re-establish the Byzantine supremacy in Syria. The Frank princes, the King of Jerusalem, the Pope, and the Latin clergy, all viewed his project with fear and jealousy, and were eager to thwart his operations. The year 1141 was occupied by military operations against the Sultan of Iconium, in order to secure the frontiers of the empire from all danger during the emperor's absence in Syria. One of the measures adopted by John during this campaign has been already blamed.

On the frontiers of Lycaonia, nearly in a direct line between Attalia and Iconium, there is a large fresh-water lake surrounded by mountains, called Pasgusa by Cinnamus. This lake, the Koralis of Strabo, is about twenty miles long and eight broad, and is distant upwards of forty miles from Iconium. Many islands are interspersed on its surface,

which in the time of John II. were inhabited by a numerous Christian population, enjoying a considerable degree of municipal liberty, and carrying on a flourishing trade with Iconium under the protection of the sultan. The emperor now summoned these islanders to receive Byzantine garrisons; but as the islands were well fortified, and the people feared the fiscal rapacity of the imperial administration, and hated the ecclesiastical tyranny of the Greek church, they rejected the summons, and prepared to resist. But though the lake and the island fortifications had proved an effectual defence against the Seljouk Turks, they could oppose only a weak barrier to the scientific attacks of John. Boats were constructed, battering-rams and storming-towers were floated on rafts close to the walls, and after a brave resistance the island fortresses were taken and their inhabitants made prisoners and compelled to emigrate. Byzantine garrisons for a while retained possession of these conquests, but when deprived of their industrious inhabitants the islands became useless, and the shores of the lake were deserted¹.

The emperor passed the winter near Anazarba, on the frontiers of Cilicia, holding his army ready to enter Syria and take possession of Antioch in spring. But while he was revolving his projects, and arranging everything necessary for his march to Jerusalem, an accident suddenly terminated his life. While he was hunting on Mount Taurus, it happened that he received the charge of a wild boar with his hunting-spear, and in his struggle with the wild beast a poisoned arrow from his own quiver wounded his hand. At first he paid no attention to the wound, and when his arm began to swell with the effect of the poison, he refused to submit to amputation, which might then have proved unavailing. Without loss of time, he made every arrangement necessary for the tranquil transmission of the imperial power to his youngest son, Manuel, whom he selected for his successor on account of his superior talents. John II. expired tranquilly on the 8th of April 1143, after a reign of twenty-four

¹ Strabo, xii. c. 6, p. 568; Cinnamus, 12; Nicetas, 25. The lake is still called Karali, from a town of the same name, which has evidently preserved the ancient name. Its more general appellation, however, among the Turks, is the lake of Bey Sheher, which is a town of some importance at its south-eastern extremity.

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years, seven months, and twenty-five days, at the age of fifty-five¹.

SECT. III.—*Reign of Manuel I*, A.D. 1143-1180.

Character of Manuel.—Anecdotes of his court.—Condition of the empire.—Commercial treaties with Venice, Pisa, and Genoa.—Raymond prince of Antioch.—Invasion of Greece by Roger king of Sicily.—Thebes and Corinth plundered.—Decline of Greece.—Conduct of Manuel during the second crusade.—Recovery of Corfu.—War with the Servians and Hungarians.—With the Venetians.—Wars in Asia.—Marriage of Manuel with Mary of Antioch.—Expedition to Egypt.—War with the Seljouk Turks.—Defeat of Manuel at Myriokephalon.—Death of Manuel.

Manuel was not unworthy of his father's preference, but the possession of absolute power at an early age brings temptations which few can resist. Perhaps if Manuel had enjoyed the advantage of passing some additional years under his father's eye, he might in his maturer age have become a wise and great prince. He possessed courage, ability, and strength of character; nor was he deficient in literary cultivation, political sagacity, or theological knowledge; but he ascended the throne of a corrupted empire before his passions were disciplined. We need not wonder, therefore, at finding that his vices developed themselves so rapidly as to choke many of his virtues. Neither the institutions of Byzantine society nor the political organization of the government enabled the higher and middling classes of the capital to acquire the knowledge or the virtues necessary to invest public opinion with any authority, so that Manuel felt little moral restraint, and rarely considered it an imperative duty to make his conduct conformable to the dictates of his judgment by sacrificing his inclinations. A middle class could hardly be said to exist any longer in the empire².

Manuel's authority as emperor was peaceably recognized at Constantinople in consequence of the energy and prudence of

¹ Nicetas, 31. Cinpamus (15) gives, erroneously, twenty-five years and seven months.

² Many laws of the Byzantine emperors might be cited to prove that, in the better days of the empire, they endeavoured to prevent the extinction of the middle classes; but while they were willing to hinder the large proprietors from devouring the small, they overlooked the fact that fiscal oppression reduced the small proprietor to the rank of a peasant. See Mortreuil, *Histoire du Droit Byzantin*, ii 330, 336, 339.

Axouchos, his father's friend and prime-minister, who hastened to the capital, and took all necessary precautions before the death of John II. was publicly known. The young emperor's elder brother, Isaac, was confined in a monastery and closely watched, while the intrigues of his brother-in-law, the Caesar Roger, were easily rendered abortive¹. The support of the clergy was purchased by a yearly pension of two hundred pounds' weight of gold, and the goodwill of the Patriarch was secured by a further donation of one hundred pounds, which Manuel placed on the high altar of St. Sophia's at the time of his coronation². The army was attached by promotions, bounties, and furloughs; and the citizens of Constantinople were gained by the grant of a donative of two pieces of gold to every householder in the capital. The circumstances attending Manuel's accession compelled him to hasten in person to Constantinople, in order to receive the imperial crown in St. Sophia's. Custom and popular prejudice rendered the immediate performance of this ceremony absolutely necessary to give a legal sanction to his occupation of the throne, for it often happens that, long after law and religion are neglected, forms and ceremonies exert despotic power over nations deaf to the voice of justice and truth.

Manuel possessed both the personal advantages and mental qualities most admired by his contemporaries. He was tall, handsome, vigorous, and brave; skilled in all military exercises, and indefatigable as a sportsman and a soldier. But his headlong courage degenerated into rashness, and his personal skill made him seek the fame of a daring knight oftener than was prudent in an able general. His unlimited power and violent passions rendered his wars as much a matter of amusement as his hunting parties, and induced him to engage in them with as little reference to the welfare of his subjects. The wealth of the empire was lavished on brilliant fêtes and tournaments, which were renowned through all

¹ The Emperor John II. had four sons, but two died before their father. The Caesar Roger, husband of Maria, daughter of John II., was a member of the family of the Norman princes of Capua. Manuel pardoned Roger's treasonable intrigues for his sister's sake. Compare Anna Comnena, 556; Ducange, *Notes to Cinnamus*, 436; and see the genealogy of the family of Comnenus in Ducange, *Fam. Byz. Aug.*, and in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*.

² Cinnamus, 18; Nicetas, 34. Nicetas says the payment was made in silver coin.

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Europe as the most magnificent spectacles of the kind that had ever been exhibited. But the dignity of the empire was forgotten, and the emperor's love of pleasure was unrestrained by morality and religion. The Byzantine court, already familiar with every vice, was taught by him to tolerate even the crime of incest.

Two anecdotes may be selected to give a picture of the state of society early in Manuel's reign. At one of the social meetings in which he indulged, the conversation of his relations present turned on his own and his father's military exploits. His nephew, John, the son of his deceased brother Andronicus, extolled the deeds of the Emperor John as superior to those of Manuel, and the preference was admitted to be just by Manuel himself, who loved his father and respected his memory. But the emperor's brother Isaac and his cousin Andronicus engaged in a violent altercation on the subject, in which something which Andronicus said offended Isaac to such a degree that he drew his sword, and made a blow at his cousin's head. The emperor, with his usual boldness and promptitude, warded off the blow with his arm, and John Ducas, another cousin of the emperor, assisted in parrying it with his hunting-whip. Manuel, however, received a wound from his brother's sword, even through his gold-embroidered dress, of which he carried the mark to his grave. His cousin Andronicus showed little gratitude to the emperor for saving his life. The circumstances of this affair made a deep impression on the mind of Manuel, to whom it revealed the existence among the members of his own family of concealed feelings of ill-will and envy which he had not previously suspected, and he is said ever after to have worn armour under his clothes¹.

The other anecdote exhibits the court in a state of society so disgusting, that we should be unable to believe the possibility of so much vice under the eye of a Christian clergy and an established church, unless we possessed convincing proofs of

¹ Cinnamus, 73. Nicetas (74) gives us another anecdote worthy of record. John Kamateros, the intendant of the post, was a favourite minister on account of his jovial qualities. He was the greatest wine drinker of his time, but wine appeared to clear his intellect instead of confusing it. He delighted the emperor with his singing, music, and dancing, and he astonished the world by the quantity of raw beans he devoured. He gained a bet from the emperor by drinking the water contained in an immense porphyry vase at two draughts. He was admired by the people for his immense strength and his tall handsome person.

the fact. It shows us how far crime may proceed where the aristocracy have no feelings of moral responsibility, and where the church is the creature of a corrupted state. The amours of Andronicus with his cousin Eudocia were the object of much remark, as the connection was considered incestuous among the Greeks. It was notorious, however, that the emperor was carrying on an adulterous and incestuous intercourse with his niece Theodora, the sister of Eudocia. Andronicus, therefore, openly made a jest of his own and his sovereign's infamy, observing that water from the same fountain has the same taste. Yet while such was the state of the court, Manuel gave his imperial sanction to an ecclesiastical prohibition of the marriage of his subjects to the seventh degree of consanguinity¹.

At this time the aristocracy of western Europe far surpassed the nobles of the Byzantine empire in all warlike accomplishments. The military spirit of the times of Nicephorus Phokas, John Zimiskes, and Basil the Bulgarian-slayer, had passed away. This degeneracy of the Greeks induced the Emperor John II. to fill his ranks with Turkish mercenaries, and it now caused Manuel to adopt the habits of Western chivalry, and in military affairs to show a strong preference for the Franks². Both Manuel's wives were Latin princesses. His first was Bertha, called by the Greeks Irene, who was daughter of the Count of Sulzbach, and sister of the wife of Conrad, emperor of Germany. His second was Maria, the daughter of Raymond and Constance of Antioch, and this marriage mingled the blood of Alexius and Bohemund in an unlucky alliance. His daughter Maria, after having been betrothed to Bela III. before he became king of Hungary, promised to William the Good, king of Sicily, and asked in marriage by the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa for his son, Henry VI., was at a ripe age, A.D. 1180 (years, however, not having in

¹ Nicetas, 69; Mortreuil, *Histoire du Droit Byzantin*, iii. 182. Compare iii. 156, and the synodal decrees in Freher's edition of the *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, tom. i. 215, 217, 231.

² Marvellous stories are told of the personal strength of Manuel. In tournaments he used a heavier spear and shield than any Latin knight; and Raymond prince of Antioch, who was called the Frank Hercules, was amazed at the weight of the emperor's armour. Cinnamus answers for the wonderful strength and activity of the emperor from personal observation; 72, 140. An Arabian author says that Raymond could tear a stirrup in two with his hands. Vaublanc, *La France au Temps des Croisades*, ii. 207; Michaud, *Biblioth. des Croisades*, iv. partie, 98.

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any way impaired her beauty), bestowed on Rayner, second son of William, marquess of Montferrat, who received the rank of Caesar¹. At the same time, the emperor's young son Alexius was married to Agnes, daughter of Louis VII., king of France. To this disposition of the emperor Manuel in favour of the Latins we may trace something of the hostile feeling which the Greek clergy showed to his government on more than one occasion, and there can be no doubt that it was from political and personal reasons, not from religious preference, that Manuel endeavoured to effect a union with the papal church².

To form a correct estimate of the position occupied by the Byzantine empire at this period in the international system of the Christian states, we must bear in mind the superior intellectual cultivation of its rulers and its immense pecuniary resources. Though the Byzantine nobility were inferior to the Western barons in warlike accomplishments, they surpassed even the Latin clergy in intellectual culture. Even the Emperor Manuel, who rivalled the valour of Richard Cœur-de-Lion in the field, was instructed in all the learning of his age. His knowledge of surgery enabled him to dress the broken arm of Baldwin III., king of Jerusalem, and his theological studies enabled him to direct the determinations of the synods of the Byzantine church. After a long dispute with the

¹ The Princess Maria was thirty years old, and as strong as a man, according to Nicetas (111). Rayner was a beardless youth of seventeen. The Western chronicles assert that Manuel made Rayner king of Thessalonica, but it is not mentioned by the Byzantine writers, and probably the title of Caesar was considered as equivalent to that of king; and the idea of Thessalonica having been granted as an appanage was adopted to legitimate the conquest of Boniface in 1204, who was a younger brother of Rayner. See Robertus de Monte in Struve, *Rerum German. Scrip.* iii. 924. Buchon (*Recherches et Matériaux pour servir à une Histoire de la Domination Française*, etc. 64) and *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates* (v. 169, 4to. edit.) adopt the doubtful statement. Nicetas (133) blames Manuel's preference for the Western nations. Compare William of Tyre, xxii. 10, in Bongars, 1023.

² The Patriarch Kosmas of Aegina was deposed by a synod of bishops of the court party. He was accused of favouring the heretical opinions of his friend Niphon, a monk convicted of holding some of the doctrines of the Bogomilians. But the real ground of the deposition of Kosmas was his hostility to Manuel's views, and the suspicion the emperor entertained that he was intriguing with his brother Isaac. The deposed Aeginetan patriarch had very little Christian charity. He appears to have been an ecclesiastic worthy of Manuel's court, for when he heard his sentence, he heaped curses on the heads of his accusers, on the synod, and on the emperor; and his frantic rage went so far that he implored Heaven the empress might never have a child. Nicetas, 54. Kosmas was patriarch for only ten months, until February 1147. He is called Kosmas Atticus. Cupér, *De Patriarchis Constantin.* 134.

Greek clergy, he succeeded in expunging an anathema against the God of Mahomet from the church catechism, and replacing it by an anathema against Mahomet and his doctrines¹!

The relative superiority of the Byzantine empire to the other Christian states was still very great, though the foundations of its prosperity and strength were already undermined. This superiority was also rendered more apparent in a political point of view, from the immense power conferred on the emperor by the centralization of the whole governmental authority in his person, and by the arbitrary power he was thereby enabled to exercise over the fortunes of his subjects. But we shall see that the splendour of Manuel's reign was purchased by the expenditure of the capital as well as of the income of the empire, and the diminished resources of his dominions became apparent immediately after his death. The wasteful extravagance of his court and his tournaments, together with the expense of the large military establishments he maintained, kept his treasury so low that he was compelled to use both oppression and rapacity in order to fill it; his financial administration was marked by injustice; wealth was seized wherever he could lay his hands on it; the people were impoverished by monopolies, and individuals were enriched by privileges, so that the inhabitants of the provinces began to contemplate subjection to the Franks and the Mohammedans as an alternative by which they could escape spoliation². Unfortunately for the empire, the family of Comnenus was a fruitful stock, and every member of the house required to be provided with an income suitable to his imperial rank; so that if we glance our eye over the long catalogue of these Byzantine princes in the volume of Ducange, and estimate their cost to the state by the fact that, when prisoners, their ransom was generally rated at twenty thousand pieces of gold, there can be no doubt that an army of one hundred thousand men, with its officers and materials of war, might have been maintained for the same expenditure³.

¹ Nicetas, 141; Le Beau, xvi. 246; Le Quien, *Oriens Christianus*, i. 270. Manuel, like all monarchical theologians, not only persecuted those who differed from him, but required that all who ventured to examine his opinions should be excommunicated. Zachariä, *Hist. Juris Graeco-Romani Delineatio*, 55; Mortreuil, iii. 169. Cinnamus (110) says that he had seen Manuel bleed patients and dress wounds in the absence of a surgeon.

² Nicetas, 132, 135.

³ *Familiae Byzantinae*, 169, &c.

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But when we look beyond the expense of the imperial family, the corruption of the administration, the vices of the court, and the servility of the clergy, we perceive that a desire for improvement still existed in those classes who were free from the immediate circle of official influence. The degraded condition of society was felt, and some anxiety to escape its evils was manifested. The scanty records of the civil and ecclesiastical jurisprudence of the time, and the pedantic remains of Byzantine literature, allows us to trace this spirit in the history of the law and of the church. Unfortunately for the Eastern Empire, the Greeks, in whom these feelings could alone have produced some practicable political reform, sacrificed their nationality to the pride of calling themselves Romans, and to the profit arising from appropriating to themselves innumerable offices in the public and in the ecclesiastical administration. The Greeks never made any national opposition to the ruinous abuses of the imperial government. The only constitutional remedy on which all classes in the empire could ever agree, was to depose an emperor when his conduct became intolerable. The officials, who shared in the plunder of the people, declared that no earthly power was entitled to circumscribe the imperial authority, and the people were unable to discover any practical guarantee for their natural rights. The consequence was, political incapacity in the higher and intellectual apathy in the lower classes, so that the subjugation of the Byzantine empire by foreigners became at last an easy task.

The Greeks were almost excluded from military service, for they were regarded by the emperors as more useful in their capacity of tax-payers than they were likely to become as soldiers; yet their prosperity was neglected, and their country was left unprotected. A national feeling at length arose among the provincial clergy in Greece, but it was prevented from producing any political effects favourable to popular liberty, by being diverted into a bigoted hatred against the Latins.

We derive some valuable information concerning the condition of the Byzantine empire during the reign of Manuel from the travels of the Jewish rabbi, Benjamin of Tudela. Whether Benjamin visited in person all the countries he describes is a matter of no great importance, for he certainly

records the observations of an eyewitness. The state of the Eastern Empire is sketched with as much clearness and precision as is generally displayed even by modern travellers. The wealth of Constantinople, the power and magnificence of the emperor Manuel, the commercial activity and manufacturing industry of the Greeks, the riches and luxury of the Byzantine nobles, the unwarlike spirit of the people, the mercenary composition of the imperial armies, and the heterogeneous population of various races in different states of civilization that peopled the provinces, from the Vallachians of Thessaly to the Armenians of Cilicia, are all pointed out by this observing traveller, who, free both from the prejudices of the Latin monk and the antipathies of the Byzantine official, gives us a deeper insight into the composition of the empire than the eulogies of Greek historians or the calumnies of Western chroniclers¹.

The external policy of Manuel's reign was guided by a desire to gain personal renown; the internal was solely directed to augment the receipts of the imperial treasury. But he was not insensible to the increasing power of the commercial republics of Italy; he concluded treaties with the Pisans and the Genoese, and protected the Amalfitans, who had formed a colony at Constantinople when their city was taken by the Normans². Manuel's object was, by these alliances, to counterbalance the great influence the Venetians had acquired over the Byzantine finances by the immense privileges conceded to them by Alexius I., as a reward for their services in the Norman war. Anna Comnena enumerates these concessions in a curious passage, which throws great

¹ Compare the *Itinerary* of Benjamin of Tudela, translated by Asher, vol. i. 48-58, vol. ii. 38-60, with the more critical notes of Tafel, *Thessalonica*, 489. The immense wealth Benjamin speaks of as existing in Constantinople has induced many to call his authority in question. Marco Polo, however, in speaking of the city of Hangtcheou-fou, about a century later (A.D. 1273-1295), says its revenue amounted to 14,700,000 saiks, estimated at 7,350,000*l.* sterling. In both cases the revenue of the capital appears to be given when the revenue of the empire is really meant. The resemblance of the financial system in the Byzantine and Chinese empires at this period is deserving of investigation, if any materials exist. *Travels of Marco Polo*, edit. Murray, 198. The Arabian geographer, Edrisi, informs us that at this period the Arabs brought considerable supplies of gold from Sofala.

² The commerce of the Amalfitans with Constantinople was probably as old as that of the Venetians. It is mentioned by Luitprand, A.D. 968. The colony is noticed by Nicetas, p. 355: "Ὅσοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀμαλφίτης ἤθεσαν ἐντετραμμένοι Ῥωμαϊκῶς.

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light on the history of Byzantine commerce, and proves that her father's generosity must have inflicted a severe loss on the native merchants of the empire. A street of warehouses was given to the Venetians in the capital. The Amalfitans were compelled to place themselves under Venetian protection and pay dues to the Venetian colony. Venetian merchandise was exempt from custom duties, and Venetian merchants were permitted to trade over the whole extent of the empire as far as the entrance of the Black Sea¹. It is difficult to fix the precise nature of the advantages which they acquired by this treaty over the native merchant: but there is no doubt that it marks the commencement of a system of commercial policy on the part of the Byzantine government to which we must attribute the ruin of Greek commerce in the Mediterranean. These concessions were also made the ground of many abuses on the part of the Venetians, who, because they paid little, endeavoured to pay nothing, and thus innumerable disputes arose with the fiscal officers as well as with the native merchants. The mutual dissatisfaction arising from such discussions broke out into open hostilities during the reign of John II.; and Manuel, warned by his father's difficulties, endeavoured to render the empire independent of the Venetians, by encouraging their commercial rivals to visit his dominions.

In attempting to estimate the effect produced on the trade and manufactures of the inhabitants of the Byzantine empire by the privileges conceded to the Venetians, it is necessary to avoid drawing our inferences from the state of commerce in

¹ Anna, 161; Cinnamus, 164. See above, p. 75, and compare the documents given by Marin, *Storia Civile e Politica del Commercio de' Veneziani*, tom. iii. 282. Any patriotic Greek, who has pursued his studies with profit in the Athenian university, might render an important service both to the literature and commercial legislation of his country, by collecting and publishing all the Byzantine documents which exist relating to commerce. Many have only been preserved in Latin translations, and they would become more intelligible by being restored as far as possible to their original language. Historical as well as geographical notes would be necessary. Professors Tafel and Thomas are engaged in the publication of those relating to Venetian commerce, *Urkunden zur ältern Geschichte der Republik Venedig*. [An account of the commercial relations of the Byzantine empire, and of Alexius I. in particular, with the states of Western Europe, founded on the most recent authorities, has been given by Hopf in Brockhaus' *Griechenland*, vol. vi. pp. 149-151. He refers especially to the writings of Heyd in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, which have been collected and translated into Italian with additions under the title *Le Colonie commerciali degli Italiani in Oriente nel medio Evo*, vol. i. Venezia e Torino, 1866. See also below, vol. iv., *Mediæval Greece and Trebizond*, chap. ii. § 3. Ed.]

modern times. The difficulties of transport both by sea and land confined commerce within a smaller sphere, and restricted it to fewer articles. Jews exacted fifty per cent. interest, barons gloried in plundering merchants, and merchants acted as pirates. To us it would seem that immunity from import duties must have very soon thrown the whole trade of the empire into the hands of the Venetians. But we know that this was not the case, and we observe three circumstances which exercised great influence in preventing the immunity from proving as injurious to the imperial treasury as it must have been to private traders. The first was the exclusion of all foreign ships from the Black Sea¹. The second, the monopoly which the Byzantine government retained of the commerce in grain and all kinds of provisions, both as regarded importation and exportation². And the third was, that the rents of shops and warehouses formed no trifling portion of the imperial revenues at Constantinople; though it is not easy to say how the privileges granted to the Venetians raised the value of this species of property³. Other circumstances probably contributed to modify the natural effect of fiscal immunities, and to render them less oppressive to the general trade of the empire than is apparent from historical records. Still, there can be no doubt that the preference accorded by the Byzantine emperors to foreigners during the twelfth century was one of the principal causes of the decline of Greek commerce, which ought to be attributed rather to the direct effect of the fiscal measures of the house of Comnenus than to the increased commercial activity of the Italian republics caused by the Crusades.

The Emperor Alexius I. had concluded a commercial

¹ A special license from the emperor was necessary to enable any foreign vessel to enter the Black Sea, until after the taking of Constantinople by the Crusaders and Venetians. This appears from Manuel's treaty with the Genoese, which interdicts all communication with Russia and Matica, and from the omission of Cherson, Sinope, Amisus, and Trebizond in the list of cities with which Venice was permitted to trade. Compare Sauli, *Colonia di Galata*, ii. 192, and Tafel's *Symbolae criticae Geographiam Byzantinam spectantes*, published in the Transactions of the Academy of Munich, 1849.

² On the subject of the monopoly of provisions, see the preceding volume, pp. 279, 281, and p. 39 of the present volume. Albertus Aquensis (of Aix), speaking of the first crusade, says—'Nam nullius praeter imperatoris merces tam in vino et oleo quam in frumento et hordeo omnique esca vendebatur in toto regno. Et ideo regis aerarium assidua pecunia abundans nulla datione evacuari potest.' lib. xi. c. 16, in Bongars, 203.

³ Benjamin of Tudela, *Itinerary*, i. 53.

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treaty with Pisa towards the end of his reign¹. Manuel renewed this alliance, and he appears to have been the first of the Byzantine emperors who concluded a public treaty with Genoa². The pride of the emperors of the Romans, as the sovereigns of Constantinople were styled, induced them to treat the Italian republics as municipalities still dependent on the empire, of which they had once formed a part; and the rulers both of Pisa and Genoa yielded to this assumption of supremacy, and consented to appear as vassals and liegemen of the Byzantine emperors, in order to participate in the profits of the Venetians. Several commercial treaties with Pisa and Genoa, as well as with Venice, have been preserved. The obligations of the republics are embodied in the charter enumerating the concessions granted by the emperor, and the document is called a chrysobullum, or golden bull, from the golden seal of the emperor attached to it as the certificate of its authenticity.

In Manuel's treaties with the Genoese and Pisans, the republics bind themselves never to engage in hostilities against the empire; but, on the contrary, all the subjects of these republics residing in the emperor's dominions become bound to assist him against all assailants: they engage to act with their own ships, or to serve on board the imperial fleet, for the usual pay granted to Latin mercenaries. They promise to offer no impediment to the extension of the empire in Syria, reserving to themselves the factories and privileges they already possess in any place that may be conquered. They submit their civil and criminal affairs to the jurisdiction of the Byzantine courts of justice, as was then the case with the Venetians and other foreigners in the empire. Acts of piracy and armed violence, unless the criminals were taken in

¹ The treaties of Alexius I. and Manuel I. with Pisa are printed in Buchon's *Nouvelles Recherches historiques sur la Principauté Française de Morée—Diplomes*, Pise, i. ii. The dates in the originals appear to be incorrectly given, as the indiction and the year of the Constantinopolitan æra do not accord. Ducange, citing his authority in *Annalibus Rerum Pisan.* Ughellianis, conjectures that the Pisans, being connected with the Venetians in the Byzantine empire, were expelled by Manuel, and restored in 1172. *Notæ in Hist. J. Cinnami*, 487. Compare Marin, *Commercio de' Veneziani*, iii. 162.

² The documents relating to the Genoese treaty are given by Sauli, *Della Colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, ii. 181. The date is there also defective. It is not 1178, as Vincens (*Histoire de la République de Gènes*, i. 220) supposes, but 1169, in which October of the third indiction of the year 6678 of the Constantinopolitan æra falls. The date of the treaty was third indiction VIMDCLXXVIII.

the fact, were to be reported to the rulers of the republic whose subjects had committed the crime, and the Byzantine authorities were not to render the innocent traders in the empire responsible for the injuries inflicted by these brigands. The republicans engaged to observe all the stipulations in their treaties in defiance of ecclesiastical excommunication, or the prohibition of any individual, crowned or not crowned.

Manuel, in return, granted to the republicans the right of forming factories, erecting quays for landing their goods, and building churches, and the Genoese received their grant in an agreeable position on the side of the port opposite Constantinople, where in after times their great colony of Galata was formed. The emperor promised to send an annual present of from four hundred to five hundred gold byzants, with two pieces of a rich brocade then manufactured only in the Byzantine empire, to the republican governments, and sixty byzants, with one piece of brocade, to their archbishops. These treaties fixed the duty levied on the goods imported or exported from Constantinople by the Italians at four per cent.; but in the other cities of the empire, the Pisans and Genoese were to pay the same duties as other Latin traders, excepting, of course, the privileged Venetians. These duties generally amounted to ten per cent. Foreigners were expressly excluded, by the Genoese treaty, from the Black Sea trade, except when they received a special license from the emperor. In case of shipwreck, the property of foreigners was to be protected by the imperial authorities and respected by the people, and every assistance was to be granted to the unfortunate sufferers. This humane clause was not new in Byzantine commercial treaties, for it is contained in the earliest treaty concluded by Alexius I. with the Pisans¹. On the whole, the arrangements for the administration of justice in these treaties prove that the Byzantine empire still enjoyed a greater degree of order than the rest of Europe.

The state of civilization in the Eastern Empire, as we have had already occasion to observe, rendered the public finances the moving power of the government, as in the nations of modern Europe. This must always tend to the centralization of political authority, for the highest branch

¹ See the charter under the golden seal, given by Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches historiques sur la Principauté Française de Morée—Diplomes*, 4.

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of the executive will always endeavour to dispose of the revenues of the state according to its views of necessity. This centralizing policy led Manuel to order all the money which the Greek commercial communities had hitherto devoted to maintaining local squadrons of galleys for the defence of the islands and coasts of the Aegean, to be remitted to the treasury at Constantinople. The ships were compelled to visit the imperial dockyard in the capital to undergo repairs, and to receive provisions and pay. A navy is a most expensive establishment; kings, ministers, and people are all very apt to think that when it is not wanted at any particular time, the cost of its maintenance may be more profitably applied to other objects. Manuel, after he had secured the funds of the Greeks for his own treasury, soon left their ships to rot, and the commerce of Greece became exposed to the attacks of small squadrons of Italian pirates who previously would not have dared to plunder in the Archipelago. It may be thought by some that Manuel acted wisely in centralizing the naval administration; but the great number, the small size, and the relative position of many of the Greek islands with regard to the prevailing winds rendered the permanent establishment of naval stations at several points necessary to prevent piracy; and unless local interests possess considerable influence in appropriating the funds required for local objects there is always great danger that the duty will be neglected by the central administration. But no general rule can be safely applied to a problem in practical administration. Manuel ruined the navy of Greece by unwise measures of centralization; Pericles, by prudently centralizing the maritime forces of various states, increased the naval power of Athens, and gave additional security to every Greek ship that navigated the sea¹.

¹ Nicetas, 38. As late as A.D. 1170, the city of Dyrrachium sent ten galleys, and the island of Euboea six, to the fleet which Manuel employed to invade Egypt.

In ancient Greece the smaller states of the confederation of Delos neglected their duties, while the Athenians for some years performed the obligations they assumed, on centralizing the naval administration, with honesty and energy; but a popular government is as easily corrupted, by being intrusted with unlimited power, as an individual monarch.

Professor Ross mentions, that among the other curious documents throwing light on the administration of the Byzantine empire, which he found in the monastery at Patmos, he saw an imperial ordinance commanding the community to fit out a ship of war. *Reisen auf den Griechischen Inseln*, ii. 135.

The same fiscal views which induced Manuel to centralize the naval administration, prompted him to pursue a diametrically opposite course with regard to the army. The Emperor John had added greatly to the efficiency of the Byzantine military force by improving and centralizing its administration, and he left Manuel an excellent army. But Manuel, from motives of economy, abandoned his father's system. Instead of assembling all the military forces of the empire annually in camps, where they received pay, and were subjected to strict discipline, towards the end of his reign he broke up the regular army into small divisions, which he distributed in quarters far apart, in order that each district, by maintaining a certain number of men, might relieve the treasury from the burden of their pay and subsistence while they were not on actual service. The money thus retained in the central treasury was spent in idle festivals at Constantinople, and the troops, dispersed and neglected, became careless of their military exercises, and lived in a state of relaxed discipline. Other abuses were quickly introduced; resident yeomen, shopkeepers, and artisans were enrolled in the legions, with the connivance of the officers. The burden of maintaining the troops was in this way diminished, but the army was deteriorated. In other districts, where the divisions were exposed to be called into action, or were more directly under central inspection, the effective force was kept up at its full complement, but the inhabitants were subjected to every kind of extortion. The tendency of absolute power being always to weaken the power of the law, and to increase the authority of the executive agents of the sovereign, its effects were soon manifested in the rapid progress of administrative corruption. The Byzantine garrisons in a few years became prototypes of the shopkeeping janissaries of the Othoman empire, and bore no resemblance to the feudal militia of western Europe, which Manuel had proposed as the model of his reform. This change produced a rapid decline in the military strength of the Byzantine army, and accelerated the fall of the empire¹.

For a considerable period the Byzantine emperors had been gradually increasing the proportion of foreign mercenaries

¹ Nicetas, 136.

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in their service, and Manuel carried this practice farther than any of his predecessors. Besides the usual Varangian, Italian, and German guards, we find large corps of Patzinaks, Franks, and Turks enrolled in his armies, and officers of these nations occupying situations of the highest rank¹. The heavy armour and powerful horses of the Crusaders effected a change in the military tactics of the East, and the greater personal strength and superior skill in the use of their weapons among the western nations compelled the Byzantine troops to revive the military exercises which had fallen into neglect. In the higher ranks of western society, warlike skill was the great object of education, the nobles expended their wealth on arms, and in general the western soldiers were more completely armed than the Byzantine troops. The warlike disposition of Manuel led him to favour the military nobles of the West who took service at his court; his confidence in his own power, and in the political superiority of his empire, deluded him with the hope of being able to quell the turbulence of the Franks and set bounds to the ambition and power of the popes².

The wars of Manuel were sometimes forced on him by foreign powers, and sometimes commenced for temporary objects; but no permanent policy ever directed the employment of all the military resources at his command, for the purpose of advancing the interest of his empire and giving security to his subjects. His military exploits may be considered under three heads:—His wars with the Franks, whether in Asia or Europe; his wars with the Hungarians and Serbians; and his wars with the Turks.

His first operations were against the principality of Antioch. The death of John II. caused the dispersion of great part of the fine army he had assembled for the conquest of Syria; but Manuel sent a portion of that army, and a strong fleet, to invade the principality. One of the generals of the land forces was Prosuch, a Turkish officer in high favour with his father. Raymond of Antioch was no longer the idle gambler he had shown himself in the camp of the Emperor John; but though

¹ Tatikios and Axouchos were Turks; Petraliphas and the Caesar Roger were Italians; Alexis Gifard and Alexander of Conversan, Normans;—and all were distinguished Byzantine commanders.

² Cinnamus, 127.

he was now distinguished by his courage and skill in arms, he was completely defeated, and the imperial army carried its ravages up to the very walls of Antioch, while the fleet laid waste the coast. Though the Byzantine troops retired, the losses of the campaign convinced Raymond that it would be impossible to defend Antioch, should Manuel take the field in person. He therefore hastened to Constantinople, as a suppliant, to sue for peace; but Manuel, before admitting him to an audience, required that he should repair to the tomb of the Emperor John, and ask pardon for having violated his former promises. The Hercules of the Franks, as Raymond was called, after submitting to this humiliation, was admitted to the imperial presence, swore fealty to the Byzantine empire as Prince of Antioch, and became the vassal of the Emperor Manuel¹. The conquest of Edessa by the Mohammedans, which took place in the month of December 1144, rendered the defence of Antioch by the Latins a doubtful enterprize, unless they could secure the assistance of the Greeks².

Manuel involved himself unnecessarily in a war with Roger, king of Sicily, which he might have avoided by more prudent conduct. A Byzantine envoy concluded a treaty with the Sicilian court, of which the terms were displeasing to Manuel who disavowed it with unsuitable violence: this gave the Sicilian king a pretext for commencing war, but the real cause of hostilities must be sought in the ambition of Roger and the hostile feelings of Manuel. Roger was one of the wealthiest princes of his time; he had united under his sceptre both Sicily and all the Norman possessions in southern Italy; his ambition was equal to his wealth and power, and he aspired at eclipsing the glory of Robert Guiscard and Bohemund by his military exploits and some permanent conquests in the Byzantine empire. On the other hand, the renown of Roger excited the envy of Manuel, who, proud of his army, and confident of his own valour and military skill, hoped to reconquer Sicily. His passion made him forget that he was surrounded by numerous enemies, who would prevent his

¹ Cinnamus, 20 : Καὶ λίξιον αὐτὸν λοιπὸν ἐποίησατο. The Byzantine court was fully aware of the difference between simple homage and liege homage. Ducange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*—'Homagium.'

² This date is given in the *Notice sur Nersès-Klaidès, Auteur du Poème élégiaque sur la Prise d'Edesse*, by Saint-Martin, p. 5.

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employing all his forces against one adversary; while Roger could direct all his forces against one point.

At the commencement of the second crusade, when the attention of Manuel was anxiously directed to the movements of Louis VII. of France, and Conrad, emperor of Germany, Roger, who collected a powerful fleet at Brindisi, for the purpose either of attacking the Byzantine empire or transporting the Crusaders to Palestine, availed himself of an insurrection in Corfu to conclude a convention with the inhabitants of that island, who admitted a garrison of one thousand Norman troops into their citadel. The Corfiotes complained with great reason of the intolerable weight of taxation to which they were subjected, of the utter neglect of their interests by the central government, and of the great abuses which prevailed in the administration of justice. The remedy they adopted, by placing themselves under the rule of foreign masters, was not likely to alleviate these evils. The Sicilian admiral, after landing the Norman garrison at Corfu, sailed to Monemvasia, then one of the principal commercial cities in the East, hoping to gain possession of it without difficulty; but the maritime population of that impregnable fortress gave him a warm reception, and easily repulsed his attack. After plundering the coasts of Euboea and Attica, the Sicilian fleet returned to the west, and laid waste Acarnania and Aetolia; it then entered the gulf of Corinth, and debarked a body of troops at Crissa. This force marched into Boeotia, plundering every town and village on the way. Thebes, then a populous and wealthy manufacturing city, offered no resistance, and was plundered in the most deliberate and barbarous manner. A century had elapsed since the citizens of Thebes had gone out valiantly to fight an army of Sclavonian rebels in the reign of Michael IV. (the Paphlagonian), and their defeat on that occasion was perhaps not entirely forgotten¹. But all military spirit was now dead, and the Thebans had so long lived without any fear of invasion that they had forgotten the use of arms. The Sicilians not only found them unprepared to offer any resistance, but so unexpected was the attack that they had not adopted any effectual measures to conceal their movable property. The conquerors, secure against all danger

¹ See vol. ii. p. 417.

of interruption, plundered Thebes at their leisure. Not only gold, silver, jewels, and church plate were carried off, but even the goods found in the warehouses, and the rarest articles of furniture in private houses, were transported to the ships. When all ordinary means of collecting booty were exhausted, the citizens were compelled to take an oath on the Holy Scriptures that they had not concealed any portion of their property. Many of the wealthiest inhabitants were dragged away captive, in order to profit by their ransom; and many skilful workmen in the silk-manufactories, for which Thebes had long been famous, were pressed on board the fleet to labour at the oar¹.

From Boeotia the army passed to Corinth. Nicephorus Kaluphes, the governor, retired into the Acro-Corinth, but the garrison appeared to his cowardly heart not strong enough to defend that impregnable fortress, and he surrendered it to George Antiochenus, the Sicilian admiral, on the first summons. On mounting to the summit of the Acro-Corinth of which he had thus unexpectedly gained possession, the admiral could not help exclaiming that he fought under the protection of Heaven, for if Kaluphes had not been more timid than a virgin, he might have repulsed every attack². Corinth

¹ Nicetas, 65. Benjamin of Tudela, who visited Thebes about twenty years later, or perhaps in 1161, speaks of it as then a large city, with two thousand Jewish inhabitants, who were the most eminent manufacturers of silk and purple cloth in all Greece: i. 47. The silks of Thebes continued to be celebrated as of superior quality after this invasion. In 1195, Moïeddin, sultan of Ancyra, demanded forty pieces of Theban silk, *such as was woven for the emperor's use*, with a sum of money, as the price of his alliance. Nicetas, 297. It was not until the reign of John III. (Vatatzes), A.D. 1222-1255, that the decline of the silk manufacture among the Greeks caused the importation of Babylonian, Assyrian, and Italian silk. A law was then passed to prohibit the wearing of foreign silk. Nicephorus Gregoras, 25. Samit was a rich kind of silk made in the island of Samos, from which some derive the German word Sammet, 'velvet.'

² George Antiochenus was High Admiral and noble of the first rank in Sicily. The deed by which King Roger conferred the title of Protonobilissimus on Christodoulos, the father of George, who is styled Amer, and was also High Admiral, is dated in 1139. Montfaucon (*Palaeographia Graeca*, 408) gives a fac-simile of the original in the archives of the Royal Chapel at Palermo. There is a stone bridge of five arches near Palermo called Ponte del Ammiraglio, which was built by George from the spoils of Greece. There are also some remains of a church at Palermo built by George, called La Martorana. Two curious mosaics seem to indicate that Greek was the language in general use, or else that the workmen were exclusively Greeks. Gally Knight, *The Normans in Sicily*, 262. George was of the Greek church, and of Byzantine-Greek descent. [On the history of the architecture of Palermo, perhaps the most interesting in Europe from the various influences that combined to produce it, the reader is referred to a useful monograph by Anton Springer, *Die Mittelalterliche Kunst in Palermo* (Bonn, 1869). It is there pointed out, that in the middle of the twelfth century at Palermo four

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was sacked as cruelly as Thebes; men of rank, beautiful women, and skilful artisans, with their wives and families, were carried away into captivity. Even the relics of St. Theodore were taken from the church in which they were preserved; and it was not until the whole Sicilian fleet was laden with as much of the wealth of Greece as it was capable of transporting that the admiral ordered it to sail. The Sicilians did not venture to retain possession of the impregnable citadel of Corinth, as it would have been extremely difficult for them to keep up their communications with the garrison. This invasion of Greece was conducted entirely as a plundering expedition, having for its object to inflict the greatest possible injury on the Byzantine empire, while it collected the largest possible quantity of booty for the Sicilian troops. Corfu was the only conquest of which Roger retained possession; yet this passing invasion is the period from which the decline of Byzantine Greece is to be dated.

The century which preceded this disaster had passed in uninterrupted tranquillity, and the Greek people had increased rapidly in numbers and wealth. The power of the Slavonian population sank with the ruin of the kingdom of Achrida; and the Slavonians who dwelt in Greece were peaceable cultivators of the soil, or graziers. The Greek population, on the other hand, was in possession of an extensive commerce and many flourishing manufactures. The ruin of this commerce and of these manufactures has been ascribed to the transference of the silk trade from Thebes and Corinth to Palermo, under the judicious protection it received from Roger; but it would be more correct to say, that the injudicious and oppressive financial administration of the Byzantine emperors destroyed the commercial prosperity and manufacturing industry of the Greeks; while the wise liberality and intelligent protection of the Norman kings extended the commerce and increased the industry of the Sicilians.

When the Sicilian fleet returned to Palermo, Roger deter-

languages, Greek, Latin, Arabic, and French, were officially recognized; the administration of law was based on Justinian's Code, the Koran, and the customs of the Normans; and time was reckoned, in accordance with the practice of the three races, by the æra of the world, the Christian æra, and the Hejira. The architectural features derived from these three sources are clearly traced, together with the history of their introduction, and the existing buildings by which they are exemplified. Ed.]

mined to establish the manufacture of silk in his dominions. He collected together all the workmen who had been taken on board the fleet, and after reuniting them with their families as far as lay in his power, he settled them at Palermo, supplying them with the means of exercising their industry with profit to themselves, and inducing them to teach his own subjects to manufacture the richest brocades and to rival the rarest productions of the East. Roger, unlike most of the monarchs of his age, paid particular attention to increasing the prosperity of his subjects. During his reign the cultivation of the sugar-cane was introduced into Sicily. The conduct of Manuel was very different: when he concluded peace with William, the son and successor of Roger, in 1158, he neglected the commercial interests of his Greek subjects; the silk-manufactures of Thebes and Corinth were not reinstated in their native seats, but were left to exercise their industry for the profit of their new prince. Under such circumstances, it is not remarkable that before another century had elapsed the commerce and the manufactures of Greece were transferred to Sicily and Italy¹.

Though Manuel has been justly blamed for his conduct to the Crusaders, it would be wrong to give credit to all the accusations of the Latin writers, who frequently attribute to his conduct disasters which arose solely from the rashness and incapacity of the Franks. The Crusaders, ashamed of their defeats, indulged their national and ecclesiastical antipathies by attributing all their misfortunes to Manuel, forgetting that

¹ Cinnamus, 51, 68; Nicetas, 49. References to the passages in the Western writers relating to this expedition are given by Ducange in his Notes to Cinnamus, p. 446. The passage of Otho of Frisingen, in which special mention is made of the silk-weavers of Greece, is given by Carusius, *Bibliotheca Hist. Regni Siciliae*, ii. 934; see also Muratori, *Script. Rer. Ital.* vi. 668.

Muratori, in his *Annali d'Italia*, places this expedition to Greece in the year 1146. It must be recollected, however, that the ambassadors of Roger appeared at the assembly held by Louis VII. at Étampes in February 1147, offering to supply vessels and provisions for the passage of the French army to Palestine. Their offers were rejected, as the Sicilian fleet was not sufficiently numerous to transport both the army and the immense train of pilgrims under its escort. Now a doubt may arise whether the expedition to Greece did not happen after this refusal, when it was known that Manuel was compelled to keep the greater part of the Byzantine army and fleet in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, to watch the movements of the Germans and French in the vicinity of his capital, and to transport their armies over the Bosphorus. Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, ii. 136.

The anonymous chronicle of Mount Cassino (Carusius, *Bibliotheca Hist. Regni Siciliae*, i. 511) says that the treaty concluded between Manuel and William I. (the Bad) in 1158 was for the term of thirty years.

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every accusation brought against him could with equal truth be made against the Latin princes and nobles of Syria, in whose conduct the crimes assumed a blacker dye. The truth is, that all the Christian princes in the East, whether Greek, Latin, or Armenian, watched with fear and jealousy the conduct of the great Western monarchs who took the cross. Princes were not then amenable to the tribunal of public opinion, and the powerful, consequently, generally regarded it as a glorious exploit to seize every country of which they could hope to retain possession. When, therefore, the crusading monarchs were unable to conquer the Mohammedans, they were too apt to conquer the Christians.

The second crusade commenced in 1147. Conrad III., emperor of Germany, was the first prince who marched eastward; and he took the route through Hungary which had been followed by the first Crusaders. His army was numerous and well furnished; but it was embarrassed by an immense crowd of pilgrims, over whom the military chiefs could exercise very little control. It had, however, the advantage of being attended by a numerous body of workmen, to make roads and construct bridges; for the army feared nothing so much as delay. The agents of the Emperor Manuel, who were sent to count these troops as they crossed the Danube, reported that the number exceeded ninety thousand; and if we may trust the report of contemporary chronicles, seventy thousand of these were horsemen¹. During their progress through the Eastern Empire they were accompanied by a strong body of Byzantine troops, under the command of Prosuch, who advanced parallel to their line of march, and endeavoured to restrain the plundering propensities of the pilgrims, who thought they were entitled to help themselves to everything they desired, as they had received ample absolutions for every crime they might commit. The precautions of Conrad and the prudence of Manuel were insufficient to preserve order. The Greek suttlers, accustomed to cheat and to be cheated by their own government, defrauded the German soldiers; and the bands of robbers, whom the false piety of the Papal Church had allowed to take the cross, plundered the open country as a hostile district². The Bulgarians and

¹ Of these a great part consisted rather of mounted pilgrims than of soldiers.

² Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, ii. 132.

Greeks took up arms to revenge themselves. A relation of Conrad, falling sick, remained behind in a monastery at Adrianople, where some Byzantine soldiers murdered him and plundered his effects. The news reached the German emperor when he was already two days' march beyond Adrianople; but he immediately sent back his nephew, the celebrated Frederic Barbarossa, to punish this act of treachery. Frederic, naturally more violent than his uncle, set fire to the monastery and attacked the Byzantine troops in the vicinity; but after some slaughter, Prosuch succeeded in appeasing his anger and preventing a battle.

The Emperors Manuel and Conrad had married sisters; but their pride and etiquette prevented their meeting, and produced various acts of hostility between their armies. The Germans destroyed many of the splendid villas round Constantinople, and thereby ruined one of the greatest ornaments of that capital¹. But as Conrad was eager to pursue his route before Louis VII. of France could witness the disorder which already began to manifest itself in his army, and as Manuel was anxious to transport one army into Asia before the other reached the Bosphorus, the two emperors arranged their quarrels, and the Byzantine navy transported the Germans into Asia. Manuel also supplied Conrad with guides for his march to Antioch; and the Crusaders attributed all their subsequent misfortunes to the treachery of these guides, forgetting that the road from Constantinople to Antioch was quite as well known as that from Vienna to Constantinople, and that the real cause of their disasters was to be found in their own rashness, and in the natural difficulty of finding provisions for a large army, whose flanks were infested with brigands in the guise of pilgrims, whom the Emperor Conrad could not venture to hang, as they were the chosen sheep of the Pope. Conrad had unfortunately selected the summer as the season for marching through the arid plains of Phrygia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the men died of fever and the horses from want of forage. But it cannot be denied that the envious and malignant policy which marked the proceedings of the Byzantine court in its communications with western

¹ Cinnamus (42) gives the contents of a correspondence between the two emperors. The letters are filled with insults, and reflect no credit on either party. See also Michaud, *Bibliog. des Croisades*, vii, 168.

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Europe did much to increase the unavoidable difficulties of the Crusaders. It was undoubtedly a measure of prudence to exclude them from all walled towns; but it was an act of the basest infamy to mix chalk with the flour that was sold to them, and to coin false money to defraud them when they exchanged their gold and silver. Yet Nicetas tells us that Manuel was guilty of these meannesses¹. The Turkish cavalry attacked the German army when it was weakened by disease, and Conrad, with the portion of his cavalry still capable of service, was compelled to retreat. After meeting Louis VII. at Nicaea, he again advanced with the French monarch as far as Ephesus; but sickness compelled him to return to Constantinople, where Manuel gave him the kindest welcome, as he had ceased to be an object of fear².

Louis conducted his march with more prudence than Conrad. He possessed more control over his troops, and was not attended by so many idle followers and disorderly brigands. But Louis found even the European provinces of the Byzantine empire on his line of march so hostile, that he had to force his way through the country up to the walls of Constantinople. Manuel received Louis with demonstrations of friendship; but while the French army was encamped before Constantinople, it became known that the Byzantine emperor had concluded a truce with the Sultan of Iconium. A council was held in the French camp, and the Bishop of Langres proposed that the Crusaders should commence their military operations for the deliverance of Christ's sepulchre by conquering the heretics of Constantinople. He employed all his eloquence to incite his countrymen to attack the Greeks; but the French nobles declared that they had taken the cross to fight with infidels and defend Jerusalem, not to destroy Christian cities or punish heretics³. The King of France was so anxious to preserve amicable relations with the Byzantine

¹ Nicetas, 45. The Crusaders, however, acted very often quite as dishonourably as the Byzantine emperors. They appear to have been in the habit of cheating one another with false weights during the first crusade. Albertus Aquensis, iii. 57, in Bongars, p. 234. The children who embarked at Marseilles, in seven vessels, under the care of Hugh Ferrier, and William called the Hog, were many of them sold by their guides as slaves to the Mussulmans at Bugia, A.D. 1213. Matthew Paris; Vincent de Beauvais, xxx c. 5; Alberic de Troisfontaines, 459.

² The letter of Conrad is a better authority than prejudiced historians. *Veterum Script. et Monument. Hist. Collectio*, cura Martenne et Durand, ii. 252; Michaud, *Biblioth. des Croisades*, vi. 235.

³ Odo de Diogilo. Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, ii. 151.

government, and so eager to march forward, that he permitted his barons to do homage to Manuel, in order to remove all jealousy on the part of that emperor, and gave him the fullest assurance of the good faith of the French army. Louis also enforced the strictest discipline possible in his age, and punished any soldiers who committed acts of brigandage with as much cruelty as they had exercised in their depredations; some had their hands and feet cut off.

In Asia the French army kept nearer the coast than the Germans, which enabled them to proceed farther in the Byzantine territory. But when they entered the Turkish dominions they soon began to suffer the same evils as their predecessors, and only a small part reached Attalia in an efficient state. With these Louis embarked for Antioch, leaving upwards of seven thousand men behind, who, abandoned by their leaders and ill-treated by the inhabitants of the country, perished in attempting to force their way to Syria by land. At Antioch, Louis found the Frank princes of Syria no better disposed to favour his expedition than he had found the Greek emperor. Every intrigue was employed to delay his march to Jerusalem; and when at last Conrad returned, and he and Louis uniting their forces with the troops of Baldwin III., king of Jerusalem, laid siege to Damascus, the enterprize failed in consequence of the jealousy or treachery of the Syrian barons, the Templars, and the Prince of Antioch. But in western Europe every failure, whether it was caused by the folly of the Crusaders, the perfidy of the Latin Christians in Syria, or the jealousy of the Byzantine government, equally tended to increase the outcry against the treachery of the Greeks¹.

The destruction of the crusading armies left Manuel at liberty to turn all his attention to Corfu; but the Patzinaks having availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the passage of the Crusaders to plunder in Bulgaria, it was first necessary to clear the country of this enemy. The summer of 1148 was employed in this task. In the following year the Byzantine forces invested Corfu by sea and land.

¹ The disasters which befell the brilliant armies of Conrad and Louis were so unexpected that men's minds were stricken with despair. Three thousand Crusaders embraced Mohammedanism at one time, and St. Bernard himself exclaimed, that the man who could see such judgments without scandal might truly be called happy.

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The position of the citadel is extremely strong, occupying the base of a bold rocky promontory which rises abruptly out of the sea with a double head. The city itself was strongly fortified by art as well as by its natural position. When the emperor had assembled all his forces before the place, he ordered a general assault under the cover of showers of missiles from all the military machines then in use, which were planted in his ships and along the shore so as to enfilade the points assailed; but the advantage of their position enabled the Sicilian garrison to repulse the attack, and the Grand-duke Kontostephanos, who commanded the fleet, was slain as he encouraged his men to plant a ladder against the walls. In spite of this defeat Manuel continued to press on his attacks at a considerable sacrifice of men without gaining any advantage, until an unexpected circumstance had nearly rendered him master of the citadel. It was observed that a gully in the rock would admit the assailants into the body of the place, if they could gain possession of a single wall that covered it towards the sea. A lofty tower was constructed on the hulls of several transports, which were bound firmly together, and on this tower a ladder was fixed which reached the ramparts. Pupakes, a Turkish officer of the guard of Axouchos, and four brothers of Frank descent named Petraliphas, led a body of four hundred chosen troops to the assault. Pupakes mounted the ladder and reached the rampart with a few followers; but while the rest of the forlorn hope were mounting, the ladder broke with their weight, and many were precipitated into the sea or dashed to pieces on the rocks of the citadel. Pupakes, and those who had gained a firm footing, cleared for themselves a space on the wall; but when they saw there was no hope of receiving further aid, they availed themselves of the confusion into which they had thrown the garrison, and with singular audacity and presence of mind they descended from the ramparts and escaped by a wicket to the Byzantine army.

Manuel, undismayed by this failure, continued to direct his attacks against the place with great courage, but with a degree of impatience which often proves injurious to the military operations of sovereigns who command their own armies. The Venetians had sent a large naval force to his

assistance, but a serious quarrel occurred between the Byzantine troops and the Venetian sailors. The tumult threatened to become a general engagement, when Axouchos, unable to appease the combatants, determined at least to separate them. By ordering his guards to charge the Venetians, he forced them to retire to their ships. The republicans, furious at their discomfiture, immediately weighed anchor and sailed to attack a division of the Greek fleet which was stationed in the channel between Cephallenia and Ithaca to prevent the Sicilians from throwing supplies into Corfu on that side. They burned several of the Greek ships and captured the emperor's own galley, in which they placed a negro clad in the imperial robes with a crown on his head; and having seated him on a throne placed under a canopy, they paraded before the Byzantine camp at Corfu, saluting their black emperor with all the multifarious and servile prostrations practised at the Constantinopolitan court. Manuel, however, had the good sense to smile at this buffoonery, in which his dark complexion and the sacred ceremonial of the Byzantine court were both ridiculed; and by his prudence he succeeded in bringing the Venetians back to their duty. A fleet sent by Roger to relieve Corfu was defeated, and the garrison, being cut off from all hope of succour, at length capitulated. The Norman and Sicilian troops were allowed to retire with their arms; but Theodore Capellan, their commander, fearing to encounter the indignation of Roger, or satisfied that his courage and military skill would be better appreciated by Manuel, entered the Byzantine service¹.

The emperor resolved to make the recovery of Corfu a step to the invasion of Sicily. A division of the Byzantine fleet ravaged the coast of Sicily², and Manuel twice attempted to invade the island, but was driven back to Avlona by storms; and the damage his ships sustained compelled him to abandon the undertaking for the time, nor did future wars ever allow him to resume this enterprize. His officers, however, were ordered to persist in a vain struggle to restore the Byzantine domination in southern Italy, in order to form a base for operations against Sicily. The war was prolonged for several years. On one occasion a Sicilian fleet of forty

¹ Cinnamus, 55; Nicetas, 52-61.

² Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, i. 152.

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sail passed the Hellespont, and appeared unexpectedly before Constantinople while the emperor was absent; but the city was too well fortified to be exposed to any danger from such a force. The Sicilian admiral, after proclaiming his sovereign master of the sea, shooting a flight of gilded arrows at the walls of the great palace, and plundering some houses at Damalis on the Asiatic coast, retired¹. The Byzantine generals enrolled considerable bodies of mercenaries at Ancona and Venice, and obtained some success in Apulia; but at last Alexius Comnenos, the son of the Princess Anna the historian, having been defeated and taken prisoner, and Constantine Angelos, who was sent to regain the superiority with a powerful fleet, having met with the same fate, Manuel became inclined to peace. The terms of the treaty satisfied the vanity of the Byzantine emperor, and served the policy of the Sicilian king. The Byzantine officers and soldiers who were prisoners in Sicily were released without ransom; but Manuel, with that indifference to useful industry, and to the feelings of his peaceful subjects, and with the ignorance of the true sources of national strength which is so common among princes, left the artisans of Thebes and Corinth to pass their lives in bondage under the Norman king. The fact that they were well treated, and settled as freemen with their families around them, reflects honour on Roger and additional disgrace on Manuel. As they were living in a climate similar to that of their native cities, and in the midst of a population speaking the Greek language, they probably were happier in their favoured exile than they could have been under the fiscal oppression that reigned in Byzantine Greece². The peace between Manuel and William the Bad, Roger's son and successor, was concluded in the year 1155.

The appearance of the crusading monarchs of Germany and France, and the events of the war with the King of Sicily, gave Manuel a more correct knowledge of the resources and wealth of western Europe than he had previously possessed. He began to fear their power as well as to esteem

¹ Cinnamus, 58. Nicetas (66) says the fleet was commanded by Count Maio, which places this visit to Constantinople in the reign of William the Bad; but some writers attribute it to George Antiochenus, the admiral of Roger. Gally Knight, *Normans in Sicily*, 52.

² Cinnamus, 69; Nicetas, 65.

their valour, and during the remainder of his reign he watched the politics of Italy with great attention. On more than one occasion he assisted the Italian cities in their struggle for liberty against Frederic Barbarossa, both with troops and money. He feared lest a general pacification of the Western states should enable some crusading monarch to employ an irresistible force against the Byzantine empire and the Greek Church.

For about twenty years, from 1148 to 1168, the chief field of Manuel's personal exploits was on the northern frontier of his empire. His first campaign, after the fall of Corfu, was against the Sclavonian princes who ruled in Servia and Dalmatia, whom the Byzantine emperors always affected to consider as vassals, and who had been really dependent on the empire as long as the state of the roads enabled the population of these mountainous districts to transport their produce with profit to the markets of the populous cities in Macedonia and Thrace. But the decay of communications by land depopulated and barbarized the mountain districts, while the sea-coast began to be more closely connected with Italy, by commercial interests, than with the Byzantine empire. During the Sicilian war, the Prince of Servia leagued himself with Roger; Manuel marched into his country in order to punish him. The Hungarians sent a powerful army to his assistance, and the united forces encountered the emperor on the banks of the Drin, not far from its junction with the Save¹. Manuel led his own troops to the attack, and behaved in the battle rather as a valiant knight than as a prudent general. At the head of his noble guard, he charged Bachin, the Servian archzupan, with his lance; but the Servian general was a man of immense size, and his heavy armour turned aside the imperial lance. Bachin rushed at Manuel with his drawn sword, and cut away the linked veil that hung before the emperor's face as a vizor. The broken clasps wounded Manuel's cheek, yet he instantly closed with his antagonist, and, seizing him by the sword arm, secured

¹ The Drin was then the boundary between Servia and the smaller principality of Bosnia. Cinnamus, 59. [This river is more commonly called the Drina, to distinguish it from the Albanian river of the same name (the ancient Drilo), which is formed by the junction of the Black and White Drin, and flows into the Adriatic not far from Alessio. Ed.]

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him as a prisoner¹. This combat decided the victory in favour of the imperial troops. Peace followed; for the Servian prince, abandoning all hope of resistance after the defeat of the archzupan, swore fidelity to the emperor as a vassal, engaging to furnish a contingent of two thousand men to the Byzantine army whenever it took the field in Europe, and five hundred when the Servian auxiliaries were required to pass over into Asia. This treaty, after subsisting some years, was violated by Primislas, prince of Servia, on which Manuel again invaded the country, dethroned Primislas, and conferred the government on his younger brothers Beluses and Deses. The latter, entering into secret alliances with Frederic Barbarossa and Stephen III. of Hungary, prepared to revolt; but was arrested by Manuel as a perfidious vassal, tried, condemned, and imprisoned at Constantinople. His successor Neeman continued to give the emperor much trouble, planning rebellion when an opportunity presented itself, and making the humblest submissions whenever the emperor was prepared to invade Servia².

All the wars which Manuel carried on in Europe were of secondary importance to his contest with the kings of Hungary, though by prudence and policy he might easily have avoided wasting so large a portion of the military resources of his empire on this unnecessary and unprofitable war. His pretext for commencing hostilities was the circumstance that Geïsa II. had afforded assistance to the Prince of Servia at the battle of the Drin; but the real cause of his engaging in this ill-judged enterprize was a hope that he should be able to conquer a part of Hungary, in consequence of the continual disputes in that country concerning the succession to the crown. Manuel coveted the possession of the country between the Save and the Danube. This district was the centre of a rapidly increasing commerce. In order to avoid the oppressive duties and fiscal severity of the Byzantine government, a very considerable portion of the trade which had once taken the routes by Cherson and Trebizond to Constantinople now avoided the empire, and passed along

¹ Cinnamus (64) and Nicetas (61) mention this single combat. For the obscure history of the princes of Servia, compare Cinnamus and Ducange, *Familiae Dalmaticae*, 284.

² Ducange, *Fam. Dal.* 285.

the northern shores of the Caspian and Black Seas, through the territory of the Patzinaks, until it reached Zeugmin. The commerce of the Greeks was thus declining in the north as well as the south. The Patzinaks, Russians, and Hungarians became their rivals in the carrying trade by land, as the Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese were by sea; while the Jews and Lombards were beginning to supplant them as capitalists.

Manuel invaded Hungary in the year 1151, when Geïsa II. was carrying on war in Russia. Zeugmin was taken. The emperor abandoned the place to be pillaged by his troops, making a merit of sparing the lives of the inhabitants. This mode of commencing the war naturally rendered all classes his determined enemies, and greatly increased his difficulties in a country where traders were men accustomed to encounter danger, and where merchants frequently possessed both military skill and influence. The Byzantine army, after laying waste the province between the Save and Danube, crossed the latter river, stormed several cities, and spread its ravages far and wide. Geïsa, on returning from the war in Russia, found that his forces were insufficient to encounter Manuel in the field. He therefore solicited a truce, which the emperor readily granted, that the Byzantine army might carry off the immense booty it had collected without molestation. These spoils were exhibited with great triumph at Constantinople. In the following year Geïsa commenced hostilities by laying siege to Branisova, the command of which Manuel had imprudently intrusted to his unprincipled cousin Andronicus, who was engaged in treasonable plots, and was suspected of inviting the Hungarians to recommence the war. But the promptitude of the emperor saved Branisova and deranged the projects of Andronicus. In the following year (1153) peace was concluded with Hungary, which lasted until the death of Geïsa II. in 1161.

On Geïsa's death, Manuel made the Hungarian law of succession to the throne a pretext for again attacking the kingdom. As in other monarchies of the time, the brother of the last monarch was preferred to his son. But Geïsa II. had done everything in his power to change this order of succession in Hungary, and to secure the crown to his son Stephen III. The great majority of the Hungarians supported his

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views and ratified his choice ; for they feared lest the brothers of Geïsa, who had resided long at the Byzantine court, should sacrifice the independence of Hungary. Manuel, deeming the time favourable for his own schemes of conquest, supplied Ladislas, the elder of the two brothers of Geïsa II., with liberal aid. Stephen III. was driven from the throne, but Ladislas died after a reign of six months. Stephen, the youngest brother of Geïsa, who had married Maria Comnena, the daughter of Isaac, the emperor's eldest brother, succeeded Ladislas. The exactions of Stephen soon rendered his government so unpopular that the Hungarians took up arms, expelled him from the kingdom, and replaced his nephew Stephen III. on the throne. Manuel sent a Byzantine army into Hungary to assist the husband of his niece, and the elder Stephen again recovered his crown ; but the Byzantine troops had hardly crossed the Danube on their return before their royal client was compelled to follow them, and present himself once more as an exile at the imperial court. Manuel, perceiving that his endeavours to force a worthless monarch on the Hungarians would only lead to an interminable war, consented to treat with Stephen III., whom he acknowledged King of Hungary, on condition that Bela, his younger brother, should be recognized as heir to the Hungarian crown ; Bela engaging to adopt the Greek church, and marry Maria, the only child of Manuel. A treaty of peace was concluded on this basis in 1163, and the ceremony of the betrothal of Maria and Bela (whose name was changed to Alexios by the Greeks) was performed in the church of Blachern. Manuel conferred the title of Despot on the Hungarian prince, and looked forward to the union of Hungary with the Byzantine empire as an achievement which would reflect immortal glory on his reign, and raise the Eastern Empire to the highest degree of power among the states of Europe.

This peace proved of short duration, for Manuel not only refused to disarm the elder Stephen, but even permitted him to enrol troops, and invade Hungary from the Byzantine territory. Stephen III., who justly held the emperor responsible for these hostilities, sequestered the appanage of Bela in order to indemnify Hungary for the losses it suffered, and Manuel recommenced the war. He entered Hungary in

person at the head of a large army, and, bearing down all opposition, marched to Peterwardein; but as his object was to conciliate the Hungarian people, he, on this occasion, prevented his troops from plundering, and offered to conclude peace if Stephen III. would restore Bela's appanage. Stéphen III. preferred the chance of war, for he was on the eve of effecting his junction with his ally Uladislav, king of Bohemia, who had brought a powerful army to his assistance. The Hungarian and Bohemian armies effected their junction, but Manuel was not deterred by their numbers from advancing to attack them. He crossed the Danube, and encamped at Titul on the banks of the Theiss, in front of the two kings. The brilliant appearance of the Byzantine army after its rapid movements, the order with which it had marched, the high military reputation of the emperor, the moderation of his demands, and the justice of the King of Bohemia, prevented a battle. He persuaded Stephen III. to surrender Bela's appanage, and Manuel immediately retired. But the emperor, not having engaged to disarm the elder Stephen, still allowed him to assemble troops within the frontiers of the empire and make plundering incursions into Hungary. The King of Hungary, finding that he had been deceived, reassembled his army, and, laying siege to Zeugmin, took that important city before it could receive assistance. His uncle Stephen was taken prisoner soon after, and falling ill, is reported to have been murdered by a physician, who was suborned to bleed him with a poisoned lancet.

The capture of Zeugmin enraged Manuel, who now resolved to dethrone Stephen, and place his son-in-law Bela on the throne. To effect this he formed alliances with the Emperor of Germany, Frederic Barbarossa, with the Venetians, and with several of the princes who then governed different parts of Russia. In 1166 he assembled a powerful army at Sardica, and marched to Zeugmin. Attacking the place with his ordinary impetuosity, he carried it by storm. The King of Hungary, seeing that he could offer no resistance in the field, sent an embassy to the emperor to demand peace, offering to cede Zeugmin, Sirmium, and Dalmatia to Manuel. To these offers Manuel replied by asking the Hungarian envoys, with a sneer, if their king possessed other cities named Zeugmin and Sirmium, and a second province called

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Dalmatia, for his troops were already in possession of the places usually known by those names. In this campaign, the Byzantine army, under the immediate command of the emperor, conquered all the country between the Save and the Danube; while a second army, under the command of John Dukas, subdued all Hungarian Dalmatia, a province which then contained fifty-seven towns, among which were the cities of Trau, Sebenico, Spalato, Dioclea, Scardona, Salona, and Ostrourypitza.

Next year (1167) the Byzantine army in Hungary was commanded by two Byzantine nobles, Gabras and Branas, through whose cowardice it was completely defeated¹. The Hungarian general, Dionysius, was an officer of great military talent. To repair the losses caused by this disaster, the emperor took the field in person in 1168; but the state of his health prevented his accompanying all the movements of the army, the immediate command of which he intrusted to his nephew, Andronicus Kontostephanos. The Hungarians had a well-appointed and numerous army under the command of Dionysius. The Byzantine council of war decided that Kontostephanos should engage the enemy without loss of time; and the emperor, who was extremely superstitious, was delighted with its decision when he learned that, just as the council rose, a Hungarian, who was galloping towards the Byzantine camp, had fallen from his horse. This trifling accident he viewed as a lucky omen, and Kontostephanos was ordered to hasten forward. But the astrologers who accompanied the emperor, being anxious to avoid falling into neglect, assured Manuel that he should himself suffer some

¹ Michael Gabras was the husband of Eudocia Comnena, the paramour of Andronicus. The two historians of Manuel's reign, Cinnamus and Nicetas, both record an anecdote which reveals the corruption of the Byzantine court. The defeated generals were accused of ruining the army by their misconduct, before they made the final exhibition of their cowardice on the field of battle. In spite of former jealousies, they agreed to stand by one another in their defence. When Gabras was examined by the emperor in council, he referred to Branas as a man who could give disinterested evidence concerning his behaviour as commander-in-chief. Branas was in consequence brought before the emperor to be examined; but he requested that Gabras, as his superior officer, might bear testimony to his conduct, as second in command, in order that he might speak more freely concerning Gabras. On this appeal, Gabras praised the personal valour of Branas, particularly in covering the retreat. When he concluded, Branas coolly observed, 'I am surprised you know so well what I performed, for I swear by the head of the emperor, that when I turned myself, I hardly got a glimpse of you galloping off in the distance.' Cinnamus, 151; Nicetas, 87.

misfortune if the engagement took place next day. Manuel was weak enough to send a courier to his general at their suggestion, ordering him to suspend the attack for twenty-four hours. All the dispositions for battle were made when the imperial order reached the army, and Kontostephanos, who had no confidence in the tactics of the stars, thought there would be more danger in withdrawing his troops from their positions, than in despising the predictions of the astrologers. He knew well that nothing but a complete victory would serve as his apology for disobeying the emperor; and as delay seemed to him likely to diminish his chances of success, the order was instantly given for attacking the Hungarians. The battle was long and bloody. Dionysius had drawn up his best troops in one solid mass, at the head of which he expected to break through the ranks of the Byzantine army, and then destroy its divisions in detail. He himself fought beside the national standard of Hungary, which was displayed on a tall mast fixed in an immense waggon, and elevated high above the field, that it might serve both as a guide for the attacks and a rallying-point for the Hungarian squadrons. The plan of Dionysius was foiled by the dispositions of Kontostephanos. The cavalry, which composed the best part of the Hungarian army, was broken by the Byzantine horse, and after a desperate struggle driven from the field. The great standard was taken; Dionysius saved himself with difficulty; two thousand suits of complete armour were collected from the slain, against which the lances of the Byzantine cavalry had been shivered in vain, and whose wearers had only perished when their helmets were crushed by the weight of the terrible mace-of-arms. Only eight hundred prisoners were taken, for the imperial cavalry was too much exhausted to continue the pursuit; but these prisoners were the heaviest-armed and bravest knights in the enemy's army: among their number were many of the highest nobility, and five Bans¹.

This battle, which was fought near Zeugmin, put an end to the war. Peace was concluded in 1168, Stephen III. ceding to the empire Zeugmin, Sirmium, and Dalmatia, so that Manuel only gained the same terms after this great victory

¹ Cinnamus (160) calls the Bans 'Zupans.'

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which he might have obtained in the year 1166. When Manuel returned to Constantinople, he made a triumphal entry into the city, riding on horseback, with Andronicus Kontostephanos by his side. The imperial cavalcade was preceded by a chariot of silver gilt, drawn by four white horses, in which a picture of the Virgin Mary was displayed to the superstitious inhabitants, who considered the protection of the Virgin as a surer defence for the empire than either a well-disciplined army or a wise political administration. This was Manuel's last triumph, and the battle of Zeugmin was one of the last great victories gained by the Byzantine arms. The splendour of the Eastern Empire now began to wane, and was rapidly obscured, never to recover its brightness¹.

Though Manuel had suppressed his anger, and overlooked the insolence of the Venetians during the siege of Corfu, he never forgot it; nor was he prudent enough to conceal the jealousy he felt at the increasing power and wealth of the republic. His ill-will was displayed in the strictness with which he interpreted every clause of the treaties and charters conceding to them commercial privileges and immunities in the Byzantine empire. It was natural, therefore, that the conquest of the southern part of Dalmatia by John Ducas in 1166, and the negotiations of Manuel with Frederic Barbarossa, should alarm the Venetian senate, and render war with the Eastern Empire an event which it might soon be impossible to avoid. In this state of feeling, Manuel availed himself of some tumults between the Venetians and Lombards settled at Constantinople to impose new restrictions on the Venetians. Ever since the time of Alexius I. the Venetians had possessed a street or quarter of their own, where their warehouses were situated. This quarter possessed its own quay, and enjoyed the privileges of a free port. All Venetian subjects were bound to reside within its limits, and justice was there administered, in the differences of Venetian subjects, according to the laws of Venice. But the numbers of the Venetians established in the empire soon increased, and many resided beyond the limits of the privileged quarter. Their wealth and character obtained for them matrimonial alliances with

¹ For the Hungarian wars, see Cinnamus, 56, 72, 75, 123, 134, 145, 150-160; Nicetas, 61, 67, 83, 87, 98-103.

many respectable native families. It seems, at first sight, a strange fact that so many of the foreign races which took up their residence within the limits of the Byzantine empire should have increased more rapidly than the Greeks and that relic of the Roman conquerors which still formed the dominant portion of Byzantine society; but a little attention to the history of the empire reveals the fact that fiscal oppression deprived the natives of all hope of bettering their condition, and compelled them to rest contented if they could preserve the possessions they had inherited from their ancestors unimpaired, while among the higher ranks social corruption and pride of caste prevented all increase of numbers. On the other hand, the condition of foreign settlers, and particularly of the Venetians, was very different: they escaped the worst effects of imperial rapacity, and their social manners still rendered a numerous family a greater enjoyment, and a surer means of obtaining consideration in the decline of life, than a large house and a gallery of pictures and statues. But though the moral and political state of Venetian society was superior to that of Greek, it had also great defects. The spirit of personal independence, which gave strength and dignity to the republic, too often degenerated in the individual Venetian into disorderly conduct and insolence to others. They frequently raised tumults in the streets of Constantinople, and set the laws of the empire at defiance.

Manuel determined to make the great party-quarrel of the Venetians and Lombards the pretext for increasing his power. Every Venetian was ordered to reside within the quarter set apart for their habitation; all who continued to dwell without those limits were commanded to take the oath of allegiance as subjects of the emperor, in order to secure for themselves and their property the protection of the Byzantine laws. Many Venetians complied with this ordinance rather than sacrifice the landed property they possessed; but they could not so readily lay aside their disorderly habits and forget their party contests. The Venetians repeated their attacks on the Lombards, overpowered their opponents, and plundered their warehouses. The Emperor Manuel was justly enraged at the insolent contempt shown for his authority in his own capital. To avenge the injured laws of his empire, and, as was generally thought, to gratify at the same time his own

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avarice, he ordered all the Venetians in his dominions to be arrested, and their property to be sequestered, (A.D. 1171).

The government of Venice regarded the emperor's conduct in this affair as a direct violation of their treaty; they held that he was only authorized to arrest those who had taken part in the tumult, and that any claim for pecuniary indemnification ought to have been addressed to the Venetian senate. The republic, therefore, fitted out a fleet to exact reparation, and in the spring of 1172 the Doge Vital Michieli II. sailed with one hundred galleys and twenty carracks to attack the recent conquests of John Dukas in Dalmatia. Trau and Ragusa were besieged and taken, and the Byzantine forces were soon expelled from all Dalmatia. The doge then sailed to the Archipelago, where, however, he was not so fortunate as he had been in the Adriatic. After losing some time in a vain attempt to render himself master of Chalcis in Euboea, he took possession of the island of Chios, where he passed the winter. The Greeks everywhere showed the greatest animosity to the Venetians, whose commercial immunities had robbed them of a considerable portion of their trade, and the doge became sensible that he had no chance of making any permanent conquest in the Aegean. The merchants of Venice soon felt the loss of their commerce with Constantinople, and the senate began to fear lest the privileges which the Venetians had previously enjoyed should be conferred on the Pisans or the Genoese. An embassy was despatched to solicit peace with the Byzantine empire, but the terms offered were rejected by Manuel.

In the mean time a dreadful pestilence broke out in the Venetian fleet at Chios; while the imperial fleet, which had been almost entirely destroyed in an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt during the year 1170, was again ready for sea. In the spring of 1173, one hundred and fifty Byzantine galleys issued from the Hellespont to attack the Venetians. The republican force was so enfeebled by the ravages of the plague that the doge abandoned Chios on the approach of the enemy, and retired successively to Lesbos, Lemnos, and Skyros, gradually abandoning numbers of his ships, as the crews were thinned by disease. At last he quitted the Archipelago altogether, and returned to Venice with seventeen ships; the rest had

either been abandoned from want of hands to navigate them, or they had been captured by the Greeks.

Before quitting the Grecian seas the doge sent a second embassy to the Emperor. One of the ambassadors was Henry Dandolo, a man whose name will live for ever in the history of the Greek race. Thirty years after this he was the principal agent in destroying the Byzantine Empire and enslaving the Greek people. The propositions of the doge were again rejected, and the ambassadors had perhaps reason to complain of the rudeness of their reception¹. The Doge Vital Michieli was held to be responsible for misfortunes he could not prevent, and the Venetians, being as ungovernable in their passions at home as abroad, assassinated him in a public assembly. The social condition of the republic evidently called for reform. It was universally admitted that there was a necessity for adding to the vigour of the law. The ruling men in the senate made this necessity a pretext for changing the old aristocratic democracy into an administrative oligarchy².

To revenge themselves for their losses in the East the Venetians resolved to destroy the city of Ancona, which was their rival in the trade of the Adriatic, and might, through the protection of the Emperor of Constantinople, supplant them in their commerce with the East. The Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, who was anxious to gain possession of Ancona for himself, joined the republic; and while the Venetian fleet blockaded the port, a German army besieged the city by land.

¹ Many writers have repeated the fable that Dandolo was deprived of his sight by the Emperor Manuel when he visited Constantinople as ambassador of Venice on this occasion. The authority quoted is the chronicle of Andrea Dandolo, himself a doge of Venice, and a descendant of the great Henry. But the story is certainly false; and though silence can rarely prove any fact, yet in this case the silence of Villehardouin is decisive. Villehardouin, who was the companion of Dandolo in his enterprise against Constantinople, and his personal friend, mentions that he was stone-blind from a wound in his head. Villehardouin would have been delighted to urge the treachery of Manuel as an excuse for the rapines of the Crusaders. Andrea Dandolo, *Chron.* lib. x. c. 4; Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, i. 176; Villehardouin, in Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, pt. ii. 47, 223.

² Daru mentions that fifty doges had preceded Vital Michieli II. Of these nineteen were driven from the throne by violence, and five abdicated. It is worth while observing, that the state of society seems to have had more to do in producing these revolutions than the form of government; and perhaps the social state of Venice presented a miniature copy of that of Constantinople. The Emperor Leontius reigned over the Eastern Empire when the first Doge of Venice was elected in 697. From that period until 1174 the throne was occupied by forty-four emperors; and of these nineteen were driven from the throne by violence, one perished in battle, and one (Isaac I.) voluntarily resigned his crown.

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The inhabitants defended themselves most valiantly, and all the attacks of the besiegers were repulsed; but towards the end of autumn their provisions failed, and hunger compelled them to demand a capitulation. The Archbishop of Mayence, who commanded the German army, insisted that they should surrender at discretion, and the people of Ancona, who hesitated to accept such hard terms, were saved from the dangerous experiment of trusting to the mercy of the warlike ecclesiastic by the patriotism of an Italian lady and of a wealthy citizen of Ferrara. An Italian army, levied by their exertions, advanced to Ancona and defeated the Germans. The ships in the port, elated with the victory of their allies, sailed out, and by their sudden attack threw the Venetians into confusion, so that the siege and blockade were both raised. William Adelard, the patriotic citizen of Ferrara, carried the news of this success to the Emperor Manuel, who received him with honour. The expenses of the Italian army were repaid, rich presents were sent to the noble Italian lady, whose name the Greek historian does not consider it necessary to record, but which from other sources we learn was Aldruda, countess of Bertinoro¹.

The repeated losses of the Venetians disposed them to seek peace with the Byzantine empire on the best terms they could procure, and Manuel was equally desirous to terminate his unprofitable contest with the republic, in order to devote all his forces to arrest the progress of the Turks, who were daily increasing their power in Asia Minor. A treaty of peace was concluded about the end of the year 1174, which restored the Venetians to the position they occupied in 1171, before the war broke out. Their ancient privileges were confirmed, and Manuel engaged to pay fifteen hundred pounds' weight of gold in a fixed number of instalments as an indemnity for the property of the Venetian merchants which had been confiscated².

The Asiatic wars of Manuel were generally commenced and conducted with the same indifference to the dictates of sound policy and the real interest of his empire as the

¹ Cinnamus (168) says, Ἦν δέ τις γυνή, Ἰταλὴ μὲν τὸ γένος. There is great uncertainty in the chronology of this period. See the notes of Ducange to Cinnamus, 491; Wilken, 613; Nicetas, 131.

² Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, i. 150.

European. Instead of forming a firm alliance with the Armenian sovereigns of Cilicia and the Frank princes of Antioch, and directing the united forces of the confederacy to break the power of the sultans of Iconium and to expel the Turks from Phrygia and Bithynia, the emperor wasted the resources of the Christians, and aided the growth of the Turkish power by his repeated attacks on Cilicia and Antioch and his constant endeavours to force their princes to acknowledge a temporary vassalage to the Byzantine crown. Success unfortunately favoured his arms in the projects least conducive to his interests. Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch, was defeated, and compelled to own himself a vassal of the imperial throne, as he had done during the life of the Emperor John. This was Manuel's first warlike exploit as emperor, and it took place in the year 1144, during the summer which preceded the conquest of the Christian principality of Edessa by Zengui¹. Raymond perished in a battle with Nouredin, sultan of Aleppo, in 1149. Reynold of Chatillon married Constance of Antioch, his widow, and conducted the government of the principality more like a leader of robbers than a civilized prince². He renewed the war with Manuel by invading Cyprus, which he plundered in the most barbarous manner. Manuel, however, could not find time to punish Reynold until the year 1155, but he then imposed on him the deepest humiliation. The emperor advanced to Mopsuestia with an army which Reynold was unable to resist. The Patriarch of Antioch, who had been grossly insulted by the Frank prince, would have either admitted the Byzantine troops into the city or betrayed Reynold into the emperor's hands, had Manuel not been more desirous to chastise his enemy than to occupy his principality. The Prince of Antioch was also in reality only the regent of his wife's dominions. He was allowed to retain his authority on presenting himself at the emperor's court in Mopsuestia with a rope round his neck, after marching barefooted and bareheaded through the

¹ See above, p. 160, note 2.

² Reynold's brigandage caused the ruin of the kingdom of Jerusalem; for it was in consequence of his plundering a caravan of Mussulmans, and throwing his captives into prison, that Saladin declared war with the Christians. Reynold was taken prisoner at the battle of Hottein; and his murder in Saladin's tent, some say by the sultan's own hand, has been described by Sir Walter Scott in *The Talisman*, when he narrates the death of the Grand Master of the Templars.

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streets to the imperial residence. When he entered the emperor's presence he fell on his knees, and implored mercy with uplifted hands. After long solicitation he received his pardon, on binding himself to furnish a contingent of troops to the Byzantine armies, and engaging to treat the Greek patriarch with the respect due to his rank in the orthodox church, and to furnish him with an official residence within the walls of Antioch (A.D. 1155).

Armenian Cilicia was at this time governed by Thoros, an able prince and gallant soldier, whose position exposed him to be attacked on every side. The Byzantine emperors regarded the Armenian principality as a portion of their dominions; and the prosperity it enjoyed, from being usually governed in a less oppressive manner than the provinces of the empire, excited their rapacity. The Byzantine emperors, the sultans of Iconium, and the princes of Antioch were all eager to make conquests from the Armenians, so that Thoros was compelled either to fight with these powerful neighbours or form such alliances with one against the others as circumstances dictated. Manuel had twice intrusted his cousin Andronicus with the command of armies destined to subdue Thoros, but the folly and rashness of that debauched prince led to their complete defeat, A.D. 1145 and 1152. At length, in the year 1155, Manuel led an army in person through the defiles of Mount Taurus, and compelled Thoros to become his vassal and receive the investiture of his dominions by a golden bull, with the title of Pansebastos, to mark his subjection.

While Manuel remained at Mopsuestia, his court was visited by Baldwin III., king of Jerusalem (who subsequently married his niece Theodora¹), by Reynold of Antioch—in a very humble manner, as we have already narrated—and by Thoros, the sovereign of Armenian Cilicia. All were solicitous of gaining the emperor's favour, but Manuel derived little advantage either from his own brilliant military exploits or from the public submission of these proud and warlike princes. He had, nevertheless, the gratification of making a triumphal entry into Antioch in the midst of his Varangian guard—

¹ Theodora was the daughter of Isaac, the emperor's elder brother. She was married in 1158, at the age of thirteen. After Baldwin's death, she became the concubine of her cousin Andronicus, and had a number of strange adventures with him. Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 183.

a pageant which greatly flattered his pride, because it appeared to elevate his power above that of his father. He had also the pleasure of exhibiting his skill in all the exercises of chivalry at a grand tournament, where he unhorsed every antagonist, and left the Frank knights amazed at his skill, strength, and daring. Even Nouredin, the Sultan of Aleppo, who was as politic as he was valiant, sought to avoid war with so powerful an enemy, and purchased peace by releasing Bertrand, the Grand Master of the Templars, with six thousand French and German prisoners, the remains of the armies of Louis VII. and Conrad III., who were languishing in hopeless slavery. Manuel returned to Constantinople covered with personal renown.

In 1161 Manuel married the beautiful Maria, daughter of Raymond of Poitiers and Constance princess of Antioch. Raymond, count of Tripoli, who had been led to believe that the emperor was on the eve of espousing his sister Melisenda, considered this marriage to be an insult which he was bound to avenge. In order to obtain what was held to be honourable satisfaction, he sent the twelve galleys he had prepared to conduct his sister to Constantinople to plunder the islands of the Archipelago. The Saracen pirates never committed greater cruelties than the Christians in Raymond's ships. They spared neither age nor sex; monasteries and churches were pillaged, towns and villages were burned to the ground, and no inconsiderable portion of the inhabitants in many islands were exterminated. Yet Manuel was so occupied with his marriage festivities that he paid no attention to the sufferings of his subjects; and when the Byzantine fleet had chased the galleys of Raymond out of the Grecian seas, their ravages were forgotten by the government¹.

The lavish and wasteful administration of Manuel caused him to adopt many ill-judged schemes for recruiting his finances. Before his unjust sequestration of the property of the Venetian merchants, he had expected to fill his exhausted treasury by the spoils of Egypt. After the termination of the Hungarian war, he joined Amaury I., king of Jerusalem, in a project for the subjugation of Egypt, which was then

¹ William of Tyre, xviii. 33, in Bongars, 953. The Byzantine writers do not consider these ravages worthy of commemoration.

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in a state of anarchy. An imperial fleet, consisting of one hundred and fifty galleys, and sixty cavalry transports, in which a well-appointed army was embarked, attended by ten dromons laden with provisions and engines of war, sailed for Egypt under the command of Andronicus Kontostephanos. Ten galleys of this fleet were fitted out by the city of Dyrrachium, and six by the island of Euboea; for Manuel had not yet confiscated the municipal revenues of the commercial cities in the empire to fill the central treasury at Constantinople and be wasted on the pageantry of the imperial court¹. When Amaury beheld the strength of the Byzantine expedition, his avarice induced him to delay his own preparations, and it was near the end of October 1170 before he joined Kontostephanos under the walls of Damietta. The Byzantine general pushed the siege with vigour, and conducted himself in a manner worthy of the victor of Zeugmin; but the Franks of Jerusalem afforded him little assistance, and after remaining before the place fifty days, provisions began to fail, and he was compelled to conclude a truce with the Egyptians, in order to retire with his army by land into Syria. The fleet, on its return, was dispersed by a succession of storms, and few of the ships reached Constantinople in safety². Amaury had thwarted, and perhaps betrayed, the Egyptian expedition; but next year (1171) he was so alarmed at the progress of Saladin that he visited Constantinople to solicit assistance from Manuel. He was treated by the emperor with great magnificence; and during the three months he remained, as much money was spent in pageants, festivals, and tournaments, as would have raised a powerful army. Manuel seized any pretext for magnificent display; but the disasters of the Byzantine forces before Damietta deprived him of the wish, and weakened his power, to afford the King of Jerusalem any effective assistance.

We must now review Manuel's conduct and policy in his relations with the Seljouk Turks, who possessed the greater part of Asia Minor, and counted a numerous population of Greek Christians among their subjects. The Sultan of

¹ William of Tyre, xx. 14, in Bongars, 982; and Nicetas, 104.

² William of Tyre admits that the conduct of the King of Jerusalem was unfriendly, if not treacherous: xx. 16, 17, in Bongars, 983. Compare Cinnamus, 162, and Nicetas, 107.

Iconium was the nearest and most dangerous enemy of the Byzantine empire. Prudence required Manuel to devote his unwearied attention to oppose the progress of a power hostile to the civilization and the laws of the Christians, as well as to their political government. His father, even towards the end of his reign, after he had gained many victories over the Turks, was compelled to struggle hard to prevent their establishing themselves on the banks of the Rhyndacus, and had great difficulty in driving them from the plains of Bithynia. At the commencement of his own reign, Manuel appears to have been fully persuaded of the necessity of circumscribing the Turkish dominions; and after he had arranged his differences with Raymond of Antioch, he led the well-disciplined army he had inherited from his father against the Sultan of Iconium. The Turkish troops were defeated whenever they could be brought to risk an engagement; yet, in this campaign of 1145, the Byzantine army was unable to advance beyond Philomelium, and in the following year it only reached the shores of the lake Pasgusa, which the Emperor John had depopulated. Manuel was, nevertheless, preparing an army to besiege Iconium, when the expedition of Roger of Sicily against Greece, and the movements of the leaders of the second crusade, compelled him to concentrate his best troops for the defence of Constantinople. He therefore concluded a treaty of peace with Massoud, the Sultan of Iconium, a measure of common prudence, which the Crusaders unjustly regarded as an act of signal treachery to the Christian cause. This peace endured without interruption until the death of Sultan Massoud in 1155.

Had Manuel been able to appreciate the full extent of the alarming changes which were going on during his reign in the social condition of the various races that peopled his empire, he must have been struck with the necessity of making great exertions to increase the resources, the numbers, and the strength of the Greek population in the provinces nearest to the Turks; but no measures having this object in view are noticed by the historians of his reign. It appears, therefore, that neither the emperor nor his ministers attached sufficient importance to the decline which was taking place in the numbers of the Christian population of the Byzantine

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provinces in Asia Minor, while, perhaps, they neglected to contrast it with the steady increase of the Mohammedan population in the dominions of the Sultan of Iconium. The corruption of Byzantine society was certainly not entirely unobserved by Manuel; but his education taught him to believe that ecclesiastical formulas and strict orthodoxy were the best remedies for every evil. The church, however, proved as ineffectual to oppose the progress of Mohammedanism under the Seljouks, as it had proved in earlier times to arrest its advance under the Saracens; while, on the other hand, Manuel and his contemporaries were destitute of the enlightened views and the freedom from orthodox prejudices which rendered Leo the Isaurian and his Iconoclast supporters capable of infusing new vigour into society by an equitable administration of the law. An increase of the Greek population in the Asiatic provinces could alone have enabled the Byzantine government to resist the progress of the Turks; but to produce this increase, a great change would have been required both in the conduct of the administration and the condition of the people. Manuel must have diminished the expenses of his court, lightened the weight of taxation, improved the civil and judicial administration, enlarged the sphere of municipal activity, and facilitated the means of intercourse by land and sea; while the Greek people must have adopted habits of industry, self-reliance, and truth, from which they had been long weaned by the fiscal oppression of their masters; and they must have learned to regard the commandments of God as more binding than the superstitions, traditions, or canons of the church.

The Sultan Massoud, at his death, divided his dominions among his children, and his eldest son, Kilidji-Arslan II., succeeded to the sovereignty of Iconium. As Manuel was marching carelessly through the Turkish territory on his return from Antioch in the early part of the year 1157, his troops were attacked by the Turks. The war was renewed; but the new sultan, finding himself too weak to encounter the Byzantine army in the field, endeavoured to avert hostilities with the Christians until he had regained possession of the territories bequeathed to his brothers. Manuel, having induced many Crusaders, who were in the habit of touching

at Rhodes on their passage to Palestine, to join his army by the high pay he offered, collected an immense number of chariots and oxen in the Thrakesian theme to transport his military stores, and threatened to attack Iconium. Kilidji-Arslan, however, succeeded in averting the attack by consenting to surrender every place the Turks had occupied since the death of John II., by engaging to maintain an auxiliary corps of Turkish cavalry in the emperor's service, and by promising to prevent any hostile inroads of the nomadic Turkomans into the Byzantine territory¹. These conditions prove that the Greeks had been losing ground during the reign of Manuel; and that, in spite of the great force he had assembled for the conquest of Iconium, he felt the difficulty of retaining possession of that city, even if he succeeded in taking it. Shortly after the conclusion of this treaty, Kilidji-Arslan visited Constantinople, where he was received with great pomp. This visit had a bad effect on the fortunes of the empire. Manuel despised the sultan on account of his mean appearance and submissive behaviour; while the astute Mussulman, who concealed his envious and daring character, observed many of the weak points of the Byzantine power, and became eager to acquire a share of the wealth which he saw so ill defended².

The peace between the emperor and the sultan was in reality only a truce, during which both parties were ready to avail themselves of any opportunity of renewing the war with advantage. Both sovereigns found themselves ready for action about the same time. Kilidji-Arslan, having subdued all his brothers, reunited all the central provinces of Asia Minor under his dominion. Manuel, who had seen all his schemes of distant conquest and all his labour for the acquisition of military glory prove delusive, now, when

¹ Cinnamus (121) calls these nomades *Τουρκομάνοι*.

² During the sultan's visit at Constantinople, one of his attendants made an attempt to fly from the summit of the Theatre. He was dashed to pieces in spite of his artificial wings, to the great amusement of the mob. Nicetas, 78.

In the reign of James IV. an Italian visited Scotland, and the king made him Abbot of Tungland in Galloway for his supposed skill in alchemy. He pretended that he could fly, and made an attempt from the walls of Stirling Castle; but his wings failed him, and he fell to the ground and broke his thigh-bone. The abbot accounted for his misfortune in a singular manner. 'My wings,' said he, 'were composed of various feathers; among them were those of dunghill fowls, and these by sympathy were attracted to the nearest dunghill.' *Ancient Scottish Poems*, from MS. of George Bannatyne, 20, 280.

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it was already too late, turned his attention to what ought to have been his first military duty as Emperor of Constantinople. He resolved to devote all his energies to driving back the tide of Turkish conquest. For this purpose he repopled and fortified Dorylaeum, and a place at the most distant sources of the Maeander called Subleon. The sultan complained of the construction of these works as an infringement of the treaty; for both Dorylaeum and Subleon were situated in the midst of districts occupied by Turkish settlers. Manuel, however, whose object was to stop the constant encroachments of the Turkish nomades, persisted in completing these fortresses as the only means of expelling the Turks from the country round ¹.

The war recommenced in the year 1176. The sultan had obtained large reinforcements from the Turks of Mesopotamia, who were accustomed to engage the chivalry of Europe on the plains of Syria, where they had already gained a superiority over the Franks. The emperor, besides assembling all his veterans from the frontiers of Hungary, enrolled new corps of Franks and Patzinaks. He collected large supplies of cattle for provisioning the army, and prepared a train of three thousand waggons for the transport of the stores and military engines necessary for the siege of Iconium ². In the month of September, the army advanced, under the immediate command of Manuel, by Laodicea to Chonae (then a large and populous town), the birthplace of the historian Nicetas, who has left us a minute account of the events that followed. The emperor occupied Lampe Celaene, and marched forward to Choma, from whence he advanced to a ruined fortress called Myriocephalon, which has become memorable by the total defeat of the Byzantine army ³. At this place Manuel received an embassy from

¹ Subleon (Nicetas, 115) is called Sublas by Cinnamus (174). It is identified with Silbium, and has been supposed to be at Subashi. This, however, would place it in Manuel's line of advance from Celaenae; and if it had been so, it could hardly have escaped the notice of Nicetas. Perhaps it must be sought in the plain of Sandukli. See Hamilton's *Researches*, vol. ii. pp. 167, 365.

² Cinnamus, 174.

³ Nicetas mentions his birthplace, p. 115. Manuel apparently proposed to advance by the ancient road from Celaenae to Apollonia and Antioch of Pisidia, from whence he could march to Iconium either by Philomelium or by the lake Pasgusa. Leake's *Asia Minor*, 156. Hamilton must have passed very near the scene of Manuel's defeat. Myriocephalon was probably at Subashi, but Hamilton thinks that Silbium (Subleon) was situated there. *Researches*, ii. 365.

Kilidji-Arslan, offering to conclude peace on the conditions of their former treaty; but the emperor replied that he would give an answer at Iconium, and immediately marched forward from Myriokephalon into the pass of Tzyvritze. The Turks had already assembled in numbers on the flanks of the army, carrying away all the forage and destroying the wells and springs, so that fatigue and bad water began to spread disease among the Christians.

Everything indicated the necessity of marching with caution; and the fate of the armies of Conrad of Germany and Louis of France ought to have served as an additional warning to Manuel. Yet Manuel pushed forward without adopting the commonest precautions. Without sending forward his cavalry to clear the defiles and protect his flanks, he entered the valley of Tzyvritze, a long pass, over the southern side of which the mountains protrude in bold precipitous rocks, while to the north the hills which bound it open into several wide ravines. Into this dangerous defile the Byzantine army plunged with such carelessness that its different divisions were ten miles apart, separated by the long trains of waggons and cattle which accompanied their march. The Turks, who watched all the movements of the Christians from their ambuscades, began the attack as soon as the baggage reached the middle of the pass. The front and rear of the Byzantine army were assailed at the same time; but the advanced guard, driving back the Turkish cavalry that attempted to dispute their passage, secured the command of the summits which overlooked the exit, and formed a camp. In the mean time, other corps of Infidels had issued from concealment, and manned the summits on the southern side of the valley wherever the road compelled the Christians to approach the rocks. The right wing of the Byzantine army, commanded by Baldwin, the brother of the empress, was attacked in unfavourable ground, where it was cut off from the rest of the army by the long train of baggage-waggons, and, unable either to draw out its ranks to retreat or to receive any assistance, it was overwhelmed by the Turks, who descended from the heights: Baldwin and the bravest officers were slain, and the whole corps destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the victorious Turks seized the baggage-waggons,

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and employed them to close up the road, while they opened a communication with their countrymen placed in ambuscade among the ravines on the north side of the valley. The Turks then attacked the central division of the army, where the emperor commanded in person, surrounded by the imperial guard. The officers in vain attempted to form their troops, but they could find no space to charge the enemy. The narrow valley was blocked up by the sudden stoppage of the line of march. Waggon, cattle, cavalry, and infantry were crowded together in the wildest confusion. The heavy-armed Byzantine lancers, who in an open field could have swept the Turkish hordes before them, stood useless amidst the overturned waggon and slaughtered oxen. The rear was now vigorously assailed, and fresh squadrons of Mohammedans issued from the branches of the great valley to attack the flanks. Defence and flight were equally hopeless; the slaughter was immense, and the emperor, perplexed by the extent of the calamity, ceased to give any farther orders, but fought to deliver himself with his own sword like a common soldier. Some faithful followers kept close to him, and at last, by a desperate charge, he opened a passage through the enemy, and escaped with a few attendants. He had been recognized by the Turks, who eagerly sought to make him prisoner, and his armour was deeply stained with blood, and bore the mark of many a blow, before he gained the camp of his advanced guard at the issue of the defile.

When Manuel's bodily exertions ceased, his mental sufferings commenced. On calling for a drink of water, he could only obtain it from the stream in the valley, which was stained with blood; he turned away with loathing, and as he poured it on the ground, exclaimed, 'This is horrible! it is the blood of Christians;' but an officer standing near, to whom the recent disaster seemed a natural consequence of the emperor's inconsiderate rashness, coolly observed, 'Never mind, O emperor! you have often drained Christian blood while you were expending the treasures extorted from your subjects.' Shortly after, a party of mules, laden with treasure, was overtaken by the Turks within sight of the camp; and as the Infidels deliberately cut open the money-bags, and began to divide the spoil, Manuel called to the troops to sally out

and divide the treasure among themselves. But he was again rebuked for thus endangering the safety of his remaining soldiers. The same officer rudely exclaimed, 'Your majesty would have done well to leave this treasure in the possession of your subjects; but it is better the Turks should now carry it off and retire with it, than that it should be recovered by the blood of your surviving troops, merely to excite them to assail us with greater vigour.' The emperor felt the justice of the rebuke, and the Turks carried off the treasure.

The rear of the army was commanded by Andronicus Kontostephanos, and that experienced general, with a small body of men whom he had rallied round him, succeeded, by a well-combined series of attacks on the Turks, in forcing his way through the whole length of the valley, and reaching the camp of the advanced guard in the evening. His success afforded the strongest proof that the terrible disaster of the army was caused by the incapacity of Manuel as a general, rather than by the superior tactics of the Turkish force, or the insuperable difficulties of the ground. The conduct of Manuel, after the defeat, was as disgraceful as his military ignorance during the battle. He proposed to save his own person by flight, leaving the generals to conduct the retreat of the remains of his army as they should think fit. But Kontostephanos boldly opposed this arrangement, which had probably been suggested by some of the courtiers who would have accompanied the emperor, and who therefore persuaded Manuel that it was his duty to preserve the person of a Roman emperor from death or captivity at any sacrifice. There was as much sound policy as cowardice in the advice, for as Manuel had only an infant son, the danger of anarchy in the empire would have been great had he fallen. But it was now too late to make such reflections, and the remonstrances of Kontostephanos, who pointed out that the emperor's departure would cause the immediate dissolution of the army and allow the Turks to advance to the shores of the Bosphorus without opposition, induced Manuel to abandon his disgraceful project.

The condition of the Byzantine troops proved to be much better than it appeared at the moment of the defeat. A considerable body of veterans reached the camp in safety,

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and though they were far inferior in numbers to the Turkish squadrons that surrounded them, they felt themselves still superior to their enemy in a fair field of battle. They were no longer encumbered with a train of baggage to impede their movements, and they were consequently enabled to choose their point of attack. On the other hand, the Turkish army was disorganized by its victory, which had put the auxiliaries and nomade tribes in possession of so much booty that they were too much occupied in securing their own gains to pay attention to the Byzantine army. The wary sultan, who saw the numbers of his troops rapidly decreasing, determined to treat of peace with the emperor while his enemies were still under the influence of the panic caused by their disaster. On the day after the battle he sent an envoy to the imperial camp, and Manuel readily agreed to all the terms proposed by Kilidji-Arslan. He engaged to destroy the fortifications he had recently erected at Dorylaeum and Subleon, and to cede to the Turks all the country they had colonized during his reign. The Byzantine army then commenced its retreat, but many independent bands of Turkomans hung on its flanks, and molested it by desultory attacks. The first day's march led the army over the field of slaughter, where the extent of Manuel's folly was forced on his attention by the revolting aspect of heaps of unburied bodies. The surviving troops were soon placed in good quarters at Chonae and Philadelphia. Subleon, which was in the neighbourhood, was immediately dismantled and abandoned; but in a short time the emperor gained sufficient courage to act a dishonourable part, and violate the engagements he had entered into to save himself and his army. He refused to destroy the fortifications of Dorylaeum¹. This caused the renewal of the war.

The sultan opened the campaign of 1177 by sending an army of twenty-four thousand men into the Byzantine territory, with orders to lay waste the country as far as the sea,

¹ Nicetas gives a minute account of the battle of Myriokephalon, and there is a curious letter of Manuel's to our Henry II. preserved by Roger of Hoveden, a contemporary writer. It seems that several English nobles and knights who had joined Manuel's army had distinguished themselves in the battle, and some had fallen. Has any family history preserved the memory of their deeds, or recorded their names? Nicetas, 115; Rogeri Hoveden *Annales*, in Savile, *Rerum Anglicarum Scriptores post Bedam*, Francof. 1601, p. 554.

and bring back from the coast some salt-water, some sea-sand, and the oars of an imperial galley. This army spread over the rich valley of the Maeander, gained possession of Tralles and Antiocheia by capitulation, took Louma and Pentecheira by storm, and laid waste the country to the sea-shore. But as it was returning, laden with other booty besides the salt-water, the sea-sand, and the oars which the sultan was so anxious to see, it was attacked on the banks of the Maeander by John Vatatzes, and completely defeated. This victory restored the character and courage of the Byzantine troops¹.

The last military exploit of Manuel was a rapid march to relieve Claudiopolis, which was closely besieged by another Turkish army. His approach caused the enemy to raise the siege. Both the emperor and sultan being now satisfied that they were wasting the resources of their dominions in unprofitable hostilities, entered into negotiations which soon led to the conclusion of peace.

The mind of Manuel never recovered from the shock his pride had received at the battle of Myriokephalon. The wounds and bruises which he had received appeared to affect his body in a very trifling degree, but he became melancholy, and his health gradually declined. His family affairs now forced themselves on his attention, and he was surprised to find that he had allowed his beautiful daughter Maria to attain the age of thirty without celebrating her marriage, though she had been betrothed to Bela III., king of Hungary, and asked in marriage by the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa as a wife for his son Henry. In the month of March 1178, her marriage was celebrated with Rayner, son of the Marquess of Montferrat, a youth only seventeen years old; and at the same time Alexius, the emperor's son by Mary of Antioch, who was in his eleventh year, was married to Agnes, daughter of Louis VII. of France, who was only seven years old. Alexius and Agnes received the imperial crown, and were proclaimed emperor and empress².

¹ Nicetas says the Turkish general Atapak crossed the Maeander on his shield, but was overtaken and slain (p. 126). Manuel was said to have thirty arrows sticking in his shield when he reached the camp of his advanced guard. The shields of the leading men must, therefore, at this time, have been very large, light, and of a concave form.

² Nicetas, III. William of Tyre (xxii. 4, in Bongars, 1018) passed seven months at Constantinople, and was present at these marriages.

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Manuel displayed during his last illness all the deficiencies of an ill-regulated and undisciplined mind. Though confident in his faith and orthodoxy, he placed great dependence on the predictions of astrologers, and while his strength was rapidly declining he allowed these impostors to persuade him that the stars announced that he should still reign with glory for fourteen years. But in the month of September he became suddenly aware that his end was near: feeling his own pulse, he sighed deeply, struck his thigh with his hand, and ordered his attendants to bring him instantly the habit of a monk. In a few minutes he was divested of the imperial robes, and clad in a monachal garb which proved much too short for his tall figure. He expired, on the 24th of September 1180, at the age of fifty-eight, after a reign of thirty-seven years, and with him the power and glory of the Byzantine empire perished. No sovereign of the Eastern Empire had possessed more absolute power. His reign was undisturbed by rebellion, and the circumstances of the age allowed the greatest latitude for social and political reforms. Men's minds were in a state of fermentation in western Europe; and though Roman political self-sufficiency and Greek ecclesiastical orthodoxy kept the population of the Eastern Empire in a comparatively torpid state, the necessity of making some great changes to prevent the decline of society was generally felt. Yet, while the Latin Christians were actively advancing in their progressive improvements, the Greeks remained stationary and conservative. In the West, the Crusades produced a revolution in ideas as well as in property. The popes made a bold attempt to constitute themselves the centre of all dominion in Europe, under the pretext of restraining the tyranny of kings. Liberty, not yet trammelled by the prejudices of Roman law nor overpowered by the authority of despotic centralization, made a noble effort in the north of Italy to unite municipal independence with political order. There can, therefore, be no doubt that, if the Emperor Manuel had possessed a mind capable of understanding the events which were passing before his eyes, without allowing his judgment to be obscured by traditions founded on social contingencies that no longer existed, he might have reformed the administration and laws of his empire, and laid the foundation of social improvements

sufficiently extensive to have awakened the Greeks from the civil and ecclesiastical torpor into which their minds had fallen. By vigorous reforms, such as Leo III. had adopted at the commencement of the eighth century, Manuel could, in all probability, have restored vital power to the Byzantine empire, but he clung with conservative prejudices to a political and ecclesiastical order of things from which the life had departed. The consequence was, that the crisis during which reform was practicable passed away, and the empire putrefied into a mass of political corruption.

SECT. IV.—*Reigns of Alexius II. and Andronicus I., A.D.*
1180–1185.

Court intrigues and misconduct of the ruling classes.—Andronicus invited to administer the government.—Murders Alexius II.—Biography of Andronicus. Events of his reign.—His cruelty and tyrannical disposition.—Affects justice in his general administration.—Rebellion of Cyprus.—A Sicilian army invades the empire.—Taking of Thessalonica.—Murder of Andronicus.

The latter years of Manuel's life effaced the lessons of prudence inculcated by his father. Following the guidance of his passions instead of his judgment, he selected subservient courtiers to act as his ministers of state, so that, on his death-bed, it was not in his power to place his son under the guardianship of an independent-minded counsellor like his father's friend Axouchos. As soon as he was dead, every member of the imperial family, which was very numerous, aspired at the office of prime-minister; the court was thrown into a state of revolution, and the administration became a scene of anarchy. Unfortunately, no individual, who from his rank could pretend to the regency during the minority of Alexius II., possessed that moral rectitude of character which commands universal respect. Every one knew that his rivals were as worthless as himself. All history testifies the importance of moral character in political contests; yet, strange to say, politicians and statesmen appear rarely to have fully appreciated its practical value.

Alexius was only thirteen years old at his father's death. His education was from that moment utterly neglected. His mother, Maria of Antioch, in the first paroxysms of her grief,

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was so alarmed at her unprotected position, amidst an unprincipled nobility, that she retired into a monastery, and took the name of Xene. Alexius Comnenus, a grandson of the Emperor John II., who held the rank of protosebastos, secured to himself the office of prime-minister; and in order to strengthen his influence he persuaded the empress to quit her retirement and appear again at court, where her beauty, gaiety of heart, and sweetness of manner, gave her considerable power over the young nobility. Her steady support of the protosebastos, whose arrogance rendered him extremely unpopular, exposed Maria to many calumnies; and in spite of his age, personal defects, and disgusting effeminacy, it was generally believed that a criminal attachment induced her to maintain him in office. We must call to mind the prevalence of calumny in Byzantine history, the proneness of courtiers to employ calumny as an efficient weapon in party contests, the readiness of the Greeks to hate Maria for her Latin descent, and the universal disposition of the people in a despotic government to speak evil of their superiors, before we admit the corruption that reigned in the court of Constantinople as a presumption of Maria's immorality¹.

Though the protosebastos held the reins of government, he was unable to repress the seditious movements of the aristocracy: some nobles intrigued to drive him from his post; others threatened to oppose him unless he silenced their opposition by bestowing on them high rank and lucrative offices. The citizens of Constantinople, being without political organization, were a mere mob, led away by every prejudice and rumour of the moment. The lowest classes of the population, consisting of men collected from every province of the empire and every trading city of the East, were always eager for sedition as a means of pillage. Such a society, vibrating between servility and rebellion and guided by personal ambition and individual avarice, was utterly deaf to the voice of patriotism.

For about a year and a half the young emperor was allowed to amuse himself with hunting and gambling, while the whole

¹ Compare Nicetas, 147 and 158, and William of Tyre, xxii. 11. in Bongars, 1023. Nicetas gives a very unfavourable account of the personal appearance of Alexius who was compelled to devote much time to the toilet in order to conceal his defects and appear young. He was the son of Andronicus, the second son of the Emperor John II., who died at Attalia in the year 1141, or early in 1142.

court was occupied with plots and party intrigues. At last the Princess Maria, the emperor's sister, thought the moment favourable for driving the protosebastos from power by a popular sedition. But Alexius had taken care to secure the support of the foreign mercenaries in the capital; and Maria was compelled to retreat, with her young husband, the Caesar, and her armed partisans, into the precincts of St. Sophia's. Many, however, rallied to her standard, and a bloody battle was fought in the streets of Constantinople. The protosebastos feared to pursue the sister of his sovereign to extremity; and the Patriarch effected a compromise, leaving matters as they were before the insurrection. This state of things could not continue long, and a darker storm was now gathering. All the discontented turned their eyes towards Andronicus, the adventurous and unprincipled cousin of the Emperor Manuel, whose strange personal exploits gave him a degree of fame he little deserved, but whose vices were now forgotten in consequence of his long absence from court. He had passed the latter years of Manuel's life as an exile in Paphlagonia; his reputation for courage and ability was great; time was supposed to have moderated the violence of his passions; and his hypocritical piety imposed on the superstitious Greeks, who thought that the saints and holy images he adored could efface, even from his conscience, the black stains of murder and incest. All ranks concurred in soliciting his presence at Constantinople; and he soon approached the capital, declaring that his object was to deliver the young emperor from the hands of the evil counsellors who surrounded him. His march met with little opposition on the part of the government; and the protosebastos Alexius was easily driven from power, and condemned to lose his sight. The Latins in Constantinople, attached to his interests through the support given him by the Empress Maria of Antioch, were massacred by the Greek populace with circumstances of the greatest cruelty; nor did Andronicus make any effort to put a stop to these murders. Their property was pillaged, their houses destroyed; and men, women, children, and priests, torn from the sanctuaries to which they had fled, were barbarously slain. Many of the Franks, nevertheless, escaped to their ships in the port, and endeavoured to repay themselves for the losses they had sustained by plundering the coasts of the Propontis and the

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islands of Greece. This bloody tumult greatly widened the breach between the Latins and the Greeks, and inflamed the western nations of Europe with a thirst for revenge that soon filled the Aegean Sea with Frank pirates¹. A more terrible revenge was taken twenty years after by the Latin conquest of Constantinople.

It is needless to give a detailed account of the crimes of Andronicus; he used his unlimited power as all prudent persons must have foreseen that he would use it. The Princess Maria and her husband the Caesar were poisoned. The Empress Maria of Antioch was condemned to death for what was termed treasonable correspondence with her brother-in-law, Bela III., king of Hungary, and strangled. Andronicus Kontostephanos, the best general in the empire, was deprived of sight. John Vatatzes, who defeated the Turks at the Macander, died shortly after raising the standard of revolt. The Patriarch Theodosius was removed from office, and Basilios Kamateros placed at the head of the Greek church, on his promising to do everything that Andronicus might desire. Andronicus then ordered himself to be consecrated emperor by the new patriarch, and immediately took precedence of Alexius II., who was soon after deposed, on the pretext that a single emperor was necessary in order to re-establish order in the empire. The unfortunate youth, who was not yet fifteen years old, was strangled with a bowstring in the prison to which he had been committed; and when Andronicus examined the corpse in order to be assured of his death, he kicked it carelessly, and exclaimed, 'Thy father was a villain, thy mother a prostitute, and thou a fool².'

The corrupted state of society had brought the Byzantine empire to the verge of ruin; Andronicus, who was no incorrect type of the higher classes in the nation over which he reigned, accelerated its destruction. The nobility and the higher clergy were the partners of his guilt, and often the agents of his crimes; while the citizens of Constantinople were generally the delighted spectators of his greatest cruelties.

Andronicus was the grandson of the Emperor Alexius I.; Isaac, the younger brother of the Emperor John II., was his father. It has been noticed that Isaac's rash and unsteady

¹ Nicetas, 162; William of Tyre, xxii. 12, 13, in Bongars, 1024. ² Nicetas, 176.

temper induced him to quit his brother's court and reside for a time with the Sultan of Iconium. His children were more violent and vicious than their father. The manner in which his eldest son John joined the Turks, and abjured the Christian religion, has also been recounted¹. The vanity of the Greeks, at a later period, sought consolation for their actual sufferings by forging a tale concerning the marriage of this Byzantine renegade with a daughter of the Seljouk sultan of Iconium; and from the offspring of this imaginary alliance it was pretended that the Othoman dynasty was descended. Andronicus was Isaac's second son; his expressive countenance, handsome figure, and tall robust frame were rendered doubly attractive by a singularly sweet and powerful voice, an easy-flowing elocution, and a graceful manner. These advantages, joined to daring courage and great skill in military exercises, made him for some time a favourite with his cousin the Emperor Manuel. His unprincipled conduct at last estranged them; and his life was subsequently marked by a series of the strangest adventures. No wandering Crusader or nomade Turk ever lived a wilder or more romantic life than the princely Andronicus.

Early in the reign of Manuel he was taken prisoner by the Turks, as he had wandered from the emperor's escort on a hunting party while crossing the Turkish territory in Phrygia. During the time he remained a captive at the court of Sultan Massoud he cultivated the acquaintance of the leading Turks, into whose society he was introduced by his Mussulman brother; and he learned the Turkish language, which was often useful to him in his future adventures. Manuel was accused of having neglected to pay his ransom, from jealousy of his skill in military exercises; but after his return he saved his life by interposing his own arm to ward off a blow aimed at his cousin's head². Andronicus was twice intrusted by the Emperor Manuel with the command of the army in Cilicia; on both occasions he was shamefully defeated by the Armenian prince Thoros. Subsequently he was appointed governor of Belgrade and Branisova, the two principal Byzantine fortresses on the Hungarian frontier; and either his negligence or treachery exposed the empire to serious danger.

¹ See above, pp. 132 and 143.

² See above, p. 147.

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His public conduct at last completely alienated the affection of Manuel.

Though addicted to pleasure, and leading a life of the most shameless profligacy, Andronicus kept aloof from the rest of the court, and always assumed a marked superiority. Though no one was more eager in the chase, he never mixed in the noisy revels of the nobility, and showed himself an enemy to the pleasures of the table. He was a sober and abstemious profligate: his dinner was generally a single dish of roast meat; and after the fatigues of the longest day his supper frequently consisted of a crust of bread and a goblet of wine. But he indulged his two favourite passions, love and ambition, without respect for divine or human laws. No principle of duty, and no bond of gratitude, restrained him when he thought power was within his grasp; and when inflamed by lust, he knew no ties of morality or religion. His amours were often carried on in the circle of his nearest relatives; and in the opinion of his countrymen, he, as well as the Emperor Manuel, was stained with the crime of incest. Eudocia, the daughter of Manuel's elder brother Andronicus, was the paramour of his youth, while her sister Theodora was the mistress of her uncle the emperor. Another Theodora, also the emperor's niece, being the daughter of his brother Isaac, became the mistress of Andronicus at a later period, when she was the widow of Baldwin III., king of Jerusalem. Both these ladies shared his company with his lawful wife, and divided his affections with a crowd of actresses and dancing girls. The loves of Eudocia and Andronicus excited more anger in her family than the incestuous intercourse of her sister with the emperor; the rank of the sinner hid the crime of the blacker dye. After vainly endeavouring to separate the criminals, John, the brother of Eudocia, and Cantacuzenos, her brother-in-law, resolved to avenge their family by assassinating Andronicus. The court was encamped at Pelagonia in palaces of canvas, like those which may be still seen when an Oriental sovereign takes the field in state. As Andronicus was in the habit of visiting his cousin at unseasonable hours, a band of armed men was stationed to murder him as he quitted Eudocia. The lady's spies warned her of the danger; and while her female attendants were making a noise to bring in lights, Andronicus cut a small passage with his sword in

the back of the tent, and, creeping between the ropes and pegs, gained the canvas wall that enclosed Eudocia's tents. This he also cut through, and crept away unobserved.

The political conduct of Andronicus, on several occasions, excited just suspicions. He was accused of holding treasonable intercourse with the King of Jerusalem, with the Sultan of Iconium, and with the King of Hungary; and there can be little doubt that he was only prevented from making an attempt to dethrone Manuel by the superior political ability and more systematic energy of the emperor. Andronicus was so convinced of Manuel's personal superiority that despairing of being able to dethrone him he appears to have designed assassinating him. At an imperial hunting-party he presented himself, uninvited, with the numerous train of armed followers which the great nobles of the Byzantine empire maintained in their palaces; the emperor's escort was too strong for any attempt at open violence; but during the night Andronicus was found disguised in an Italian dress, armed with a dagger, lurking near the tent of Manuel. His suspicious behaviour, scandalous conduct, and bitterly satirical expressions, gave his enemies an opportunity of bringing so many charges against him that the emperor at length committed him to prison.

Andronicus passed nine years of his life in confinement; his escapes from imprisonment and his captures were as singular as his crimes, and mark the restless activity of his mind, his self-possession, and his rashness. During his first imprisonment, chance led him to discover a secret recess in the tower where he was confined. After laying up a store of provisions, he withdrew into this retreat, and every search was made for him in vain. At last his wife was arrested as privy to his escape, and confined in the tower from which it was supposed he had escaped. On retiring into her bedchamber, the spectre of her husband made its appearance. He soon informed her how matters stood, and made arrangements with her for continuing his concealment and obtaining a supply of provisions. The two prisoners lived most affectionately together, and their son John was the fruit of this period of domestic felicity. The guards were careless in watching the princess, whom they believed to be their only prisoner, so that Andronicus at last found means of escaping. He was however

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soon recognized, arrested at Melangia in Bithynia, and again committed to prison, where he was loaded with chains. He was fortunate enough to escape a second time, by procuring an impression of the keys of his dungeon in wax. His son Manuel contrived to get new keys made from these models, and to convey them to his father, with a coil of ropes, in an amphora of wine. On a dark and rainy night Andronicus opened his prison doors unobserved, and reached the garden of the imperial palace, from the outer walls of which he descended at the place where John Zimiskes had mounted to murder Nicephorus; there he found a boat waiting to receive him. He reached Anchialus in safety, and Pupakes, whose gallant conduct at the siege of Corfu has been already mentioned, owing him gratitude for some personal obligations, furnished him with the means of continuing his flight¹. Andronicus was again tantalized with the fear of returning to a worse captivity than that from which he had escaped. He was recognized by a party of Vallachians, who resolved to deliver him up to the emperor. From their hands he escaped by stratagem. Counterfeiting a violent diarrhœa and excessive weakness, he persuaded his guards to make frequent halts; and when evening approached, and he was allowed to retire for a short distance from the road, he fixed his cloak and hat on the stick with which he had apparently supported himself with difficulty, and plunged into a neighbouring forest, from whence he ultimately reached the Russian principality of Halicz or Galicia².

The share Pupakes took in aiding the flight of his benefactor was discovered, and Manuel, forgetting the former services of the valiant Turk, ordered him to be publicly scourged, and led through the streets of Constantinople with a rope round his neck, preceded by a crier, who proclaimed at intervals, 'This man is disgraced and punished for having aided the enemies of the emperor!' To which Pupakes himself always added, 'There is no dishonour in the punishment,

¹ See above, p. 169.

² Nicetas, though an *ἀνρόπητης*, requires to be read with great caution, in order to separate his meaning from his rhetoric. In one page he tells us Andronicus was ten feet high (164); in another, he recounts how Andronicus acted the part of a fugitive slave to the life (85). Now, as fugitive slaves ten feet high cannot have been a common apparition among the Constantinopolitans, we may conclude that Nicetas in the one passage only meant to say that Andronicus was a very tall man, but his rhetoric got the better of his meaning.

for it was incurred in assisting a benefactor instead of betraying him.' After this indignity Pupakes quitted the empire, and returned to the possessions of his uncle, who was an emir in the Seljouk empire of Iconium, where Manuel met him once again charged with a mission from his uncle¹.

Andronicus, who could neither command his temper nor restrain his tongue in prosperity, was good-humoured and fair-spoken in adversity. At the court of Yaroslaf the prince of Galicia he became a great favourite, and was soon the constant companion of the prince. They hunted the urus together, and formed plans for invading the Byzantine empire². Manuel at last considered that there was so much danger to be apprehended from the continuance of his cousin's residence in Galicia, that he granted him a full pardon, and induced him to return to Constantinople.

Andronicus after his return was intrusted with the chief command in Cilicia for the second time. His conduct was that of a madman, and he marched to attack the Armenian prince Thoros with his army drawn up in a new and ill-judged manner. The experienced Armenian took immediate advantage of his folly, and broke his troops in many places, scattering the Byzantine army in utter confusion. Nicetas pretends that when Andronicus saw the defeat of his army, he conceived the hope of redeeming his blunders by an act of daring valour. He charged Thoros with his lance, though he was surrounded by a numerous staff, and the Armenian had barely time to interpose his shield before his breast when he was hurled from his horse. Andronicus, abandoning his lance, which he believed was quivering in the heart of Thoros, burst through the Armenian guards, striking every man who encountered him to the ground with his mace. But before he could rally his own fugitive battalions, Thoros, who had risen from the ground unhurt, resumed the direction of the pursuit, prevented the scattered divisions of the Byzantine army from effecting a junction, and compelled Andronicus to seek safety in precipitate flight.

After this disgraceful defeat, Andronicus was immediately superseded; but as both his liberty and his eyesight were in danger had he returned to Constantinople, he collected all

¹ Cinnamus, 114.

² Nicetas (214) calls the urus 'Zoumpros;' the Polish word is Zubr.

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the money he was able, and, quitting Cilicia with a splendid suite before the arrival of his successor, presented himself at the court of Reynold of Antioch. Here he soon fell in love with the Princess Philippa, the sister of the empress Maria, and inspired her with a passion so violent that she set at naught the counsels of her family, and consented to a marriage with her debauched lover. It is not easy to say how long Andronicus remained at Antioch, but he became at last alarmed lest he should be arrested by order of the Emperor Manuel in that vassal principality, and he fled to Jerusalem, where his passions soon involved him in new difficulties. At Jerusalem he met Theodora, the daughter of his cousin Isaac, whom he had not seen since her childhood. She was now the widow of Baldwin III. of Jerusalem, and enjoyed the admiration and esteem of all the Frank nobles on account of her beauty, talents, and prudence. Andronicus became deeply enamoured of his fair cousin, and she returned his passion with equal violence. The state of society among the Latin Christians in Jerusalem was as debauched as at the court of Constantinople, so that the lovers carried on their amours with little affectation of secrecy¹. But when Manuel heard of this insult to his brother's family, he sent messages to the Syrian barons, offering great rewards to any one who should seize Andronicus and put out his eyes; at the same time he requested Amaury, king of Jerusalem, with whom he had a close alliance, to arrest the fugitive. Theodora obtained information of these communications in time to warn Andronicus of his danger, and as there was no longer any hope of safety among the Christians, she consented to fly with him to the Turks. After visiting Damascus, and wandering for some time in Mesopotamia and Iberia, they settled at Koloneia, in Chaldia, where Andronicus, assembling a band of Turkish mercenaries, of renegades and refugees, formed a camp for making incursions into the empire and carrying off Christians to sell as slaves. From this brigand life he derived a considerable revenue, and it is strange to find that the wretch who had maintained himself for years as a slave-dealer was subsequently invited to ascend the throne of Constantinople. In this infamous exile Theodora bore him two sons. The

¹ See the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of James de Vitriaco (i. 69, 70, 71, in Bongars, 1086, &c.) for a picture of the depraved state of society in Palestine.

Greek church, it is true, excommunicated him for living with his cousin's daughter, and making slaves of its flock; but Andronicus, who despised divine laws, had no fear of ecclesiastical censures, from which either the possession of political power or the payment of a sum of money could at any-time release him.

The evils he inflicted on the Byzantine territory were so great, that Manuel repeatedly sent troops to pursue him incessantly and capture his strongholds; but these operations were attended with little result until Nicephorus Palaeologos, the governor of Trebizond, succeeded in capturing the fortress in which Theodora had sought safety. Her captivity induced Andronicus to negotiate his own pardon, and he received permission to present himself to the emperor. As he was now seriously alarmed for his future safety, he adopted every artifice his crafty mind suggested for flattering the vanity of Manuel. At a public audience, as soon as he entered the hall of reception, he fell on his knees, and drew from under his clothes a heavy iron chain, made fast to a collar round his neck; then holding up his hands, he implored pardon from the emperor, weeping, protesting his repentance, and quoting passages from Scripture. Though a bitter sneerer, he was a profound hypocrite and an admirable actor; so that, in spite of his previous conduct, he more than once in his life persuaded every one who beheld him that he had become an altered man. The Emperor Manuel, on seeing his cousin's abasement, requested him to stand, and assured him of full pardon; but Andronicus continued his hypocritical wailings until he induced one of the courtiers to drag him by the chain to the emperor's footstool. Some years later, when Andronicus was dragged through the streets of Constantinople, to perish in a frightful manner, men remembered that Isaac Angelos, his successor, had been the courtier who had dragged him to Manuel's feet. After receiving his pardon, Andronicus was ordered to reside at Oenaion in Pontus.

From this place of exile he watched the progress of the intrigues in the Byzantine court after Manuel's death, and he easily found partisans among the dissatisfied courtiers, who demanded his presence in the capital. His agents were also employed in gaining the people; for wicked and worthless as Andronicus was, he perceived that the unprincipled

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behaviour of the court had excited a deep-rooted aversion to the whole family of Comnenos, and that, unless the people of the capital declared in his favour, the mercenary troops of the government might defeat his attacks. He therefore affected to pay the greatest attention to the last oath he had publicly taken in the Byzantine court, in which he had promised never to conceal from the emperor anything contrary to the interests of the empire, but as soon as such a thing might come to his knowledge to oppose it with all his power. This oath was now made a pretext for writing to the young emperor, and censuring the measures of the protosebastos; and the letters were of course composed rather with reference to the effect they were likely to produce on the public than on the court. His remonstrances were of course useless, so he resolved to save the empire by force. The treachery of Andronicus Angelos, the general of the imperial army, and of Andronicus Kontostephanos, the grand admiral, rendered him master of Constantinople.

Prosperity revived all the evil passions which age was supposed to have eradicated from the heart of Andronicus. The innate cruelty of his disposition, and the unforgiving malice of his depraved feelings, soon revealed themselves in his treatment of the most influential nobles. The aristocracy saw its leaders put to death on account of the influence they possessed, or merely to confiscate their wealth; while the people, whose burdens Andronicus lightened and whose vengeance he gratified, loudly applauded his conduct. Angelos and Kontostephanos now saw their error, and conspired to drive Andronicus from the post of prime-minister, to which their treachery had raised him. The plot was discovered, and the brave Kontostephanos was arrested with his four sons, and other conspirators, all of whom were deprived of sight. The cowardly Angelos and his sons escaped. From that time the servility of the Byzantine nobles became greater than ever, and it only increased the contempt of Andronicus for their persons, while, by exciting his distrust, it increased his cruelty. John Cantacuzenos, in order to ingratiate himself with the tyrannical regent, ill-treated one of the eunuchs of the young emperor, who had attempted to warn his sovereign of the dangerous position of public affairs, and to persuade the prince to devote some attention

to serious business, instead of publicly trifling away his time in idle, expensive, and vicious amusements, which were sure to render him unpopular. Cantacuzenos struck the eunuch on the face in the presence of Andronicus; but the wily old villain, suspecting that this enthusiastic meanness covered evil intentions, ordered the eyes of Cantacuzenos to be put out on hearing that he held some slight communication with his brother-in-law Constantine Angelos, who was in confinement on a charge of treason.

As soon as Andronicus had put to death all those who he thought possessed the power of resisting his schemes, and accumulated as much wealth in the public treasury as would enable him to diminish the public burdens, he ascended the throne, and put the young Alexius to death. He looked forward to the tranquil enjoyment of power, and indulged his cruelty by putting to death the wealthiest members of the aristocracy. Yet so perverted was his character, that he could not refrain from insulting the universal feelings of mankind by outrages which no class could pardon. The Patriarch Theodosios was compelled to quit his office, because he refused to sanction the marriage of Alexius and Irene, the incestuous offspring of himself and Manuel with the two Theodoras; but the Greek church was at this time in the same demoralized condition as the Byzantine court, and the marriage ceremony was performed by the Archbishop or Patriarch of Bulgaria.

The nobility were not inclined to submit tamely to be decimated; some were eager to obtain power, some were burning to revenge their relations, and some, perhaps, were impelled by the duty of avenging the murder of their lawful prince. Various nobles took up arms at Nicaea, Prusa, and Lopadion before the murder of the young Alexius; but, for a time, fortune smiled on the enterprises of the tyrant, and all these rebels were subdued and punished with unheard-of cruelty: numbers were hanged on the largest trees, and few were dismissed without losing a hand or a foot; even the Bishop of Prusa was deprived of his sight. Andronicus Lapardas, one of the generals of the army on the frontiers of Hungary who attempted to avenge the death of Alexius II., was also taken prisoner and deprived of sight.

Andronicus appears to have formed some general plan

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of improving the civil administration, and reforming the judicial system, by which he expected to render himself popular, and secure the support of the great body of the population. He reduced the expenditure of the court; but in rendering it less brilliant, he did not render it less vicious. He was too old to find pleasure in tournaments and fêtes. He had learned moderation in exile, and his habits of self-indulgence led him to live in a retired manner, even after he obtained the throne. This mode of life, however, made him neglect the amusements of the populace of Constantinople; and he soon became unpopular with the mob, who accused him of avarice in plundering the nobles for his own solitary gratification; while, in their opinion, it was one of the principal duties of the emperor to preside at the games of the hippodrome, and to plan a succession of fêtes for the public gratification. Old age had rendered Andronicus inactive, and his intense selfishness and domineering insolence of disposition persuaded him that all mankind would bend to his opinions. His first care, as emperor, was to prepare for lightening the public burdens by making extensive fiscal reforms. He abolished the practice of selling official charges, a measure which enabled him to suppress many useless offices. He selected able and experienced lawyers to act as judges, on whom he conferred ample salaries from the public treasury, prohibiting them, at the same time, under the severest penalties, from extorting money from the people. Indeed, it is possible that, if he had been able to control the malicious violence of his temper, and if his reign had been prolonged, the cultivators of the soil throughout the empire might have derived some permanent advantage from his government¹. But his personal conduct inflamed the hatred of every class at Constantinople, where he was very soon regarded as a monster whom it was the duty of every man to hunt to death. The seclusion in which he lived concealed from him the change that had taken place in the

¹ Nicetas (209) gives Andronicus great praise for his exertions to abolish the practice of plundering shipwrecked vessels which prevailed among the Greeks, and which preceding emperors had vainly endeavoured to suppress. We have noticed that the Emperor Manuel I., as well as his successors, inserted a clause in the commercial treaties with the Italian republics to put an end to this barbarous custom (above, p. 156). Andronicus himself would have been astonished at the system of salvage exacted by our law in favour of the British navy. See many cases in the Admiralty Reports.

popular mind, and he continued to pursue his old course of cruelty, shut up in his palace. His strange behaviour kept the attention of the capital fixed on his actions. The memory of the murdered Alexius seemed to haunt every man's mind but his own. To calm the superstitious scruples of his instruments, he induced the Greek clergy to grant absolution to himself and his partisans for having violated their oaths of allegiance to Alexius II., thus allowing the church to assume the power of pardoning treason and murder. Heretics might well say that the Greek church was more corrupt and degraded than the imperial government; for the emperor committed his crimes to gain some definite object, but the clergy gratuitously undermined the principles of morality and religion¹. As an additional insult to the feelings of mankind, Andronicus, who had reached the age of seventy, though he still retained the appearance of a man of middle age, thought fit to marry Agnes of France, the child-widow of his murdered sovereign. The young empress was only eleven years old when she was led to the imperial palace by the hoary sinner, and placed among a crowd of actresses and dancing girls to complete her education.

Few men at Constantinople acknowledged the restraints of duty and religion, and the few who did so retired from public life. The successful rebellion of a man, almost as depraved, and far less able than Andronicus, revealed the facility with which the empire might be dismembered. Isaac, whose father's name is unknown, but who was the nephew of Theodora, queen of Jerusalem, and who adopted the name of Comnenus, had been appointed governor of Tarsus in the reign of Manuel; and having been taken prisoner by the Armenians of Cilicia, was delivered from captivity by Andronicus, who authorized him to draw sixty thousand byzants from the revenues of Cyprus in order to pay his ransom. Reuben, the Prince of Armenian Cilicia, had made over his captive to Bohemund III., prince of Antioch, who, on receiving payment of half the ransom, allowed Isaac to visit Cyprus in order to expedite the collection of the remainder. Isaac, on reaching the island, availed himself of

¹ Nicetas, 178.

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the authority he had received from Andronicus to dispose of the revenue and act as governor. As soon as he could collect a body of troops, he proclaimed himself emperor. He equalled the cruelty of Andronicus in his public administration. This rebellion filled the heart of the tyrant with fear and rage. A prediction declared that a man, whose name commenced with the letter I, was destined to deprive him of his crown and life; and this prediction now alarmed him, for he had no fleet which he could immediately despatch with a force sufficient to suppress the rebellion. The island of Cyprus was completely separated from the Byzantine empire. It was shortly after conquered by Richard, king of England, and its Greek inhabitants have ever since been subjected to foreign domination.

Constantine Makrodukas and Andronikos Dukas, two of the worst agents of the emperor's cruelty, had become sureties for the good conduct of Isaac when Andronicus granted him the money necessary to pay his ransom. Undeterred by any feelings of political prudence, the tyrant determined to gratify his revenge by a public exhibition of his rage. On Ascension Day it was usual for the whole court to pay their respects to the sovereign. Andronicus was residing at the palace of Philopation, and thither the two sureties of the rebel Isaac repaired as suppliants, waiting in the inner court, lifting up their hands as petitioners, and seeking to be judged by a tribunal in order to prove their innocence. Even the tyrant's most intimate friends thought the culprits would escape severe punishment. One man alone was intrusted with the order for their execution, and instructed how it was to be carried into effect. Stephen Aghiochristophorites, the agent of many murders, entered the assembly, and, taking up a large stone, struck Makrodukas with it, calling, at the same time, to all the nobles present who honoured the emperor to take stones from a pile placed purposely in the court of the palace, and put the enemies of their sovereign to death. The imperial guards stood by to watch their behaviour, so that none dared to appear dilatory. In this strange and barbarous manner the sureties of the rebel emperor of Cyprus were murdered by the servile nobles of Constantinople. Worthless as the Byzantine nobility had become, they could not conceal their indignation

at this insult, and Alexius, the incestuous offspring of Manuel, whom Andronicus had married to his own illegitimate child Irene, conceived the monstrous idea of mounting the throne. His plot was discovered—his fellow-conspirators were put to death in the cruellest manner—his secretary was burned alive in the hippodrome—his own eyes were put out—and Irene was banished from her father's presence for weeping over the misfortune of her husband.

The mad career of Andronicus was now drawing to an end. Alexius Comnenos, one of the grand-nephews of Manuel, had escaped to the court of William II., king of Sicily, where his account of the state of the Byzantine empire agreed so well with the reports which were daily brought by recent fugitives, that the Sicilian monarch resolved to support Alexius' pretensions to the throne, in the hope of making some valuable conquests for himself. A Sicilian fleet, under the command of Tancred, the cousin and successor of William II., and the Admiral Margaritone, with an army commanded by the Counts Richard d'Acerra and Aldoin, entered the Adriatic, and took Dyrrachium by assault, after a siege of a few days. The troops marched thence by land to attack Thessalonica, while the fleet circumnavigated the Peloponnesus. Andronicus seemed to feel little alarm when he heard of this attempt to drive him from the throne; he thought that the danger could not be great, as his rival's name did not begin with I. His second son, John, who had been invested with the imperial title, was sent to assemble an army to relieve Thessalonica; and David Comnenos, who commanded in the place, was ordered to defend it to the last. The incapacity of David, the disorder that reigned in the garrison, and the discontent of the inhabitants, enabled the Norman troops to take Thessalonica on the 15th of August 1185, after a siege of ten days.

The cruelties committed by the Sicilians after they gained possession of Thessalonica roused the indignation of the Byzantine population, and did more to arrest their further progress than the troops of Andronicus. The Latins and Greeks now regarded one another as heretics as well as political enemies; and their hostilities were marked by horrors of which we may estimate the fearful violence by reflecting on the cruelty of the government and populace

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of Constantinople, and remembering that it affords the best type of the feelings of society in the East. Nicetas furnishes us with a dreadful picture of the proceedings of the Sicilian army. Nineteen years after, he was himself a spectator of similar scenes acted by a Latin army in Constantinople. Many of the inhabitants of Thessalonica were expelled from their houses; people of rank were tortured to compel them to deliver up the treasures they were supposed to have concealed; some were hung up by the feet and suffocated by burning straw beneath them. Insult was added to cruelty: the altars in the Greek churches were defiled; the religious ceremonies of the Greeks were ridiculed; and when the priests chanted their service in the nasal melody prevalent in the East, the Norman soldiers howled out a chorus in imitation of beaten hounds. At last, however, Eustathius, the celebrated Archbishop of Thessalonica, by his prudent conduct succeeded in conciliating the Sicilian generals, and inducing them to restrain the license of their troops, which they had too long tolerated ¹.

The Sicilian army at last quitted Thessalonica to march to Constantinople; but all ranks were so eager for plunder that its progress was slow. Andronicus made some dispositions for the defence of his capital; and it was reported that he proposed to put every person to death who was imprisoned on a charge of treason. The report filled the population of Constantinople with alarm, for almost every family of any standing had one of its members in prison; the nobles were rendered desperate by a sense of danger—the people were indignant at the dismemberment of the empire and at the conquests of the Latins. The tyrant, having given his orders to the agents of his cruelty, considered that the tranquillity of the capital was assured, and retired to enjoy himself with a crowd of parasites and courtesans at the palace of Meludion, on the shores of the Bosphorus ².

The storm that drove him from the throne, and terminated

¹ Eustathius, besides many other learned works, has left us a declamatory account of the taking of Thessalonica, which gives us some interesting facts. It was first published by Professor Tafel in Eustathii *Opuscula*, Tübingen, 1832; and has been reprinted with *Leo Grammaticus* at Bonn.

² Many absurd reports concerning the cruelty of Andronicus were current at this time. It was believed that he wished to roast a fat priest of St. Sophia's alive, and to serve up his body to his wife. Nicetas, 201.

his existence, burst suddenly on his head from a quarter whence it was least expected. Aghiochristophorites deemed it necessary to arrest Isaac Angelos, though the emperor had such a contempt for his incapacity and cowardice that he refused to sign an order for his condemnation. The minister was therefore obliged to make the arrest in person, on his own responsibility. When Isaac heard that the terrible Aghiochristophorites, who was universally known to be the agent of the emperor's greatest cruelties, was in the court of his palace, his very cowardice rendered him courageous, for he derived fury from despair. Instead of submitting tamely, he mounted his horse, and, rushing at Aghiochristophorites with his drawn sword, slew him on the spot. But he had neither the ability nor the courage to take any farther measures for his defence, and he sought an asylum in St. Sophia's. The absence of the emperor and the death of the minister allowed Isaac Angelos to remain unmolested. His friends ventured to join him; and the people, hearing that Aghiochristophorites was slain, rose in rebellion. The prisons were broken open, armed bands were formed, and Isaac was proclaimed emperor. All the nobility now assembled in the church of St. Sophia, and the crown of Constantine, which stood on the high altar, was taken down in order to perform the ceremony of coronation; but the timidity of Isaac was so great that he sought to decline the dangerous honour. His uncle, John Dukas, stepped forward and offered his bald head to receive the crown his nephew feared to accept; but the people, thinking that he bore some resemblance to Andronicus, shouted loudly, 'We will have no more old men to rule us, and no man with a forked beard shall be emperor.' Isaac was therefore compelled to receive the crown. It is remarkable that the coins of Andronicus distinctly portray the forked beard which excited the antipathy of the populace¹.

Andronicus hastened to Constantinople as soon as he was informed of the insurrection, and attempted to defend himself in the great palace; but his guards refused to attack the people, even though he himself mounted one of the towers and shot a few arrows against the crowd. The assailants,

¹ Saulcy, pl. xxix. 1, 2, 3; Nicetas, 222.

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meeting with no opposition, burst open the gate Karea ; and Andronicus, throwing off the imperial robes, and disguising himself in a pointed Russian bonnet, embarked in the galley which had brought him from the palace of Meludion, accompanied by his young empress Agnes of France, a favourite concubine named Maraptika, remarkable for her musical skill, and a few personal attendants. His object was to escape into Russia, but contrary winds kept him on the Bithynian coast, and he was captured by the agents of Isaac, brought back to Constantinople, and imprisoned in the tower of Anemas, with a heavy chain round his neck and irons on his limbs.

We have not ventured to describe the torments Andronicus had often inflicted on his victims when he made a public display of his worst acts of cruelty, but the people now showed that they had been apt scholars. Isaac allowed the old emperor to be dragged by the chain from his prison, to be conducted through the streets of the capital, undergoing every insult, and then to be tortured in the most inhuman manner. The populace, headed by the relations of those whom he had put to death, among whom the women were conspicuous, beat the old man cruelly, tore his hair from his head and his beard from his face. The Emperor Isaac insulted him when he was brought into his presence, and ordered his right hand to be cut off and his right eye to be put out. After this treatment he was thrust back into prison, where he remained more than a day without food or attendance. At last he was led out, and abandoned to the people for execution, who put out his remaining eye, and conducted him to the place where he was to suffer, mounted on a lean camel. Crowds followed throwing stones at him, beating him with long poles, and pricking him with spears. Hot water was thrown from the windows on his head, and he was compelled for hours to suffer tortures which nature recoils from recording. At last he was taken to the hippodrome, and hung up by the feet between two columns, near a group of ancient sculpture representing a she-wolf and a hyaena, where his sufferings were terminated by two Latin soldiers, who plunged their swords into his heart. Andronicus bore all his torments with the greatest fortitude, exclaiming only at intervals, 'Lord have mercy

upon me,' and, addressing the people, 'break not a bruised reed ¹.'

¹ The reign of Andronicus lasted only a year, from September, 1184, to September, 1185; and his administration as guardian of Alexius II. commenced about a year earlier. Nicetas gives a minute account of this period, and he is our only authority of any value. He records many curious anecdotes concerning Andronicus, which show that he was a man of sense when not governed by his passions. One anecdote is worth recording, as it relates to the historian John Cinnamus, who has so often been our guide in the preceding pages. Andronicus overheard the Bishop of New Patras (Hypate) and John Cinnamus disputing concerning the words of Christ, 'My Father is greater than I,'—and though he was well read in Greek theology, his anger was so much excited by the sophistical distinctions and quibbles of the ecclesiastical disputants, that he threatened to throw the divine and the historian into the river Rhyndacus, which was flowing near, unless they ceased their cavils concerning the Divine words, which he deemed sufficiently explicit. Nicetas, 213.

CHAPTER III.

THE FALL OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, A.D. 1185-1204.

SECT. I.—*The Reign of Isaac II. (Angelos),*
A.D. 1185-1195.

Anarchy at Constantinople.—Worthless character of Isaac II.—Sicilians expelled the empire.—Isaac pays tribute to the Sultan of Iconium.—Observations on the Vallachian population in the Byzantine empire.—Origin of the Vallachian or second Bulgarian kingdom.—Rebellion of Alexius Branas.—Conrad of Montferrat.—Third crusade.—Conquest of Cyprus by Richard I. of England.—Rebellions and conspiracies.—Isaac dethroned by his brother, Alexius III.

THE Byzantine empire was now hurrying rapidly to its end, and little is left to record except the progress of its dismemberment and destruction. The despotic power of the emperors was so firmly established, that every executive act emanated directly from the imperial cabinet. But, in perfecting this system of centralization, every tie of interest which had once attached the provincials to the imperial authority had been broken. The adhesion of the distant countries and various nations which composed the empire was destroyed; while, at the same time, the vital energy of the Greek population, which had grown to be the dominant race, was weakened by the immorality which, under the house of Comnenus, had spread through every rank of society. The defensive powers of the empire were consequently rapidly diminishing. The lavish expenditure of the imperial court impelled the government to carry its fiscal exactions so far, that the whole annual profits of the people's industry were absorbed by taxation, and only the inferior classes of the cultivators of the soil and the day-labourers were able to retain the scanty surplus of wealth necessary to perpetuate their existence. Indeed, it is evident

that encroachments were constantly made on the vested capital accumulated in past ages; and the funds appropriated in preceding times to uphold the most indispensable adjuncts of civilization were either annihilated or diverted from their destination. Ports, bridges, roads, aqueducts, and fortifications were falling to ruin in every province. Court spectacles and ecclesiastical ceremonies at the capital absorbed the funds which had been accumulated in distant municipalities for local improvements, hospitals, and schools. Everything that could inspire the people with zeal to defend their national independence had disappeared, or was rapidly disappearing.

Political despotism, national demoralization, ecclesiastical corruption, fiscal oppression, and habitual misgovernment, must therefore be considered responsible for the anarchical and disorderly state of Constantinople at the accession of Isaac Angelos; and the circumstance that a man so incapable and worthless was raised to the throne by the popular voice, testifies the degradation of the capital.

After the people forced their way into the great palace, and established Isaac there as emperor, they remained for several days in possession of the greater part of the buildings which were enclosed within the circuit of its fortified walls. The residence of the emperors of the East was plundered like a sacked city; the furniture was carried away; the chapel was robbed of its plate, ornaments, images, and relics; the casket containing the letters said to have been written by our Saviour to Abgarus, king of Edessa, was stolen. The private treasury of the emperor was broken into, and eighty-six thousand byzants in gold coin, thirty centners in silver coin, and two hundred of copper, were carried off, besides a considerable quantity of bullion¹. The new emperor did not venture to arrest the devastation going on before his eyes while his rival was still living. He removed to the palace of Blachern, and it was only after the death of Andronicus and when the people were satiated with the plunder of the residences of his partisans, that Isaac attempted to re-establish order.

The family of Comnenus had been distinguished for talent

¹ Nicetas, 223. *Κεντηνάρια*, like our pounds sterling, may have been used to denote the value in gold. In this case the sum in silver coin was equal to 216,000 byzants, and amounted to 2,592,000 *miliaresia*. Modern collectors of Byzantine coins, finding silver rare, have erroneously supposed that it was so anciently.

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and courage. Isaac I., Alexius I., John II., and Manuel, were all men of great natural ability. The family of Angelos affords a strong contrast. The founder of the house was Constantine Angelos, a noble of Philadelphia, who married Theodora, the youngest daughter of Alexius I. In consequence of his incapacity the Byzantine fleet was defeated by the Sicilians in 1152. His son Andronicus was intrusted by Manuel with a high command in Asia Minor after the disastrous battle of Myriokephalon, and he conducted himself with so much cowardice during the campaign of 1178 that the emperor threatened to send him in procession through the streets of Constantinople clad in a female dress. The Emperors Isaac II. and Alexius III. were the children of this coward.

Isaac Angelos may, nevertheless, be considered as a fair specimen of the Byzantine nobility of his age; and his government may be taken as a correct type of the society he ruled. A wise sovereign is as rarely found in a corrupt people as a virtuous population is seen groaning for any length of time under a native tyrant. The vices of Isaac II. were certainly those of his subjects; he was weak and presumptuous, cowardly and insolent, mean and rapacious, superstitious and vicious. The wonder is, not that his administration accelerated the ruin of the empire, but that the inhabitants of so many provinces submitted tamely to his government. No preceding emperor had paid less attention to public business; he seemed to consider the throne merely as a means of gratifying his passion for pompous dresses and unbounded luxury. The court was filled with an innumerable train of pages, mistresses, clowns, musicians, and comedians. The emperor made himself contemptible by strutting about publicly in gorgeous robes like a peacock; and hateful, by sharing the bribes which his courtiers and ministers openly exacted. He had also a taste for building. New apartments were added to the old palaces, and new villas were constructed. Churches were pulled down, not only to rebuild others, but even to strengthen the palace of Blachern with their materials; and new hospitals were erected. The rapacity of Isaac was so great that it overcame his superstition. When he was besieged in Constantinople by Branas, he borrowed large sums of money from the churches, placing the

imperial plate and jewels in deposit as security. But as soon as he was delivered from danger he sent for the plate, which the clergy were compelled to restore, and never repaid the money¹. Yet no emperor ever did more for ornamenting churches or for filling the public squares and street-corners with gilded pictures of the Virgin than Isaac. When reproached with his inconsistency, he replied, that all things were permitted to the emperor, who represented the Divine Power; and to authorize his appropriation of church property to his own use, he quoted the example of Constantine the Great, who converted one of the nails of the holy cross into a bit for his charger, and put another in the front of his helmet. Authorized by this example, he plundered the richest churches in the provinces of their paintings and mosaics; and among these he carried off from Monemvasia a celebrated representation of our Saviour led out to be crucified, which was considered one of the finest works of art embodying Christ's sufferings. His exactions and injustice might affect only particular classes of society; but he rendered himself universally unpopular by adulterating the imperial coinage².

The reign of Isaac opened with victory over the Sicilian invaders. After the conquest of Thessalonica they had divided their forces; and while the troops were wasting their time in pillaging the villages of Thrace, the fleet under the command of Tancred entered the Propontis and advanced within sight of Constantinople. Weak as Isaac was, he saw that the empire was exposed to serious danger from the operations of the Sicilians; and he exerted himself to furnish the Byzantine army with the means of attacking the enemy. To prove the interest he took in the welfare of the troops, he despatched a sum of four thousand pounds' weight of gold to the military chest, in order to discharge arrears and furnish a donative. The first successes of the Sicilians had inspired their generals with unbounded presumption, and they viewed

¹ Nicetas, 245.

² Nicetas, 280-285, 346, 347. Gibbon, who says, 'I must repeat the complaint that the vague and scanty memorials of the times will not afford a just estimate of the taxes, the revenue, and the resources of the Greek (Byzantine) empire,' nevertheless tells us, when he mentions the extravagance of Isaac, that 'the number of his eunuchs and domestics amounted to twenty thousand; and the daily sum of 4000 lb. of silver would swell to 4,000,000*l.* sterling the annual expense of his household and table.' See also Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xvi. 461.

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with contempt the assembly of a Byzantine army in their vicinity. Alexis Branas, an experienced officer, availed himself of their carelessness to drive in their advanced guards and defeat one division of their army which had reached Mosynopolis. The remaining Sicilians concentrated their forces at Amphipolis, where another battle was fought on the 7th November 1185, at a place called Demerize, in which the Byzantine army was again victorious. This victory decided the fate of the expedition. The generals of the land forces, Counts Aldoin and Richard d'Acerra, were both made prisoners; and the fugitives who gained Thessalonica immediately embarked and put to sea, without any attempt to defend the place. As soon as Tancred heard of these disasters he abandoned the Propontis, and, collecting the shattered remains of the expedition, returned to Sicily. Dyrachium was the only conquest retained; but King William II., considering the expense of guarding that fortress incommensurate with its political importance to Sicily, soon after ordered his garrison to abandon it. About four thousand Sicilian prisoners were sent by Branas to Constantinople. These unfortunate men were treated with the greatest cruelty by the worthless emperor, who ordered them to be thrown into dungeons, where they were left destitute of every succour, so that they owed the preservation of their lives to private charity¹.

Isaac ought now to have directed all his attention, and devoted the whole force of the empire, to repel the incursions of the Turks, who were annually extending their ravages farther into the Asiatic provinces. Kilidji-Arslan II., though more than seventy years of age, took advantage of the disorders that attended the death of Andronicus to send the Emir Sami into the Thrakesian theme, where he laid waste the district of Celbiane and the plain of the Cayster, from whence he carried off an immense booty in slaves and cattle, leaving whole villages desolate. The emperor, instead of forming garrisons on the frontier and establishing squadrons of light cavalry to protect the exposed districts by vigorous opposition, considered that he should be able to retain more money for his private pleasures by paying an annual tribute

¹ Nicetas, 230-234.

to the sultan and distributing presents among the chiefs of the nomadic hordes¹.

The reign of Isaac II. is filled with a series of revolts, caused by his incapable administration and financial rapacity. The most important of these was the great rebellion of the Vallachian and Bulgarian population which occupied the country between Mount Haemus and the Danube. The population of this extensive country now separated itself finally from the government of the Eastern Empire, and its political destinies ceased to be united with those of the Greeks. A new European monarchy, called the Vallachian, or second Bulgarian kingdom, was formed, which for some time acted an important part in the affairs of the Byzantine empire, and contributed powerfully to the depression of the Greek race. The sudden importance assumed by the Vallachian population in this revolution, and the great extent of country then occupied by a people who had previously acted no prominent part in the political events of the East, render it necessary to give some account of their previous history. Four different countries are spoken of under the name of Vallachia by the Byzantine writers: Great Vallachia, which was the country round the plain of Thessaly, particularly the southern and south-western part; White Vallachia, or the modern Bulgaria, which formed the Vallacho-Bulgarian kingdom, that revolted from Isaac II.; Black Vallachia, Maurovallachia, or Karabogdon, which is Moldavia; and Hungarovallachia, or the Vallachia of the present day, comprising a part of Transylvania².

There is no subject connected with the decline and fall of the Roman empire, both in the East and West, of greater importance for tracing accurately the political and social progress of the inhabitants of Europe, than the history of the diminution, extinction, and modification of the population in the various nations subjected to the Roman domination. In the preceding pages I have pointed out that every class of society raised somewhat above the ranks of poverty was exposed to such constant fiscal extortion, and bound with so many local and social fetters, that in the latter days of the empire the middling classes lost the means of perpetuating

¹ Nicetas, 236.

² Villehardouin, *Conquête de Constantinople*, note of Ducange, No. cvi.

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their existence; and, consequently, the bulk of the inhabitants actually disappeared in many provinces, which were then easily occupied and colonized by the northern nations—as happened in the case of Servia and Bulgaria. But it is more difficult to trace the modifications which gradually change a nation than to note the final extinction of a numerous class, though, in truth, we can rarely be assured that the extinction of any race of mankind is anything more than a modification of its elements. It is therefore necessary to distinguish accurately how far the causes which tended to extinguish the population operated on the different classes of society, without reference to their ethnological differences; and to inquire whether the causes which modified the civilization and language of the races that have survived the Roman domination had any direct connection with the increase or decrease of their numbers. No historical facts seem more evident than these two, that the Thracian race—which during the first century of the Christian era formed the most numerous ethnological division of the inhabitants of the eastern part of the Roman empire¹—has long ceased to exist; and, on the other hand, that the modern Greeks are a modification of the ancient Achaian, Dorian, Ionian, Aeolian, and Hellenic population. And yet there are those who consider that the Albanians and Vallachians have quite as much right to be considered as the descendants of the ancient Thracians, who instructed the Greeks in the first elements of civilization, as the modern Greeks have to be regarded as the progeny of the Hellenes who were conquered by the Romans.

The universality of the causes which operated under the iron sway of Rome, both in diminishing the numbers of mankind, and in modifying national elements, renders it difficult to determine the limits of their separate effects. There is no doubt, however, that the inhabitants of the extensive plains and pastoral mountains of Thrace were more exposed to the material oppression of the Roman administration than the inhabitants of the narrow coasts and rocky mountains of Greece. While fiscal extortion and military operations exterminated the majority of the free Thracians,

¹ Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, *Commentarius in Dionys. Periegetem*, v. 323. Strabo, vii. 5, p. 313.

moral influences only modified the customs and language of Greece. In every province of her empire Rome planted colonies in which her usages, laws, and language were as completely national as they were in Rome itself. In Greece, Corinth, Patrae, and Nicopolis were Latin cities; and for many ages they were almost the only flourishing cities in the country. The provincial administration, and particularly the fiscal, was everywhere carried on in Latin; the proconsular tribunals acknowledged the existence of no other language, and thus even the Greeks were compelled to adopt new habits, new thoughts, and new expressions. In the West, Gaul and Spain were modified according to a Roman type, of which they bear the impress to the present day; in the East, the same causes produced an effect on the more civilized inhabitants of Greece, though the change was of a modified nature. Similar influences, bearing powerfully on the whole Greek people wherever they might be scattered, effected the same ethnological change on the whole race. The rude mountaineers of Laconia could not well become less civilized than they had been before the Roman conquest, but they yielded to the same circumstances which affected Athens and Alexandria, Syracuse and Byzantium. The moral power of the Roman administration changed the ancient Hellenes into modern Greeks, according to the impress of one unvarying type; and of that change into Romaioi, or subjects of the Roman empire, the Greek language bears ineffaceable marks. As the institutions of the great Transatlantic republic mould English, Irish, Celts, Dutch, Germans, French, and Spaniards who settle under its sway into one people, so the great empire of the ancient world moulded the Spartan, Athenian, Dorian, Ionian, and Aeolian into a homogeneous mass. There can be no doubt that a change similar to that which took place among the Greeks was wrought about the same time on the Thracian race, but a dark veil covers the history of the native proprietors of the soil in the countries between the Aegean Sea and the Danube for many centuries.

The Vallachian population of Thrace acquired some degree of importance during the reign of Alexius I., though the passages in which it is mentioned are vague. The number of the same race which then inhabited the countries north

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of the Danube is also recorded to have been considerable¹. We have already had occasion to notice that in the reign of Manuel I. the Vallachians were masters of a considerable part of Thessaly, which was subsequently known by the name of Great Vallachia; and the resemblance which their language bore to Latin was so striking that they were generally pronounced to be the descendants of Italian colonists². Like the modern Greeks, they called themselves Romans, from having, like the Greeks, acquired the rights of Roman citizenship by the decree of Caracalla; and the name of Vlachs, or Vallachians, appears to have been first given them by the Sclavonians who colonized their depopulated plains³. It may be observed that the Sclavonians gave the Italians the same name, struck apparently by their general similarity, and that the name has always been repudiated by the Vallachians⁴.

No portion of the Roman empire was more rapidly changed or earlier depopulated by the severity of the government than the Thracian provinces, though they were among the last which were subjected to fiscal oppression⁵. Several Roman legions were constantly quartered in these provinces, and numerous Roman colonies were founded in them. Roman veterans settled in the country, and young Thracians departed annually as recruits to distant legions. The language of

¹ Anna Comnena for those south of the Danube, pp. 138, 227, 274; for those beyond the Danube, whom she calls Dacians, 188; but compare Cinnamus, 152.

² *Itinerary* of Benjamin of Tudela, vol. i. p. 48, Asher's edit.; Cinnamus, 152; *Epist. Innocentii III.* lib. ii. ep. 266, tom. i. 513, edit. Baluze; Chalcocondylas, 16, 40.

³ Lucius, *De Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, 283.

⁴ [The name Vlach or Wallach is the same as Welsh, Wälsch, Walloon, and similar names, by which the Teutonic races called the peoples of a different stock, on whom they bordered. According to Schafarik (*Slawische Alterthümer*, i. pp. 236 foll.), it was originally the same word as Gael, Celt, &c., and at first was only applied to tribes of Celtic origin. It seems to have passed from the German to the Slavonic tribes, and by them to have been applied to the Roumans. All the various branches of the Wallachian family still call themselves Rumuni, except those of the colony of Metzovo in the Pindus, who style themselves Armeng; and this may possibly be a corruption of the same word. Those that dwell south of the Danube are frequently known by the name of Tsintsar, a term of ridicule, recalling the original use of *shibboleth*, because they pronounce *chinich* (five, *quinque*) as *tsints*. The title Kutzo-Vlachs, i.e. 'lame, halting Wallachs,' probably refers to the same, or a similar, defect of speech. The Albanians call them Tjoban (the Turkish word for 'shepherd') on account of the pastoral habits of a great part of the tribe; similarly in modern Greek, βλάχος has come to be used for 'a shepherd.' Ep.]

⁵ *Moesia*, by Tiberius—Appian, *De Bell. Illyr.* p. 767; *Thrace*, by Claudius; Suetonius, *Vesp.* c. 8.

Thrace appears also to have amalgamated more readily with Latin than with Greek. We are informed by a Greek writer, who was himself a Roman ambassador, that in the middle of the fifth century the Greek language was unknown in the countries between the Adriatic, the Aegean, the Black Sea, and the Danube, except in the commercial towns on the coasts of Thrace and Illyria; but that Latin was the ordinary medium of communication among foreign races, both for commercial and political intercourse¹. In the sixth century, the Thracian dialect appears to have borne a strong resemblance to corrupt Latin, and to the Vallachian language spoken at the present day². This Vallachian language, too, like the modern Greek, bears marks of having been formed by the operation of one overwhelming influence, affecting every portion of the nation at the same time. And accordingly, as in the case of the Greeks, we find that the language which is spoken on Mount Pindus by the last isolated survivors of the population of Great Vallachia differs little from that spoken by the *Romans* beyond the Danube and the Carpathian Mountains. But, after all, the question remains undecided whether these Vallachians are the lineal descendants of the Thracian race, which Strabo tells us extended as far south as Thessaly, and as far north as to the borders of Pannonia; for of the Thracian language we know nothing³.

¹ *Excerpta e Prisci Hist.* 190, edit. Bonn.

² Theophanes, *Chronog.* 218; Theophylactus Sim. 52.

³ [The idea which Mr. Finlay here suggests somewhat doubtfully, and which he put forward with less hesitation in several places in vol. i. (pp. 183 *note*, 187, 335 *note*), that the Wallachs south of the Balkan were descended from the Thracians, was entertained by Thunmann in his *Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der östlichen Europäischen Völker* (pp. 323, 331, 339, 343), who considered that the Wallachian language was the original Thracian language, greatly intermixed with and modified by Latin words during the Roman occupation of that country. The view that Latin was more familiar than Greek in Thrace as a medium of communication is disproved by the researches of the French traveller Albert Dumont, whose impression is that the civilization of Thrace in the second century after Christ was purely Greek (*Comptes rendus de l'Académie*, quoted by Roesler, *Römische Studien*, p. 135). He found numerous Greek inscriptions, even in remote valleys, but only six Latin, five of which were bilingual; even the milestones were in Greek, and the inscriptions on the tombs of Roman soldiers were provided with Greek translations. In the succeeding centuries the anti-Latin influence was too strong to allow of an increasing prevalence of the Latin language. It seems far more probable that the southern Wallachs are descendants of the inhabitants of the country popularly called Aurelian Dacia, and in official language Dacia Ripensis, i.e. the part of the ancient Moesia which bordered on the Danube. The whole question of the origin of the Wallachians has had new light thrown on it by M. Roesler's able book, which has just been referred to. The established view with regard to the Wallachians north of the Danube, which

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From some causes which cannot now be traced, it is certain that the Vallachian population in the Byzantine empire increased greatly in wealth and numbers during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Benjamin of Tudela gives a romantic account of the complete independence of the Vallachians who inhabited Thessaly; and the general fact, that they were governed according to their own usages by a tributary prince—as the Sclavonians of the Peloponnesus had been in the ninth and tenth centuries—is confirmed by Nicetas, who informs us that they were able to defend their independence against the Crusaders, who conquered the Byzantine empire. Though the Vallachians of Mount Haemus had not, like their countrymen in Thessaly, aspired at self-legislation and independence, they had been gradually thrown more and more on their national resources by the oppressions of Manuel, by the disorders that prevailed in the central administration after his death, and by the invasion of the Sicilians. The immediate cause of their rebellion against the empire was the imposition of an additional tax by the Emperor Isaac in the year 1186,

among that people themselves it is almost a point of national honour to maintain, is that they are the descendants of the military colonists, who were settled in Dacia by Trajan when he conquered the country (A.D. 106), and who have maintained themselves in that country and some of the districts to the north ever since. There is no doubt that the Wallachian or Rumanian language is a lineal descendant of Latin, and that the difference between the dialects spoken at the present day by the tribes north and south of the Danube is very slight. But it has always been felt to be extraordinary, that the Latin language should have made this permanent impression in the space of 160 years, at the expiration of which time Aurelian withdrew the Roman settlements to the south side of the Danube, especially as the historian Vopiscus, in his life of Aurelian (c. 39), speaks of the evacuation of the country as complete. M. Roesler further shows (p. 66), that there is no trustworthy mention of the Rumanian people north of the Danube from the third to the thirteenth century. His conclusion is that the present inhabitants of the Danubian principalities migrated northwards from Moesia about the latter of these periods. The strongest argument which he brings forward in support of this view is derived from the language; for whereas, if the nation had occupied all along their present country, their language would undoubtedly contain some words derived from the Goths, and other tribes whom we know to have settled there, this is found not to be the case; but instead, it possesses numerous words and forms derived from Greek and Albanian (pp. 123 foll.). This naturally suggests the idea that they lived for some time in the neighbourhood of those peoples, and this would agree with the view that they were the inhabitants of Moesia, especially if we suppose that part of the race were in contact with the Illyrian tribes. If this is true, the Wallachs, or southern Wallachians, would represent that part of the race who spread towards the south from Moesia into Macedonia, Thessaly, and other parts of Greece. The Roman origin of the Wallachian people is shewn, not only by their language, but also by the numerous beliefs and customs of the ancient Romans which exist among them. An interesting account of these is given in the introduction to Schott's *Walachische Märchen*. Ed.]

to defray the expenses of his marriage with Margaret, the daughter of Bela III., king of Hungary.

Three brothers, Peter, Asan, and John, placed themselves at the head of the insurrection, and claimed to be descended from the elder line of the Bulgarian monarchs, though they were Vallachians in their nurture and early associations. The Bulgarian and Sclavonian population, from Mount Haemus to the Danube, suffered from the same oppression as the Vallachian, and detested the Byzantine government and their Greek rulers with equal hatred. The hope of throwing off the domination of their oppressors, induced all to take up arms with enthusiasm; and as superstition was a feeling more deeply rooted in the human breast at this period than patriotism, it was announced, and generally believed, that Saint Demetrius, the favourite saint of the Vallachians, Bulgarians, and Sclavonians of these provinces, had forsaken the city of Thessalonica, of which he had hitherto been the patron, and had removed his sanctuary to a church lately erected to his honour by Peter¹. The fanatics considered it their duty to put every Greek to death who fell into their hands; and the people had suffered so much from the exactions of the fiscal officers of the Byzantine government, that they were incited to take part in these cruelties.

Peter having assembled an army in Mount Haemus and assumed the imperial title, marched into the districts of Thrace, which were inhabited by the Greeks, and laid everything waste; but his first operations were unsuccessful. He was defeated, and compelled to seek refuge in the Patzinak territory, beyond the Danube. In the year 1187 the rebels were again defeated by the emperor's uncle, John the Sebastokrator; but the jealousy of Isaac induced him to remove his uncle from the command of the army and he sent John Cantacuzenos, who had been deprived of his sight, to take the command of the troops. The rebels defeated the blind general; and, to arrest their progress, the emperor was compelled to intrust Alexis Branas with the conduct of the war. Branas drove the Vallachians beyond Mount Haemus; but as

¹ Nicetas (238) mentions Peter as the first king; but Geo. Acropolita (11) calls Asan the first king, and says Peter governed a district with him. Ducange, *Fam. Byz.* 318.

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soon as he had driven the rebels out of Thrace, he left them to consolidate their power in Bulgaria, and marched his army to Adrianople. Seeing that rebellion was to a certain degree successful both in Bulgaria and Cyprus, and foreseeing that new insurrections would soon follow, he thought that it would be easy to turn the general discontent to his own profit. He therefore assumed the title of Emperor, and appeared before Constantinople at the head of a well-appointed force, not expecting to meet with any serious resistance.

But the persons connected with the general administration, and the people within the walls of the capital, entertained the greatest aversion to receive an emperor raised to the throne by the army. They feared that he would be compelled to effect a financial revolution, and make numerous personal changes in order to reward his followers. Alexis Branas, therefore, met with a more determined opposition than he had expected. But Isaac, in place of aiding the troops, consumed his time in prayers and processions, so that Branas, manning a number of fishing-boats which he had collected in the islands of the Propontis, rendered himself master of the imperial fleet. The capital seemed on the eve of falling into his hands, when it was saved by Conrad of Montferrat. That distinguished Crusader, who has transmitted the vain title of King of Jerusalem to the reigning family of Sardinia, had visited Constantinople on his way to Palestine. Having married Theodora, the sister of the Emperor Isaac, and received the rank of Caesar, he felt himself authorized to reproach his brother-in-law with his misconduct, and point out to him that, unless he exerted himself, he was likely to lose his crown. The alarming position of Constantinople rendered the Greeks willing to submit to the superior military skill of Conrad. His satirical observations roused Isaac to activity. He told the emperor that things were in such a state, that swords and lances were the means Heaven would use if Isaac's crown was to be saved, not priests and processions. When he found the emperor occupied in planning feasts, he coolly remarked that it would be time enough to think of the enjoyments of the table when he should be sure of eating the dinner he ordered; but, for the moment, the defence of Constantinople demanded all his care. Conrad fortunately found two hundred and fifty Latin knights and five hundred veteran infantry

at Constantinople, who ranged themselves under his orders. All the Turkish and Georgian merchants who resided in the city, and whose expeditions had accustomed them to war, formed themselves into corps to defend their property. Isaac himself at last mustered all the native soldiers in the capital, and roused their spirit by a donative, which he procured by pledging the imperial plate and borrowing money from the church funds.

At the head of these forces Conrad took the field, accompanied by the emperor. Branas had encamped his army before Constantinople without attempting to form a regular siege. The two armies spent several hours in skirmishing; but Branas having examined the strength of the imperial army, at last drew together his best troops and prepared for a decisive attack. Conrad, who had closely watched his operations and kept his Latin knights ready for some daring exploit, boldly anticipated the enemy's movement. His defensive armour was a red linen body-coat of numerous folds, soddened together into a substance impenetrable to lance or sword; and with this light covering, and his small triangular shield, which made him appear to the Greeks almost defenceless, he led his cavalry to charge the centre of the rebel army. The shock bore down every opposition; and the cavalry of Branas were soon scattered in irretrievable confusion. Branas, attempting to rally them, was dashed from his saddle by Conrad's lance; and when he demanded quarter on the ground, Conrad exclaimed—'You must pay your treason with your life!' His attendants immediately decapitated the prostrate general¹.

This victory was celebrated by Isaac as if it had been achieved by his own military prowess. He passed through Constantinople in triumph before the army, with the head of Branas borne before him on the point of a lance; and when he reached the

¹ Nicetas, 247. The coat of Conrad consisted of eighteen folds of linen, prepared with salt and strong rough wine. Pliny mentions felt as used for defensive armour, prepared from wool and vinegar. *Nat. Hist.* viii. 192.

Conrad was an elder brother of Rayner (Alexius) the husband of Maria, daughter of the Emperor Manuel. He was elected King of Jerusalem by the barons of Syria, and assassinated by the emissaries of the Sheik of the Mountain on the day he received the news of his election. Nicetas, when mentioning his assassination, does not allude to the existence of any report that Richard Lionhearted, the conqueror of the Greeks of Cyprus, had been accused of having had anything to do with it.

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imperial palace, he had the inhumanity to send this bloody trophy to Maria Comnena, the widow of Branas, whom the Emperor Manuel, her uncle, had called, for her virtues, an honour to the imperial family. The populace of the capital was allowed to make expeditions for the purpose of plundering the inhabitants of the islands of the Propontis who had declared in favour of Branas ; and houses and villages were seen in flames on every side of Constantinople. The Latins availed themselves of the general anarchy to plunder the houses of many of the wealthy nobles who were considered hostile to the emperor's policy ; and at last a regular battle was fought by the Greeks and Latins in the streets, which the imperial officers had the greatest difficulty in terminating. Much blood was shed on both sides ; and the hatred between the two races and religions became every day more bitter. Conrad finding that the state of affairs was not favourable to his ambition, his wife Theodora dying, and the news arriving that his father, the Marquis William, had been taken prisoner by Saladin at the battle of Tiberias, quitted Constantinople and arrived in Palestine, where he immediately increased his fame by defeating Saladin under the walls of Tyre.

The Vallachian war was resumed after the death of Branas, and Isaac took the field against the rebels ; but though Peter and Asan were unable, with their Vallachian, Bulgarian, and Sclavonian levies, to encounter the imperial army, they prevented the campaign from producing any decided results. After besieging Lobitza for three months, the Byzantine army was compelled to retire ; A.D. 1188.

While the Vallachians were thus gradually forming an independent kingdom, a new crusade threatened the Byzantine empire with fresh dangers. Fortunately for the Greeks, the only leader of the third crusade who passed through the dominions of Isaac was Frederic I. (Barbarossa), Emperor of Germany, an experienced and prudent monarch, who wished to avoid all collision with the Byzantine government ; and who, having passed through the empire with his uncle Conrad during the second crusade, knew how to adopt the most effectual measures for preserving order. He allowed no pilgrim to join his standard who did not possess three marks of silver to defray his expenses on the road. Never did a finer army, or a nobler and abler commander, leave Europe

for the East; yet, in spite of the valour and discipline of the troops, and the experience of the general, fortune declared against this expedition, and it was as fruitless as the wildest enterprises of preceding Crusaders.

Before Frederic Barbarossa quitted Germany, he despatched an embassy to Constantinople to ask permission to pass through the Byzantine empire, and Isaac sent Dukas, the intendant of posts, to arrange the articles of a treaty by which all disorders might be averted during the march of the Crusaders, and a sufficient supply of provisions and forage might be ensured to them at reasonable prices. Frederic made all his dispositions with prudence; but he had not proceeded far on his march before the inconstancy of Isaac, who heartily detested the Franks, induced him to throw obstacles in the way of the advance of the German army, and stop their supplies of provisions. Nicetas the historian was then governor of Philippopolis; and he informs us that he received from day to day the most contradictory orders from the court. By one despatch he was ordered to repair the fortifications, by another to dismantle the place. Attempts were made to render the roads impracticable; large trees were cut down to block up the passes, and other measures were taken which delayed and irritated the Germans, who punished the subjects of Isaac for obeying the orders of their emperor. Frederic reached Philippopolis on the 23rd of August 1189, and entered the city without opposition. The Armenians, who had been for ages established in this city and its neighbourhood, and whose heretical opinions rendered them ill-disposed towards the Greeks, who treated them often with great injustice, welcomed the Latins, and afforded them exact information concerning the state of the empire and the movements of the Byzantine troops¹.

The insolence of Isaac at last involved the two emperors in war; but the Greek troops were unable to resist the Germans, and were soon defeated. In their flight they plundered the inhabitants of the country far more cruelly than the Crusaders. This opposition, and the advanced time of the year, induced Frederic to take up his winter-quarters in Thrace. He felt

¹ Nicetas (258) says the Armenian heretics resembled the Germans in their religious opinions. They did not adore images, and used unleavened bread in the communion.

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that the proceedings of Isaac might force him to attack Constantinople; and he therefore made arrangements for assembling a fleet of Genoese, Pisan, and Venetian ships, which he could employ either against the Byzantine empire, or for transporting his army to Asia, as circumstances might require.

Isaac persisted in his hostile conduct. Frederic marched to Adrianople in the month of February 1190, took Didymoteichos by storm, and occupied Arcadiopolis. Isaac, who had trusted for success rather to the prophecies which the bigoted members of the Greek clergy had repeated to him than to his military arrangements, was now seriously alarmed, and sent to solicit peace on any terms. The conduct of the German emperor was in accordance with his previous declarations. He asked nothing but what Isaac had promised by their first treaty. Frederic also afforded a proof of his generosity which ought to have made a deep impression even on a fool like Isaac, and on a herd of such knaves as composed the Byzantine court. Peter and Asan offered to join the Crusaders with an army of forty thousand Vallachians and Bulgarians, on condition that the German emperor would invest one of the brothers with the crown of Bulgaria; but Frederic refused to intermeddle in the affairs of another Christian state, further than was necessary to remove the obstacles thrown in the way of his march to the Holy Land. The Byzantine government renewed its promises to supply the Crusaders with provisions as long as they remained in the imperial dominions, engaged to furnish them with vessels to convey them from Gallipoli to Asia, and gave hostages to Frederic, who were to be released when he reached Philadelphia. Frederic also insisted that the Emperor Isaac and five hundred of the principal officers of the empire should publicly take an oath to fulfil the articles of the treaty to his ambassadors in the Church of St. Sophia, and in the presence of the Patriarch; and to this the Byzantine emperor was compelled to submit¹.

¹ So violent was the hostility that prevailed against the Latins at Constantinople that Isaac addressed a letter to the Sultan of Egypt, Saladin, in which he boasted of having done everything to arrest the advance of the Crusaders. Le Beau, xvi. 418; Brosset's Additions: *Extr. des Hist. Arab.* 275. Nicetas (262) mentions an anecdote which is deserving of notice, as its authenticity has the guarantee of a distinguished Byzantine officer in the service of Isaac. Frederic sent ambassadors

On the 28th of March 1190, Frederic passed over into Asia Minor with the last division of his army, and marched by Thyatira, Philadelphia, and Laodicea into the dominions of the Sultan of Iconium. He was generally received with as much ill-will as the Byzantine authorities ventured to show: but at Laodicea he found an independent Greek population accustomed to continual war with the Turks, and who trusted to their own exertions, not to the imperial court and the central government, for safety. These free citizens gave the Crusaders a sincere welcome, and afforded them every assistance in their power. Frederic was so touched by their conduct that he knelt down in the plain before his camp, and prayed that God would recompense the people of Laodicea.

The Sultan of Iconium had promised to allow the Crusaders to pass through his dominions without molestation, and permit them to purchase provisions; but, like the Emperor Isaac, he endeavoured to throw obstacles in their way. Frederic, however, used little ceremony with the Mohammedans; he defeated their army at Philomelium, and marched direct to Iconium, which the Emperors Alexius I., John II., and Manuel I. had vainly endeavoured to reach. The capital of the sultan was taken by storm, and ample supplies of provisions were obtained for the army; but the sultan was allowed to remain quietly in the citadel, as he offered no further opposition. Frederic then pursued his march through the territories of the Armenians of Cilicia. The delivery of the Holy Land was now supposed by the Christians to be certain, for a numerous and well-disciplined army, led by a general experienced in Eastern warfare, was about to enter Syria. But at this period, when everything promised him success, death suddenly arrested the progress of Frederic Barbarossa. He bathed in the limpid stream of the Calycadnus, near Seleucia, the waters of which were chilled by

to Constantinople during the winter, whom Isaac detained as hostages; and when he gave them audience, they were compelled to stand among the attendants, though the Bishop of Munster and two counts of high rank formed the embassy. Isaac, however, was soon compelled to send an embassy of Greek nobles to Frederic, who received the deputation with great politeness, and invited them all to an entertainment. At the banquet, Byzantine nobles, Greek cooks, and Sclavonian grooms were all compelled to sit down together, the German emperor observing sarcastically that all the Greeks he had met with were such great men, that it was impossible to make any distinction in their merits,

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the melted snow descending from Mount Taurus, was attacked by a violent fever, and died in a few days. The enemies of Frederic acknowledge that he was a valiant and noble prince¹.

The evils inflicted on the Greek race by the third crusade were rendered permanent by fortuitous circumstances, and fell heaviest on the island of Cyprus, which was already separated from the Byzantine empire. Isaac Comnenos, who had assumed the title of Emperor in Cyprus during the reign of Andronicus, contracted an alliance with William II., king of Sicily. Isaac II. of Constantinople, elated with his victory over the Sicilians, expected to reconquer Cyprus without difficulty. In the year 1186 he sent a fleet of seventy galleys with a numerous army to perform this service, but his jealousy of his best officers induced him to intrust the command to men incapable of performing military duty, as a security against their mounting the throne. One was an old man, named John Kontostephanos, and the other Alexis Comnenos, the natural son of Manuel, whom Andronicus had deprived of sight. The expedition reached Cyprus in safety, and the army was landed. But the King of Sicily sent a fleet to the assistance of his ally, under the command of the Admiral Margaritone, the ablest naval officer of the time, who surprised the Byzantine fleet, and captured most of the transports and galleys. In the mean time the land forces were also defeated, and the two generals, falling into the hands of the Sicilian admiral, were carried prisoners to Palermo. Isaac of Cyprus, after this victory, which he owed to the valour of foreigners, treated most of the prisoners with horrid cruelty. Those whom he did not wish to enrol in his own service were put to death with inhuman tortures².

This victory secured the throne of Cyprus to Isaac, who was a worthless and rapacious tyrant; but as his political government favoured the trade of the Cypriots with Sicily, Syria, and Armenia, they submitted to his sway; and had he possessed ordinary prudence, he might have enjoyed his usurpation without danger. A wanton display of insolence caused his ruin. In the year 1191, as the fleet of Richard Lionhearted was proceeding from Messina to Palestine, it

¹ Nicetas, 266.² Nicetas, 237.

was assailed by a tempest, and two ships were wrecked on the coast of Cyprus. Isaac, who felt all the dislike to the Crusaders generally entertained by the Greeks, and who was ignorant of the power of the King of England, seized the opportunity of proving his friendship for Saladin, with whom he had recently formed an alliance. He allowed his subjects to plunder the shipwrecked vessels, and imprisoned all the English who escaped the waves. Perhaps Isaac might have escaped with impunity had he only plundered the English, but he ventured to insult the king. The vessel which carried Joanna of Sicily, Richard's sister, and Berengaria of Navarre, to whom he was betrothed, sought shelter from the storm in the port of Amathus (Limisso) where it was refused entrance. The storm had already abated and the King of England anchored at Cyprus. Isaac refused to deliver up the shipwrecked Crusaders and restore their property. Richard landed his army and commenced a series of operations, which ended in his conquering the whole island, abolishing the administrative institutions of the Eastern Empire, enslaving the Greek race, and introducing the feudal system, by which he riveted the chains of a foreign domination. He then bestowed the island on Guy of Lusignan, the titular King of Jerusalem, who became the founder of a dynasty of Frank kings in Cyprus. From that time to the present day the Greeks of Cyprus have suffered every misery that can be inflicted by foreign masters; and the island, which at the time of its conquest by Richard was the richest and most populous in the Mediterranean, is now almost uncultivated, and very thinly inhabited.

Isaac Angelos, who reigned at Constantinople, was in constant danger of being precipitated from his throne, like his namesake of Cyprus. When accident had placed the crown on a head so weak and incapable, every man of ambition hoped to be able to transfer it to his own, and rebellion succeeded rebellion. One of the most dangerous pretenders to the throne was a young man of Constantinople, who assumed the name of Alexius II., and whose singular resemblance to that prince and to his father Manuel induced many to credit his assertions. He visited Iconium during the reign of Kilidji-Arslan; and the old sultan, struck with his resemblance to Manuel, allowed him to enrol troops, but he refused

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to break the treaty he had concluded with Isaac, and lose the tribute he received from the Byzantine empire¹. The false Alexius assembled an army of eight thousand men, and ravaged the vale of the Maeander, storming several cities in order to gratify his followers with plunder: among others he took the rich city of Chonae. Isaac sent his brother Alexius to encounter the pretender, but the imperial troops met with little success. The career of the rebel was, however, suddenly arrested by a priest, who assassinated him as a just vengeance for his alliance with the infidels, whom he allowed to plunder many Christian cities and to desecrate many of the most sacred shrines in Asia Minor. The assassin carried his head to Alexius the sebastokrator, who was so struck by its resemblance to the well-known features of Manuel, that he exclaimed, 'Those who followed him may indeed be innocent!' After his death several persons assumed the name of Alexius II.; one was taken in Paphlagonia and put to death, and another at Nicomedia, who was deprived of sight.

Theodore Mankaphas, a noble of Philadelphia, also assumed the title of Emperor; but his historical importance is derived rather from the fact that he is recorded to have coined silver money with his effigy than from the importance of his rebellion². In the year 1189 he rendered himself master of the country round Philadelphia, and his progress alarmed Isaac to such a degree that he marched against him in person. The approach of Frederic Barbarossa made the emperor anxious to terminate the war, and he agreed to pardon Mankaphas, on the rebel making his submission, and laying aside the imperial ensigns. The pardoned rebel soon after fled to Iconium, where Gaiasheddin Kaikhosrou allowed him to enrol troops among the nomade tribes, and with these bands he ravaged the frontiers of the Byzantine empire with the same barbarity as the false Alexius. At last Isaac bribed the sultan to deliver him up, on condition that his life should be spared, and his punishment should not exceed perpetual

¹ Nicetas (269) mentions that this happened before Kilidji-Arslan II. was dethroned by his son Kothbeddin, consequently before 1187. *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates*, ii. 67, 4to. edit.

² Nicetas, 255. I believe coin-collectors have not yet met with silver coins of this scoundrel, which they would prize highly, but I see mention made of five copper concave pieces in the catalogue of Mr. Borrel's collection, which was formed at Smyrna, and sold at London in 1852.

imprisonment. New claimants to the throne, however, continued to take the field, and the suspicions of Isaac induced him to punish many nobles of the highest rank for real or imaginary conspiracies¹.

The Vallachian insurrection in the mean time kept the northern provinces of the empire in a state of anarchy. In the year 1192 the emperor hoped to crush it by conducting in person a well-disciplined army against a number of half-disciplined bands of Vallachians, Bulgarians, and Sclavonians, who had taken up arms. But he led his army into the mountain-passes, where it was attacked and its ranks broken. The valour of the imperial guard saved the emperor by breaking through the Vallachians, carrying with them Isaac, helpless and bareheaded. In the following year the Vallachians stormed Anchialus, Varna, Naissus, and Stupion, and burned part of Triaditza (Sardica). The emperor boasted of a glorious campaign when he recovered possession of the plundered ruins of these cities. He, however, defeated the Zupan of Servia, who had invaded the empire and plundered Skopia. Subsequently he marched to the banks of the Save, and after an idle procession to meet his father-in-law, the King of Hungary, he returned to Constantinople. In 1194 the Byzantine army, under the command of the generals of the European and Asiatic native troops, was completely defeated by the Vallachians near Arcadiopolis; and the country round Philippopolis, Sardica, and Adrianople was laid waste by the insurgents.

The Emperor Isaac now felt the necessity of making some extraordinary exertions to terminate this war, which was daily approaching nearer to the walls of the capital. New levies were made in the empire, the foreign mercenaries were assembled from their different stations, and great numbers of Hungarian auxiliaries were brought into the field. Fifteen hundred pounds' weight of gold and six thousand of silver were expended in equipping the troops and forming the necessary magazines; and in the month of March 1195, Isaac quitted Constantinople, accompanied by his brother Alexius, in whom he placed implicit confidence. But natural affection, as well as honour and truth, appears to have been banished

¹ Nicetas, 271, 272, 273, 278.

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from Byzantine society; and this brother had already formed a plot to seize the throne, which he carried into execution when the court reached Kypsela. While the Emperor Isaac was engaged in hunting, Alexius occupied his tent, and was proclaimed emperor by a number of nobles and officers of the army who had been gained over to support his usurpation. The troops, who despised Isaac, readily transferred their allegiance to Alexius, whose vices were then less known. The dethroned emperor, when informed of the catastrophe, turned his horse's head from the camp and fled, he knew not whither. At Stageira, then called Makri, he was overtaken by his brother's agents, who immediately deprived him of sight. He was transported directly to Constantinople, where he was imprisoned in a dungeon, and supplied with rations of bread and water like a criminal.

Isaac II. reigned nine years and seven months. He was middle-sized, of a healthy constitution, with a florid complexion and red hair. When dethroned, he was not forty years of age (April 1195)¹.

SECT. II.—*Reign of Alexius III. (Angelos Comnenos),*

A.D. 1195-1203.

Character of Alexius III.—Lavish expenditure of the court.—Venality and disorder in the administration.—Relations with the Seljouk Turks.—Vallachian war.—Assassination of Asan and Peter, founders of the Vallachian-Bulgarian kingdom.—Rebellions.—Relations with western Europe.—Alexius, son of Isaac II., obtains the assistance of the Crusaders and Venetians.—Siege of Constantinople.—Repulse of the Crusaders.—Success of the Venetians.—Alexius III. abandons Constantinople.

During the reign of Andronicus, Alexius Angelos, who was older than his brother Isaac II., fled for safety to the court of Saladin, where he was residing when he heard of his brother's elevation to the throne. On his way to Constantinople he was arrested by the Prince of Antioch, and owed his release from captivity to his brother's affection. This, and many other acts of kindness, he repaid with the basest treachery. Even the corrupt society of Constantinople required that some attempt should be made to throw a veil over the

¹ Nicetas, 290.

ingratitude of the new emperor. To effect this Alexius III. assumed the name of Comnenus, insinuating thereby that his adoption into that imperial house had dissolved his connection with the humbler family of Angelos, and that duty compelled him to dethrone a worthless sovereign like Isaac. Alēxius, being tall and well made, and possessing an agreeable and dignified manner, as well as more natural talent, a better education, and more command over his temper, appeared very much superior to his brother until he mounted the throne. As emperor, however, he laid aside his hypocrisy, and was as careless of public business, as lavish in his expenditure, as ignorant of military affairs, and as great a coward as Isaac.

The first act of Alexius III. was to reward the officers and troops who aided his treason, by distributing among them the money his brother had collected for carrying on the war against the Vallachians. He then sent the army back to its usual quarters, and returned to the capital, leaving Thrace and Macedonia exposed to the incursions of the rebels. His wife Euphrosyne prepared the senate and people to give him a favourable reception by a liberal distribution of bribes and promises of promotion; and his coronation was performed in St. Sophia's by the obsequious Patriarch. The behaviour of his horse alone caused some to reflect on the injustice of his conduct and the instability of his power. As he was about to mount on horseback at the steps of the great church, after the ceremony was finished, and return in procession to the palace, according to the immemorial usage of the Roman empire, his horse for a long time refused to allow him to mount; and when at last he had gained his seat, it reared and plunged until the emperor's crown fell from his head and was broken by the fall. It then completed the disaster by throwing the emperor himself on the ground. Alexius, however, escaped unhurt¹.

The public treasury was quickly emptied by the lavish expenditure of Alexius and Euphrosyne; and every species of extortion, injustice, and fraud was then employed to collect money. When it was no longer possible to bestow money, places, pensions, and estates belonging to the imperial domain

¹ Nicetas, 294.

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were conferred on some favoured courtiers; and the right of collecting particular branches of the revenue in the provinces was granted to others. Nicetas sarcastically observes that Alexius III. would have granted golden bulls to plough the sea or pile Athos on Olympus, had any courtier presented himself to solicit such gifts. This conduct completed the destruction of that wonderful financial and governmental mechanism which the Byzantine government had inherited from the Roman empire.

Euphrosyne, who was better acquainted with her husband's idle disposition than others, assumed a large share in conducting the business of the empire, and no minister dared to take any step without her approval. Her beauty, her talents, and her aptitude for business gave her immense influence among the nobility; but her pride, extravagance, and licentiousness often produced scandalous quarrels with Alexius. Nothing is generally supposed to mark more strongly the degraded condition of the proudest nobles of the Byzantine empire, at this time, than the fact that members of the celebrated families of Comnenos, Dukas, Palaeologos, and Cantacuzenos contended for the honour of carrying Euphrosyne in her litter at public ceremonies; yet British peers now contend to be lords-in-waiting, their wives to be ladies of the bedchamber, and their daughters to be bedchamber-women. The insolence and license of Euphrosyne at last roused the anger and jealousy of the emperor. Alexius ordered her paramour, Vatatzes, to be assassinated, and her female slaves and the eunuchs of her household to be put to the torture. The beautiful and accomplished Euphrosyne herself was expelled from the palace, clad in the dress of a menial, and immured in the convent of Nematorea, near the entrance of the Black Sea, with only two foreign slaves as her attendants. Six months' absence from court, however, taught her worthless husband the value of her talents and energy. Everything fell into disorder; even Alexius was alarmed at the peculations of the courtiers; and Euphrosyne was reinstated in all her former power, which she abused with all her former insolence. Her political energy, her superstitious follies, and her magnificent hunting parties excited the wonder of the inhabitants of Constantinople; and as she rode along with a falcon perched on her

gold-embroidered glove, and encouraged the dogs with her voice, and the curvetings of her horse, the crowd enjoyed the splendid spectacle, and only grave men like Nicetas thought that she was wasting the revenues which were required to defend the empire¹.

The venality of the imperial administration had caused so much discontent, that Alexius III., on ascending the throne, deemed it necessary to promise publicly that no official charge should be sold, but that all employments should be bestowed according to merit. This promise remained without effect. The emperor paid no attention to business, Euphrosyne cared nothing for the people, the courtiers persisted in profiting by their influence, and public employments continued to be an object of traffic. The empress, however, at length perceived the danger of these proceedings, and attempted to effect some reforms. Before her disgrace she persuaded Alexius to appoint Constantine Mesopotamites prime-minister, and this statesman succeeded in suppressing much venality and flagrant jobbing. But it required purer hands to root out the inveterate corruption of Byzantine society. Mesopotamites, while calling on others to respect the laws, violated them himself. He thought that he could render his power more secure against the factions of the court, and at the same time extend his influence and patronage, by entering the church. But as the ecclesiastical canons of the Eastern Church forbade the clergy to hold civil offices, Mesopotamites, on becoming a priest, obtained a dispensation from the Patriarch to violate the law. In order to secure an independent position, he got himself appointed Archbishop of Thessalonica; but by this step he lost the emperor's favour, and his enemies induced the Patriarch Xiphilinos to hold a synod, in which Mesopotamites was condemned for various crimes, and deposed from the archiepiscopal dignity, without being allowed an opportunity of refuting the charges brought against him. The contempt of justice shown by the ecclesias-

¹ The belief in magic and the power of incantations was so general that it excited little surprise at Constantinople when Euphrosyne, in order to insure the happy issue of some of her divinations, thought fit to order a bronze boar about to engage a lion, which formed one of the finest groups of ancient sculpture in the hippodrome, to be mutilated by cutting off its snout. She also ordered many other works of ancient art to be broken in pieces. Thus the Greeks began to destroy the most precious remains of Hellenic taste before the Latins entered Constantinople. Nicetas, 335.

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tical authorities in these proceedings excited general aversion, and though no popular cry was heard demanding reform either in church or state, the inhabitants began to feel as little inclined to defend the throne of their patriarch as the crown of their emperor.

The utter neglect of the moral and religious condition of the people by the hierarchy of the Eastern Church, during the twelfth century, proved a severe blow to the Greek nation. The provincial Greek saw no authority to which he could address himself in order to obtain justice against the violence and rapacity of the imperial officers, and consequently every friendly link which had once connected him with Constantinople was broken. The apostasy of the prelates from the cause of the people, and the ignorance and selfishness of the monks, left the Greeks, as a nation, exposed to greater oppression and injustice than any other portion of the inhabitants of the empire; for they were less accustomed to bear arms, and their municipal institutions were rendered completely subservient to the central administration. There is, perhaps, no feature in the history of the Christian church which suggests more melancholy reflections than the prostitution of the Greek clergy to the imperial power during this century. When we behold a priesthood which founded the hierarchy of the church, gave laws to the Christian world, and curbed the political presumption of the Popes of Rome, perverting an influence it had justly gained to serve the vices of a corrupt court, we learn how small is the measure of irresponsible power which can be intrusted to individuals, however sanctified their occupations may appear¹.

The anarchy that prevailed in the Byzantine administration increased daily. Michael Stryphnos, the admiral of the fleet, being sure of impunity, as he had married a sister of the Empress Euphrosyne, sold the stores from the naval arsenal, and thought only of making as much profit as possible from his office². The seas round the empire were filled with pirates, and their profits were so considerable that the

¹ See the discourse, *De emendanda Vita Monachica*, by Eustathius, the celebrated Archbishop of Thessalonica, published by Professor Tafel, in *Eustathii Opuscula*, Franc. 1832, p. 214.

² Nicetas, 348. The evidence of Nicetas concerning the excessive venality of the Byzantine administration is valuable, as he was himself high in the service of Alexius III.

Emperor Alexius himself at last turned pirate. He sent six galleys into the Euxine, under the pretext of saving the cargo of a vessel wrecked near Kerasunt, but he gave the admiral secret orders to make prizes of all ships bound for Amisos. This infamous expedition proved extremely profitable to the court. Many merchants lost their whole fortunes, and some, whose complaints it was feared might excite dangerous inquiries, were murdered: others were put on shore, and found their way to Constantinople, where they vainly presented themselves at the courts of law and at the imperial palace, to demand justice. They carried their petitions to the staircase of the palace as suppliants, with wax tapers in their hands, and stood to receive the emperor in the vestibule of St. Sophia's; but all their endeavours were fruitless; it was a time when justice slept and no one suspected that vengeance was near. Those merchants only who were subjects of Rokneddin, the sultan of Iconium, obtained an indemnity. The emperor, to avoid war, threw the whole blame of the piracies on his admiral, Constantine Francopulo, paid an indemnity to the merchants of Iconium, and promised to pay Rokneddin an annual tribute¹.

The conduct of the emperor on the high seas was imitated by the nobles in the capital. A rich banker named Kalomodios was envied by those who often borrowed his money, and who for some time attempted to cheat or rob him without success. At length a party of courtiers entered his house and made him prisoner, declaring that they would not release him until he paid them a large ransom. The merchants of Constantinople, hearing of this insolent assault, repaired in a body to the residence of the Patriarch John Kamateros, the brother of the Empress Euphrosyne, but found him not inclined to assist them by active interference. In the mean time, however, the populace became aware of the conduct of their superiors, and determined to use the same license to enforce justice. They assembled before the Patriarch's palace, and informed him that they would plunder his residence and precipitate his holiness from the window unless he obtained the liberation of Kalomodios. These threats

¹ Nicetas, 341.

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opened the mind of the Patriarch to the claims of justice, and Kalomodios was released ¹.

The foreigners in Constantinople conducted themselves in the same lawless manner as the natives. The Venetians and Pisans engaged in bloody battles in the streets, which the Greeks viewed with pleasure and the imperial authorities with indifference ². Rebellions in the provinces were also as common as seditions in the capital ³.

Fortunately for the Byzantine empire, the Seljouk empire of Roum or Iconium had been divided among the numerous sons of Kilidji-Arslan II., or the Turks, by forming an alliance with the rebel Vallachians, might have succeeded in taking Constantinople before the arrival of the Crusaders and Venetians ⁴. But Moeddin, the sultan of Angora, availed himself of the disorders in the Byzantine provinces to invade Paphlagonia and take the city of Dabyra. Alexius, after carrying on the war feebly for a year and a-half, purchased peace (A.D. 1197) by paying Moeddin five hundred pounds' weight of coined silver, by presenting him with forty pieces of the rich brocaded silk which was manufactured at Thebes for the emperor's especial use, and by engaging to remit to Angora an annual tribute of three hundred pounds' weight of silver ⁵. In the following year Alexius involved himself in war with Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou I., who then reigned at Iconium, in consequence of the detention of two Arabian horses by the Turk. In one of his thoughtless fits of passion, the emperor ordered all the Turkish merchants at Constantinople to be imprisoned and their property to be sequestrated. The sultan's revenge was prompt and terrible. He broke into the vale of the Maeander, and ravaged the country to the walls of Antioch in Phrygia. Numbers of the inhabitants were carried away into slavery, but an agricultural colony of five thousand families was settled at Philomelium. They were furnished with good farmhouses, and everything necessary for cultivating the land ; they were exempt from all taxation for

¹ Nicetas, 337.² Nicetas, 347.³ Nicetas, 296, 298, 314, 339.

⁴ Nicetas (336) gives an account of the division of the empire of Roum among the sons of Kilidji-Arslan. Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou I., who succeeded his father Kilidji-Arslan in 1193, was dethroned by his brother Rokneddin, who originally received Tocat as his share of the empire, but conquered all his brothers. He died in 1202, when Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou again mounted the throne.

⁵ Nicetas, 297, 304.

five years, and after that period they were assured that a fixed contribution would be required without any of the arbitrary additions levied in the Byzantine empire to cover the expense of collecting the public revenues. This humane policy inflicted a more serious wound on the empire than the devastations of the Turkish armies; for many Christian families, worn out by the financial exactions of the imperial officers, emigrated into the Turkish dominions; and Nicetas informs us that whole towns were abandoned by the Greek inhabitants¹. Rokneddin subsequently expelled his brother Kaikhosrou from Iconium, and compelled Alexius to purchase peace by the payment of a tribute. Kaikhosrou, after wandering from the court of Aleppo to that of Leo, king of Armenian Cilicia, reached Constantinople as a suppliant, where he was well treated, and remained, until the death of Rokneddin, in 1202, enabled him again to mount the throne of Iconium. He had afterwards an opportunity of repaying the obligation he received, when Alexius III. appeared as a fugitive at Iconium.

The whole Vallachian, Bulgarian, and Sclavonian population between Mount Haemus and the Danube was now in arms to secure their independence; and as society was in very much the same condition in these provinces as in the other parts of the Byzantine empire, many of the native nobles aspired to the throne, or endeavoured to render themselves independent princes. The three Vallachian brothers, Peter, Asan, and John, however, maintained their position as the leaders of the rebellion, but Asan, who was considered the real founder of the Vallachian or second Bulgarian kingdom, was assassinated in the year 1196. His murderer Ivan, a Bulgarian noble of great military talent, expected to mount the throne; but both the Bulgarians and Vallachians recognized Peter as king and successor to his brother. Ivan was compelled to seek safety in the Byzantine empire. Peter was also assassinated, but his youngest brother John, commonly called Joannice, who had escaped from Constantinople, where he was detained as a hostage, was acknowledged King of Bulgaria. Alexius intrusted the command of the passes of Mount Haemus to Ivan, who for three years (1197-1200) effectually

¹ Nicetas, 321.

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protected Thrace and Macedonia from the incursions of the Vallachians.

During this time a Vallachian officer in the Byzantine army, named Chryses, who had refused to join his rebellious countrymen, was intrusted with the command of the fortress of Strumitza. The anarchy prevailing round him induced Chryses to declare himself independent; and the Emperor Alexius III., hoping to obtain an easy victory over so weak an enemy, took the field against him in person. In the second campaign, A.D. 1199, the emperor besieged Chryses in the fort of Prosakon, which was situated on high rocks overhanging the Axios (Vardar). The Byzantine troops stormed the outer enclosure of Prosakon, and attacked the citadel with such vigour that their showers of missiles drove the enemy behind the ramparts. But the emperor had no scaling-ladders, tools, or machines for an assault ready; the plate, provisions, wine, and baggage of the imperial household had been brought forward with the main body of the army, and the artillery and warlike stores had been left behind until fresh means of transport should be collected. After a vain attack, in which many of the bravest soldiers and officers perished, the troops were repulsed. Alexius, finding that it would require more time and labour to take Prosakon than he had expected, concluded a treaty with Chryses, leaving him in possession of Prosakon and Strumitza, on condition that he acknowledged himself a subject, and held his command as an officer named by the emperor.

The weak conduct of Alexius induced Ivan to aspire at forming an independent principality in Thrace and Macedonia. In 1200 he threw off his allegiance to the Byzantine empire, defeated an army commanded by the protostrator Manuel Kamytzes, whom he took prisoner, and, descending the valley of the Nestos, roused all the Bulgarian and Slavonian population to revolt, from Mosynopolis to Xantheia, Mount Pangaeum, and Abdera.

Alexius took the field against Ivan in person, but the campaign was almost immediately terminated by a treaty. The emperor, after taking possession of the fort of Stenimachos, agreed to allow Ivan to remain as governor of the country he occupied, promised him his grand-daughter in marriage, and allowed him to assume the ensigns of a member of the

imperial family. Ivan, deceived by these proofs of amity, visited Constantinople, where he was thrown into prison, Alexius perverting a passage of the psalmist as an excuse for his treachery¹.

As soon as Ivan began to treat with Alexius, the Bulgarian guards of Manuel Kamytyzes carried their prisoner into the dominions of Joannice, king of Bulgaria. Chryses, however, paid his ransom, and Kamytyzes was brought to Strumitza. Alexius, with his usual rapacity and injustice, had sequestered the immense private fortune of Kamytyzes as soon as he heard of his defeat; and he now refused to repay Chryses 200 lb. of gold from the treasures he had so unjustly seized. Kamytyzes, enraged at this act of injustice, formed an alliance with Chryses, and determined to raise the ransom by plundering the empire. The two generals invaded Pelagonia, and took Prilapos. Kamytyzes then marched into Thessaly, and extended his ravages over all Greece, exciting considerable commotion in the Peloponnesus by his intrigues, and contributing to increase that disorganization of the imperial administration, which rendered it so easy for small bodies of Crusaders and Venetian merchants to conquer Greece in the course of a few years. In the mean time, a Cypriot of low rank, who was governor of Smolena, also raised the standard of revolt; and the Patzinaks and Komans plundered the empire. Joannice, king of Bulgaria, availed himself of the general confusion to take possession of the important commercial cities of Constantina and Varna.

The empire seemed on the eve of dissolution; but the danger roused the ministers to activity. A powerful army was brought into the field. Peace was concluded with the King of Bulgaria, by sacrificing Constantina and Varna. Order was in some degree restored in the Peloponnesus and continental Greece. Kamytyzes was driven from all his conquests. The Cypriot was compelled to abandon Smolena and escape into Bulgaria; and Chryses himself surrendered Strumitza to purchase pardon².

¹ 'Give them according to their deeds and according to the wickedness of their endeavours; give them after the work of their hands; render to them their desert.' Ps. xxviii. 4.

² The history of the Vallachian war, and the operations against the rebels, are narrated in detail by Nicetas in his three books concerning the reign of Alexius III.

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The preceding review of the internal condition of the dominions of Alexius III., and the conduct of his government, renders it by no means surprising that the Byzantine empire was destroyed by the first energetic attack made on the capital, in spite of the great resources of which the central administration could still dispose. The insolence with which the Crusaders had been generally treated was deeply resented by the nobility and clergy throughout western Europe. The Venetians had never forgotten the injustice they had suffered when the Emperor Manuel confiscated the property of their merchants, and they sought an opportunity for revenge. The weakness of Alexius III. now invited every enemy of the Greeks to assail the empire.

The Emperor Henry VI. of Germany, son of Frederic Barbarossa, having effected the conquest of Sicily by means of the money extorted as a ransom from Richard, king of England, formed the project of invading the Byzantine empire. His ambition, which knew no bounds, easily furnished him with a pretext for war. He claimed all the country from Dyrrachium to Thessalonica as having belonged to the Sicilian crown, and from which Isaac II. had driven the troops of William II. Alexius III., on mounting the throne, had purchased peace by promising to pay the German emperor sixteen hundred pounds' weight of gold¹. A considerable part of this treasure was collected, when the death of Henry VI. (A.D. 1197) relieved Alexius from all further alarm on the side of Germany and Sicily; and the money was soon wasted in idle expenditure, and in the foolish war with the Sultan of Iconium about the two Arabian horses, which has been mentioned. Philip, who succeeded his brother Henry VI., was the son-in-law of Isaac; but he was involved in too many difficulties in Germany to attempt anything against Alexius. The dethroned emperor and his son Alexius were consequently guarded with little care, and at last the young Alexius escaped to Italy in a Pisan ship².

In the mean time the Venetians—who had sought in vain, by several embassies to Constantinople, to obtain payment

¹ Nicetas ventures to say that this was the first occasion on which a Roman emperor condescended to purchase peace with money, 306. He has, however, recorded similar transactions in the preceding pages of his own work, 236, 256. This is a specimen of the veracity even of the better class of Byzantine historians.

² Nicetas, 346.

of the sums which remained due to them under the treaty of indemnity concluded with the Emperor Manuel in 1174—found it prudent, after the death of Henry VI., to conclude a commercial treaty with Alexius III., which was ratified by a golden bull of the emperor in 1199¹. Though the emperor granted them extensive commercial privileges, and immunity from many duties paid by his Greek subjects, he treated them as vassals of the empire; and the treaty, whether because it failed to secure payment of the indemnity, or because its provisions were not fairly carried into execution, seems to have increased rather than allayed the hostile feelings of the Venetians. Venice soon found allies to join her in seeking to obtain revenge by open war.

When the leaders of the fourth crusade assembled at Venice to embark for Palestine, they were unable to pay the stipulated sum for transport. Thirty-four thousand marks of silver were wanting to complete their contract. The Doge of Venice, Henry Dandolo, a blind hero of ninety years of age, then proposed that the republic should defer the claim, and allow the fleet to depart immediately, on condition that the Crusaders joined the Venetians in reducing the city of Zara, which had lately rebelled and admitted a Hungarian garrison². In vain the greatest of the popes, Innocent III., menaced the Crusaders with excommunication if they dared to attack a city belonging to Andrew of Hungary who had taken the cross. Dandolo, who was as able a statesman as Innocent, and a man of a firmer mind, set the threats of the Papal See at defiance, and persuaded the superstitious barons that the Pope was acting from motives of policy, not religion. He succeeded in conducting the greater part of the Crusaders to Zara, which was soon taken; and this unholy crusade com-

¹ The golden bulls of Isaac II. and Alexius III., which require to be read together, are given in a very corrupt state by Marin, *Storia civile e politica del Commercio de' Veneziani*, vol. iii. pp. 282–327. Tafel has given a corrected text of that of Alexius III., *Symbolarum criticarum Geographiam Byzantinam spectantium Partes duae*, published in the Transactions of the Academy of Munich. Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, i. 178, 246.

² Nicetas, 347; Villehardouin, 25, edit. Ducange; Ramnusius, *De Bello Constantinopolitano*, 33, edit. 1634. Authors differ concerning the age and the blindness of Dandolo. The best authorities seem to be, Marin Sanudo (*Vite de' Duchi di Venezia*, p. 526), who says he was eighty-five years of age when he was elected doge in 1192; and Villehardouin, who must often have spoken with his friend about the cause of his blindness. He says the doge was very old; and although he had fine eyes, he was completely blind from the effect of a wound in his head. p. 47, edit. Ducange; see note xxxiv.

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menced by plundering a Christian city, defended by the troops of a crusading king.

While the Crusaders were passing the winter at Zara, ambassadors from the Emperor Philip of Germany solicited their assistance to restore his nephew, the young Alexius Angelos, and his father, Isaac II., to the throne of Constantinople. In spite of the opposition of many French nobles, the Belgians, Venetians, and Lombards determined to attack the Byzantine empire¹. A treaty was signed, by which the Crusaders and Venetians engaged to replace Isaac II. and his son Alexius on the throne, and the young Alexius bound himself to pay them the sum of two hundred thousand marks of silver, and to furnish the whole expedition with provisions for a year. He engaged, also, to acknowledge the papal supremacy, to accompany the Crusaders in person to Egypt, or else to furnish a contingent of ten thousand men to their army, with pay for a year; and he promised to maintain during his life a corps of five hundred cavalry in Palestine for the defence of the Latin possessions. Thus, says Nicetas, Alexius, who was as young in mind as in years, consented to change the ancient usages of the Romans².

The storm that was gathering in the Adriatic seems to have caused Alexius III. very little alarm. He wrote to Pope Innocent III., who was regarded as the head of this crusade, requesting him to prevent the expedition from visiting the Byzantine empire, as such a proceeding would frustrate his plans for the deliverance of the Holy Land. To this letter Innocent returned an evasive answer, assuming the right of deciding to whom the Byzantine crown really belonged³.

The fleet sailed from Zara in the month of April 1203, accompanied by the young Alexius, who joined the Crusaders with a numerous suite of German knights. It stopped at Dyrrachium, where the governor presented the keys to

¹ Villehardouin, 35, edit. Ducange. Nicetas, 348.

² Nicetas, 348.

³ *Gesta Innocentii III.* s. 82, tom. i. p. 43, 673, edit. Baluze. The Pope authorized the Crusaders to plunder the lands of those who refused them provisions, particularly in the dominions of the Emperor of Constantinople; adding, however, that the pillage must be committed with the fear of God, without injuring the person of any Christian, and with the resolution to make atonement—to the Church. Compare Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, iii. 135; and the *Gesta Innocentii III.* tom. i. 48, edit. Baluze.

Alexius as the representative of his father, Isaac II. Corfu followed the example; and Andros and Euboea, at which the expedition touched, changed their allegiance with equal readiness. No one showed any disposition to defend the rights of Alexius III. A prosperous voyage conducted the fleet within sight of Constantinople on the 23d June, and the troops were landed near Chalcedon, which they occupied, as well as Chrysopolis (Scutari).

Constantinople was as ill prepared to resist an enemy as when it was saved by the valour of Conrad of Montferrat, whose younger brother, Boniface, now commanded the army that attacked it. The imperial fleet had been so neglected that only twenty galleys could be rendered fit for service; the discipline of the troops had been neglected; and in spite of the great wealth and population of the city, few of the citizens were inclined to take up arms to defend the empire. Alexius III. endeavoured to negotiate, but all his offers were rejected, and the Crusaders transported their cavalry across the Bosphorus. The emperor sent troops to prevent their landing; but when the Venetian transports approached close to the shore above Galata, and let down the bridges which opened in the sides of the vessels, the horses bounded on shore, and the knights mounted with such order and rapidity that the Greek troops were immediately put to flight. The imperial tent formed part of the first spoils of the empire. Galata was protected by fortifications, of which the line may be traced in some parts of the existing walls. Towards the sea they were flanked by a great tower, to which one end of the immense chain that closed the entrance of the port was secured. The other end was made fast in the citadel within the walls of the great palace. The besiegers prepared to attack the tower, the fleet to force the chain, when a rash sortie of the Greeks enabled the Latin troops to render themselves masters of the tower by entering it along with the fugitives. The chain was soon after broken by one of the heaviest of the transports, armed with an immense pair of shears, which enabled the Venetians to bring the whole weight of the ship, impelled by a strong wind, to press on the chain. The fleet ranged itself in the port near the present dockyard.

It now remained to storm Constantinople, which had once

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enjoyed the reputation of being impregnable, and which had, on eleven great occasions, repulsed the attacks of powerful armies¹. But Alexius I. had destroyed the spell of its impregnability, and its walls were in a neglected state. Though the Emperor Manuel, during the second crusade, had found it prudent to strengthen the fortifications near the palace of Blachern at the northern angle, it was on this side that the Crusaders determined to attack the city, while the Venetians assailed it near the centre of the port. The army, formed in six divisions, encamped on the hill above the modern suburb of Eyoub, and ranged in order the powerful engines they had brought for the attack of Jerusalem². The young Alexius summoned the people of Constantinople to open their gates and replace his father on the throne; but the people, who considered him an apostate from the orthodox church, treated his propositions with scorn. The Crusaders, not being in sufficient force to occupy the whole line of the land wall from the port to the Propontis, contented themselves with guarding the gate near the palace of Blachern, and left the others open to the Greeks to make their sorties—convinced that, whenever they could meet the enemy in a fair field, they were sure of victory. But garden walls and enclosures often enabled the besieged to harass the Crusaders with sudden attacks, in which they lost many men. At last, on the 17th of July, the Crusaders having effected a breach in one of the towers opposite their camp, a general attack was simultaneously made on the city both by sea and land.

A long and bloody struggle ended in the repulse of the Crusaders by the English and Danish guards, whose battle-axes were well adapted for defending the walls. The Pisan

¹ The eleven sieges of Constantinople alluded to are—I, A.D. 616, by Khosroes of Persia, in the sixth year of Heraclius; 2, A.D. 626, by the chagan of the Avars and the Persians, in the sixteenth year of Heraclius; 3, A.D. 672, by Sophian, the general of Caliph Moavyah; 4, A.D. 717, by Moslema, in the reign of Leo III.; 5, A.D. 798, by the troops of Haroun Al Rashid, in the second year of Irene; 6, A.D. 811, by Crumn, king of the Bulgarians; 7, A.D. 821, by the rebel Thomas; 8, A.D. 866, by the Russian pirates Ascold and Dir; 9, A.D. 913, by Simeon, king of the Bulgarians; 10, A.D. 1047, by the rebel Tornikios; 11, A.D. 1187, by the rebel Alexis Branas.

² The van of the Crusaders consisted of the Belgian chivalry under Baldwin, count of Flanders; the rear, of Savoyards, Italians, and Germans, under the commander-in-chief, Boniface, Marquess of Montferrat. Of the four divisions of the main body, one consisted of Flemings under Henry, brother of Baldwin, and three of French under the Counts of Blois and St. Pol, and of Matthew Montmorency.

auxiliaries also distinguished themselves by their valour. The Emperor Alexius III. viewed the defeat of the Crusaders from a tower in the palace of Blachern, and he was urged by the officers of his suite to put himself at the head of the Varangian guard and attack the disordered Franks. A vigorous attack of the Byzantine army, under the command of his son-in-law, Theodore Lascaris, who was then at his side ready for action, might at this moment have saved Constantinople. But Alexius was incapable of any exertion and the Byzantine army was drawn out before the walls in idle parade.

While the Crusaders suffered a defeat by land, the Venetians were completely successful by sea. They had constructed high towers of woodwork in some of their vessels, and these towers were furnished with bridges which were let down on the walls of the city. Many other galleys, whose tops were filled with archers and crossbowmen, supported the attack, and swept the defenders from the fortifications. The old doge, in complete armour on the deck of his galley, encouraged his countrymen; and when he gave the signal for the grand assault, he ordered the crew of his ship to press forward, in order to be the first to mount the walls. In a few minutes many bridges were firmly fixed on the battlements, and after a short and desperate struggle the banner of Saint Mark was seen waving on a lofty tower overlooking the centre of the port. Twenty-five towers and the connecting line of wall were soon in possession of the Venetians. But the narrow streets of the city, and the vigorous defence of the Greeks, who defended their property with more valour than they had defended the walls, arrested the progress of the Venetians. In order to penetrate into the centre of the city, and at the same time to keep open their communications with the port, they set fire to the houses before them. The conflagration extended from the foot of the hill of Blachern to the monastery of Euergetes, and as far as the Deuteron. At this critical moment the news reached Dandolo that the attack of the Crusaders had failed, and that the Byzantine army was issuing from Constantinople to assail their camp. He immediately abandoned all his conquests, and hastened with the whole Venetian force to support his allies. But when he reached the camp the danger was already past, and the

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Byzantine troops withdrew behind the walls without striking a blow.

During the following night the Emperor Alexius III. assembled a few of his confidential creatures, and, carrying off as much of the imperial treasures and jewels as he was able to transport, abandoned Constantinople, and escaped to Debeltos¹.

SECT. III.—*The Conquest of Constantinople, and the Partition of the Byzantine Empire.*—A.D. 1203-1204.

Isaac II. reinstated on the throne, with his son Alexius IV. as his colleague.—Incapacity of both emperors.—Impossibility of fulfilling the engagements entered into with the Crusaders.—Second conflagration of Constantinople.—Insurrection.—Death of Isaac II.—Murder of Alexius IV.—Reign of Alexius V. (Murtzuphlos).—Treaty for the conquest and partition of the Byzantine empire.—Storming and sack of Constantinople.—Baldwin, count of Flanders, elected Emperor of Romania.—End of the Byzantine empire.

Before any of the ambitious nobles, who were usually watching to place the imperial crown on their own heads, could take advantage of the flight of Alexius III., the intendant of the imperial treasury, a eunuch named Constantine, contrived to induce the Varangian guard to replace Isaac II. on the throne, by promising them a liberal donative. The blind emperor was immediately conducted from the monastery where he had been latterly confined, to the palace, and proclaimed emperor, with his son Alexius IV. as his colleague. The administration underwent no change, and only those courtiers were driven from their places who were attached to the personal interests of the late emperor. Most of the Byzantine statesmen were satisfied with this arrangement. It purchased peace for the moment; and it might afford the Greeks, who prided themselves on their intellectual superiority over the Latins, an opportunity of obtaining some diplomatic advantage over their enemies. Their vanity made

¹ Besides the contemporary historians Nicetas and Villehardouin, we have original accounts of this siege of Constantinople in the letter of the Count of St. Pol to the Duke of Brabant; D'Outremann, *Constantinopolis Belgica*, 705; and in the letter of the Crusaders, of which there is a copy addressed to Pope Innocent III. in the *Gesta Innocentii III.* tom. i. 51, edit. Baluze; and one addressed to Otho, king of the Romans, in Reusner's *Epistolæ Turcicae*, i. 21.

them overlook the profound knowledge of Eastern affairs possessed by the Venetians, who equalled the Greeks in cunning, and far surpassed them in daring. Even the Crusaders, though incapable of steady counsels, had their suspicions fully awakened, and their distrust was increased by their avarice. As soon, therefore, as it was known in the Latin camp that Isaac II. was restored to the throne, they were prepared to meet with chicane in place of open hostilities. Alexius IV. was retained as a hostage until envoys of their own should bring back a report of the real state of affairs within the walls of Constantinople, and obtain from Isaac the ratification of the treaty concluded by his son at Zara. Isaac, on hearing the concessions made by his son, frankly informed the Crusaders that he saw no possibility of carrying the stipulations of the treaty into effect; but with his accustomed weakness he consented to ratify it, in order to have the pleasure of embracing his son. Alexius IV. made his solemn entry into the capital on horseback, between Baldwin, count of Flanders, and the doge, Henry Dandolo, and on the 1st of August was crowned as his father's colleague.

The long imprisonment of Isaac II., and the loss of his eyesight, had weakened his feeble mind; while Alexius, an idle and ill-educated youth, destitute of natural talent, having contracted the habits and vices of the Franks, was incompetent to supply the deficiencies of his father. Both emperors, however, were sensible of the insurmountable difficulties of their position; they felt that they could not trust their own subjects, and they perceived the danger of relying on the Latins. The blindness of Isaac, and his constant attacks of gout, made him pay more attention to his own sufferings than to the dangers of the empire. As human aid promised no relief in either case, he sought consolation from monks and astrologers, who flattered him with imaginary prophetic revelations, and the supposed results of divination. These cursed monks, as Nicetas calls them, dined at the imperial table, where they consumed the finest fish of the Bosphorus and the richest wines of the Archipelago, which they paid for by persuading Isaac that he was destined to recover his sight and health at the very time he was visibly sinking into the grave. The conduct of Alexius was as foolish as that of Isaac, and he was equally inattentive to public business. His thoughtless

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behaviour rendered him contemptible both to the Greeks and Latins. He spent whole days in the tents of the Crusaders, feasting and gambling with the young nobles, who, in their revels, sometimes took the imperial bonnet, ornamented with precious stones, from his head, and replaced it with the woollen cap commonly worn by the Latins¹.

It soon became evident that the Byzantine government was unable to satisfy the demands of the Crusaders; but the army and fleet were regularly supplied with provisions, and from time to time their leaders were furnished with such sums of money as the emperors were able to collect. These instalments were obtained by confiscating the wealth accumulated by the Empress Euphrosyne and some of her relations, and by collecting the gold and silver plate, and the jewels in the imperial palaces, the monasteries, and even the churches. But all was inadequate to discharge the debt, while the feelings of irritation between the Greeks and Latins were daily increasing. To avoid a collision, the Latin army was encamped close to Galata, and the soldiers were only allowed to visit Constantinople during the day in small numbers.

The 29th of September, St. Michael's Day, was fixed for the departure of the Crusaders; and Alexius IV., in order to extend his power in the provinces and collect additional sums of money, left Constantinople, accompanied by a considerable body of Latin troops under the command of the Marquess of Montferrat, a selfish intriguer, who increased the general difficulties by seeking to obtain clandestine profits for himself. He cheated Alexius with as little delicacy as knavish associates usually display in their dealings with foolish spendthrifts. Before Alexius mounted the throne, the marquess obtained a promise of the investiture of Crete; and he now exacted an engagement for the payment of one thousand six hundred pounds' weight of gold before accompanying the young emperor. The movements of the dethroned Alexius rendered it absolutely necessary to attack him without delay; for, finding that he was not pursued, he had collected a considerable body of troops at Debelto, occupied Adrianople, and secured his authority over the greater part of Thrace. The young Alexius IV. and the Marquess Boniface soon drove him out of

¹ Nicetas, 358.

Adrianople, and took possession of Philippopolis and Kypsela ; but it was found that no money could be hastily collected in a province exhausted by continual hostilities, beyond what was required for supplying the immediate wants of the troops in the field. The marquess and his followers, who thought more of securing payment of their subsidies than of assisting the empire, compelled Alexius IV. to return to Constantinople, though their precipitate retreat left Alexius III. in possession of Mosynopolis and all Macedonia, and allowed Joannice, king of Bulgaria, who had crossed Mount Haemus in order to profit by the disturbed state of the Byzantine empire, to conquer many places in Thrace.

The relations between the Byzantine government and the Crusaders were thus rendered every day more complicated and less friendly. The Crusaders insisted on the immediate fulfilment of all the stipulations of the treaty; the emperors complained that the Crusaders left the provinces from which great revenues were derived in the hands of the usurper, while they employed themselves in plundering the property of the friendly population in the vicinity of Constantinople. As the emperors were unable to pay the immense sums they had promised, and the Crusaders had only fulfilled a part of what they had engaged to perform, nothing but mutual concessions could prevent a quarrel. But the complicated nature of the obligations between the Byzantine government and the Crusaders and Venetians on one side, and between the Crusaders and the Venetians on the other, rendered a peaceful arrangement almost impossible. Things were in that peculiar state, when nothing but great talents and great moderation on the part of three different powers could insure tranquillity. One man alone possessed the talents and the authority capable of preserving order; and this very man, Henry Dandolo, was eagerly watching for every event tending to hasten the collision which he looked forward to as inevitable.

An accidental calamity tended greatly to increase the hatred of the Greeks to the Latins. On the 19th of August, while young Alexius was absent on his Thracian expedition, a dreadful fire destroyed a considerable part of Constantinople, adding greatly to the sufferings of the population, and to the embarrassments of the government. This conflagration

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originated in the wilful act of a few Flemish soldiers, who had crossed the port to visit some of their countrymen established as merchants in the empire. After drinking together they proposed attacking a Turkish mosque in the neighbourhood, and plundering the rich warehouses of the Turkish merchants who traded with Persia and Egypt. Their pillage was interrupted by the Greeks, who drove them back, and pursued them so hotly towards the port, that the Flemings, in order to save themselves, set fire to some houses in their rear. A strong wind caused the conflagration to spread with frightful rapidity, and it burned for the space of two days. The entire breadth of the city, from the port to the Propontis, was laid in ashes, forming a belt of cinders a mile and a half in extent, over which it was necessary to pass from one part of the town to the other. The fire passed close to the Church of St. Sophia, destroying the richest quarter of the city. Splendid palaces, filled with works of ancient art and antique classic manuscripts, as well as warehouses stored with immense wealth, were destroyed by this conflagration, from the calamitous effects of which Constantinople never recovered¹. About fifteen thousand Latins had hitherto continued to reside in Constantinople as traders and artisans. The fury of the populace and the ruin of their houses now compelled them to seek refuge at Galata, under the protection of the Crusaders.

The losses caused by this fire, and the just animosity it awakened in the breasts of the Greeks both against the emperors and the Latins, rendered it impossible to continue the pecuniary payments required by the Crusaders. Their threats compelled the Byzantine government to seize the golden lamps and silver candelabra that ornamented St. Sophia's and other churches in the capital, the golden shrines that enclosed the relics of saints and martyrs, and the silver

¹ Gibbon (vii. 308) and Le Beau (xvii. 120), in defiance of the authority of contemporary historians, say that this fire lasted eight days. Nicetas (356) says it lasted all the night of the day on which it commenced, and all the following day and night. Villehardouin (82) says two days and nights. His text, as published by Ducange, says it extended a league in front; but the text published by Buchon says half a league. Daru and Michaud allowed themselves to be misled by Cousin's translation of Nicetas into supposing that the Flemings attacked the Jews; and Buchon propagates the error by reprinting the inaccurate translation of Cousin in his notes to Villehardouin. Nicetas uses the expression *a synagogue of the Saracens* for a mosque—*Τῷ τῶν ἐξ Ἀγὰρ συναγωγῇ*.

frames of holy pictures, which were melted down and handed over to the Venetian commissaries. A new treaty with the Crusaders prolonged their stay until the following Easter. The emperors engaged to defray the whole expenses of the army and fleet during the interval, though the Venetians exacted an additional freight for their ships. The young Alexius IV. promised to oblige the Patriarch to proclaim Innocent III. head of the whole Christian Church, and wrote to that ambitious pontiff an assurance that he was labouring to reunite the Eastern Church under papal supremacy¹. Many of the Crusaders were extremely unwilling to remain, and their army showed signs of discontent. The Greeks, on the other hand, goaded by their sufferings and the insults offered to their Church, began to think of resistance. They remembered that they had repulsed the attack of the land troops, and Alexius IV. spoke at times of placing himself at the head of the national party, and formed a friendship with Alexius Dukas Murtzuphlos, who was the most daring leader of the war party; but his father warned him of the danger, and convinced him that, without the assistance of the Crusaders, it would be impossible to defend the throne².

Things at last reached a crisis. The Crusaders sent a formal declaration of war to the emperors, in case they failed to fulfil the conditions of the new treaty and pay the money due. The people of Constantinople rose in rebellion, and declared that they would no longer submit to be governed by emperors who had sold the empire and the church to the Latins. On the 25th of January 1204 the people assembled in St. Sophia's, and compelled the members of the senate, the clergy, and the principal nobles of the capital to attend in order to elect a new emperor. But as every man of rank

¹ Raynaldi *Annales Ecclesiastici*, an. 1203, and in the portion of Innocent's Letters published by Brequigny and Dutheil, *Diplomata*, lib. vi. ep. 210.

² The monks and astrologers who surrounded Isaac II. persuaded him to transport the bronze boar, which Euphrosyne had mutilated, from the hippodrome into the palace, as an effectual means of taming the fury of the populace of Constantinople, of which they said this boar was the type. The people emulated his astrological follies. They conceived a fancy that a splendid bronze statue of Minerva, thirty feet high, was the genius of the Latins, whom its attitude appeared to invite, and they destroyed this noble work of Hellenic art. Nicetas has given us an interesting description of this statue, which Müller (*Handbuch der Archäologie der Kunst*, 539) thinks resembled the monument figured in the *Denkmäler*, zweite Reihe, No. 217; see also Clarac, *Musée de Sculpt.*, pl. 320, n. 871. It must have differed from all those figured in the *Denkmäler*; and No. 207 approaches nearest to the description of Nicetas.

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knew that the Latins would support the cause of Alexius IV., no one was found who would accept the proffered sovereignty. For three days the confusion continued, until a young man named Nikolas Kanavos was anointed emperor against his will. Isaac II. died during this anarchy. Alexius IV. sent to the Marquess of Montferrat, and made arrangements for introducing the Crusaders into Constantinople; but Alexius Murtzuphlos, hearing of this, placed himself at the head of his military partisans, and, having obtained admittance to the Emperor Alexius late in the evening, frightened him with dreadful accounts of the conduct of the enraged populace. The shouts of the followers of Murtzuphlos were heard at the palace gates. The fate of Andronicus presented itself to the imagination of Alexius, who begged Murtzuphlos to assist him in escaping to the Latins. The traitor, after receiving the ensigns of the imperial rank from the hands of the confiding prince, led him by long galleries to the dungeons of the palace. Alexius Murtzuphlos then returned to his followers, by whom he was proclaimed emperor; and the choice was ratified by all the troops. Kanavos was compelled to descend from the throne; and Alexius IV. was strangled in the dungeon to which he had been conducted, after a reign of six months and eight days¹.

Alexius V., who placed himself on the throne by this daring act of rebellion and assassination, was a member of the great family of Dukas, which had given two emperors to the East, and was closely allied with the families of Comnenos and Angelos. He had received the by-name of Murtzuphlos from his school companions on account of his large overhanging eyebrows². At this time he was generally looked up to by his countrymen as the bravest soldier among the nobility, and he had given proofs of his valour in several skirmishes with the Crusaders. His enemies admit that he was indefatigable in his exertions to re-establish order and put the fortifications in a state of defence. He restored the discipline of the troops by appearing constantly at their exercises. He preserved tranquillity among the populace by traversing the city frequently on horseback, by night as well as by day, with his mace-of-arms in his hand. He

¹ Nicetas, 361.² Ducange, Notes to Villehardouin, No. cxvi. p. 307, edit. Paris.

repaired the walls, strengthened the towers, improved the machines for throwing missiles, and formed scaffolds for new engines on the towers most exposed to attack from the side of the port, in order that they might command the decks of the Venetian ships.

As the military energy of the Byzantine empire, like that of modern states, depended in a great measure on its financial resources, and the circumstances under which Murtzuphlos mounted the throne rendered it impossible for him to think of imposing any new tax, even though it was well known that the treasury was empty, he took measures for raising the supplies necessary for the preparations he was carrying on, and for the payment of the mercenary troops, by confiscating the fortunes of all who had acted as intendants of finance, as collectors of the imperial revenue, or as government contractors, on the ground that they were deeply indebted to the public. This mode of raising money was popular in the Roman empire in every age, from the time of Augustus Caesar to that of Dukas Murtzuphlos. But it was impossible to infuse a warlike spirit into the breasts of the Greeks of Constantinople. Both nobles and citizens were equally disgusted with the severe military discipline introduced by the new emperor, who compelled every man to serve in the cavalry or to do duty on the walls. The merchants and shopkeepers were averse to serve in person, because they paid exorbitant taxes in order that government might find mercenary troops for their defence; and they were ashamed of the ridicule to which they exposed themselves by their awkwardness in military array beside the English, Danes, and Pisans of the imperial guard, who moved in complete armour as easily as the citizens in their holiday garments. Many of every class detested the imperial government, and had lost their attachment to the church. Some looked forward to the destruction both of the empire and the patriarchate as a necessary reform, and many viewed it with indifference¹.

For two months the new emperor and the Crusaders prepared with all their energy for the struggle which was to

¹ See what Nicetas says of the disposition of the country people round Constantinople, 382.

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decide the fate of the Byzantine empire. Murtzuphlos, by repeated skirmishes, ably conducted, succeeded in circumscribing the foraging parties of the Crusaders in the immediate vicinity of the capital, and Henry of Flanders was obliged to march with a large body of cavalry as far as Philea on the Black Sea, in order to collect a supply of provisions. The emperor attempted to surprise this division on its return; but the Belgian soldiers of Henry, though suddenly attacked, closed their ranks without confusion, and completely defeated the Greeks. Twenty of the bravest horsemen of the imperial guard were slain in the first charge; and the grand standard of the Virgin, which always accompanied the emperor when he took the field in person, and which was regarded by the people as the talisman of the empire, was taken by Henry. The Byzantine troops suffered so severely in this encounter that Murtzuphlos did not again venture to lead them without the walls¹.

The Crusaders and Venetians prepared everything for a new assault by the end of March 1204. A council was held to arrange the manner in which the plunder of Constantinople was to be divided, and to settle the partition of the Byzantine empire. The treaty then signed put an end to the Eastern Roman Empire; for neither the Latin empire of Romania, established by the conquerors, nor the Greek empires of Nicaea and of Constantinople which succeeded, have a just claim to be considered the legitimate representatives either of the policy or of the dignity of the Byzantine government.

This treaty was concluded by the Doge Henry Dandolo on the part of the Venetians, and by Boniface, marquess of Montferrat, Baldwin, count of Flanders, Louis, count of Blois, and Henry, count of St. Pol, on the part of the Crusaders, in order to avoid all disputes, should it please God, for His honour and glory, to grant them the victory over their enemies. The Venetians very naturally considered that the freight of the expedition was the first debt which it was the duty of the Crusaders to discharge. But to prevent the whole booty from being absorbed by this claim, it was

¹ The Latin historians accuse Alexius V. of a treacherous attempt to get the chiefs of the crusade into his hands before they were aware that Alexius IV. was dethroned; and Nicetas charges the Latins with a treacherous attempt to seize Alexius V. during a conference with the doge.

provided that the Venetians were to receive three quarters of the plunder, and the Crusaders one, until the whole sum due to Venice was discharged. In every case the rations necessary for the whole expedition were to be issued from the common stock according to the established rule. The Venetians were to enjoy all the privileges in the conquered territory which they possessed in their own country, and were to be governed by their own laws. Twelve electors were to be chosen as soon as Constantinople was taken, who were to elect an emperor; and they were to choose the man best able to govern the new conquests for the glory of God and the advantage of the Holy Roman Church: six of these electors were to be named by the barons, and six by the Venetians. The emperor was to possess as his immediate domain the palaces of Blachern and Bucoleon, with one quarter of the Byzantine empire; the remaining three quarters were to be equally divided between the Crusaders and the Venetians. The clergy of the party to which the emperor did not belong were to elect the patriarch of the Eastern Church, and the ecclesiastics of the two parties were to occupy the benefices in the territories assigned to their respective nations. The two parties bound themselves to remain united for another year—that is, until the 31st of March 1205; and all who then established themselves in the empire were to take an oath of fealty, and do homage to the emperor. Twelve commissioners were to be chosen by each party, in order to divide the conquered territory into fiefs, and determine the service due by the crown vassals to the emperor. No person belonging to any nation at war with the parties to the treaty was to be received in the empire as long as hostilities lasted. This stipulation was evidently inserted by the Venetians, and directed against their great commercial and political rivals, the Genoese. Both parties were to exert all their influence to induce the Pope to ratify and confirm the treaty, and excommunicate any who should refuse to execute its stipulations. The emperor was to swear to observe the treaty; and in case it should be found necessary to make any modifications in it before his election, the Doge of Venice and the Marquess of Montferrat, with the twelve electors, were empowered to make the change required. The doge, Henry Dandolo, as a personal honour, was dispensed from taking an oath of

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fealty to the future emperor for any fief or office he might hold¹.

It appears that an act of partition, describing the territories comprised in the quarter of the empire assigned to the emperor, in the quarter and half quarter assigned to the Venetians, and in the quarter and half quarter assigned to the Crusaders, was drawn up at the same time as the treaty. But the imperfect copies of this act which have been preserved, the manner in which the geographical names are disfigured, and the modifications to which it was immediately subjected, in consequence of disputes, exchanges, and sales of the various lots, render the fragments we possess a doubtful authority for determining the original partition of the empire².

On the 9th of April everything was ready for the assault, and at daybreak the whole force of the expedition moved forward to attack the towers on the side of the port, for it seemed doubtful whether the diminished numbers of the land forces would be able to make any impression on the numerous mercenaries who manned the land wall under the eye of Murtzuphlos. On the other hand, the long line of wall towards the port offered no flank defences beyond the slight projection and elevation of its towers; while the assailants could take advantage of the quays for landing

¹ This treaty is given in the *Gesta Innocentii III.* xcii. tom. i. 55, edit. Baluze; and in Muratori's notes to the Chronicle of Andrea Dandolo, in *Rer. Ital. Script.* xii. 326. Tafel, in his *Symbolarum criticarum Geographiam Byzantinam spectantium Partes duae*, has devoted the second part to an examination of the act of partition annexed to this treaty; and he has given the text both of the treaty and the act of partition. He affords, however, no satisfactory explanation of the numerous omissions and imperfections of the act of partition. Ramnusius (*De Bello Constantinopolitano*, p. 159) gives us also a commentary on the treaty, in which there is some political information, but many geographical errors. See also p. 223, edit. 1634. The Memoir of Tafel is a valuable contribution to the materials for a geographical account of the Byzantine empire. See also documents relating to the fourth crusade in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur ältern Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republic Venedig*, i. 286-452.

The title of Doge of Venice, derived from this treaty, is given by Acropolita, when he mentions that the Crusaders who received a like share with the Venetians acquired τὸ τέτροπον καὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ ἥμισυ. Quartae et dimidii quartae totius imperii Romaniae dominum. G. Acropolita, 7, edit. Paris.

² We need not wonder at the ignorance of the Crusaders and Venetians, who divided provinces without knowing their boundaries; we may remember the treaty concerning the frontiers of the British Possessions in North America and the United States. Even at the present day we have seen mercantile companies proposing to make canals from the Atlantic to the Pacific through districts that had not been surveyed. See the act of partition in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, i. 464, 489.

merchandise in planting their scaling-ladders, and could concentrate an overwhelming flight of missiles on any given point from three hundred engines on the decks of their ships. Murtzuphlos had, however, done much to strengthen this part of the fortifications, and it was found well prepared to offer a desperate resistance. The assault was commenced with the greatest fury, and persisted in with the fiercest perseverance. Many Crusaders landed on the quays and planted their ladders against the walls, but every assailant who reached their summit was hurled down headlong. The machines of the defenders broke the yards of those ships that approached the towers, and swept the men from their decks. At length, after a contest of many hours and the loss of some of their bravest soldiers, the Crusaders were obliged to retire.

But the assailants were not men to be easily discouraged by danger, and they renewed the attack on the 12th of April. The interval was employed in preparing more powerful means of escalade. The largest ships of the fleet were bound together in pairs, their decks were protected by stronger bulwarks, and their tops were enlarged. The fleet, ranged in successive lines, was enabled to bring an overwhelming force against the defenders of any single tower. The attack commenced by an unremitted volley of missiles against the points which it was proposed to storm. When the defenders were compelled to conceal themselves from this volley, the ships destined for the assault were impelled rapidly to the wall, aided by a strong north wind, which carried the heaviest double ships alongside the towers. The *Pilgrim* and the *Paradise* were the first to plant their platform on a Byzantine tower, and a band of Venetians and Crusaders sprang in eager emulation at the same instant on the hostile ramparts. The shout of victory spread instantaneously through the host, and four towers were immediately stormed. In a few minutes, three of the city gates were thrown open, and the knights began to land their horses from the ships in the rear. Murtzuphlos had pitched his tent and encamped the imperial guard at the monastery of Pantepoptes, in the open space left by the first conflagration. The victory was gained before it was in his power to send succours to the defenders; and when the hostile banners were floating from the towers, his guards refused to march against the victorious enemy, and

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retired with the emperor to the palace and citadel of Bucoleon. The conquerors immediately occupied his encampment, and took possession of the palace of Blachern¹; but the day was too far spent to do more than establish themselves firmly in the positions they had seized. The leaders deemed it imprudent to allow any part of their troops to advance into the streets of a city which had not yet capitulated, and to which the imperial palace formed a strong citadel, garrisoned by a numerous body of well-disciplined mercenaries. To increase the confusion among the Greeks, and prevent their attacking the camp during the night, the Crusaders set fire to the houses on their flank. This third conflagration destroyed the eastern part of the city beyond the monastery of Euergetes, and extended near the sea as far as the Drungarion. Villehardouin says that the three fires lighted by the Crusaders destroyed more houses than were contained in the three largest cities in France².

The Emperor Alexius V., finding no one disposed to defend his throne, embarked in a galley with his wife Eudocia and her mother the Empress Euphrosyne, and escaped from the capital³. In the mean time, the people of every rank crowded to St. Sophia's, and exhibited a strange example of the political weakness caused by the complete centralization of all executive action. No one thought of taking advantage of the numerous means of defence which were still available. The election of a new emperor was necessary to secure

¹ The site of the monastery of Pantepoptes is marked by the mosque Fetiye; and the neighbouring mosque, Kilisé, is supposed to mark the position of the headquarters of the Latins on the night after their victory.

² Nicetas, 366; Villehardouin, 101, edit. Ducange.

³ The imperial families of Comnenos and Angelos offer scenes as tragical as anything in the ancient drama 'presenting Thebes and Pelops' line.' Alexius II. and his sister, the beautiful Maria, were murdered by Andronicus I., whose horrid death was accompanied by the murder of his sons. Isaac, the tyrant of Cyprus, the blind Isaac II., the fugitive Alexius III., the murdered Alexius IV., and Eudocia, the daughter of Alexius III., all bore a part in fearful tragedies. Eudocia was married to Simeon, king of Servia, who retired into a monastery on Mount Papykes. His son Stephen, struck with the beauty of his young stepmother, married her, and had children by the marriage. A scandalous quarrel, however, arose; he divorced her, and expelled her from the palace, almost naked. As nobody dared to assist her, she would probably have perished, had not Fulk, the king's brother, sent her to Constantinople. Murtzuphlos, who had already divorced two wives, married her; and after the execution of Murtzuphlos, she married Leo Sgueros, the chief of Argos, Nauplia, and Corinth. The complaint of Nicetas (echoed by Dr. Johnson, in his tragedy of *Irene*) that no prodigies foretold the fall of the Byzantine empire, is certainly misplaced. Nicetas, 342, 367; Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 205.

obedience to any order, and even in this scene of anarchy two claimants presented themselves as pretenders to the throne. Fortune determined the election in favour of Theodore Lascaris; but after a vain attempt to rally the imperial guard, and excite the Greeks to active resistance, he found it necessary to escape to Asia as soon as morning dawned; adding a third to the fugitive emperors who were wandering in the Byzantine provinces.

The Crusaders and Venetians met with no further resistance. The Marquess of Montferrat occupied the palace of Bucoleon, and Henry of Flanders that of Blachern, and the Byzantine troops laid down their arms on receiving assurance of personal safety. Guards were placed over the imperial treasury and the arsenal, but the Crusaders and Venetians were allowed to plunder the city without restraint. Victory was never more cruelly abused; every crime was perpetrated without shame. The houses of the peaceful citizens were plundered, their wives dishonoured, and their children enslaved. Churches and monasteries were rifled; monuments of religious zeal were defaced; horses and mules were stabled in temples whose architectural magnificence was unequalled in the rest of Europe. The ceremonies of the Greeks were ridiculed; the priests were insulted; sacred plate, precious shrines in which the relics of martyrs and saints were preserved, rich altar-cloths, and jewelled ornaments, were carried off. The soldiers and their female companions made the Church of St. Sophia the scene of licentious orgies; and Nicetas recounts with grief and indignation that 'one of the priestesses of Satan' who accompanied the Crusaders seated herself on the Patriarch's throne, sang ribald songs before the high altar, and danced in the sacred edifice, to the delight of the infuriated soldiery. It is not necessary to detail all the miseries suffered by the unfortunate Greeks; Pope Innocent III. has left a description of the scene so horrible that it will hardly bear a literal translation¹. The age was one of fierce

¹ 'Illudque longe gravius reputatur quod quidam nec religioni nec aetati nec sexui pepercerunt, sed fornicationes, adulteria et incestus in oculis omnium exercentes, non solum maritatas et viduas, sed et matronas et virgines Deoque dicatas exposuerunt spurcitiis gargonum. Nec imperiales sufficit divitias exhaurire ac diripere spolia majorum pariterque minorum, nisi ad ecclesiarum thesauros et, quod gravius est, ad ipsarum possessiones extenderetis manus vestras, tabulas argenteas de altaribus rapientes, et violatis sacrariis, cruces, iconas et reliquias

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wars and dreadful calamities ; but the sack of Constantinople so far exceeded every other event of that age, both in its glory and shame, as to become the favourite theme of popular song and dramatic representation throughout the known world¹. Villehardouin says that every Crusader occupied the house that pleased his fancy ; and men who the day before were in absolute poverty, suddenly found themselves possessed of wealth, and living in luxury².

Some of the Latin clergy vainly endeavoured to moderate the fury which their own bigoted precepts had instilled into the troops ; but many thought only of collecting a rich booty of relics, and showed themselves as little scrupulous as the soldiers in robbing churches and monasteries³. Well might the Greeks contrast the conduct of this army of the soldiers of Christ with the behaviour of the Mussulman troops under the command of Saladin, who conquered Jerusalem. The Christians had bound themselves by an oath not to shed the blood of Christians ; they had made vows of abstinence and chastity. What attention they paid to these vows when they turned their arms against a Christian state, which for many centuries had formed the bulwark of Europe against the invasion of the Saracens, is recorded by the Pope himself.

The chiefs of the expedition at last determined to re-establish order ; but before it was possible to restore the salutary restraint of military discipline, they were obliged to put several of their mutinous followers to death, and the Count of St. Pol hung a French knight with his shield round his neck. This severe punishment was inflicted, not for an abuse of the rights of conquest towards the defenceless Greeks, but as an act of public vengeance against a traitor who had defrauded his companions by concealing a portion of the plunder. Thanks were then offered up to God with the greatest solemnity for the glorious conquest of a city containing half a million of Christian inhabitants, and ' God

asportantes, ut Graecorum Ecclesia, quantumcunque persecutionibus affligatur, ad obedientiam apostolicae sedis redire contemnat, quae in Latinis non nisi proditiōis exempla et opera tenebrarum aspexit, ut merito illos abhorreat plusquam canes.' *Gesta Innocentii III.* p. 57, edit. Baluze.

¹ Nicetas, 371.

² Villehardouin, 104, edit. Ducange.

³ An account of these clerical robberies is given by Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, iii. 269.

wills it' was fervently shouted by twenty thousand pious brigands.

A proclamation was published, ordering all the booty to be collected in three of the principal churches of the city, and promising personal protection to the inhabitants. Most of the Byzantine nobility availed themselves of this opportunity to escape from the city. Nicetas the historian has left us an account of his own adventures during the catastrophe of his country. He occupied a palace enriched with many treasures of ancient art and literature in Sphorakion a quarter near St. Sophia's, which was destroyed in the second conflagration, and the historian then retired to a smaller dwelling in a narrow street. In this house many of his friends sought refuge; and a Venetian whom he had protected in the days of his official power now armed himself as a Crusader, and guarded the entrance as if it was his own quarters. In this way, he was protected for some days; but as soon as the proclamation was known, Nicetas and his friends resolved to quit Constantinople, and abandon their property in order to escape from insult. On Saturday, the fifth day after the capture of the city, while a cold wind from the Black Sea gave the morning a wintry aspect, Nicetas, accompanied by his pregnant wife, and surrounded by his children and friends, walked through the streets to the Golden Gate, where some wretched conveyance might be obtained, to carry the women and children to Selymbria. Several of the party carried infants in their arms, for their servants and slaves had deserted them. The young women of rank and beauty were placed in the midst of the band of exiles, their faces disfigured with dust, and their figures concealed in unsightly dresses. In this way the fugitives passed many bands of soldiers without interruption, but when they reached the Church of St. Mokios a soldier seized a beautiful girl, and carried her off by force. The father, feeble from sickness, was unable to pursue the ravisher, and he implored Nicetas to save his daughter. The historian followed the soldier, imploring all the Latins he met to protect the honour of an innocent family, and save a noble lady from insult and slavery. He appealed to the proclamation which it was their duty to respect, until his eloquent and pathetic gestures, rather than his words, awakened compassion. A party of Crusaders

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accompanied Nicetas to the house into which the maiden had been carried, where they found the robber standing at the door. He denied all knowledge of the transaction; but when the house was searched, the young lady was found, and conducted back to her father. The sad procession reached the Golden Gate, and gained the road to Selymbria, where it was joined by the Patriarch, now travelling forth, like a true apostle, without attendants and sumpter-mules, and as destitute as the rest of his companions. The exiles reached Selymbria in safety; but the people generally treated their sufferings with derision, which galled them even more than the insolence of the Franks¹.

The financial oppression of the Byzantine government, the vices of the court, and the crimes of the recent emperors, were attributed by the people to the meanness and rapacity of the nobility and dignified clergy, who upheld the vicious fabric of the imperial administration for their own profit. The people, therefore, expressed their satisfaction in rude terms when they saw princes, patriarchs, and senators, reduced to the state of poverty in which they were themselves living. The calamity appeared to them an equitable dispensation of Divine justice. Nor was this judgment confined to the lower classes; on the contrary, it was the deliberate opinion of many Greeks throughout the provinces that the ruin of the Byzantine empire was caused by the base complicity of the senate and the clergy in all the abuses and rapacity which had disgraced the public administration since the death of Manuel I. Nicetas complains bitterly of the injustice of this opinion, and endeavours to throw the blame of the taking of Constantinople on the cowardice of the troops and the worthlessness of their officers; but it is certain that the civil government was more to blame than the troops for the fall of the empire².

¹ Nicetas retired to Nicaea, and occupied an honourable position at the court of Theodore I. (Lascaris). Several of his orations and letters exist in MS. at Venice, the publication of which might throw some additional light on the state of society, the history, and the chronology of the empire, from the accession of Isaac II. to the middle of the reign of Theodore I. *Graeci Codices Manuscripti apud Nanios patricios Venetas asservati, descripti a J. Aloysio Mingarellio*. Bononiae, 1784, 4to., p. 462.

² Nicetas, 382, 415. The description Nicetas gives of the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, Thomas Morosini, is amusing. It shows the violence of his indignation, and the impression produced on the Greeks by the appearance of the Catholic clergy. He says Morosini was a man of moderate stature, with

The first care of the victors was to divide the plunder accumulated in the three churches they had selected for magazines. Sacred plate, golden crowns, images of saints, shrines of relics, candelabra of precious metals, statues of ancient gods, precious ornaments of Hellenic art and of Byzantine jewellery, were heaped up with coined money from the imperial treasury, and with silk, velvet, embroidered tissues, and jewels, collected from the warehouses of merchants, from the shops of goldsmiths, and by domestic spoliation. The booty, in spite of fraud, concealment, waste, and conflagration, amounted to three hundred thousand marks of silver, besides ten thousand horses and mules which had belonged to the cavalry or the imperial stables¹. Baldwin of Flanders, the future emperor, declares that the riches of Constantinople equalled the accumulated wealth of all western Europe². The spoil was first divided into two equal parts, and the Crusaders then paid the Venetians from their portion the sum of fifty thousand marks, according to the original convention concluded at Venice. The remaining one hundred thousand marks were divided in the following proportion: each horseman received double the share of a foot-soldier, and each knight double the share of a horseman³. The small difference between the shares of a common soldier and a knight proves that the feudal militia of this expedition, which was a fair type of the military force of the age in western Europe, consisted of men in a higher social rank than those who form our modern armies. It was necessary to be born a gentleman in order to be a soldier in the twelfth century; and as great physical powers and long practice alone could enable a man to move with activity under the weight of the armour then worn, the power of raising recruits was restricted to a much smaller proportion of the population

a fat body, like that of a well-fed pig; he was dressed in a habit that fitted so tightly that he appeared to have been sewed up in it; both his beard and head were shaved, and the latter was as round as a bullet.

¹ Villehardouin, 101, edit. Buchon. The edition of Ducange says four hundred thousand marks.

² Baldwin's letters of similar tenor, addressed to Pope Innocent III., to the whole Christian world (Reusner, *Epistolae Turcicae*, i. 24), and to the Cistercian chapter. D'Outremann, *Constantinopolis Belgica*, 712.

³ In a MS. published by Buchon, as an appendix to *Le Livre de la Conquête de la Princesse de la Morée*, it is said that each knight received twenty marks (p. 491). A mark was then equal to a pound weight of silver.

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than it is in our days, when scientific manœuvres and distant artillery do much of the work formerly achieved by the personal courage and the strong arm of the combatants¹.

On the 9th of May, Baldwin, count of Flanders, was elected Emperor of the East, and the sceptre passed from the Greeks to the Belgians. The personal character of Baldwin, his military accomplishments, his youth, power, and virtue, all pointed him out as the leader most likely to enjoy a long and prosperous reign. His piety and the purity of his private life commanded the respect of the Greeks, who vainly hoped to enjoy peace under his government. He was one of the few Crusaders who paid strict attention to his vows of abstinence; and a singular proclamation, which he thought it necessary to repeat twice a-week, forbidding all who were guilty of incontinency to sleep within the walls of his palace, shows that he knew the majority of his companions easily forgot their vows². The connection of the Belgians with the French, and the little jealousy entertained by the Venetians for a sovereign whose hereditary dominions were so far distant from the possessions of the republic, contributed to the preference of Baldwin.

Two of the fugitive Byzantine emperors, Alexius III. and Alexius Murtzuphlos, wandered about in Macedonia, with little hope of finding partisans disposed to join their cause. Murtzuphlos joined his father-in-law, hoping by their united influence to assemble an army capable of preventing the Crusaders from reaching Thessalonica. But Alexius III. feared his son-in-law on account of his military talents, and contrived to seize him and have his eyes put out. The unfortunate Murtzuphlos was soon taken prisoner by the Crusaders, who carried him to Constantinople, and tried him for the murder of Alexius IV. Murtzuphlos pleaded that the young Alexius had been deposed and condemned as a traitor by a lawful assembly; but the Crusaders found him guilty, and ordered him to be executed in a singular manner. The last of the Byzantine emperors was precipitated from the top of a column in the Tauros, one of the

¹ In ancient times, the rank of men and officers was very similar. Xenophon mentions that the captains received double the pay of the hoplites, and the generals quadruple. *Cyri Exped.* vii. 6. 1. The modern scale of pay is very different.

² Nicetas, 384.

principal squares in the capital, and was dashed to pieces on the pavement of the city¹. Alexius III. fled as the Crusaders advanced. To gain a new ally, he bestowed the accommodating Eudocia in marriage on Leo Sguros, who occupied a great part of Greece; but when that chief was defeated by the Marquess of Montferrat, Alexius submitted to the conqueror, and received a pension. But his ambition prevented his remaining long quiet, while his cowardice and incapacity rendered all his efforts to recover power abortive. He soon fled from the protection of the Marquess, and joined Michael, despot of Epirus, by whom he expected to be acknowledged as emperor. Disappointed in his hopes and strictly watched by the suspicious despot, he repaired as a suppliant to the court of Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou II., sultan of Iconium, where he had formerly received much kindness when an exile. The power which Theodore Lascaris had acquired at Nicaea excited his envy, though Theodore was the husband of his daughter Anna, and he persuaded the Sultan to aid him in dethroning his son-in-law. But after a short contest, Theodore defeated the Sultan, and Alexius who was taken prisoner was shut up in a monastery, where he passed the remainder of his life, universally despised as a worthless and cowardly emperor, and detested as an envious and cruel man, utterly void of every feeling of natural affection, honour, or gratitude².

Such was the termination of the Byzantine phase of the Eastern Roman Empire. Many new states were formed from its disjointed members, as had formerly happened at the fall of the Empire of the West. Three of these assumed the rank of empires, and the Belgian Emperor of Constantinople found himself compelled to dispute the honour of representing the Roman Empire of the East with two Greek sovereigns, who assumed the imperial title at Nicaea and at Trebizond. Most of the European provinces were subjected to a new code of laws, and were forced to adopt new habits and manners. The feudal system was imposed on Greece

¹ Nicetas, 392. For some distance he fell in an upright position; he then turned over on his head, and at last came to the ground by falling on his side. [For the supposed oracle of Leo the Philosopher relating to this event, see above, vol. ii. p. 259 *note*. Ed.]

² Nicetas, 392; Acropolita, 6; Nicephorus Gregoras, 12.

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by its conquerors, and a considerable portion of the Hellenic race never again recovered its independence; but when the power of its feudal princes and other masters, Venetians, Genoese, and Knights of St. John, declined, it passed under the dominion of the Othoman Turks. The Greek emperor of Nicaea, even after he had expelled the Belgian emperor from Constantinople, never extended his power over more than a moiety of the Greek nation. The Greek empire of Constantinople was only a counterfeit representation of its Byzantine predecessor, in the same manner as the empire of Charlemagne formed a mere nominal revival of that of Rome. But more instruction would be derived from an accurate description of the different conditions of society presented by the Romans at the dissolution of the Western Empire in the fifth century, and by the Greeks at the conquest of the Eastern Empire in the thirteenth, than by tracing analogies which naturally occurred at the dissolution of two states long governed by the same principles of policy and jurisprudence.

The task here assumed is confined to a more restricted field. It will be enough to recapitulate the principal causes which produced the ruin of the Byzantine empire, and to indicate the various influences that operated in transforming the spirit of universality, which characterized the government of the Iconoclast emperors, into the confined Greek nationality that displayed itself under the houses of Comnenos and Angelos. A great modification in the official establishment of the empire took place by the consolidation of arbitrary power in the hands of the Basilian dynasty. The arbitrary nature of the executive power, as then exercised, circumscribed the class from which the higher officials in the administration were selected, and robbed intellectual cultivation, scientific knowledge, and long experience of the guarantees they previously possessed for attaining high rank in the public service. Courtly privileges, political ignorance, decreased communications, restricted ideas, the decay of internal trade, and a stationary condition of the people, soon proclaimed the decline of society. We are apt to feel surprised that ancient nations submitted tamely to the severe oppression under which they are recorded to have bowed for many successive generations. A careful consideration of the constitution of society, that arose out of the existence of slavery,

explains this submission. The slaves at Constantinople, as in ancient Rome, were very numerous; many were as well educated as their masters, and mingled habitually with the highest ranks of society. To a large body of these slaves, therefore, the feelings of every class, the extent of popular grievances, the strength of rival factions, and the resources of the central executive power, were as well known as to the greater part of the free population. The mass of slaves lived in perpetual hostility to the existing order of things, ready to seize any opportunity that might present itself for effecting a social revolution; nor would leaders have been wanting among the slaves themselves, had a favourable moment been found. The free citizens knew the danger in which they lived, and hence their political conduct was fettered by perpetual bonds: they feared an insurrection of their slaves more than the arbitrary power of their emperors.

It may be asserted without hesitation, that the first irremediable injury inflicted on the Byzantine government was the corruption of the administration of justice by ignorant and venal courtiers, whom the Basilian emperors intrusted with the exercise of arbitrary power. The immense influence of the Byzantine judicial system, in maintaining order and activity throughout all ranks of society, is apt to be overlooked, because it was never fully appreciated by contemporary historians. Its social power may be justly estimated by reflecting that the Byzantine law approached much nearer to the principles of equity than the Eastern Church did to the principles of Christianity. As soon as judicial functions were ill performed, general civilization declined. The people, finding that justice was prostituted, and that there was no hope of reforming the administration, ceased to respect the central authority, and the great moral tie which had attached the inhabitants of the provinces to the emperors was broken. A practical separation of the interests of different nations and territories ensued; and the first manifest sign of the weakness of the empire was a marked change in the relations of those provinces which possessed a national character to the central government. The operation of fiscal oppression in separating every subject race except the Greek from the government has been fully treated in the preceding pages. The Armenians, Cappadocians, Cilicians, Bulgarians, Slavonians,

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Vallachians, and Albanians were, one after the other, driven to assert their independence; and the supremacy of the Hellenic race in the Byzantine empire, which may be dated from the extinction of the Basilian dynasty, prepared the way for internal revolutions and foreign conquest. The other nations struggled to preserve their independence; the Greeks bartered theirs for official and ecclesiastical power.

The decline of the Byzantine empire must also be considered as closely connected with the identification of the Greek church with the Roman administration. This union of the ecclesiastical with the civil government may be also dated from the last years of the Basilian dynasty. It was consummated after the complete schism of the Greek and Latin churches in 1053, which was unfortunately effected by the Patriarch Michael Keroularios, with a degree of violence that implanted a deep hatred in the breasts of the priesthood of the rival sects. By this union of the ecclesiastical with the political administration, the power and influence of the Greek aristocracy was greatly extended and strengthened, but the spirit of the government was rendered more exclusive and bigoted. The Byzantine emperors, as they identified the ecclesiastical with the civil administration, always held the Eastern clergy in a state of abject dependence on the imperial power. They used the church as a ministerial department of government for the religious affairs and the education of the people. So that, when the loss of Sicily and Italy and the hostility of Armenia excluded men of education belonging to these countries from the higher ecclesiastical charges at Constantinople, the general ignorance of the other subject races threw every ecclesiastical office into the hands of the Greeks, who converted the Oriental Church into a national monopoly. From that period the administration of public affairs displayed an excess of bigotry from which it had been generally free in preceding ages. The union of the church and state grew constantly more intimate, and the Greeks, having no rivals in official power, became more blindly prepossessed in favour of their own national prejudices and ecclesiastical practices. This combination of religion with politics has ever since proved a misfortune to the Greek race. During the latter years of the Byzantine empire it prevented the people from learning those new social and religious ideas

which were beginning to enlarge the intelligence and the energies of the people in western Europe. The religious hatred with which the Greeks regarded every nation that acknowledged the papal supremacy led them to reject many social, political, and ecclesiastical reforms that originated in Catholic countries. The twelfth century did much to improve the condition of the Western nations, but nothing to improve that of the Greeks. The consequence was that the arbitrary power of the Byzantine emperors was exercised without any civil or ecclesiastical restraint; for the Greeks repudiated every principle of civil liberty, and every ecclesiastical declaration in favour of the rights of humanity, as heretical and revolutionary innovations introduced by the popes to further their own ambitious projects. It must be remembered that the papal church was at this time often actively engaged in defending freedom, in establishing a machinery for the systematic administration of justice to the people, and in impressing men with the full value of fixed laws for the purpose of restraining the abuses of the temporal power of princes. In short, the papal church was then the great teacher of social and political reform, and those who scorned to listen to its words and study its policy could hardly perceive the changes which time was producing in the Christian world. The Byzantine Greeks always rejected the idea of progress; the papal church gave a progressive impulse to the Christian mind, which it did not think of arresting until a century or two later. The Greeks prided themselves on their conservative, or, as they called it, their Roman spirit. By clinging superstitiously to antiquated formulas, they rejected the means of repairing a ruinous political fabric, and refused to better their condition by entering on paths of reform indicated by the Western nations, who were already emerging from their social degradation. While the rest of Europe was actively striving to attain a happier future, the Greeks were gazing backward on what they considered a more glorious past. This habit of appropriating to themselves the vanished glories of the Roman empire, or of ancient Greece, created a feeling of self-sufficiency which repudiated reform in the latter days of the Byzantine empire, and which has ever since retarded the progress of the modern Greeks in the career of European civilization.

BOOK FOURTH.

GREEK EMPIRE OF NICAËA AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

A. D. 1204-1453.

CHAPTER I.

EMPIRE OF NICAËA, A. D. 1204-1261.

SECT. I.—*Reign of Theodore I. (Lascaris)*, A. D. 1204-1222.

State of society among the Greek population at the time of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders.—Pretenders to the empire.—Progress of Theodore I.—War with the Crusaders.—Wars with rivals.—Communications with Pope Innocent III.—War with the Sultan of Iconium.—War with the Emperor Henry.—Death and character of Theodore I.

THE taking of Constantinople filled the Greek population in all the provinces of the Byzantine empire with wonder and alarm. The national existence was bound up with the central government, so that the loss of the capital seemed to imply the ruin of all the institutions under which they had hitherto lived. The future threatened them with individual ruin as well as political anarchy, even if they escaped foreign conquest. Yet even at this crisis of the national fate the people made no exertions to reform the vices which degraded their character and paralyzed their exertions. No attempt was made to circumscribe the arbitrary conduct of the court, or restore vigour to the old scheme of systematic administration; nothing was done to correct ecclesiastical abuses in the church, to improve the courts of law, to abolish the monopolies that ruined native industry, or to invigorate the municipal institutions which could alone breathe energy into the

mass of the population. The news that a Belgian emperor ruled in Constantinople spread from Dyrrachium to Trebizond without rousing a single citizen to step forward as the defender of the rights of the Greek nation. Much political disorder was caused by the avarice and ambition of Greek nobles, but no anarchy occurred from the populace endeavouring to deprive the ruling classes of any of the powers which for several generations they had grossly abused. So completely had the court, the administration, the clergy, and the lawyers perverted the judgment and feelings of the whole Greek population, that the fabric of the imperial government continued to stand though its foundations were destroyed, its vitality decayed, and its judicial efficacy corrupted. The civil and military governors of provinces, the judges, intendants, and collectors of taxes, continued to pursue their ordinary course of action, in alliance with the bishops and clergy, until they were driven from their posts by the conquering Latins, or summoned to yield their places to the representatives of a new emperor. Never was the national imbecility which arises from the want of municipal institutions and executive activity in local spheres more apparent. Had the towns, cities, corporations, districts, and provinces, inhabited by a Greek population, possessed magistrates responsible to the people and accustomed to independent action, there can be no doubt that thousands of Greek citizens would have rushed forward to defend their country against the Crusaders and the Venetians, and that they would have soon reformed the abuses which rendered the empires of Constantinople and Trebizond fearful examples of the degraded condition into which a civilized Christian society may sink. A sense of national independence and a spirit of liberty might have infused themselves into the hearts of the Greek people, and the empire of Constantinople might then have shared with the Western nations the task of advancing the progress of Christian civilization. But the Greeks at this critical conjuncture proved incapable of making any intellectual exertion; they had long ceased to reason on politics; national feeling and political intelligence were dormant in their souls, and they submitted blindly to any sovereign who seized the reins of government, whether a foreigner or a native.

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The great catastrophe, which had fallen alike on every class of society, ought certainly to have suggested to the Greek statesmen of the period the importance of identifying the feelings and interests of the whole free population with the cause of the government. We know that these men were in the habit of reading Thucydides and Plato. In the works they have left us, we find them so often aping the style of the ancients that we feel disgusted when we discover they paid little attention to their thoughts. The value of the study of the classics to form or improve the mind was then, as it is now, very much overrated. Experience shows that it is almost as likely to produce learned pedants as accomplished scholars; for unless there be a basis of mental education very different from that which is acquired through books, learning cannot produce statesmen. The Greeks are not the only people among whom the study of classical literature has produced no practical improvement in political knowledge. Yet every one must admit that the study of the republican literature of the ancients bears that deep impression of truth which cannot fail to enlarge the intellectual vision and purify the taste of those who examine its records with minds already familiar with the principles of civil liberty and political order. England certainly ought never to forget that many of her best patriots and greatest statesmen have imbibed in the study of classic literature increased devotion to those liberal and philanthropic ideas which enabled them to improve the prospects of the human race; and their names, whether they belong to the seventeenth or the nineteenth century, will go down to future ages with as pure and as great a fame as the greatest in the annals of Greece and Rome. But the minds of these men were formed by their domestic education and native institutions; they were only improved and matured by classic studies.

Unfortunately for the Greek race, their teachers and their rulers never felt that the people had an inalienable right to the impartial administration of justice. The government of the Byzantine empire considered that the very basis of its existence was the absolute submission of the people; it regarded all popular rights and municipal authority as incompatible with a strong central power.

There was also a material obstacle to any general action of

the Greek nation at the time of the conquest of Constantinople. Civilization had already declined to such a degree that communications between distant portions of the nation were becoming rare. Monopolies and privileges had thrown commerce into the hands of strangers. No ties of common interests or feelings bound distant localities together, unless with the fetters of political despotism and ecclesiastical bigotry. Little was to be gained or hoped for by the people beyond the narrow sphere in which they lived. The emperors were prompt to avail themselves of this state of things, and easily attached the wealthiest men in each district to their service. The profits of imperial oppression were shared with these provincial nobles and archonts. Such was the state of society when the foundations of the empire of Nicaea were laid.

The rebellion of powerful nobles was a chronic disease of Byzantine society, and even amidst the calamities of their country many members of the aristocracy thought more of their own projects of ambition than of their duties to their country. The provinces were consequently soon filled with pretenders to the empire. The two fugitive emperors, whose fates have been recorded at the close of the preceding book, Alexius III. and Alexius V., attempted to preserve some power in Macedonia. Theodore Lascaris, who had been acknowledged emperor after the flight of Alexius V., escaped to Bithynia, where he assumed the direction of the central government, contenting himself for the moment with the title of Despot, and appearing as the representative or colleague of his worthless father-in-law Alexius III. As the news of the taking of Constantinople spread, fresh pretenders to the throne sprang up, and many nobles who had been preparing to render themselves independent from the first appearance of the Crusaders, assumed the rank of sovereign princes without claiming the title of Emperor. In Europe, Leo Sgueros, the governor of Nauplia and Argos, endeavoured to render himself master of all Greece; but his career of ambition was soon terminated by the conquests of the Crusaders. On the other hand, Michael Angelos Comnenos laid the foundations of an independent principality in Epirus, which successfully resisted the Crusaders, and defended its independence against the Greek emperors of Nicaea and Constantinople for several generations. In Asia Minor, Theodore Mankaphas, who had

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assumed the title of Emperor during the reign of Isaac II., again claimed the empire at Philadelphia, and Manuel Maurozomes rendered himself master of the upper valley of the Maeander. But the great rival who disputed the empire of the East with Theodore Lascaris was Alexios Comnenos, the founder of the empire of Trebizond. He claimed the throne as the legal heir of the house of Comnenos. The tyranny of his grandfather, Andronicus I., was perhaps forgotten in the provinces. The life of his father, Manuel, the eldest son of Andronicus, had been sacrificed to confer the throne on the worthless family of Angelos, and the memory of that father's virtues and orthodoxy were doubtless loudly celebrated by the partisans of his son¹. The calamities of the empire afforded the young Alexios a fair opportunity for stepping forward in its defence, as no one could advance a more legitimate claim to the vacant throne. With the assistance of a corps of Iberian mercenaries he occupied Trebizond, and all the coast of Pontus and Paphlagonia soon acknowledged his authority.

Future events could alone determine to whom the empire would ultimately fall. The good fortune of Theodore I., joined to his prudence and valour, contributed much more than his election in the Church of St. Sophia to fix the crown on his head. When he fled from Constantinople, he presented himself at the gates of Nicaea, into which he demanded admittance as the representative of his father-in-law, the dethroned Emperor Alexius III. The inhabitants, who hated Alexius, refused to admit Theodore within their walls, but allowed his wife Anna to seek shelter in their city. They were perhaps doubtful whether it would not be more for their advantage to submit to the Crusaders than to acknowledge a cowardly and rapacious emperor like Alexius III. Theodore retired to the fastnesses of Mount Olympus, where he assembled a considerable body of troops, and many of the fugitives who had fled from Constantinople. Several fortified towns in Bithynia submitted to his authority; and when it became known that the Latins confiscated a considerable part of the landed property in all their conquests, the inhabitants

¹ Manuel had refused to marry Agnes of France, the widow of Alexius II., as they were too nearly allied, according to the canons of the Greek church. His father disinherited him, and, as has been said, married young Agnes himself.

of Asia Minor willingly placed themselves under his protection.

Theodore I. fought his way to the crown by his indefatigable exertions in opposing the progress of the Crusaders. Before the end of the year 1204, Louis, count of Blois, who had been created Duke of Nicaea, and received Bithynia as his share in the partition of the empire, sent an army, headed by one hundred knights, to take possession of his duchy. This force landed at Pegae, occupied Panormus, and marched into the interior until it encountered the troops of Theodore at Poimanenos. The Greeks were still incapable of sustaining the charge of the Western cavalry, and the Crusaders gained a complete victory. Poimanenos and Lopadion were taken, and Prusa was besieged. The position of Prusa (of which the walls may still be seen on a rocky ridge overlooking the romantic Turkish city of Brusa) was then strong; and as it was defended with constancy, the assailants were compelled to retire with loss. But another division of the Crusaders occupied the strong, rich, and important city of Nicomedia, which the Greeks did not attempt to defend. Their active enemies immediately repaired the ruined and dismantled fortifications¹.

During the same autumn, Henry of Flanders, the Emperor Baldwin's brother, landed with his Belgian knights at Abydos, and occupied all the Troad. In this operation he was assisted by a colony of Armenians, established in this district by the Byzantine emperors. These Armenians were treated by the Greek civil and military authorities with that bigotry and oppression which had often driven the subjects of the Byzantine empire, not of the Greek race, into open rebellion. They now submitted to the Crusaders, in the hope of escaping from the sufferings under which they had long groaned. From Abydos, Henry marched to Adramyttium, where he met with no resistance, and the conquest of the Troad and the whole of the rich province between the Hellespont and the Adramyttian gulf was completed without loss. Theodore Mankaphas, who had assumed the imperial title at Philadelphia, deemed it his duty to oppose the progress of the Belgian chiefs. He led a body of Asiatic troops to encounter the

¹ Villehardouin, 126, 129, 131, edit. Ducange; Nicetas, 388.

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lances of the Crusaders, but he was easily defeated by Henry of Flanders.

Henry's career of conquest was suddenly cut short by an order to join his brother, the Emperor Baldwin, at Adrianople, with all his disposable force, in order to encounter Joannice, king of Bulgaria. The Armenians of the Troad, fearing the vengeance of the Greeks after the departure of the Belgian troops, emigrated, under the protection of Henry's army, with the intention of settling among their countrymen who were established at Philippopolis. A colony of twenty thousand souls crossed the Hellespont ; but Henry, receiving the news of his brother's defeat and captivity, hastened forward with his cavalry to assemble and protect the fugitives who had escaped from the battle of Adrianople. A body of Armenian infantry remained to escort the long train of waggons, loaded with the families and goods of the emigrants. The Greek troops and the armed bands of countrymen, who were kept in constant agitation by the disturbed condition of the country, soon found themselves sufficiently numerous to form a plan for plundering the property of the Armenians. A general attack was made on the colonists ; the escort was separated from the baggage, and the waggons were pillaged. The women and children were reduced to slavery, the unarmed emigrants were slaughtered, and this industrious colony was utterly exterminated, sharing the fate of everything practically useful in the Eastern Empire. Thus the Greeks and Crusaders emulated one another in exterminating the inhabitants of the country they aspired to rule ; and the numbers of mankind in all the provinces they governed diminished as rapidly as the wealth and civilization of the people declined¹.

The valour and prudence displayed by Theodore Lascaris induced the authorities of Nicaea to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and that city became the point where all the most eminent of the Greek aristocracy and clergy assembled to oppose the progress of the Latins. The primary step towards re-establishing the unity of the imperial administration

¹ The conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders coincides with an era of general decline in the wellbeing, and consequently in the numbers of mankind throughout the East. While the Crusaders ravaged Syria and Greece, the Mongols laid waste Bokhara and Samarcand, and Genghis Khan took Pekin in the year 1215.

was to ratify the election of Theodore in the most solemn manner, and thus give him a decided pre-eminence over all his rivals. To do this, it was necessary that he should be the first to receive the imperial crown from the hands of the Patriarch. Alexius V. had been slain by the Crusaders; Alexius III. was at this time a prisoner in the kingdom of Thessalonica. The Patriarch John Kamateros, who retired with Nicetas to Selymbria, had settled at Didymoteichos; and when he was now requested to visit Nicaea, in order to resume his patriarchal functions and place the crown on the head of Theodore Lascaris, he preferred resigning his office to quitting his retirement. A new patriarch, Michael Autorianos, was elected his successor about two years after the taking of Constantinople, and one of his first public acts was to place the imperial crown on the head of Theodore I. with as much pomp and ceremony as if the scene had been acted in St. Sophia's (A.D. 1206)¹.

The enemies of Theodore continued to attack his little empire with vigour, though the victory of the King of Bulgaria over the Emperor of Constantinople relieved him for a time from his greatest danger. David Comnenos, the brother of Alexius, emperor of Trebizond, invaded Bithynia, captured Heracleia, and was so elated with his success that he sent forward his army under Synadenos to occupy Nicaea and drive Theodore from the throne. Lascaris encountered Synadenos on the banks of the Sangarius, and completely defeated the Iberians of Comnenos. He was equally successful in the south-west. Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou, who was under great obligations to Alexius III., occupied the throne of Iconium; and while Lascaris appeared to be too weak to be dangerous and only acted as despot in the name of his father-in-law, the sultan favoured his progress. The power of the Seljouks was threatened both by the conquests of the Crusaders and the rapid progress of the young Emperor of Trebizond. But as soon as Theodore was firmly established on the throne, Kaikhosrou sought for a weaker ally. He gave his daughter in marriage to Manuel Maurozomes, and supplied that pretender with Turkish auxiliaries to attack

¹ Cuper, *De Patriarchis Constantinopol.* 146, 153, edit. Venet. The commencement of the reign of Theodore I. is always reckoned from his election at Constantinople in 1204. Boivin's note to Nicephorus Gregoras, 749, edit. Paris.

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Lascaris. The Turks of Maurozomes were defeated as well as the Iberians of Comnenos. Theodore Mankaphas was also compelled to lay aside the imperial title for the second time, and Sabas, the governor of Amisos, who had defended his independence against the Emperor of Trebizond, acknowledged the nominal supremacy of the Emperor of Nicaea. Theodore I. was consequently enabled to re-establish the old imperial administration of the whole country, from the mouth of the Sangarius to the sources of the Rhyndacus and the Maeander¹.

The difficulties in which the empire of Nicaea was placed by its geographical position were very great. It was open to the invasion of all its enemies; hostile princes occupied all its frontiers, and its friends and allies were far distant. David Comnenos, after the defeat of his army on the banks of the Sangarius, concluded a treaty of alliance with Henry, the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, from whom he received a body of knights and men-at-arms. To obtain this succour he engaged to become a vassal of the Latin empire for a part of the territory he had previously governed in the name of his brother Alexios, the Emperor of Trebizond. No step could have proved more advantageous to Theodore than this close alliance of his principal rival with the detested Latins. Nicaea was now the residence of the Greek Patriarch, and all the most distinguished members of the Greek church had already attached themselves to his cause. The clergy in the western part of Asia Minor were driven, from fear of the extension of the Latin power through the desertion of David Comnenos, to rally round their Patriarch; and the authority of the bishops, which was not inconsiderable in civil affairs, was universally employed to maintain a political connection with the empire of Nicaea as the centre of orthodoxy. The auxiliary force sent to the aid of David enabled him to take the offensive; but Theodore proved again victorious. A chosen body of three hundred Latin cavalry, with all its followers, was cut to pieces in the forests near the Sangarius, and David was compelled to shut himself up in Heracleia. Theodore even hoped to revenge himself on the Latins, for the assistance they had granted to Comnenos, by conquering Pegae. He

¹ Nicetas, 403; Acropolita, 6.

gained possession of that fortress; but it was recovered by the Latins, who then invaded Bithynia at several points, in order to complete the subjugation of the fiefs which had been assigned to them at the partition of the Byzantine empire. Their forces were led by one hundred and forty knights, each of whom expected to gain a barony. One division occupied Cyzicus, and, by repairing its ruined walls, converted it into a citadel for storing provisions and plunder. Another division fortified the Church of St. Sophia, built by Constantine the Great near Nicomedia, in order that it might serve as a fort to command the rich adjacent plain; from which we may infer that the citadel and town could not be rendered defensible on account of their extent. A third division seized the castle of Charax, on the southern coast of the Gulf of Nicomedia, from which there was a direct road to Nicaea; while the remainder of the expedition established itself at Kivotos, a port which afforded easy communications both with Nicaea and Prusa¹. Theodore, alarmed at these preparations for assailing his power at its centre simultaneously from various points of attack, concluded an alliance with the King of Bulgaria, who, as soon as he was informed that the greater part of the Latin troops had passed over into Asia, laid siege to Adrianople, while his allies, the Komans, ravaged the open country to the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

This invasion compelled Henry to recall a strong body of troops from Asia, and Theodore availed himself of the weakness of the garrisons of Cyzicus and Kivotos to attack both places at the same time. He already possessed a fleet of sixty vessels, so that he was able to press the attack on Kivotos with vigour both by sea and land. The place was defended by forty knights, with their followers, but its walls were in a ruinous condition, and it was ill supplied with provisions. The Emperor Henry was sitting at dinner in the great hall of the palace of Blachern, when a courier suddenly entered, and exclaimed—‘Sire, unless the knights at Kivotos receive immediate assistance, the place will be taken, and

¹ Kivotos, the ancient Kios or Cius, is called Civitot by the Latin historians of the Crusaders. Its modern name is Ghiumlek. It was repaired by Alexius I., who established in it a colony of Anglo-Danes, driven from England by the Normans. Ducange, Notes to Villehardouin, 351.

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they will all be slain!' The Belgian emperor, with that promptitude which enabled him to sustain with glory the ill-constructed fabric of the Latin empire of Constantinople, rose from table and instantly embarked with all the troops he could assemble, and put to sea. Heralds were left to proclaim that Kivotos required immediate succour, and that every vassal of the empire must follow the emperor's banner. When the sun rose, Henry was sailing up the gulf to Kivotos, attended by the Marshal Villehardouin, Miles of Brabant, and seventeen Venetian and Pisan galleys. The Greek fleet was more numerous, but the Latins advanced to attack it; and the Greeks manœuvred so long, in order to gain an advantage of wind which would enable them to prevent their enemy reaching Kivotos, that fresh ships joined the emperor, and they declined an engagement. Henry, however, found the fortifications of Kivotos in such a dilapidated condition, that he thought it prudent to dismantle the place entirely and carry off the garrison.

Theodore, having thus driven the Latins from Kivotos, distracted their attention by attacking Cyzicus and Nicomedia. Thierry de Los, a knight of high reputation, was defeated and taken prisoner near Nicomedia by Constantine Lascaris, the emperor's brother; and Henry was again compelled to appear in person in the field, though his presence was equally necessary in the north in order to save Adrianople from the Bulgarians. Four times he had been on the eve of his departure for that city, and four times his march had been adjourned by disasters of the Latin arms in different quarters. Theodore, well informed of all his enemy's difficulties, proposed to conclude a truce for two years, on condition that the fortifications of Cyzicus and St. Sophia's of Nicomedia should be destroyed, and in return he offered to release all his prisoners, among whom were some knights of high rank. The necessity of hastening with all his troops to save Adrianople compelled Henry and his barons to accept these terms, and Theodore was put in possession of Cyzicus and Nicomedia (A.D. 1207)¹.

Theodore had still much to fear from the valour and restlessness of the Western nations. It was therefore for his

¹ These events are recounted by Villehardouin with precision and simplicity, pp. 192-203, edit. Ducange.

interest to obtain a permanent treaty of peace, and such a treaty could only be obtained by the influence of the Pope. Theodore addressed a letter to Pope Innocent III. for this purpose, and it contains as strong a proof of the power enjoyed by that celebrated pontiff as any of the acts of arbitration he exercised in the West. Many Latin adventurers paid no attention to the truce concluded with the Emperor Henry. They arrogated to themselves the right of private war, and plundered the Greek territories wherever the country offered a defenceless prey to their avarice. The Latin emperor had no power to restrain these disorders, for all the Greeks who adhered to their national church had been declared to be in a state of perpetual vassalage by papal authority, so that every adventurer was entitled to constitute himself their immediate superior under the Pope as lord paramount. In this state of things, Theodore invited the Pope to conclude a permanent peace, on the basis that the Latins should possess all the European provinces of the Byzantine empire, and recognize the right of the Greeks to the undisturbed dominion over those in Asia.

The Emperor Henry refused to conclude a permanent treaty on this basis, as it would have given the Emperor of Nicaea a decided superiority over all his Greek rivals; and there could be no doubt that, as soon as he had consolidated a strong power, no stipulations would prevent the Greeks from attempting to regain possession of all the country conquered by the Crusaders. Henry considered, likewise, that it was a duty he owed to the Catholic faith, to the Pope as the spiritual suzerain of the Christian world, to his own fame, and to his position as Emperor of Constantinople, to complete the conquest of the Eastern Empire. Theodore must, consequently, have been well aware that there was little probability of his receiving any assistance from the Pope, as the conclusion of a permanent treaty could not fail to oppose a barrier against the extension of the papal power in the East. The reply of Innocent informed Theodore that the Pope was more hostile than he had supposed. The letter was addressed to the honourable Theodore Lascaris, and thus commenced with a denial of his claim to the title of Emperor¹.

¹ *Innocentii III. Epistolae*, ii. 158, edit. Baluze. The date is A.D. 1208. It is interesting to compare this letter with that to the Latin patriarch Morosini (ii.

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It is a curious document, inasmuch as it proves how little influence pure morality and true religion exercised on the political views of this celebrated Pope. Innocent does not pretend to deny the atrocities committed by his Crusaders at Constantinople; and as it was his duty to establish peace, he promised to send a legate into the East for that purpose; but he requires Theodore to take the cross and join the Crusaders in Palestine, while he insults him with the demand that he should acknowledge himself the vassal of the Latin empire of Romania. The great Pope continues, in a style of bigotry which it is the fashion to ridicule when employed by more vulgar fanatics: 'The Greeks having rent asunder the garment of Christ, God has doubtless made use of the Latins as an instrument to punish them for their crime. The judgments of God are always just, and He frequently punishes evil by the agency of wicked men.' The solicitations of the Greek emperor to obtain peace through the mediation of the high priest of the Western Christians produced no result but a recommendation to become the vassal of a Belgian count.

Theodore employed the leisure afforded him by the truce in extending his dominions in Asia, where his prudence gave his subjects a degree of security which induced many voluntarily to acknowledge his authority, and enabled him to extend his empire from Paphlagonia to Caria. His prosperity excited the jealousy of Kaikhosrou, the sultan of Iconium, to whose court, as has been already mentioned, the Emperor Alexius III. had fled; and that envious and restless prince was as eager to dethrone his son-in-law as the sultan was to gain possession of the Greek dominions. When the truce with the Latin empire expired, the sultan, who feared the energy and activity of Theodore, strengthened himself by an alliance with the Catholic Emperor of Constantinople. Though the Latins made it a standing reproach to the Greeks, that the Eastern Christians were ever ready to become the allies of the Turks, they showed no aversion to the practice themselves whenever it served their interest.

494). Innocent employed the crusades as an instrument for increasing the temporal power of the See of Rome, and he hated the Greeks because they had little reverence for either crusades or popes. Hurter, *Innocent III. et son Siècle*, trad. nouvelle, par Jager et Vial, ii. 206.

We owe our knowledge of the present treaty between the Crusaders and the Mohammedans to the Emperor Henry, who, in a public manifesto addressed to the Christian world, speaks of his alliance with the Turkish sultan against the Christian Emperor of Nicaea as an act honourable to a good Catholic¹.

The sultan, before declaring war, sent an embassy to require Theodore to yield the empire to his father-in-law, threatening, in case of refusal, to place Alexius III. on the throne by force of arms. The threat was despised, and the sultan invaded the Greek territory, accompanied by his friend and tool Alexius. Theodore was prepared to meet his enemy. He had engaged a chosen corps of eight hundred Latin cavalry in his service; and after placing a garrison in Philadelphia, he crossed the Cayster on the eleventh day of his march. He pushed rapidly forward into the valley of the Maeander, hoping to surprise the Turkish army while it was occupied in besieging the city of Antiocheia. The rashness of the Latin cavalry favoured his plan, though it nearly caused his defeat. They hurried forward and attacked the Turks without counting the numbers of their enemy; but in spite of the fury of their charge and the weight of their armour, they were overpowered and broken by the squadrons that assailed them on the flanks and in the rear. The greater part were slain, and their defeat spread terror through the ranks of the Greeks. Theodore was compelled in this crisis to cover the retreat of his army at the head of his best soldiers. He was attacked by the sultan in person; and if we can credit the romantic description of the Byzantine historians, a single combat took place between the two sovereigns. Kaikhosrou galloped up to Theodore, and gave him a blow with his sabre on the helmet, which struck him from his saddle to the earth, though it failed to wound him. The sultan shouted to his followers to secure the prisoner; but the emperor, springing up, cut the legs of the sultan's horse so severely that it fell, and threw its master at Theodore's feet, who instantly stabbed him to the heart². The Greek officers who rushed forward

¹ Martenne et Durand, *Thesaurus Nov. Anecdotorum*, i. 821, and in Buchon's edition of Villehardouin, annexed to his *Recherches et Matériaux*, 212.

² Acropolita (9) says Theodore cut off the hind-feet of the sultan's horse. Nicephorus Gregoras (10) says the fore-feet. Compare the dramatic account

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to save their sovereign cut off the sultan's head, and exposed it to the view of the Turkish army, while the retreat of the sultan's guard at the same time spread the news of his death through its ranks. The Turks abandoned the contest, and the emperor entered Antiocheia in triumph, A.D. 1210. Alexius, who fell into the hands of his son-in-law, was confined for the remainder of his life in a monastery, as we have already mentioned. The Empress Euphrosyne, whom he had left behind in Epirus, died shortly after at Arta.

Fortunately for Theodore, the Latin empire of Constantinople was disturbed by the violent conduct of the papal legate Pelagius, who commenced a persecution of the Greeks who refused to acknowledge the papal supremacy. The Emperor Henry interfered to protect those who had entered his service; but many of the clergy and some men of rank fled to Nicaea, where they were kindly received by the Greek emperor, and the animosity of the two churches was greatly increased.

In the year 1214, the war between Henry and Theodore was renewed. Henry crossed the Hellespont at the head of a numerous army, and occupied Poimanenos without resistance; but he was compelled to besiege Lentianes with his whole force, which was courageously defended by the inhabitants, as well as by a regular garrison. The defence was conducted by one of the emperor's brothers, by his son-in-law Andronicos Palaeologos, and by Dermokaïtes, the commander of the garrison. The place was closely invested for forty days, and repeated assaults were made under the eye of Henry. It was not until the water was cut off and a breach effected in the walls that the besiegers were able to force their entrance into the town. Henry was so enraged at the resistance he had

given by Herodotus of a combat between the Persian satrap Artybius and Onesilas of Cyprus, which the Byzantine historians have imitated. Herod. v. 112. Nicephorus Gregoras says the Greek army consisted of only two thousand cavalry, the Turkish of twenty thousand. The Emperor Henry, in the manifesto already mentioned, says the Greeks were more numerous than the Turks. The loss of the Greek army was so great that Henry, when he heard how much Theodore had suffered, exclaimed, 'The Greek is not a conqueror, he is ruined.'

There is an oration of Nicetas to the Emperor Theodore I. on the subject of this combat and the death of the Sultan of Iconium, preserved in manuscript at Venice, which may place the event in its true light. *Graeci Codices MSS. apud Nanios Venetas asservati, descripti a J. Aloysio Mingarellio*, 475; MS. fol. 120; Müller, *Byzantinische Analekten*, 6.

met with, and the loss he had suffered before this insignificant fortress, that he disgraced himself by an act of infamous cruelty. After taking Lentianes, he ordered its brave defenders, Lascaris, Palaeologos, and Dermokaites, to be put to death¹. He persuaded the garrison to enter his service, and united it with the corps of George Theophilopoulos, a Greek general who had joined the Latins. Henry then advanced as far as Nymphaeum; but Theodore, who was sensible of the inferiority of the Greeks in a regular battle, carefully declined an engagement, and confined his operations to the defensive. The campaign ended without any great success on the part of the Latins; and the Greek emperor, hearing that the Despot of Epirus was assailing the European possessions of the Crusaders with great vigour, sent an embassy to Henry to propose a treaty of peace. As the Latin emperor considered his presence necessary in Europe, the terms were easily arranged. The peninsula opposite Constantinople, bounded by a line drawn from the head of the gulf of Nicomedia to the Black Sea, and all the country from the Hellespont as far as the district of Kamina, were to remain in possession of the Latins. The town of Kalamos, which lay between the territory of the Crusaders and the theme of Neokastron, was to remain uninhabited, to mark the frontier of the two empires². The boundaries of the empire of Nicaea now extended from Heracleia on the Black Sea to the head of the Gulf of Nicomedia; from thence it embraced the coast of the Opsikian theme as far as Cyzicus; and then descending to the south, included Pergamus, and joined the coast of the Aegean. Theodore had already extended his power over the valleys of the Hermus, the Cayster, and the Maeander³.

The bad success of all attempts to force the Greeks to conform to the Latin church induced Innocent III. to change his policy. The fourth Lateran council was held in the year 1215, and by it the Latin bishops in the East were authorized to appoint Greek priests to celebrate Divine service and

¹ Acropolita (15) mentions the execution of these brave men without a word of reprobation, as if the act had been authorized by the usages of war.

² Acropolita, 15. Kamina may represent the ancient Kane. Coins with ΚΑΜΗΝΩΝ are attributed to Kane. Compare Strabo, xiii. p. 615, and Hoffmann, *Griechenland und die Griechen im Alterthum*, ii. 1638.

³ Acropolita, 15.

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administer the sacraments in the Greek language ; but these priests were to teach the doctrines of the Church of Rome, and to inculcate papal supremacy. This concession produced more effect than the previous persecution. Many Greeks, who probably considered both the Patriarch and the Pope as having arrogated to themselves a degree of power in ecclesiastical affairs to which they had no valid title, conformed to the Latin rites when they heard the liturgy in Greek ; but, on the other hand, the opposition and hatred of the great mass of the Greek clergy were increased by this insidious attack on their authority. Whenever they regained possession of a church in which a Latin priest had performed mass, they washed the altar and purified the building ; and before they would admit a Latin Christian as a member of their church, they required that he should be baptized a second time. There is an act of the fourth council of the Lateran which reveals the ruinous effect of the feudal government introduced by the Crusaders into a society so differently organized as that in the Byzantine empire. When Richard I. of England conquered the rich island of Cyprus and converted it into a feudal kingdom, it contained fourteen cities, which were bishops' sees ; but so many of these had fallen into decay during the short space of four-and-twenty years, and the position of a Latin bishop was so much more aristocratic than that of a Greek, that the number was reduced to four¹.

The peace between the Greek and Latin empires lasted several years. After the death of Henry in 1216, the Empress Yolande, wife of Peter of Courtenay, acting as regent, gave her third daughter Maria in marriage to the Emperor Theodore, hoping to secure a permanent peace by this close alliance². But when the death of Peter of Courtenay, followed by that of Yolande, threw the affairs of Constantinople into disorder, Theodore laid claim to a portion of the Latin empire as the heritage of his wife. This pretension served as a pretext for attacking the Latin possessions in Asia, but the arrival of Robert with fresh forces caused the peace to be renewed. Theodore offered his daughter Eudocia

¹ Reinhard, *Histoire de Chypre*, i. 150.

² Theodore I. was married to Philippa, daughter of Reuben II., king of Cilician Armenia, after the death of his first wife, Anna, the daughter of Alexius III. ; but he soon divorced Philippa.

to the Emperor Robert in marriage, though they were already brothers-in-law. In vain the Greek Patriarch and the majority of the Greeks reprobated the marriage, both on religious and political grounds; the emperors seemed determined to celebrate it, when a sudden illness put an end to the life of Theodore, in the year 1222, after he had reigned eighteen years¹. All thoughts of the marriage were then laid aside.

Theodore Lascaris, the saviour of the Greek empire, though not a man of enlarged political views or of great capacity, seems to have far exceeded in activity and courage the rest of the Byzantine aristocracy. He was passionate, and addicted to gallantry, but he had many qualities which suited him for a popular leader in difficult circumstances. Though of small stature, he was skilful in the use of arms, and he was rash, generous, and lavish of money even to imprudence. We must recollect that it required no ordinary valour and perseverance to arrest the progress of so accomplished a warrior as Henry of Flanders at the head of his redoubted Belgian cavalry, and that the overthrow of Theodore would, in all probability, have enabled the Crusaders to complete the subjugation of the whole Greek race.

SECT. II.—*Reign of John III. (Dukas Vatatzes), 1222–1254.*

Political position of the Latin empire at the accession of John III.—War between John III. and Robert of Courtenay.—Adrianople taken by Theodore, emperor of Thessalonica.—Peace concluded with the Latin empire, A. D. 1225.—Conspiracy of Nestongos.—Rebellion of Gavalas in Rhodes.—Negotiations for the union of the Greek and Latin churches.—John de Brienne attacks the empire of Nicaea.—Alliance between John III. and John Asan, king of Bulgaria.—Affairs of the empire of Thessalonica.—Baldwin II. attacks John III.—Submission of the Emperor of Thessalonica.—Fear of the Moguls.—Rhodes taken by the Genoese and recovered.—War with Michael II., despot of Epirus.—Michael Palaeologos accused of treason.—Character of the court and administration of John III.

Theodore I. left no son. It was, therefore, necessary to elect a new emperor; for though the feeling in favour of hereditary succession was gaining ground among the Greeks,

¹ Acropolita, 17. He was between forty-five and fifty years of age at the time of his death.

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still the constitution of the empire recognized no rule of succession which created a positive title to the crown. The eminent qualities of John Dukas Vatatzes, who married Irene, the eldest daughter of Theodore I., after her first husband, Andronicus Palaeologos, had been put to death by the Emperor Henry, united the suffrages of the civil and military authorities as well as of the clergy in his favour; and though the late emperor had four brothers who had served with distinction in the army, John III. was saluted emperor without any opposition¹. But his coronation excited the jealousy of Alexis and Isaac Lascaris to such a degree that they not only retired from Nicaea, but even attempted to carry off their niece Eudocia, who had been promised to the Latin emperor Robert. Failing in this attempt, they deserted to the Latins, and distinguished themselves at the court of Constantinople by their eagerness to commence hostilities against their countrymen.

The military power of the Latin empire was constantly declining. The army which effected its conquest was soon dispersed over its surface with the feudal chiefs among whom it had been partitioned, or its warriors proceeded to Palestine to complete their vows, in order to return to their hereditary possessions in their native lands. No Latin army of equal strength could ever again be assembled under the walls of Constantinople. Nevertheless, for a short time, the reports which spread through western Europe of the immense plunder and rich fiefs which the conquerors of the Byzantine empire had acquired, attracted an ample supply of fresh recruits. But in a few years, defeats and misfortunes on one side, and the improving condition of European society on the other, arrested emigration. The prudence and valour of the Emperor Henry could with difficulty efface the impression produced by the terrible romantic tales that were circulated concerning the murder of Baldwin by the king of Bulgaria; and before the melancholy end of the first Belgian emperor was forgotten, men were appalled by the news that his brother-in-law, Peter of Courtenay, the third emperor, had perished by a similar untimely end. In attempting to march from Dyrrachium to Constantinople, Peter of Courtenay was

¹ Compare Acropolita, 17, and Niceph. Gregoras, 12, with Ducange, *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 220, 222.

defeated and taken prisoner by Theodore, the despot of Epirus, and for some time his fate was shrouded in the same mystery as that of Baldwin. The world was long unwilling to believe that the imperial brothers-in-law had perished in prison. Yolande, the wife of Peter, who administered the government of Constantinople as regent with great prudence, did not long survive her husband; and Robert, the second son of Peter, who succeeded to the throne, was a weak and incapable prince. The kingdom of Saloniki was governed by an Italian regency, acting in the name of Demetrius, the second son of the king, Marquess Boniface of Montferrat¹. Greeks, Epirots, and Bulgarians attacked both the empire and the kingdom, and it was very soon evident that neither would be able to offer a prolonged resistance without constant assistance from western Europe. The solicitations for aid were generally addressed to the popes, who possessed the power of rendering the contest a holy war, by granting indulgences to every Catholic who attacked the Greek heretics. The popes consequently became the arbiters of the Latin empire, and supported its cause with fervour. As a matter of course, they regarded the Greeks as more dangerous enemies of papal influence than the Mohammedans. Pope Honorius III. was so eager to establish the predominance of the Latins in the East (as it appeared to him the only means of placing the supremacy of the popes on a firm foundation), that he invited the princes of Europe to undertake a crusade, for the purpose of delivering Peter of Courtenay from captivity. The threat of a crusade was then no idle menace, and Theodore, the despot of Epirus, employed every art to pacify Honorius and turn aside the storm. He released the papal legate, who had fallen into his hands with the Emperor Peter, with the most solemn assurances that he was willing to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, and to labour to convert his subjects. The legate, who informed the Pope that Peter of Courtenay was really dead, appears to have convinced the Court of Rome that there was little

¹ Philip, the eldest son of Peter of Courtenay, preferred his hereditary county of Namur to the imperial throne of Constantinople. Demetrius was the son of Boniface of Montferrat by Margaret of Hungary, widow of Isaac II. William, his eldest son by his first marriage with Eleanor of Savoy, succeeded to the Marquisate of Montferrat. *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates*.

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chance of compelling the Greeks and Albanians to change their religion by force. The wily despot persuaded both the legate and the Pope of his sincere desire to join the Catholic Church; and Honorius, hoping to gain a new and powerful vassal, stopped the crusade he had lately preached, and prohibited the Venetians from attacking the territories of Theodore under pain of excommunication. The fate of Peter of Courtenay, who died of grief and ill-usage in the prisons of the despot, was no longer mentioned. The republic of Venice concluded a truce for five years with Theodore. Geoffrey, prince of Achaia, and Otho, sovereign of Athens, quarrelled with the Pope, and incurred excommunication by appropriating to their own use a portion of the estates of the Greek church which were claimed by the papal clergy, and the confederacy against the Greeks was completely broken up.

This change in the affairs of the Latins rendered it unnecessary for Theodore to persevere in his hypocritical negotiations. He invaded the kingdom of Saloniki, and soon conquered it, for the officers of the young King Demetrius possessed no army capable of resisting his attack. The Pope, enraged at finding he had been used as a political tool by the cunning Greek, fulminated his excommunications against Theodore; but as Honorius had himself dissolved the confederation of the Latin powers, the despot laughed at the thunders of the Vatican. The success of Theodore now opened to him a more extensive field of ambition. He aspired at the honour of restoring the Greek empire in Europe, prepared to overthrow the Latin empire, and assumed the imperial crown at Thessalonica, which was placed on his head by the Patriarch of Bulgaria, who, as he possessed an independent ecclesiastical jurisdiction, had the power of anointing sovereigns (A.D. 1222)¹.

¹ Acropolita, 18. The Bulgarian patriarch, who had transferred his residence from Skopia or Justiniana Prima to Achrida, was styled Archbishop of Achrida by the Greeks, but the Bulgarian patriarchs exercised an ecclesiastical jurisdiction as heads of the Bulgarian church, independent of the patriarch of Constantinople, under the second Bulgarian kingdom as well as under the first. Compare the note 2 at p. 311 of the preceding volume, where it is said, 'Greek writers err in asserting that the head of the Bulgarian church was *never* officially recognized as a patriarch by the Church of Constantinople,' with Le Quien, *Oriens Christianus*, ii. 286, 287; Alemann's Notes to the *Arcana* of Procopius, p. 99, edit. Paris, tom. iii. 361, edit. Bonn; and Tafel, *Via Egnatia, pars occidentalis*, 32. See below, p. 308.

Fortunately for the Greeks, the temporal policy of the Court of Rome often placed the popes in direct opposition to the interests of the Latin princes and nobles who settled in the Eastern Empire, and thus all its endeavours to gain the same degree of power in the East which it enjoyed in the West proved vain. At this time, however, the hope of compelling the Greeks to acknowledge the papal supremacy by force of arms was strong; and Honorius III. exerted himself with so much vigour to furnish Robert of Courtenay with troops and money, that a considerable army accompanied the young emperor to Constantinople. Theodore I. was still emperor of Nicaea when Robert arrived in the East; but, as has been already mentioned, the Latin and Greek emperors concluded a treaty of peace, which enabled Robert to employ all his forces against Theodore of Epirus, whose rapid progress alarmed the Latins. The armies of Constantinople and Epirus met before the walls of Serres. The Latins were defeated in their attempt to take the city; their generals, Valincourt, and Mainvaut, the marshal of Romania, were both taken prisoners during their retreat; and the Emperor of Thessalonica was enabled to pursue his conquests and organize his new dominions without opposition.

Such was the state of affairs at the commencement of the reign of John III. The warlike Latins soon reassembled a force sufficient to protect the immediate domain of the Emperor of Constantinople from any encroachment on the part of Theodore of Thessalonica; and as they were eager to increase their territories and gain new fiefs, the Emperor of Nicaea felt that the peace concluded by his predecessor would not be of long duration; he, therefore, devoted his attention to preparing for war without imposing any additional burdens on his subjects. The Greeks knew that, unless the Latins were expelled from Constantinople, there could be no permanent peace; and it was now evident that if any other orthodox prince gained possession of the imperial city, the Emperor of Nicaea would be unable to maintain his position as the political head of the Greek nation. While John III. increased the numbers and improved the discipline of his army, he attached his subjects to his government by the economy he introduced into the financial administration, and by his strict attention to the administration of justice.

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The Emperor Robert at last declared war; and the Latins invaded the territory of Nicaea. Their army debarked at Lampsacus. It was commanded by St. Menehould, who was assisted by the two Lascaris. A decisive battle was fought near Poimanenos, in which the victory was well contested. St. Menehould was one of the first conquerors of Constantinople, and the Latin knights had hitherto proved victorious wherever they could manfully assert the prowess of the lance. But the Greek emperor was a skilful general as well as a valiant soldier; and when his cavalry yielded to the shock of the Frank chivalry, he rallied them, and renewed the combat by a series of well-combined attacks, which at length broke the line of his enemies. The heavy cavalry, once broken, was easily dispersed, and there was then little difficulty in destroying the rest of the army. St. Menehould, and many noble knights, perished on the field; the two Lascaris were taken prisoners, and lost their sight as a punishment for their treason. John III. followed up his victory with indefatigable energy. During the winter of 1224 he captured Poimanenos, Lentianes, Charioros, Berbeniakon, and every other fortress the Latins possessed on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, except Pegae. He sent a part of his army into Europe to lay waste the country round Madytos and Callipolis, while his fleet expelled the Latins from the island of Lesbos.

These successes roused the Greeks of Adrianople to attempt delivering themselves from the Latin domination. They solicited aid from John III.; and as soon as a body of Greek troops approached their neighbourhood they flew to arms and expelled the Frank garrison. But Theodore, emperor of Thessalonica, advancing shortly after to Didymoteichos, placed himself between Adrianople and the empire of Nicaea, and effectually cut off the troops of John III. from receiving any reinforcements. Theodore was eager to gain possession of Adrianople, as an important step to the conquest of Constantinople, and to securing his ultimate supremacy as orthodox Emperor of the East. By means of bribes and promises he persuaded the leading men in Adrianople to espouse his cause, for he really seemed better able to defend them against the Bulgarians on one side, and the Latins on the other, than the Emperor of Nicaea, whose resources were

far distant. The general of John III., unable to resist the army of Theodore and the wishes of the inhabitants, agreed to evacuate the place on being allowed to march out with the honours of war. The Emperor of Thessalonica attempted to arrogate a superiority to which he was not entitled. He ordered the garrison, in marching out of Adrianople, to defile before him, and placed himself, with the imperial ensigns, to receive their salute. But John Kamytzes, the Nicaean general, a man of sense and firmness, when he rode past the rival of his sovereign affected to watch the proceedings of his own troops, and never turned his head to regard Theodore. The Epirot emperor was furious at the slight, and lost all command of his temper. At first he was with difficulty withheld from arresting, and even from striking Kamytzes, but he afterwards allowed him to continue his march. The Emperor John rewarded his general by appointing him Grand Heteriarch. Though the possession of Adrianople enabled Theodore to lay waste the Latin territory as far as Bizya, he was unable to make any attempt on Constantinople. In the year 1230 his restless ambition involved him in war with John Asan, king of Bulgaria, by whom he was defeated and taken prisoner. Engaging in a conspiracy, he was punished by his conqueror with the loss of sight. In the mean time, the King of Bulgaria conquered a considerable number of the cities which Theodore had governed. He gained possession of Didymoteichos, Boleros, Serres, Pelagonia, and Prilapos, and extended his conquests as far as Albanopolis to the west, and into Thessaly as far as the frontier of Great Vlachia to the south ¹.

When the Franks found that their possessions in the vicinity of Constantinople were ravaged by the troops of Theodore, they offered to make peace with the Emperor of Nicaea, in order to concentrate all their forces ; and John III., displeased at the insolent and hostile disposition which the Emperor of Thessalonica displayed in the affair of Adrianople, was willing that the Latins and Theodore should exhaust their strength, while he remained a calm spectator of their contest. The terms of peace were soon arranged ; the Latins surrendered Pegaeto the Greek emperor, and retained possession of no spot on the Asiatic coast, except the peninsula opposite

¹ Acropolita, 23.

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Constantinople as far as Nicomedia (A. D. 1225). This peace was observed by both parties for several years—1225 to 1233.

The aristocratic element of Greek society was as little inclined to respect political order and established law in the petty empire of Nicaea, as the proud Byzantine nobles, who boasted a Roman or Armenian origin, had ever been to weigh the interests of the people against their own schemes of personal ambition during the period of their greatest power at Constantinople. The throne of John III. and all his schemes for improvement were placed in considerable danger by a conspiracy of his own cousin, Andronicus Nestongos, who engaged many men of rank in a plot to place the crown on his own head. The conspiracy was fortunately discovered, and the traitors were punished. Nestongos escaped from confinement, and passed the remainder of his life among the Seljouk Turks. The emperor, having established order, pursued his plans for improving the condition of his subjects and augmenting the efficiency of his military establishments with steady perseverance for several years. In his civil government, and especially in strengthening the moral influence of the imperial authority over every rank of society, he was assisted by the great talents and singular prudence of his wife, the Empress Irene, whose authority was the greater in consequence of her never laying aside her modest domestic manner of life, or appearing eager to exert political influence.

When the Crusaders overthrew the Byzantine empire, the family of Gabalas obtained possession of Rhodes, and Leo Gabalas governed it and several of the neighbouring islands as an independent principality. By granting commercial privileges to the Venetians, he secured in some degree the protection of the republic. But in the year 1233 John III., who regarded him as a rebellious subject, attacked him in order to re-establish the imperial authority in Rhodes. Gabalas made a brave defence, and a number of the emperor's best troops were slain before the rebel could be compelled to acknowledge the emperor's supremacy, which he did on John consenting to invest him with the rank of Caesar and leaving him in possession of Rhodes, which he retained until his death. The authority of the central administration being no

longer systematically exerted to protect the material interests of the population at a distance from the capital, a general tendency towards local independence began to be formed in the outlying provincial communities in the empires of Nicaea, Thessalonica, and Trebizond, which was in some degree strengthened by the principles of feudal society which the great vassals of the Latin empire of Romania introduced among their Greek subjects. The history of Rhodes illustrates these observations. The brother of Gabalas succeeded to his power as if it had been a family inheritance; and though he only pretended to act as the emperor's representative, John was compelled to confirm him in his vice-royalty to avoid recommencing a civil war¹.

The Emperor Robert of Courtenay died in the Peloponnesus in the year 1228, as he was returning from Rome, which he had visited to solicit succours from the Pope. His brother, Baldwin II., who was only eleven years of age, was recognized as his successor; but the exigencies of the administration required a chief capable of directing the counsels and leading the armies of the empire. John de Brienne, titular king of Jerusalem and commander-in-chief of the papal army, was supposed by all having an interest in the prosperity of the Latin empire to be a man capable of restoring its glory and re-establishing its power. He was elected the guardian and colleague of Baldwin II., and crowned emperor for life. A treaty was concluded between John de Brienne and the ambassadors of Romania, in which it was stipulated that the young emperor, Baldwin II., was to marry Agnes, the daughter of his guardian; and that, on his attaining the age of twenty, he was to be invested with the sovereignty of Nicaea, and the Latin possessions in Asia beyond Nicomedia as an independent kingdom. As the territory of which this kingdom was to be composed required to be conquered from an able and warlike sovereign, the Latin ambassadors must have attached very little value to this article of the treaty. After the death of John de Brienne, the empire reverted to Baldwin as his hereditary dominion². This treaty was confirmed by

¹ Acropolita, 24, 47; Niceph. Gregoras, 16.

² This curious treaty with the papal confirmation is given by Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux pour servir à une Histoire de la Domination Française en Orient*, p. 21.

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the Pope, Gregory IX., at Perugia in 1229; but John de Brienne was detained in Italy for two years collecting a sufficient force to take possession of his empire. During this time the regency was directed by Narjot de Toucy¹.

The treaty of Perugia, which disposed of the empire of Nicaea as a Latin possession, was an insult which policy induced the Emperor John III. to overlook; but he feared that a vigorous attack on the Latin empire might enable Theodore, emperor of Thessalonica, or John Asan, king of Bulgaria, to gain possession of Constantinople before he could prevent them. The war which broke out between these two princes in the year 1230 delivered him from this danger, yet he was still willing to gain time; and when John de Brienne arrived at Constantinople in 1231, he entered into negotiations for a union of the Greek and Latin Churches, which was conducted with wisdom and moderation on the part of the Greek Patriarch, Germanos Nauplios, but was rendered abortive by the servile submission required by the Papal Court. In the month of April 1233 the Emperor of Nicaea assembled a council of the Greek church at Nymphaeum, in which, as usual, nothing could be determined². The negotiations were broken off, and the Latin emperor invaded the Greek territory, expecting to profit by the war with Gabalas in Rhodes. A powerful army landed at Lampsacus; and the Greek emperor, having formed a fortified camp at Sigrenes, watched the operations of his enemy, and circumscribed his movements. John de Brienne was now upwards of eighty years of age, his military reputation stood high, and his force was superior to that of his opponent; but age rendered him inactive. All his plans of conquest were foiled by the superior tactics of the Greek emperor; and a four months' campaign terminated by the Latins gaining possession of Keramidi, a fort near Cyzicus, and by their recovering Pegae.

Alarm at the number of the recruits who about this time arrived at Constantinople from western Europe induced the Emperor of Nicaea and the King of Bulgaria to form a close alliance. Theodore, the son of John III., who was only

¹ Narjot de Toucy married the daughter of Agnes of France, the child-wife of Andronicus I. and then widow of Theodore Vranas.

² One of the four papal commissioners at Nymphaeum was Aymon, an Englishman, who became afterwards minister-general of the order of the Minor Friars. Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, p. 95.

eleven years of age, was betrothed to Helen, the daughter of John Asan, who was in her ninth year; and the young princess was committed to the charge of the Empress Irene to be educated¹. The two sovereigns prosecuted the war in concert. The emperor took Lampsacus, crossed the Hellespont, and captured Callipolis, and all the cities of the Thracian Chersonesus. He then extended his conquests to the westward as far as the Hebrus, and to the north as far as Tzurulos, which he secured by a strong garrison. The king pushed his incursions almost to the very walls of Constantinople, and ravaged the possessions of the Latin seigneurs. The united armies approached the imperial city; and Latin writers assert that they suffered severely from a well-arranged sortie led by John de Brienne in person². About the same time the Greeks sustained a defeat at sea, A.D. 1235. In the following year, Constantinople was relieved from all danger by the succours it received from the Venetians and Geffrey, prince of Achaia. But the death of John de Brienne in 1237, and the absence of the young Emperor Baldwin II., who was wandering about to solicit aid from the Catholic princes, placed Constantinople suddenly in such danger of falling into the hands of the Emperor of Nicaea, that the King of Bulgaria resolved to prolong the existence of an empire from which he had now nothing to fear. He suddenly concluded a separate peace, and formed an alliance with the Latins. Sound policy certainly required John Asan at this moment to keep all his forces ready for action on his northern frontier. The conquests of Genghis Khan threatened all the rival claimants of the eastern empire with the same terrible calamities, though the ignorance of the Latins prevented the

¹ By this treaty the Archbishop of Ternovo, which was then the capital of the Bulgarian kingdom, was declared independent head of the Bulgarian church, and received the title of Patriarch, ratified by an imperial charter under the golden seal, and by a decree of the Greek synod. Ternovo had been previously dependent on the patriarchal see of Constantinople. The see of Achrida, which assumed the title of Patriarchate of Bulgaria, formed part of the empire of Thessalonica; the object of creating a new patriarch of Bulgaria was to put an end to this hostile influence. Acropolita, 18, 27; Nicephorus Gregoras, 16; Ephraemius, 329. See p. 67, *note*, and p. 301; and vol. ii. p. 311.

² Philip Mouskes (Ducange's edit. of Villehardouin, p. 223) represents the united army of Greeks and Bulgarians as amounting to one hundred thousand, and the force of John de Brienne as consisting of one hundred and sixty knights, and a few sergeants and men-at-arms. Acropolita (28) says the Latin emperor watched the allies from the walls of Constantinople without venturing to move. Ducange (*Histoire de Constantinople*, 98) believes the French writer; the Greek seems more worthy of credit.

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nations of western Europe from perceiving the greatness of the danger. From the shores of the Atlantic to the Chinese seas, every country seemed on the eve of being converted into pasture-grounds for tribes of nomades and hunting-fields for Mogul princes.

About the time John Asan abandoned the Greek alliance, the Komans were driven over the Danube by the Moguls who had invaded Russia. The King of Bulgaria allowed these fugitives to pass through his dominions to enter the service of the Latin empire, and join them in attacking the Greek possessions in Thrace. John III. was consequently obliged to defend his recent conquests against an overwhelming force composed of the heavy cavalry of the Franks, the light horse of the Komans, and the organized infantry of the Bulgarians. The united army besieged Tzurulos, which was bravely defended by Nicephorus Tarchaniotes. It was saved by John Asan receiving the news of the sudden death of his wife and son. This double misfortune presented itself to his mind as a judgment of Heaven for violating his faith with the Greek emperor, and he immediately withdrew his army, hastened back to Bulgaria, broke off his alliance with the Latins, and renewed his treaty with John III.

The death of Asan's wife produced important changes in the empire of Thessalonica. John Asan married Irene, the daughter of his prisoner Theodore, emperor of Thessalonica, whom he had deprived of sight for his plots. He now released her father. Theodore repaired secretly to Thessalonica, from which he soon contrived to expel his brother Manuel, who had usurped the imperial title; and he then caused his own son John to be elected emperor, for the loss of his sight rendered it impossible for him to direct the details of the administration. Manuel escaped to Attalia, and hastened to the court of Nicæa. The Emperor John III. furnished him with a naval force of six galleys, and money to enrol troops; for he feared the restless ambition of Theodore, and was anxious to find employment for him at home. Manuel landed at Demetrias, and rendered himself master of the country from Pharsalus and Larissa to Platamona. A third brother, named Constantine, had already gained possession of that part of Thessaly called Great Vlachia. The blind Theodore, who guided the counsels of his son John, the

Emperor of Thessalonica, immediately entered into communications with his brothers, and convinced them of the necessity of forming a close family alliance in order to preserve their independence. Manuel abandoned the cause of John III., and the three brothers, with the Emperor of Thessalonica, concluded a treaty for mutual defence and offence with the Latin princes of Athens, Euboea, and Achaia. John III. was too much occupied with other affairs to bestow particular attention on these hostile demonstrations at the time (A. D. 1238)¹.

The wealth, resources, and population of the Latin empire of Constantinople declined rapidly. No taxes could be levied, for the Greeks, who had cultivated the fields and acted as traders in the towns, finding their pursuits interrupted by hostile invasions, had emigrated into the empire of Nicaea, which enjoyed uninterrupted internal tranquillity. The Latin government was reduced to such financial difficulties that it was obliged to strip the copper roofs from the public buildings, and melt down every ornament of bronze that remained in Constantinople, in order to coin money. The precious metals were borrowed from the churches, and the relics of the saints were pledged or sold. Still the supplies of warriors, whom the influence of the Pope diverted from the legitimate object of the crusades, which was to recover possession of the Holy Sepulchre, in order to war against Greek heretics, often rendered the armies of the Latins for a time superior to any force the Emperor of Nicaea could bring into the field. And in the year 1239 the zeal of Pope Gregory IX., and the pecuniary assistance furnished by Louis IX. of France, enabled Baldwin II. to return to Constantinople at the head of a considerable army, which the Greeks magnified to sixty thousand men². This force he increased by engaging in his service the whole military population of the Koman tribes who had settled within the limits of the Latin territory.

Baldwin II. opened the campaign of 1240 by besieging Tzurulos, which surrendered at discretion. The governor Petraliphas and the garrison were carried to Constantinople in order to raise money by the ransom of those who had

¹ Acropolita, 33.

² Acropolita, 31.

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wealth or wealthy friends. The Greek emperor, unable to relieve Tzurulos, attacked the Latin possessions beyond the Bosphorus, and took Charax and Dakibyza; so that nothing was left them in Asia except Chalcedon, Skutarion, the shores of the Bosphorus, and Daskyllium. After this campaign the Latin auxiliaries, being left without regular pay, retired from Constantinople; but John Asan, king of Bulgaria, dying in the following year (1241), the Emperor of Nicaea considered it most advantageous for his political interests to establish his supremacy over Thessalonica.

John, emperor of Thessalonica, was a pious and just prince, not destitute of ability, but submitting entirely to the guidance of his father, the unquiet and ambitious Theodore. Manuel was already dead, and his dominions were occupied by Michael, son of Michael, the elder brother of Theodore, and founder of the despotat of Epirus¹. The Emperor of Nicaea felt that his title to the sovereignty of the Eastern Empire would not be recognized by the European Greeks until he gained possession of Thessalonica, and he knew that this would prove a difficult task as long as the various princes of the house of Angelos Comnenos maintained a strict alliance. The conquest of the empire of Thessalonica and the union of all the Greeks who had escaped from the Latin domination in Europe under his government was therefore the first step towards regaining possession of Constantinople. To insure the success of his plans, John III. committed one of those acts of the basest treachery which Byzantine political morality considered as a venial display of diplomatic ability. He invited the blind Theodore to visit his court for the purpose of consulting him on a common plan of action against the Franks and Bulgarians; but when Theodore visited the imperial camp on the shores of the Hellespont he was detained as a prisoner, and the Emperor of Nicaea marched forward with his army to form the siege of Thessalonica. His treachery was apparently useless, for while he was pressing the siege with every prospect of a speedy surrender, a courier arrived from his son, Theodore Lascaris, informing him that the Moguls had gained a great victory over Gaïaseddin, sultan of Iconium, and were overrunning all Asia Minor. The

¹ Niceph. Greg. 28. Both the Michaels were illegitimate.

immediate return of the emperor with the whole army was therefore necessary to protect the Greek dominions. John III. had treated his prisoner Theodore with all the honour due to his high rank, and had carefully sought to gain his goodwill. He now proposed to him the office of mediating a treaty of peace with his son. John III. engaged to restore Theodore to liberty, and to raise the siege of Thessalonica, on condition that John, the son of Theodore, should lay aside the title of Emperor, but retain the sovereignty of Thessalonica, with the title of Despot, on acknowledging the imperial supremacy of the throne of Nicaea as the true representative of the empire of Constantinople. These terms were accepted; for old Theodore had seen that the power of the Emperor of Nicaea was based on a well-filled treasury, a prosperous country, and a well-disciplined army, so that resistance was hopeless; while his own power was likely to remain equally great, whether his son was styled despot or emperor. As soon as the treaty was concluded, John III. hastened back to Asia, where he found all the Greeks in the greatest alarm. The Moguls seemed on the eve of completing the conquest of the world. One division of their mighty army had subdued Russia and laid waste Poland and Hungary; another had now destroyed the Seljouk empire in Asia. As soon as the emperor returned to Nymphæum, he sent to the Sultan of Iconium, who had collected some troops from the relics of his army, and the terms of an offensive and defensive alliance were arranged between the Greek and Turkish empires. John III. then devoted all his energies to make the preparations necessary for resisting the overwhelming armies of the Moguls; but, fortunately for the Christians, the attention of these conquerors was at this time diverted to other enterprises.

While John III. (Vatatzes) was preparing to attack the empire of Thessalonica, he secured the permanent services of a large body of light cavalry admirably suited to cover the movements of his army, and guard it against surprise. He transported a numerous colony of Koman families connected with these light troops, into Asia Minor, and settled the tribe in the valley of the Maeander, where it held lands on the tenure of military service¹. The nomadic habits of the

¹ Niceph. Greg. 21.

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Komans, who were of the Turkish race, probably induced them to amalgamate with the Seljouk population in their vicinity as soon as their communications with the Greek empire were interrupted.

When no further danger was to be apprehended in Asia, the Emperor of Nicaea again recommenced his conquests in Europe. The young Caloman, king of Bulgaria, died or was poisoned in the year 1245, leaving an infant brother, Michael, as his successor. John III. availed himself of the opportunity to reconquer the ancient dominions of the Byzantine emperors in Thrace. Serres fell into his hands; the fortress of Melenikon was betrayed to him by the Greek inhabitants, and he then subdued in succession Skopia, Prosakon, and Pelagonia. About this time an opportunity presented itself of gaining possession of Thessalonica. The Despot John died in 1244, and was succeeded by his brother Demetrius, a debauched youth, who was immediately involved in war with the emperor, by his own folly and the treachery of his counsellors. In the year 1246, John III. took possession of Thessalonica, and sent Demetrius a prisoner to Lentianes. In the same year, while Baldwin II., the Latin emperor of Constantinople, was begging aid from the courts of France and England to enable him to attack the Greeks, John III. weakened the resources of the Franks by capturing their frontier fortresses of Tzurulos and Bizya¹.

This career of success was interrupted by the danger of losing the valuable island of Rhodes. While John Gabalas was absent from the city, a Genoese fleet which happened to be cruising in the Archipelago treacherously surprised the place, though the republic of Genoa was then an ally of the Emperor of Nicaea, and enjoyed some commercial privileges in his dominions. Rhodes was soon after visited by William, prince of Achaia, and the Duke of Burgundy, who were on their way to join the crusade of St. Louis. These princes left one hundred knights with their followers to assist in defending the place against the Greek emperor, on condition that they were to share in the profits of this piratical conquest.

¹ Baldwin II. received seven hundred marks of silver from Henry III., though the court of England was justly incensed against John de Brienne, who, after receiving succours from England for a crusade, had employed his resources to aid Philip Augustus in his hostilities against England. Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, 109.

But the Emperor John III. invested Rhodes without delay; and three hundred Asiatic cavalry having defeated the Frank knights before the walls of the city, the Genoese were compelled to surrender the place on being allowed to quit the island. This act of hostility on the part of the Genoese was caused by some regulations of the Emperor John III., which circumscribed the privileges conceded to them by Theodore I. Though the existence of these privileges was found to be injurious to the trade of his Greek subjects, the emperor was compelled to cancel his new regulations in order to avoid the danger of being involved at the same time in war with both Genoa and Venice¹.

The active career of John III. was drawing to a close. His last military expedition was against Michael II., despot of Epirus. This prince had concluded a treaty with the empire, and his eldest son, Nicephorus, was engaged to marry Maria, the emperor's grand-daughter. The intrigues of Michael's uncle, the blind Theodore, disturbed this arrangement. After the death of his son John, the emperor of Thessalonica, Theodore, resided at Vodena, which he made the capital of a small semi-independent principality. He now induced Michael to break off his alliance with John III., and attack the possessions of the Greek emperor in Macedonia. The emperor hastened to Thessalonica, and Theodore flying at his approach, the imperial army occupied Vodena, advanced to the lake of Ostrovos, and took up its winter-quarters in the plain of Sarighioli². Its supplies were drawn in great part from Berrhoea, and long trains of mules and camels were incessantly employed to fill the magazines formed to facilitate its future movements. In the mean time, Petraliphas, who commanded the troops of Epirus at Kastoria, deserted to the emperor, and placed him in possession of the upper valley of the Haliacmon³, by which he was able to render himself master of the passes over Mount Pindus at Deabolis, and secure an entry into Epirus by the valley of the Apsus. The Despot Michael, seeing the heart of his dominions laid open to invasion, purchased peace by ceding to the emperor the

¹ Acropolita, 47.

² [i. e. the level lands to the south of the lake of Ostrovo; the name Sari-gheul (yellow lake) is Turkish, and belongs to a sheet of water in the plain. Ed.]

³ Now called Anaselitsas.

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fortress of Prilapos, of which he still retained possession as well as of Velesos, Albanopolis (Croia), and all the country north of the road between Dyrrachium and Thessalonica. Nicephorus, the despot's eldest son, was also delivered up as a hostage, but was honoured with the title of Despot. The blind Theodore, whose restless intrigues had caused the ruin of his family and relations, was confined to a monastery for the rest of his life.

A man destined to occupy an important place in the history of the decline of the Greek race now makes his first appearance in the annals of the empire. The Emperor John, after passing the winter at Vodena, spent the following summer moving about in order to establish regularity in the administration of his new conquests. While in the camp at Ostrovo, Michael Palaeologos, a young and distinguished officer, high in the emperor's favour, and connected with several of the great Byzantine families, was accused of treason by Nikolas Manglabites, a noble of Melenikon. The emperor remitted the investigation of the affair until he reached Philippi. A court of inquiry, composed of the ablest judges in the senate and the courts of law, was then formed to examine the evidence produced by the accuser. Two officers of the imperial army were examined as witnesses: one declared that the other had made treasonable overtures to him on the part of Palaeologos; the other admitted that he had held some conversation on the subject with the first witness, but declared that he had never communicated with Palaeologos. As no further evidence could be procured, a duel was ordered. The first witness was victorious, but the vanquished persisted in denying all communication with Palaeologos, even at the block where he was decapitated. The court now called on Palaeologos to prove his innocence by the ordeal, and receive in his hands a red-hot globe of iron. To this proposal he replied that he was willing to meet his accuser in battle, but as he could not expect Heaven to work a miracle for a sinner like himself, he had no doubt hot iron would burn his hands. The Bishop of Philadelphia reproved his levity, and preached confidence in faith and innocence. Palaeologos listened with great deference to his sermon, and meekly observed, at its conclusion, 'Holy father, as you know so well the power of faith and innocence in a

holy trial, I pray you to take the glowing iron from the furnace, and I will receive it in my hands with faith and submission.' This judicious rebuke produced a favourable impression both on the judges and the emperor. Palaeologos was restored to favour, and John endeavoured to attach him sincerely to the throne by marrying him in the following year to his niece Theodora. Michael Palaeologos may have been innocent on this occasion, but when we consider that he was already twenty-seven years old, and that the prominent features of his character were unbounded ambition and profound hypocrisy, we may admire his ability in defending himself without feeling convinced of his innocence, while on the other hand the honourable conduct of the emperor commands our respect¹.

The personal character of John Vatatzes is so intimately connected with the prosperity of his reign that every trait of his private life has a historical interest. He had a noble simplicity of mind, and a degree of candour rarely found in union with great talents among the Byzantine Greeks. He was attentive to every branch of the public administration, and viewed with deep regret the neglected state of agriculture throughout his dominions. He felt that to increase the productions of the earth was the surest basis of national prosperity; and though in his age, those who cultivated political science were not sufficiently sensible of the fact that increased production can only be sustained by increased facilities of transport and more extended markets, he nevertheless did much to encourage agriculture. Instead of wasting

¹ Acropolita, 51. This species of ordeal, ἡ διὰ μύδρου ἀπόδειξις, was in common use among the Greeks at this time. Pachymeres (i. 18) declares that he had seen it successfully endured. Cantacuzenos (lib. iii. c. 27. p. 439) states that a woman guilty of adultery carried a piece of glowing iron three times round a church, through the care of a saint who protected faith more than chastity. About this time, in England, the judges were commanded to give up the trial by fire and water, and it began to fall into disuse. The ordeal was a classic mode of proof—

ἦμεν δ' ἔτοιμοι καὶ μύδρους αἶρειν χερσίν,
καὶ πῦρ διέρπειν, καὶ θεοὺς ὀρκωμοτεῖν.

SOPHOCLES' *Antigone*, v. 264.

It is amusing to see how Phrantzes, who wrote under the descendants of Palaeologos, represents his conduct. He says Michael offered boldly to seize the red-hot ball of iron, but that the Patriarch Arsenios refused to admit a proceeding so completely at variance with Roman law and Greek wisdom. Phrantzes overlooked the fact that Arsenios only became Patriarch during the reign of Theodore II. Phrantzes, p. 8, edit. Bonn. The trial by ordeal had been already prohibited by the council of the Lateran, A.D. 1215.

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the public money on theoretical lectures and model farms, he devoted his private revenues to the improvement of his estates, and thus set an example to the large landed proprietors in the empire. He fought bravely as a soldier on the field of battle; but in times of peace, instead of amusing himself with tournaments and festivities, he overlooked his farms, examined his flocks and herds, improved the cultivation of his fields and the dwellings of his farmers. His example soon brought agriculture into fashion, for it was seen that it was not only a way to gain the emperor's approbation, but also to augment the value of property. The economy of John III. was entirely free from avarice, for when he was able to restrict the expenditure of the imperial household to the sum yielded by his private property, he relieved the public treasure from the burden, without in any degree diminishing the splendour of his establishments. His liberality was further attested by the foundation of hospitals and alms-houses, and his piety by the endowment of monasteries and the decoration of churches.

A popular story, current during his lifetime, deserves to be recorded. He ordered the money collected exclusively by the sale of eggs on his property to be employed in purchasing a coronet, ornamented with jewels, which he presented to the empress, as a testimony of the effects produced by prudent economy in trifling matters. The general attention which the Greeks paid to agriculture in consequence of the emperor's exhortations and example proved extremely profitable, from the extensive demand for cattle and provisions which prevailed for several years in the territories of the Seljouk Turks—the empire of Nicaea being almost the only portion of Asia Minor that escaped all injury from the invasions of the Moguls.

Some of the emperor's commercial laws, though at variance with the true principles of political science, may have been of temporary advantage when all commercial intercourse was misdirected by restrictions, protections, and monopolies in other states. A government which cannot venture to force its nobles to abandon a life of idleness and luxury may nevertheless turn a considerable portion of their expenditure into the public treasury, when it is possible, from the aristocratic constitution of society, to tax those articles of luxury which are consumed by the wealthy. It is possible, therefore, that

the sumptuary laws of John III. were productive of more good in restraining the extravagance of the nobility, and in filling the treasury, than they produced evil by diminishing trade. He promulgated a law prohibiting his subjects from wearing Persian, Syrian, and Italian silks and brocades, compelling them to use only the produce of Greek industry, under the pain of being dismissed from all honourable employments, excluded from court, and deprived of every social distinction. It must be observed that various treaties regulated the import duties on foreign silk, which the emperor could not increase, while taxation fell heavy on the mulberry-trees and on the raw silk of the Greek manufacturers. The anxiety of John to banish extravagance from his court is also attested by a severe rebuke which he gave his son Theodore, for going out hunting in a magnificent dress. He told him that the expenditure of a prince was too closely connected with the blood of his subjects to allow him to waste his wealth in idle pomp¹.

The popularity of John III. was greatly increased by the amiable character, domestic virtues, and great talents of the Empress Irene. John Asan, king of Bulgaria, sent his daughter Helena, who was betrothed to her son Theodore, to be educated under her care; but when he determined to break off his alliance with the empire, he sent for his daughter. The king's object was evident, but the emperor scorned to retain his son's bride as a hostage; and the Princess Helena, who was only ten years old, was sent back to her father. As soon as all the Greeks who escorted her to her father's camp departed, and she understood that she was not to return to her dear mother, the empress, she was inconsolable. The praises of the Greek court, the love she expressed for the Empress Irene, her tears and her lamentations, at last excited her father's displeasure. As the court was crossing Mount Haemus on horseback, the king lost his usual good-temper, and, taking his daughter in his arms, seated her on his riding-cloak in front of his saddle, and threatened her with punishment if she did not cease to weep and praise her Greek mother. But the love of Irene was stronger than the fear of punishment; the little Helena continued her lamentations,

¹ Niceph. Greg. pp. 24, 25; Pachymeres, tom. i. p. 21.

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and it was remarked with amaze that her affectionate father became so angry as to give the child a slap on the cheek¹.

The Empress Irene died in 1241, and, two years after her death, the emperor married Anna, the natural daughter of the Emperor Frederic II. of Germany. Anna was extremely young; and an Italian lady, called Marchesina, accompanied her as directress of her court or mistress of the robes, according to our English phraseology. The Emperor John fell passionately in love with this lady, who soon received the honours conferred in courts on the mistress of the sovereign, and was allowed to wear the dress reserved for members of the imperial family. The emperor was severely blamed for his conduct; and the force of public opinion, supporting the religious authority of the Greek clergy, enabled Nicephorus Blemmidas to give Marchesina a severe rebuke. Blemmidas had decorated the church of the monastery of which he was abbot so richly that it was generally visited by the courtiers. One day, while the abbot was performing divine service, the imperial mistress passed with her attendants, and resolved to view the church; but Blemmidas, informed of her approach, ordered the doors to be closed, declaring that with his permission an adulteress should never enter the church. Marchesina, enraged at so severe a rebuke, inflicted so publicly, hastened to the palace, threw herself at her lover's feet, and begged him to avenge the insult. But John's love had not obscured his reason, and he felt the reproof was deserved: his only reply was, 'The abbot would have respected me had I respected myself.' Blemmidas was the tutor of Theodore, the emperor's son; and to the unfortunate connection with Marchesina we may perhaps attribute the circumstance that Theodore, contrary to the usual custom in the Eastern Empire, did not receive the imperial title during his father's life².

The character of John, and his political administration, deserve much praise; but his public administration was

¹ Acropolita, 28; Niceph. Greg. 26.

² Niceph. Greg. 26. There are several philosophical, political, and geographical works of Nicephorus Blemmidas still extant. For his philosophical works, see the Notes of Leo Allatius to Acropolita, cap. xxxii. Two political treatises are published by the Cardinal Mai, *Script. Veterum Nova Collectio*, tom. ii. p. 609. For his geographical writings, see Schoell, *Geschichte der Griech. Literatur*, von Pinder, iii. 330.

marked with some defects as well as his private conduct. The gold coinage of the Byzantine empire, as we have had occasion to observe, presents the longest series of coins, possessing the same weight and purity, which the world has yet beheld; and the degradation of the political institutions of the empire, the corruption of society, and adulteration of the coinage, are contemporary events. John III. had fallen on a debased age, in which the faith due by the sovereign to the public was neither understood nor appreciated. He found the standard of the imperial mint already debased, and he carried the adulteration still further by issuing coin of which only two parts were of pure gold, and the remaining third of alloy. His son persevered in the same standard; but Michael VIII., after the reconquest of Constantinople, coined money of which fifteen parts only were gold and nine alloy. At last, Andronicus II., after issuing a coinage of fourteen parts of gold and ten of alloy, carried the depreciation of the standard so far as to make the gold byzant consist of equal parts of gold and alloy¹.

John III. died at Nymphaeum on the 30th October 1254, after a reign of thirty-three years².

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 343. *Πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Δούκα τὸ δέμοιρον τοῦ ταλάντου τῶν νομισμάτων χρυσὸς ἦν ἀπεφθός.* The Latin paraphrase of Possin seems entirely to mistake the meaning of Pachymeres. I have given the sense in the text. Gibbon (vii. 382, *note*, Smith's edit.) follows Possin.

² Acropolita, 56; Niceph. Greg. 24. There seems to be an error in the chronological synopsis which Possin has annexed to his edition of Pachymeres, and it has misled Gibbon and Le Beau. Possin has adopted the erroneous date of the recovery of Constantinople from the Latins, which is given in the printed text of Acropolita; but this date is corrected by Nicetas, as Ducange points out, and is a mere inadvertency of transcription. Acropolita's dates are generally our best authority for the chronology of his time. He places the death of John III. in October 1254, by stating that Theodore I. reigned eighteen years (p. 17); that John III. reigned thirty-three (p. 56); and that Theodore II. reigned somewhat less than four (p. 85). The proclamation of Michael VIII. (Palaeologos) as emperor, in this way, falls on the 1st of January 1259. The common chronology places the death of John III. in 1255, and the proclamation of Michael Palaeologos in 1260. The reasons against admitting this last date will be mentioned hereafter.

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SECT. III.—*From the death of John III. to the recovery of Constantinople by the Greeks, A.D. 1254-1261.*

Reign of Theodore Lascaris II., 1254-1258.—Character of Theodore II.—Anecdote of Acropolita.—Bulgarian war.—Affairs of Epirus.—Michael Palaeologos, governor of Dyrrachium.—Malady and cruelty of Theodore II.—His death.—Reign of John IV., A.D. 1258.—Intrigues of Michael Palaeologos.—Murder of Muzalon.—Election of Michael VIII., A.D. 1259.—His usurped coronation.—Position of the empire at Michael VIII.'s election.—Decline of the Seljouk empire.—Of the Latin empire.—Of the Bulgarian kingdom.—War in Epirus.—Battle of Pelagonia.—Recovery of Constantinople.

Theodore Lascaris II., the only son of John III. and Irene, was thirty-three years old at his father's death. His first care was to hasten the election of a patriarch; and when Nicephorus Blemmidas declined the honour, the dignity was conferred on Arsenios, who, at the time of his election, was a lay brother in a monastery near the lake Apolloniades¹. In a single week he was consecrated deacon, priest, and patriarch. The coronation of Theodore was performed in the city of Nicaea, the new Patriarch placing the imperial crown on his head.

Theodore II. was a man of considerable talent, and of a cultivated mind; but his health was ruined, and his intellect affected, by repeated attacks of epilepsy. Participating in the common opinions of his age, the emperor sometimes believed that his malady was a Divine judgment, and at others considered that it was the effect of the incantations of his enemies. At times he sunk into profound melancholy; at times he broke out in uncontrollable fits of anger. But his public conduct was generally marked by judgment and determination. He commanded his armies with ability; and he filled the administration with men of talent, in defiance of the nobility, who pretended an exclusive title to all offices which conferred profit and patronage.

The historian George Acropolita, who held the high charge of grand logothet or chancellor, has been induced, by wounded pride and affection, to record an anecdote which offers a truer and more graphic picture of the Emperor Theodore II.

¹ Acropolita, 58.

than is usually found in the pedantic pages of the Byzantine writers¹. The conditions of a treaty with Bulgaria had been arranged by the intermediation of Ouros, a Russian prince, father-in-law of Michael, king of Bulgaria. Theodore had bestowed on the Russian presents to the value of twenty thousand byzants. Before the ratification of the treaty was exchanged, a report prevailed that its terms would be rejected by the king of Bulgaria; and the emperor was induced to distrust the Russian by the insinuations of intriguing courtiers, who said that the negotiations had been entered into merely to gain time, and would of course be disavowed.

On the Feast of the Transfiguration (6th August) 1256, after the short sleep which invariably follows dinner during the summer heats throughout the East, the emperor mounted his horse to ride round his camp, which embraced a circumference of five miles. Theodore prided himself on the discipline of his army, and called his camp the movable city, which was the guardian of all the immovable cities of the empire. As he galloped off at a rapid pace, attended by his military staff, the chancellor, spurring his mule, attempted to keep his post of honour at his master's side; but neither his own flowing robes, nor the amble of his well-fed mule, were suited to the rapid movements of the emperor, and Theodore turned to the panting Acropolita and said, 'Moderate your pace, and join us at your leisure.'

The inspection of the camp terminated at a level eminence, to which Acropolita hastened by a direct road, in order to take his place in the circle round the emperor. The malicious suggestions of the discontented courtiers dwelt on the mind of Theodore; and he asked several of the great officers of his court if they had received information that the Russian was a deceiver, and that the treaty would not be ratified. The ministers of state replied that no such news had reached

¹ Acropolita was related to the imperial family, but his father remained at Constantinople, after its conquest by the Crusaders, in order to save his property from confiscation. In the year 1233 he sent his son George to be educated at the court of John III., and the future historian was brought up in the palace with Theodore II. After the recovery of Constantinople he was named Orator of the Church by Michael VIII. In 1274 he was sent as ambassador to the council of Lyons, and swore to the union of the Greek and Latin churches. In 1281 he was sent as envoy to Trebizond, to conclude an alliance with the Emperor John II. of Trebizond; not, as most writers, copying an inadvertency of Hankius (*De Byzantinorum Rerum Scriptoris*, 562), have said, to John, king of Bulgaria. He died in the following year. Acropolita, 25; Pachymeres, i. 354.

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them, and it seemed to them impossible, for no Christian prince could be guilty of such baseness. But to this the emperor observed, that Christian princes had often been found capable of performing strange actions to obtain large presents. He then turned to Acropolita, and asked him what he had to say. The chancellor replied, 'I agree with my colleagues in thinking the report destitute of all foundation; but if Ouros has deceived us, and perjured himself, then Heaven will avenge the just cause by giving us the victory.' This reply satisfied the emperor, who shortly after mounted his horse and returned towards his tent. The moon had already risen, and as Theodore rode slowly on, he renewed the conversation. Observing that Acropolita kept silence, he called to him. 'Well, grand logothet! tell us your opinion; the business concerns you especially.' To this the chancellor, with some display of dissatisfaction, answered, 'How does it concern me particularly? If I had neglected to see the treaty properly drawn up, or omitted any requisite formality in receiving the oath of the Russian, it would be a criminal neglect; but as this was done in due form, I cannot see how the business concerns me especially.' The emperor was falling into one of his fits of ill-humour. The demure aspect of the chancellor on his sleek mule contrasting with the parade of armed nobles and prancing war-horses, and perhaps the pedantic manner and dogmatic tone of his reply, exercised more influence on his master's uncertain temper than the historian suspected. The emperor repeated, 'Tell us what you think about the matter.' The chancellor replied, 'I believe there is more falsehood than truth in the report that the treaty will not be ratified; but I cannot pretend to form a decided opinion on a matter that is uncertain.' Theodore angrily exclaimed, 'It is precisely in uncertain matters that a correct judgment is wanted; every ass can give a decided opinion about what is evident.' To this Acropolita testily replied, 'So I have lived to be ranked as an ass.' Theodore then added, 'Yes, you were always a fool, and now you are doting.' The luckless chancellor, not yet sensible of his danger in bandying words with a passionate despot, or recollecting only his habits of intercourse with his youthful playfellow, again replied, 'Then it is better for a fool to be silent: let the wise speak.' Here

the emperor lost all command over his temper: Acropolita says he put his hand to his sword; at all events, he turned to Andronicus Muzalon, the grand domestikos, and said, 'Dismount him.' Muzalon approached Acropolita, who immediately dismounted, and was seized by two of the club-bearers of the guard, and bastinadoed with the rods they carried in their hands for the punishment of meaner offenders. The chancellor endured the blows for some time in silence, while the emperor and the great officers of state sat on their horses round; but at last, moved by the pain and the disgrace, he said aloud, 'O Lord Christ, why hast thou preserved my life in the hour of sickness to suffer this misery?' The tones of a voice so long endeared to him by friendship restored the emperor's judgment. Acropolita had been one of the few friends who displayed a sincere attachment to Theodore, when the influence of Marchesina had brought him into trouble with his father. The emperor turned away, saying to one of his officers, 'Take him with you.'

This officer asked the chancellor where he wished to go; but considering himself a prisoner, he recommended the officer to carry him to the tents of the Vardariot guards. When it appeared that the primikerios of the Vardariots received no orders to retain him prisoner, Acropolita retired to his own tent, where he shut himself up in the closest seclusion. He pretends that the emperor placed a guard to watch his movements, privately fearing that he might desert to Bulgaria, or fly to the Despot of Epirus. He remained in his tent a month, resisting the suggestions of his friends, and of many prelates and dignitaries of the court, that he should ask a private audience of the emperor. He had determined not to serve a prince who could treat his most devoted servants in such an unworthy manner. In the mean time, the treaty was ratified by the King of Bulgaria, the imperial camp was removed to Thessalonica, and negotiations were opened with the Despot of Epirus. Manuel Lascaris, the emperor's grand-uncle, and George Muzalon, the protoves-tiarios, at last visited Acropolita, and carried him, by the emperor's order, to a council of ministers. When the emperor arrived to take his place on the throne, Acropolita saluted him in the usual form, but stood behind the members of the council. The emperor, observing this, said to him, 'Take

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your place as usual;' and as Acropolita had neither resigned the office of chancellor, nor been removed from it, he placed himself by the emperor's side. Theodore then stated the relations of the empire with the Despot of Epirus, and gave his official orders to the chancellor as if nothing had occurred. Both shut up their feelings in their own breasts, and our interest in the personal relations of Theodore Lascaris and George Acropolita is lost in the stream of history¹.

The military administration of Theodore II. was able and successful. His wars with Bulgaria and Epirus extended the power of the empire, and prepared the Greeks for the recovery of Constantinople. He was hardly seated on the throne when Michael, king of Bulgaria, thinking that his seclusion from public business during the latter years of his father's reign would paralyze his activity, invaded Thrace, and overran all the country inhabited by a Bulgarian, Sclavonian, and Vallachian population. They were all willing to throw off the Greek yoke, and unite with their independent countrymen². The fortresses of Stenimachos, Prestitza, Kryt-zimos, and Tzepaina, with the forts in the province called Achridos, on Mount Rhodope, were captured almost without resistance³.

At the commencement of the year 1255, in the middle of winter, when the Bulgarians thought no Greek army would take the field, the Emperor Theodore II. marched to Adrianople, and after remaining a single night pushed forward to attack the Bulgarian camp on the banks of the Hebrus. The enemy, apprized of his approach, abandoned their intrenchments, and left all their stores to the Greeks. A heavy fall of snow, rendering the passage of Mount Haemus impracticable, compelled the emperor to lead his army back to Adrianople. From thence he detached a considerable force to clear the province of Achridos of the enemy's troops. This corps was ordered to join another body advancing from Serres, and then to effect a junction with the main army at Tzepaina. The body of troops which had been sent to Serres, under the command of Alexius Strategopoulos, suffered a disgraceful defeat from a small body of Bulgarians ;

¹ Acropolita, 69.² Acropolita, 58.³ This region of Achridos, mentioned both by Nicetas and Acropolita, must not be confounded with Achrida.

and the news of this disaster caused Dragotas, who had previously betrayed Melenikon to the Greeks, to surrender that important fortress to the Bulgarians. But the emperor had in the mean time, with wonderful rapidity, retaken Pristitza, Stenimachos, Krytzimos, and the towns on the northern slopes of Rhodope, between the valleys of the Hebrus and the Nestos; so that, on hearing of the defeat at Serres, he was able, without a moment's delay, to march on that place. He continued his advance to the pass of Roupe-lion, where the Strymon forces its way between precipitous rocks. The Bulgarians had fortified this strong position, but as soon as they were assailed by a corps of light troops, which occupied the summits overlooking the pass, they retreated. Their main body was overtaken and defeated. Dragotas was slain, and the emperor entered Melenikon in triumph on the following day. From Melenikon, Theodore removed his head-quarters to Thessalonica, and subsequently to Vodena, where he was detained some time by illness. On his recovery, he again placed himself at the head of the army, and took Prilapos and Velesos, after which he returned by Neustapolis through an arid and rocky district, in which the horses of the cavalry passed two days without water, to Strumitza, Melenikon, and Serres, where he encamped. All the conquests of the Bulgarians had been recovered in this long campaign, except the small fort of Patmon, in Achridos, and the frontier fortress of Tzepaina. Patmon was taken by one of the imperial generals; but at Makrolivada, about four days' march from Adrianople, the emperor, who proposed to besiege Tzepaina in person, was overtaken by a snow-storm, and compelled to put his army into winter-quarters¹.

Theodore returned to Asia, and passed the winter at Nymphaion, directing the civil administration of the empire with the same activity he had displayed in the conduct of its military affairs. The head-quarters of the army was at Didymoteichos, and the chief command was intrusted to Manuel Lascaris and Constantinos Margarites². These

¹ Acropolita, 59, 65.

² Constantinos Margarites, according to the insolent expression of Acropolita, was a rude soldier, brought up on barley bread and bran, whose pronunciation proclaimed his want of education. He was a native of Neokastron, in the valley of the Hermus, and held the office of grand tzaous. Acropolita, 67; Pachymeres, ii. 150.

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generals, in the spring of 1256, allowed themselves to be drawn into an engagement by the Bulgarians, who had enrolled in their service a strong body of Komans, and the Greeks were defeated. Margarites was taken prisoner, but Lascaris escaped to Adrianople. Theodore immediately hastened to Europe, and his presence soon restored discipline and confidence among the troops. The Komans were defeated with great loss, and the Bulgarian king, astonished at the ease with which the emperor converted his defeated soldiers into an attacking army, sent his father-in-law, the Russian prince Ouros, to treat for peace, as has been already mentioned. The treaty was concluded on the condition that the King of Bulgaria should withdraw all his troops to the north of Mount Haemus, and cede to the emperor the fortress of Tzepaina¹.

As soon as the affairs of Bulgaria were settled, the Emperor Theodore directed his attention to Epirus. The Despot Michael II., who had violated the treaty by which his son Nicephorus had engaged to marry the emperor's daughter Maria, now sent his wife and son Nicephorus to sue for peace on such terms as Theodore might think fit to dictate. The marriage of Nicephorus and Maria was celebrated at Thessalonica; but the emperor insisted on the cession of the city of Servia on the Haliacmon, and of Dyrrachium, before he would conclude a treaty of peace. Michael, finding that his wife and son were retained as hostages at the imperial court, consented to the cession of these valuable frontier fortresses.

The emperor returned to Asia with his army, leaving only small garrisons in a few fortresses in Europe. The inspection of the civil and military administration in the country between Berrhoea and Dyrrachium was intrusted to George Acropolita, who, the emperor observed, had laid aside the frankness of their former intercourse. He hoped that a short absence would efface entirely the memory of the chancellor's punishment; but Acropolita and Theodore never met again. Acropolita left Berrhoea on his tour of inspection in the month of December 1256. When he reached Prilapos, he found that the Albanian chiefs had revolted in the neighbouring mountains, and he was soon closely besieged, for the Despot Michael joined the insurgents, declared war with the empire,

¹ Acropolita, 69.

took Berrhoea and Vodena, and kept Michael Lascaris closely blockaded in Thessalonica.

Michael Palaeologos, a restless intriguer and an infamous hypocrite, but an able officer, was sent to take the command at Dyrrachium. He had been governor of Nicaea during the Bulgarian war; but, hearing that his uncle had been arrested on a charge of treason, he abandoned his high office, and fled to the Turks. This conduct might have been considered a proof that he had been connected with treasonable intrigues by a sovereign less suspicious than Theodore; but Palaeologos contrived to produce a feeling in his favour, by despatching a circular before his flight to all the officers under his orders, ordering them to pay the strictest attention to their duty, for he had only withdrawn himself to gain time, and he hoped to be able to prove to the emperor the injustice of the accusations which had been brought against him by his enemies. These letters, and the good offices of the Bishop of Iconium, obtained his pardon. On returning to court, he took a solemn oath, confirmed by terrible imprecations, that he would preserve inviolable fidelity to the emperor and his infant son. He was then sent to command the troops at Dyrrachium.

The arrival of Palaeologos at Thessalonica revived the courage of the Greeks. He led the troops out to meet the enemy; and in a skirmish near Vodena dismounted Theodore, the natural son of the Despot Michael, who commanded the Epirots. The young Theodore was slain by a Turk in the imperial service before he was recognized. This success opened the road to Dyrrachium, to which Palaeologos marched with the greatest haste, visiting Prilapos, and affording Acropolita some temporary relief on his way. But as soon as he quitted the neighbourhood, the Despot Michael again occupied the passes; and the inhabitants of Prilapos, cut off from all communication with Thessalonica and Dyrrachium, became tired of a war in which they had no direct interest, and opened their gates to the Epirot troops. Acropolita, unable to defend the citadel, capitulated on condition that he should be allowed to retire with the garrison to Thessalonica; but the despot, in violation of this capitulation, detained him a prisoner, and even confined him for some time chained in a dungeon. The campaign of 1257 proved extremely unfavour-

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able to the Greeks ; and the illness of the emperor prevented his taking the field in person, in the year 1258, to recover the ground lost by his generals.

The latter days of Theodore were afflicted by fearful attacks of epilepsy, which produced such an effect on his temper that he appeared at times to be affected with temporary insanity. Participating in the prejudices of his age, he suspected that his malady was increased by the sortileges of his enemies ; and this suspicion opened a door for many intrigues at his court, and for the most iniquitous accusations. The only way to escape condemnation, when a charge of this nature was made, consisted in undergoing the ordeal of holding red-hot iron in the hand : and the historian Pachymeres declares that he saw this trial undergone without injury¹. At this time, Michael Palaeologos was the most popular man among the nobility. The failing health of the emperor, and the youth of the emperor's son, prepared men for a revolution in the order of succession ; and many already spoke of the title of Palaeologos to the imperial crown as better founded than that of the reigning family, for Michael was descended from the eldest daughter of Alexius III. It was fortunate for Michael Palaeologos that he was absent from the court. He was an accomplished hypocrite, and his apparent frankness of manner seemed so incompatible with the falsehood and dissimulation which formed the basis of his character, that he deceived the prudence of John III., and concealed his unprincipled ambition even from the suspicious Theodore. But had Michael Palaeologos been near the court, he would in all probability have lost his eyesight during one of the emperor's fits of passion. As it was, the emperor committed an unpardonable outrage on his family. Martha, the sister of Michael, had a beautiful daughter, whom the emperor ordered the family to bestow in marriage on one of his pages named Valanidiotes. The young man gained the affections of the high-born damsel, when the emperor, changing his mind, forced her to marry a man of her own rank. A report that this marriage was not consummated, induced Theodore to suspect that both this event and a violent attack of his disease was caused by some charm the mother had used.

¹ Pachymeres, i. 17.

He became furious, and ordered Martha, though she was allied to the imperial family, to be enclosed in a sack with a number of cats, which were pricked with javelins, that they might torture the unfortunate lady. She was brought into court with the sack fastened at her neck, and examined concerning her supposed incantations, but nothing could be extracted from her by this infamous tyranny¹. The emperor, fearing that Michael Palaeologos, on hearing how his sister had been treated, might join the Despot of Epirus, or raise the standard of revolt, sent an officer to arrest him before the news could reach Dyrrachium. Michael, when brought to Magnesia as a prisoner, contrived, by his insinuating manners, again to allay the suspicions of Theodore, who, finding that his end was fast approaching, was anxious to secure his fidelity to his infant son. The emperor believed that he had destroyed the most dangerous enemies of his house by depriving Constantine Strategopoulos and Theodore Philes of sight, and cutting out the tongue of Nicephorus Alyattes².

Theodore Lascaris II. died at Magnesia in the month of August 1258, in the thirty-seventh year of his age, and was buried in the monastery of Sosander by the side of his father³. With all his faults, Theodore II. had many generous feelings, and he was a liberal prince to his people. Though he accumulated a considerable treasure in the fort of Astyza on the Scamander, as his father had done in the citadel of Magnesia, his government was nevertheless more free from financial oppression than that of the Greek emperors generally. His military arrangements for the protection of his dominions were extremely judicious. The mountain fortresses that covered the plains of Asia from the incursions of the Turks

¹ This mode of torture has not fallen into disuse in Greece. Sir Edmund Lyons had occasion to call the attention of the British government to the fact that a woman had been tortured in a similar way, to force from her some evidence concerning acts of brigandage. If Great Britain had compelled the regent Armanberg to organize instead of ruining the municipal institutions of the Greeks, and taken care that the money furnished by England should be spent on roads and maritime communications, in place of being wasted on Bavarian regents, Bavarian troops, and a Bavarian palace, our Foreign Secretary would have been troubled with fewer despatches about brigandage and piracy; and Greece would have been in a much more prosperous state than it is after ten years of self-government; (this was written in 1853).

² Acropolita, 85; Pachymeres, i. 12.

³ He did not reign quite four years. Acropolita, 85. Compare Nicephorus Gregoras, 30 and 35.

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and Turkomans were carefully garrisoned, and the highland population that furnished the local guards for the mountain passes was freed from the payment of the land-tax¹. Theodore also displayed a sincere love of learning, though his attention was exclusively directed to theology and legendary history. He was unpopular among the Greek nobility, because he conferred official appointments with reference to the merits of the candidates, making small account of the aristocratic pretensions of the Byzantine families, who would fain have reserved every place of honour and emolument in the court and public administration to themselves and their connections². This pretension of the Constantinopolitan nobles naturally became more offensive to the other Greeks when the capital was removed from Byzantium. The piety of Theodore was irreproachable, but he steadily excluded the patriarch and clergy from all interference in politics; and this circumstance generally marks a period of prosperity in the administration of the Eastern Empire³.

John IV. was eight years old at his father's death. George Muzalon, his father's prime-minister, was appointed tutor to the young emperor, and regent during his minority. The Patriarch Arsenios was joined with him as a colleague. Muzalon, knowing that a powerful party among the nobility was hostile to his administration, feared an insurrection; he therefore assembled a council of all the officers of state and leading nobles, and offered to resign the regency, proposing that the assembly should immediately elect his successor. Muzalon appears not to have fathomed the ambition or suspected the hypocrisy of Michael Palaeologos, who was his wife's uncle; but Michael had already determined to make the unpopularity of Muzalon the means for usurping the throne; and he perceived that if another regent should be named, and Muzalon remain tutor to the young emperor, all immediate hope of effecting a revolution would be annihilated for the time. He therefore used all his influence to induce the council to ratify the choice of the late emperor, and Muzalon was easily persuaded to assume the office of regent when he saw his authority thus confirmed.

In the mean time, a powerful party was plotting the ruin

¹ Pachymeres, i. 7.² Pachymeres, i. 20.³ Pachymeres, i. 58.

of the regent, whom many regarded as the principal author of the cruelties of Theodore. The immense wealth and numerous households of a few families enabled them to make the people of Magnesia their partisans. The troops alone were exempt from their influence, but the military were in general attached to Michael Palaeologos, and hostile to Muzalon. Numerous predictions were circulated, which foretold that Michael Palaeologos was destined to reign¹. As grand constable he commanded the foreign auxiliaries, and these troops displayed a seditious spirit, under the pretence that they were deprived of a donative which the late emperor was about to confer on them. The conspirators also spread a report that Muzalon had caused the death of Theodore II. by his sortileges, in order to act as regent. The memory of Theodore was popular both among the soldiers and the citizens, and it was therefore necessary to separate the cause of the regent from that of the young emperor in order to secure success. A revolution was soon planned. While the clergy, the officers of state, and the ladies of the court were performing the funeral ceremonies appropriated to the ninth day after Theodore's death, at the monastery of Sosander, a band of soldiers burst into the church and murdered Muzalon, his two brothers, his son-in-law, and his secretary². The regent was stabbed at the altar; the dead bodies were hewed in pieces by the mob; the palace of the Muzalons was burned, and their property plundered; yet no civil or military authority attempted to stop the assassins or check the disorders of the populace.

Michael Palaeologos was only one of many conspirators who had plotted the murder of Muzalon, but he resolved to be the principal gainer by the crime. The pretensions that might have been advanced to the regency by the families of Lascaris, Vatatzes, Nestongos, Tornikes, Strategopoulos, Philes, Kaballarios, Philanthropenos, Cantacuzenos, Aprenos, and Libadarios, were withdrawn. The popularity of Palaeologos with the military, and his superior talents, pointed him

¹ See an absurd story concerning the Bishop of Dyrrachium and the Archbishop of Thessalonica in Pachymeres, i. 15.

² The private secretary of Muzalon was murdered in the tumult, on account of his resemblance to the protovestiarios, and the similarity of his dress, all persons wearing mourning at the ceremony. He was a relation of the historian George Pachymeres (i. 33).

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out as the fittest man to conduct the government; but he declined the office until he had secured the approbation of the Patriarch Arsenios, the surviving tutor of the young emperor, and the Patriarch was then absent at Nicaea. In the mean time, Palaeologos was named Grand-duke, an office which gave him no direct control over the finances. The treasury was under the guard of a special body of Varangians, and could only be opened by certain officers on the presentation of warrants duly countersigned by the heads of the various departments in the imperial administration. Palaeologos, nevertheless, contrived by his intrigues and frauds to obtain the issue of money, unauthorized by the strict rules and immediate exigencies of the public service; and this money was employed in gaining the nobility, the military, and the clergy to support his party. His liberality to others, and his personal indifference to money, greatly increased his popularity. While others were enriched by his favour, his own fortune remained small, his household was conducted with the greatest simplicity, and its expense was limited to three byzants a-day¹. When the Patriarch returned to Magnesia, Michael Palaeologos was, by universal consent, and at the particular suggestion of the clergy, invested with the office of tutor to the Emperor John IV. He was soon after honoured with the rank of Despot, second only to that of Basileus, and became invested with absolute control over every branch of the administration.

But the throne was always considered the only safe resting-place for political intriguers of the highest rank in the Eastern Empire, and Palaeologos was determined to keep the power he had obtained. His partisans were therefore instructed to declaim in favour of an elective monarchy, and of the necessity of giving the young emperor an able colleague, as the only chance of avoiding, or, at all events, of crushing rebellion. The plans of Palaeologos were also furthered by the news of a coalition, formed by the Despot of Epirus, the King of Sicily, and the Prince of Achaia, for the conquest of Thessalonica and the European provinces of the empire. The military and the partisans of Palaeologos loudly demanded the

¹ Pachymeres (i. 42) says he heard Michael give evidence to this effect, on oath, in a lawsuit relating to the dowry of his niece. Concerning the treasury, compare Pachymeres, i. 41; and Nicephorus Gregoras, 41.

election of an emperor capable of averting the danger, and succeeded in obtaining the proclamation of Michael VIII. on the 1st January 1259¹. The election was conducted with unusual formalities. Michael was publicly raised on a shield, supported on one side by bishops, and on the other by nobles; while the people, the native legions, and the Latin and Sclavonian mercenaries, hailed him with acclamations. Before the ceremony he signed a written certificate of his having sworn, in presence of the Patriarch, to restore the full sovereignty to the young emperor, John IV., on his attaining his majority, and not to advance any claim to the imperial dignity in favour of his heirs. In consequence of this oath, the prelates of the Greek church, who were generally servile instruments of the court, pronounced a sentence declaring that Michael Palaeologos did not violate the oaths he had taken to John III. and Theodore II. by accepting the crown on these conditions. The Patriarch Arsenios disapproved of this evasion, and refused to take any part in the election; but his suspicions and distrust were allayed by the hypocritical assurances and modest demeanour of Michael.

At the coronation the usurper dropped his mask, and yet the Patriarch was weak enough to betray the trust imposed on him as tutor to the Emperor John IV. It was understood that the ceremony of the coronation of the two emperors

¹ The reasons for placing the proclamation of Michael VIII. (Palaeologos) in 1259 require explanation, as his reign has invariably been supposed by modern writers to commence in 1260. Pachymeres says expressly (i. 48 and 61) that he was proclaimed on the 1st of the month Hekatombaion of the second indiction. This must be January 1, 1259, for the second indiction began on the 1st of September 1258, and terminated on the 31st August 1259. Again, Pachymeres (i. 360) says that Michael died on the 11th of Skirophorion, A.M. 6791 (11th December 1282), after a reign of twenty-four years. Concerning this date no doubt exists. Ducange, however, to get rid of the difficulty caused by fixing the proclamation of Michael in 1260, says that Pachymeres is in error concerning the length of Michael's reign, which was only twenty-three years. *Fam. Aug. Byz.* 233. Several passages may be adduced to prove that there is no error in the text of Pachymeres in this place. He says (ii. 4) that Andronicus II. was twenty-four years old at his father's death; and at the termination of his history he says it records the events of forty-nine years, the age of the Emperor Andronicus II. Now, the history begins at the commencement of the reign of Michael, which, being twenty-four years before the accession of Andronicus, must be in 1259. The dates and events recorded by Acropolita agree with this. The catalogue of the Patriarchs in Banduri's *Imperium Orientale* (i. 200) appears from Banduri's note (ii. 932) to have mentioned the third year of Michael's reign as the year in which Constantinople was retaken by the Greeks. The accuracy of Ducange requires that his slightest error should be carefully rectified. Possin's chronological tables to Pachymeres hardly deserve so much attention as they have received.

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was to take place at the same time in the cathedral of Nicaea. The coronation of the young emperor must in that case have preceded that of his colleague. To avoid this, Michael concerted with a number of bishops that the coronation of John IV. should be deferred, but without allowing the Patriarch to hear anything of their plan. When the moment arrived to receive the crown, Michael stepped forward alone. The Patriarch called for John IV., and refused to proceed with the ceremony: but neither law, honour, morality, nor religion were then predominant in the Greek mind; and the majority of the bishops present having been previously gained, the Patriarch, finding himself unsupported by the clergy, was so compliant as to perform the ceremony. The only prelate who made a long resistance was the Archbishop of Thessalonica. He refused to sign the coronation act, though he was reproached with having predicted that Michael was destined to reign, and he only yielded when the tumultuous cries of the populace and the threats of the Varangian guards backed the instances of the senators, and made him fear that little respect would be shown for the sanctity of his episcopal character by an assembly engaged in violating the law and constitution of the empire.

The first orders given by Michael VIII., after his coronation, were intended to allay all suspicions concerning his ulterior intentions. A clause was inserted in the oath of allegiance which was administered to all the subjects of the empire, binding them to take up arms against either of the emperors who should attempt any enterprise against the other. This measure was probably forced on Michael by the Patriarch's opposition. But he secured many personal supporters by lavishing the public money. To gain new friends and reward his partisans, the pay of the senators was increased, large donations were bestowed on the troops, great promotions were made among the officers, the state debtors were released, and many new pensions were granted. The mob was bribed by largesses, the people were flattered by public harangues, and the nobles were entertained by festivals. In short, Michael Palaeologos commenced his reign by wasting the public wealth, which John III. and Theodore II. had collected, by corrupting the people, and by weakening the power of the law. By acting the part of an unprincipled demagogue, he became

a successful usurper. He lived to reap the bitter fruits of his criminal conduct. The lavish expenditure by which he had gained the throne created a permanent burden on the finances; to defend his crown he was compelled to oppress his subjects with new exactions, and the powerful armies which the popularity of John III. and Theodore II. had enabled them to bring into the field against foreign enemies, were, during the latter years of the reign of Michael, employed to repress the rebellious disposition of the Greeks.

The position of the empire at the period of Michael's election was extremely favourable to its extension, and had the new emperor been able to pursue the domestic policy traced out by his two predecessors, a great increase in the population and resources of the Greeks in Asia Minor must have followed. The imperial armies were numerous and well organized, the inhabitants of the mountainous districts of Phrygia and Bithynia formed a bold and active militia, which not only garrisoned a line of forts that commanded all the roads, bridges, and mountain passes, but also furnished an efficient body of infantry for foreign service. The bowmen from the country round Nicaea occupied at this time a prominent place in the Greek armies, and in general the courage and quality of the native troops showed great improvement. This arose in part from the advance which had taken place in the social position of the Greek peasantry after the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders. The cultivators of the soil were now in many cases the proprietors of the lands they tilled, and they fought like men who possessed rights and privileges which they would sacrifice their lives to defend¹.

While the Greek empire had been gradually recovering strength, the neighbouring states had rapidly declined. The empires of the Seljouk Turks of Iconium, and of the Belgians at Constantinople, which had successively threatened the Greek nation with extinction, were both humbled. The Turkish empire was rent into fragments by civil wars, in which fathers, sons, and brothers of the line of Seljouk were arrayed in arms against one another. Tyranny ruined its resources, and the invasions of the Moguls completed its

¹ The bowmen of Nicaea are frequently mentioned. Acropolita, 93; Pachymeres, i. 79, 129, 146.

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ruin. Gaṡaseddin Kaikhosrou II., who died in 1247, was a weak and luxurious prince. His son, Azeddin Kaikous II., after sustaining several defeats from the Tartar armies, was driven from his dominions by his brother, Rokneddin Kilidji-Arslan IV., and sought safety from the fraternal discord which seemed the inheritance of his race, by retiring into the Greek empire.

Baldwin II., emperor of Constantinople, after begging succours over all Europe, and wasting the supplies he received from the ambition of the Pope and the generosity of St. Louis in maintaining an imperial court, lived by tearing the copper from the domes of the public buildings erected by the Byzantine emperors, which he coined into money, and by borrowing gold from Venetian bankers, in whose hands he placed his eldest son Philip as a pledge¹. To such a miserable condition was the empire of the Crusaders now reduced, and so great was the diminution of the military class in the Latin population, that the only efficient guard at Constantinople was maintained by Venetian merchants, and the existence of the empire was dependent on foreign succours. No body of foreign mercenaries ever consumed the resources of a conquered country with greater rapacity or weakened their own strength by their own misconduct more rapidly than the Latin conquerors of Constantinople. In order to exhibit the full extent of the social and political vices of their government it would be necessary to institute a comparison between it and the early administration of the Othoman Sultans in the same countries.

The kingdom of Bulgaria was a principal object of attention in conducting the foreign affairs of the Greek empire, both on account of its power and the contiguity of its frontier. A considerable part of the imperial territory in Europe was, moreover, inhabited by Bulgarians and Sclavonians, who were now almost amalgamated into one people. While John Asan reigned in Bulgaria, he had maintained the balance between the Latin and Greek empires; but his death, the youth of his sons, the independent position of the great Bulgarian nobles, and the low state of civilization in the country, combined to render the kingdom a scene of anarchy, and to

¹ Philip remained long in pledge at Venice. The lenders were of the family of Capello. Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, 151.

destroy its influence abroad. Constantine Tech at length rendered himself master of the throne, by expelling Mytzes, the last sovereign of the family of Asan. Constantine had allied himself with Theodore II., and espoused his daughter Irene, but he was too weak to engage in war with Michael VIII., and the usurper, anxious to secure peace on the northern frontier in order to direct his forces against the Latins, sent Acropolita, who had been released from his captivity in Epirus, as ambassador to the court of Constantine, king of Bulgaria, in 1260¹.

The only frontier power that possessed the internal strength and energy necessary for disputing the progress of the Greek empire, at this time, was Epirus. But the territories ruled by the Despot Michael were inhabited by a population consisting of various races, which showed no disposition to amalgamate into one nation. Sclavonians, Vallachians, Albanians, and Greeks occupied considerable territories, in which they were separately governed by their respective usages, institutions, and laws, and each defended its local administration both against its neighbours and the prince. The power of the Despot of Epirus was consequently less despotic than that of most contemporary princes; but the warlike disposition of a great portion of his subjects rendered him a dangerous neighbour.

Michael VIII., as soon as he acquired the direction of the government, endeavoured to conclude peace with the Despot of Epirus, who had extended his conquests to the banks of the Vardar. The emperor offered to allow him to retain his conquests, on condition that he released his two prisoners, Acropolita and Chavaron; but the despot, having formed an alliance with Manfred, king of Sicily, and William, prince of Achaia, expected by their assistance to become master of Thessalonica, and indulged in the hope of expelling the emperor's troops from Europe. When Michael Palaeologos found that war was inevitable, he sent his brother John with a considerable army to oppose the despot (A.D. 1259). The Epirot camp was established at Kastoria; but John Palaeologos, penetrating suddenly into upper Macedonia by the pass of Vodena, compelled the despot to abandon his posi-

¹ Acropolita, 97.

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tion in great haste. The Greeks regained possession of Achrida, Deavolis, Prespa, Pelagonia, and Soskos, while the despot, retiring behind the chain of Pindus, waited for the arrival of four hundred knights, who had been sent to his aid by Manfred, king of Sicily, and of a considerable body of Latin troops under the command of William, prince of Achaia. When he was joined by these auxiliaries, his army was much stronger than that of the Greeks, and he resumed the offensive. Advancing by the pass of Vorilas, he recovered possession of Stanon, Soskos, and Molykos, and pressed forward to relieve Prilapos, which the Greeks had invested. The best troops in the army of John Palaeologos consisted of light cavalry from the Turkish tribes at the mouth of the Danube and from the nomade hordes in Asia Minor. This cavalry was supported by a body of the famous archers of Bithynia, and both were under the command of experienced officers, trained under the firm discipline of the Emperors John III. and Theodore II. This force retired before the Despot Michael in perfect order, cutting off the foraging parties, and harassing the advance of the Latin heavy-armed cavalry, until an opportunity presented itself of attacking the main body of the Epirot army in the plain of Pelagonia. The attack was said to have been favoured by secret communications with John Dukas, the natural son of the Despot Michael, who, in right of his wife, was Prince of the Vallachians of Thessaly. John Dukas is said to have been grossly insulted by some French knights. It is certain that, whether there was treachery or not, the Epirot army was completely defeated, and William, prince of Achaia, with many Latin nobles, was taken prisoner¹. John Palaeologos, with one division of the victorious army, advanced into Greece and plundered Livadeca; the other, under Alexis Strategopoulos, took Joannina and Arta, and delivered Acropolita.

¹ The chronicle of the conquest of the Morea mentions the place where the battle was fought, and it is confirmed by Acropolita. French text, p. 134; Greek, verse 2627; Acropolita, 94. The passages which fix the date of this battle confirm the chronology adopted in this volume, and prove that Michael VIII. was proclaimed emperor on the 1st January 1259; for he was already emperor when he sent his brother to command against the Despot of Epirus. Acropolita, 93. The battle took place in autumn, two years before the taking of Constantinople. Compare Gregoras, 43, and Pachymeres, i. 51. That the battle occurred in 1259 is also confirmed by the observations of the Duke de Luynes. Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 175.

The Despot of Epirus fled to Leucadia, where he assembled new forces. The imperial generals hastened to pass the winter at the court of Michael VIII., in order to secure their portion of the rewards which were there distributed with a lavish hand. In the following year (1260) Alexis Strategopoulos, who remained in Epirus to conduct the war, was defeated and taken prisoner at Tricorythos by Nicephorus, the eldest son of the Despot Michael. The best part of the Bithynian archers perished in this battle; but Strategopoulos was fortunate enough to be soon released from captivity, and he was immediately intrusted with the command of the army in Thrace, where accident gave him the glory of being the conqueror of Constantinople¹. The war continued in Epirus, sustained by the national aversion of the Albanians and Vallachians to the imperial government, but without being productive of any important results.

The successful campaign of 1259, and the captivity of the Prince of Achaia, deprived the Latin empire of its most useful allies. Michael VIII. availed himself of this favourable moment to attempt the reconquest of Constantinople. The Emperor Baldwin II. was too weak to defend his capital, if left to his own resources; and the Venetians no longer possessed that command of the sea which insured their being able to introduce succours into the place during a siege, for the republics of Venice and Genoa were then engaged in a war remarkable for the fierce animosity of the combatants, and distinguished by a succession of well-contested and bloody naval battles. The Emperor Michael, in the year 1260, took the command of the Greek army in Thrace, and, after storming Selymbria, advanced to the walls of Constantinople. As he advanced without a sufficiency of military stores for forming a permanent camp, and without engines for commencing a regular siege, there seems no doubt that he counted on aid from secret friends within the walls. The traitor was said to be a French noble named Anseau; but he proved unable or unwilling to complete his treason; and Michael, after waiting in vain for the concerted aid, made several

¹ Alexis Strategopoulos was twice taken prisoner in Epirus—first at Tricorythos, and subsequently after the taking of Constantinople, when he was consigned to Manfred, king of Sicily, who exchanged him for his sister Anne, the widow of the Emperor John III. Pachymeres, i. 53.

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attempts to carry the suburb of Galata by storm¹. These attacks being repulsed, he concluded a truce for a year with the Emperor Baldwin.

Michael determined to renew his attack on Constantinople as soon as the truce expired. He felt that the conquest of the imperial city could alone throw a veil over his usurpation. As the restorer of the Byzantine empire, he could advance a new claim to the homage of the Greeks. In the spring of 1261 he signed a treaty with the republic of Genoa, by which he granted the Genoese various commercial privileges, and renewed all the concessions made to them by the Emperor Manuel². Both parties bound themselves to carry on war with Venice, and not to conclude either truce or peace, unless by mutual consent. The emperor, in the event of his conquering Constantinople, promised to put the Genoese in possession of the palace, castle, church, and domain held by the Venetians; and the Genoese promised to furnish the emperor with a fleet to aid his conquest³. By this treaty the convention—concluded under the auspices of Pope Gregory IX. in 1238, binding the republics of Genoa and Venice not to ally themselves with the Greek emperor, except by mutual consent—was annulled, and the foundation was laid of the great commercial ascendancy which the Genoese acquired in the Black Sea⁴.

While the Emperor Michael was waiting for the expiry of the truce and the arrival of the Genoese fleet, he sent Alexis Strategopoulos, who had just returned from his captivity in Epirus, to take the command of the troops in Thrace, ordering him to collect a force on the frontier, and enter the Latin territory as soon as the truce expired, in order that no time might be lost in forming the siege of Constantinople on the arrival of the Genoese fleet, when Michael proposed assuming the command of his army in person⁵.

¹ Ducange is not sure whether the supposed traitor was Anseau de Cabieu or Anseau de Poucy. *Hist. de Constantinople*, 152.

² See p. 154 of this volume, note 1.

³ This treaty is dated at Nymphaeum, 13th March, and was ratified at Genoa on the 10th July 1261. It is given in Latin by Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, *Recueil des Chartes*, p. 9; and in French by Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 462.

⁴ The alliance of the Genoese with the Greeks brought them into very bad repute with the popes and the French, who excited public opinion against them as half heretics. The prejudice is perpetuated in Italian proverbs.

⁵ A Genoese fleet, consisting of ten galleys and six large ships, was despatched

The Latin seigneurs had found their property, even in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, so insecure, that they had sold it to the Greek cultivators of the soil. The Greeks had also established themselves as farmers of the imperial possessions confiscated at the foundation of the Latin empire. They were thus the only inhabitants of the district protected by the vicinity of Constantinople from the ravages of the Greek and Bulgarian armies; and their position enabled them, during the increasing weakness of the Latin government, to acquire a certain independence. In a feudal empire, they lived exempt from feudal ties; and in order to defend their property, they formed themselves into an armed militia, called *Voluntaries*, which pretended to maintain a kind of neutrality in the war between the Latins and the Greeks. *Strategopoulos* opened communications with the chiefs of the *Voluntaries*, whose national feelings induced them to favour the Greek cause, and he found them willing to aid in gaining immediate possession of Constantinople. Their daily communications with the city enabled them to give him accurate information of all that passed among the Latins.

As soon as the truce expired, *Strategopoulos* led the troops under his command into the neighbourhood of Constantinople; but the Latins took no immediate precautions for defence, knowing that the force under his command was inadequate to besiege the city. Elated by their successful resistance during the preceding year, and by the arrival of *Marc Gradenigo*, a new Venetian *podestat*, with a few galleys, they determined to mark the expiry of the truce by striking the first blow; and their object was to recover possession of *Daphnusia* or *Sozopolis* on the Black Sea¹. *Marc Gradenigo* was anxious to secure a port of refuge for the Venetian vessels when pursued by the Genoese and cut off by adverse winds from entering the Bosphorus. He persuaded the

to aid in the siege of Constantinople immediately after the ratification of the treaty, but when it arrived the Greeks were already in possession of the city. The emperor engaged by this treaty to put the Genoese in possession of the city and port of Smyrna, and to close the Black Sea against all flags of the Western nations, except those of Genoa and Pisa.

¹ *Acropolita*, 99, with the note of *Leo Allatius*; *Pachymeres*, i. 90; *Nicephorus Gregoras*, 49. The ancient *Apollonia* was also in great part on an island; and *Daphnusia* appears, strictly speaking, to have been the name given to the island of St. John.

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Emperor Baldwin to allow him to embark the best part of the garrison in the fleet, which consisted of thirty galleys and a Sicilian galleon of great size; the absence of this, which amounted to several thousand men, afforded the Greeks a favourable occasion for executing their plan of taking Constantinople by surprise. A leader of the Voluntaries, named Koutritzakes, had secured assistance within the walls; Strategopoulos gradually brought his army close to the city, and everything was prepared for the execution of the enterprise. At midnight, Strategopoulos and Koutritzakes, with a chosen body of soldiers, approached a spot where their friends in the city informed them that no resistance would be offered. The scaling-ladders were planted, and the Greek troops entered Constantinople without opposition. The guard at the gate of the Fountain was surprised, and the gate, which had been built up for greater security, was broken open before any alarm could be given. The imperial troops then marched into the city, and took possession of the land wall. In this position things remained until the dawn of day enabled the Greek general to advance. The troops who attempted to dispute his passage to the imperial palace were defeated; and the Emperor Baldwin, finding that the enemy was rapidly approaching, instead of seizing some post which he could have defended until the expedition returned from Daphnusia, basely abandoned his empire, embarked in a vessel at anchor in the port, and fled to Euboea. His crown, sceptre, and sword, all equally useless to such a mean-spirited coward, were found by the Greek soldiers who entered his deserted palace, and carried in triumph through the streets.

The Frank and Venetian inhabitants were numerous and brave. They soon formed a force capable of defending that portion of the city in which their warehouses were situated, and of preserving the command of the port. Strategopoulos saw their preparations for defence with some anxiety, for the sudden return of the fleet from Daphnusia might have exposed him to be driven from his conquest, or forced him to defend his position by burning the greater part of the city. By the advice of a Greek, named Phylax, who had served in the household of Baldwin, he lost no time in employing fire to dislodge his opponents while it was still in his power to direct its course. The outer houses of the

Frank and Venetian quarters were set on fire, but all communications between these quarters and the port were allowed to remain free from attack. By this manœuvre they were compelled to turn all their attention to embarking their wives and children, with their jewels and money, leaving the Greeks to occupy the whole line of the fortifications and secure every post of strength.

When the news that the Greeks had entered Constantinople reached the troops at Daphnusia, they returned with all speed to the capital; but they found the ramparts manned by the Greek army, with the exception of a small portion towards the port, which was separated from the city by a mass of burning houses or impassable ruins. Only a small part of the Latin families had embarked, so that both sides were ready to conclude a truce. Under the guarantee of this cessation of hostilities, the Latins carried their families and much of their wealth on board the ships in the port; but the crowd was so great that, before they could reach Euboea or the islands in the Archipelago, many perished from want of food and water¹.

¹ Constantinople was taken by the Greeks on the 25th July 1261, after the Latins had possessed it fifty-seven years, three months, and eleven days. Compare Acropolita, 100; Pachymeres, i. 95; Niceph. Greg. 50; and Boivin's Notes, Phrantzes, p. 19, edit. Bonn. These authors disagree strangely in their chronology; but it is not difficult to correct their discrepancies.

CHAPTER II.

GREEK EMPIRE OF CONSTANTINOPLE UNDER THE DYNASTY OF PALAEOLOGOS, A.D. 1261-1453.

SECT. I.—*Michael VIII.*, A.D. 1261-1282.

Conservative spirit in which the Eastern Empire was restored.—Michael's entry into Constantinople.—Deposition of John IV.—Excommunication of Michael.—Popular discontent.—Decline of Constantinople.—Administration of Michael VIII.—Establishment of the Genoese in the Greek empire.—Treaties with Venice.—Decline of the Greek population.—First appearance of the Othoman Turks.—Re-establishment of Greek influence in the Peloponnesus.—Treaty of Viterbo.—War in Thessaly.—Treaty of Orvieto.—Affairs of Bulgaria.—State of the Greek church.—Union of the Greek and Latin churches.—Death of Michael VIII.

THE conquest of Constantinople restored the Greeks to a dominant position in the East; but the character of the people, the constitution of the imperial government, and the hierarchy of the orthodox church, were all equally unfit for reform. The Greek nation made no use of this favourable crisis in its history for developing its material resources, augmenting its moral influence, and increasing its wealth and population. The first idea of the emperor, of the people, of the government, and of the clergy, was to constitute the new Greek empire on the old standard, which had perished when the Crusaders destroyed the Byzantine empire. This vain attempt to inspire dead forms with life, impressed on the Greek empire of Constantinople the marks of premature decrepitude. The Emperor Michael, the imperial court, the orthodox church, were hardly established in Constantinople before the whole fabric of Greek nationality exhibited strong

characteristics of a torpid and stubborn old age; and the history of the empire takes the monotonous type which it retained for nearly two centuries, until the Othoman Turks put an end to its existence. There is little interest, but there is much instruction, in the records of this torpid society, which, while it was visibly declining to the eyes of others, boasted that its wisdom and experience had brought its political government, its civil laws, and its ecclesiastical dogmas, to a state of perfection. Conservatism is constantly deluding the minds of political philosophers with the hope of giving a permanent duration to some cherished virtue in society. It becomes frequently a disease of statesmen in long-established despotisms. The condition of mankind in China and Hindostan has been influenced for many centuries by this delusion of the human mind; and in the first page of this work it was observed that the institutions of imperial Rome displayed the same tendency to fix society in immutable forms and classes by legislative enactments. The same idea now not only pervaded the government and the church of the Greek empire, but was also transfused into the national mind. A people possessing a rich and noble literature, imbued with sentiments of liberty and truth, turned a deaf ear to the wisdom of its ancestors and to the voice of reason; and repugned alike independence of thought and the desire of improvement. The causes of this strange phenomenon appear to have been partly religious bigotry, and partly a wish to maintain political union among the Greek race. The Greeks hated the Catholics with a fervour which obscured their intellectual vision; and they were justly alarmed at the danger which their nation incurred, both from its geographical location and from the power of its enemies, of being broken up into a number of dependent and insignificant states. The opinion that this evil could be averted by the power of orthodoxy and the conservative principles of the Roman administration was generally embraced; and every existing relic of a state of things which had long passed away was carefully preserved. The Greeks gloried in the name of Romans; they clung to the forms of the imperial government without seeking to restore its military energy; they retained the Roman code, without preserving the systematic administration of justice, which rendered that code a blessing to

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mankind under a despotic government; and they prided themselves on the orthodoxy of a church in which the clergy, deprived of independence, lived in a state of vassalage to the imperial court. Such a society could only wither, though it might wither slowly.

On the other hand, it may perhaps be doubtful whether the state of society would have enabled the Greek nation to revive its national energy, by reforming its central administration according to the exigencies of the present, instead of modelling it on theories of the past. The progress of the people required that the system of municipal institutions should be ameliorated in order to avert the tendency of local interests to produce political separation. But, above all things, it was necessary that the Greeks should voluntarily concede to their own countrymen that religious liberty which the Genoese and the Turks were compelled, by the force of circumstances, to grant to strangers, and allow the Greek Catholics to worship according to their own forms, and to build churches for themselves. To increase the national wealth, it was necessary that commercial freedom should be secured to native merchants, and that the imperial government should be deprived of the power of selling monopolies, or granting exclusive privileges of trade to the Italian republics, in order to purchase political and military assistance. To do all this would have been extremely difficult, for many interests and prejudices opposed the necessary reforms.

Michael Palaeologos was encamped at Meteorion with the troops he had assembled to form the siege of Constantinople, when a report reached him in the dead of night that the city was taken. At daybreak a courier arrived from Strategopoulos, bringing the ensigns of the imperial dignity, which Baldwin had abandoned in his precipitate retreat¹. Michael now felt that he was really emperor of the Greeks, and he marched to take possession of the ancient capital of the Christian world with no ordinary hopes; but Byzantine formalism and Greek vanity required so much preparation for every court ceremony that the emperor's entrance into Constantinople did not take place until the 15th of August.

¹ Acropolita (101) says that Michael VIII. had marched as far as Achyraos before he received the regalia of Baldwin.

The Archbishop of Cyzicus, bearing one of the pictures of the Virgin said to have been painted by St. Luke, of which the orthodox pretend to possess several originals, passed first through the Golden Gate. The emperor followed, clad in a simple dress, and followed by a long procession on foot. After visiting the monastery of Studium, the train proceeded to the palace of Bukoleon, for that of Blachern had been left by the Franks in such a state of filth and dilapidation as to be scarcely habitable. At the great palace the emperor mounted his horse and rode in the usual state to the Church of St. Sophia, to perform his devotions in that venerated temple of the Greeks. Alexis Strategopoulos was subsequently permitted to make a triumphal procession through the city, like a Roman conqueror of old; and Michael determined to repeat the ceremony of his own coronation in the capital of what was still called the Roman Empire, at the central shrine of orthodox piety. The Patriarch Arsenios had been removed from office for opposing his usurpation; but the deposition was generally regarded as illegal, and the intruded Patriarch dying, he was now replaced at the head of the church. Michael VIII. feared to commence his reign in Constantinople by creating a schism, and the well-intentioned but weak-minded Arsenios was persuaded to repeat the ceremony of Michael's coronation in the Church of St. Sophia, while the lawful emperor, John IV., was left forgotten and neglected at Nicaea.

The morbid ambition of Michael Palaeologos was not satisfied until he was sole emperor, and, in defiance of the oaths which he had sworn, to respect the rights of his ward and lawful sovereign, he soon dethroned the unfortunate boy and ordered his eyes to be put out in order to prevent his being able to recover the throne. This crime was perpetrated on Christmas Day 1261, before John IV. had attained the age of ten. The boy was then immured in the fort of Dakibyza by the cruel and perjured emperor, who soon felt the evil consequences of his wickedness. He had hitherto been regarded as a bold, frank and generous prince; he showed himself henceforward a timid and cruel tyrant. Even the character of the Greek nation seemed to be degraded by its participation in the treason of its sovereign, as it was certainly vitiated by the part which the clergy, the nobility

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and the people took in the corrupt measures employed for smoothing the way to Michael's usurpation.

The Patriarch Arsenios, who was one of the guardians of the dethroned emperor, considered himself bound to protest against the injustice and perjury of Michael. He convoked an assembly of the prelates resident in Constantinople, and proposed that the reigning emperor should be excommunicated by the synod; but too many of the clergy had been participators in the intrigues of Michael, and were enjoying the rewards of their subserviency, for such a measure to meet with any support. Arsenios, therefore, on his own authority as Patriarch, interdicted Michael from all religious rites; but he did not venture to pronounce the usual form of words which deprived him of the prayers of the orthodox. The Greek church, under the Palaeologoi, was tainted with the same spirit of half-measures and base tergiversation which marks the imperial administration. The emperor accepted the modified censure of the church as just, and hypocritically requested that his penance might be assigned. By obtaining his dispensation in this manner, he expected that public opinion would render the church an accessory after the fact, while he secured to himself an additional guarantee for the enjoyment of the fruits of his crime. Confident in his power, he punished with cruelty all who ventured to express publicly their compassion for their dethroned emperor¹.

Though the family of Vatatzes had been unpopular among the nobility, it was beloved by the Asiatic Greeks, and especially by the mountaineers of Bithynia. The people in the vicinity of Nicaea took up arms to avenge John IV., and their insurrection was suppressed with great difficulty. A blind boy, who was found wandering in the neighbourhood, was supposed to be their legitimate sovereign, the victim of Michael's treachery. The warlike peasantry flew to arms, and rendered themselves masters of the forts and mountain passes. The advance of the imperial troops sent to suppress the revolt was impeded by those famous archers who had

¹ Haloboulos, who had been one of the companions of John IV., had his nose and lips cut off. Five years after, he was taken from the monastery in which he was confined, and placed at the head of a college founded by the Emperor Michael. Pachymeres. i. 128. Alexios Makrinos, one of the best generals in the empire, was deprived of sight, because he was suspected of a design to marry a sister of John IV. Pachymeres, i. 139.

previously formed one of the most effective bodies in the emperor's army. Every ravine was contested, and every advantage dearly purchased. The imperial troops at last subdued the country by adopting the policy by which the Turks extended their conquests. The habitations were destroyed and the forests were burned down, so that the native population had no means of obtaining subsistence, while the soldiers of Michael became masters of the country, under the cover of their widespread conflagrations¹. The province was pacified by gaining over the chiefs, pardoning the people, and proving that John IV. was still confined in Dakibyza. The poor blind boy who caused the insurrection was conveyed into the Turkish territory, and those mountaineers who refused to lay down their arms were, when taken, punished with excessive cruelty. The municipal organization and local privileges of the Bithynians were abolished, and mercenary troops were quartered in the country to overawe the inhabitants. The resources of a flourishing province were thus ruined, and its population was soon so much diminished, that when it was invaded by the Othoman Turks in the next generation, the renowned archers of Bithynia and the militia of hardy mountaineers had ceased to exist².

The unfortunate John IV. grew up in his prison, neglected and almost forgotten. At length, when the hypocritical Michael was dead, and eight and twenty years of solitary blindness had stifled hope in the breast of the poor prisoner and taught him to forget that he had once been the lawful emperor of the East, his prison was disturbed by a visit from the Emperor Andronicus, the son of the usurper. Andronicus was a bigot, and his conscience reproached him with enjoying the fruit of his father's crimes. He sought therefore to obtain from the dethroned emperor a voluntary cession of all right to the throne, and a few kind words to his father's victim easily enabled him to apply this salve to his conscience³.

Constantinople had fallen greatly in wealth and splendour under the feudal government of the Latins; and it was not destined to recover its former population and rank as the empress of Christian cities under the sway of the family of Palaeologos. The capital of the Greek empire was a very

¹ Pachymeres, i. 129.² Pachymeres, i. 129.³ Pachymeres, ii. 64.

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different city from the capital of the Byzantine empire. The Crusaders and Venetians had destroyed as well as plundered the ancient Constantinople; and the Greek city of the Palaeologoi could hardly bear comparison with Genoa and Venice¹. Before its conquest by the Crusaders, Constantinople had astonished strangers by the splendour of its numerous palaces, monasteries, churches, and hospitals, which had been constructed and adorned during nine centuries of inviolable supremacy. But now, on regaining its liberty, instead of displaying at every step proofs that it concentrated within its walls the wealth of many provinces—instead of containing the richest commercial port and the most industrious population on the globe—it was everywhere encumbered with the rubbish of repeated conflagrations, disfigured by dilapidated palaces, abandoned monasteries, and ruined churches, and inhabited by a diminished, idle, and impoverished people. The blackened ashes of the last fire, by which the Greeks had expelled the Venetians, had not yet been washed from the walls by a winter's rain. In all directions the squares and porticoes, which had once been the ornaments of the city, were encumbered with filth; for the Franks were ignorant of the police regulations which the Byzantine government had inherited from the earlier Roman emperors, and which it had not allowed to remain entirely without improvement. The state of the city attested the barbarism of the Western nobles, and the insufficiency of the feudal organization to direct the complicated machine of civil administration in accordance with the exigencies of a crowded and motley population².

Michael VIII. was eager to efface the marks of foreign domination, and to repair the injuries of time; but his plans were injudicious, and his success extremely limited. He

¹ Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, 161. See the description which Nicephorus Gregoras (vol. iii. p. 556, edit. Bonn) gives of the destruction of buildings caused by selling marble and architectural ornaments to the Genoese. Phrantzes describes Venice, on the authority of the Despot Demetrios Palaeologos, as a richly adorned city, and a second land of promise, of which the Psalmist must have spoken in the words, 'The Lord hath founded it upon the seas, and established it upon the floods;' p. 185, edit. Bonn.

² We learn from Nicetas (118) that the population of Constantinople was of a very mixed nature. Indeed, from the time of Constantine the Great to the present hour, it never appears to have been so decidedly a Greek city, nor to have contained so large a majority of Greek inhabitants, as it did under the dynasty of Palaeologos.

aspired to be the second founder of the city of Constantinople, as well as of the Eastern Roman Empire. The nobility of his dominions were invited to inhabit the capital by the gift of places and pensions; traders were attracted by monopolies and privileges. The wealth that ought to have been expended in restoring communications between the dispersed and dissevered portions of the Greek nation, in repairing roads and bridges, was wasted in building palaces and adorning churches in the capital, where they were no longer required for a diminished and impoverished population. Crowds of imperial princes and princesses, Despots and Caesars, officers of state and courtiers, consumed the revenues which ought to have covered the frontier with impregnable fortresses and maintained a disciplined standing army and a well-exercised fleet. Yet, while lavishing the public revenues to gratify his pride and acquire popularity, he sacrificed the general interests of the middle classes to a selfish and rapacious fiscal policy. All the property within the walls of Constantinople, whether it belonged to Greeks or Latins, was adjudged to the imperial government by the right of conquest; but their ancient possessions were restored to the great families whose power he feared, and to those individuals whose services he wished to secure. Sites for building were then leased to the citizens for a fixed rent; yet the Greek government was so despotic, and Michael was so arbitrary in his administration, that twelve years later he pretended that the concessions he had granted to private individuals were merely acts of personal favour, and he enforced the payment of the rent for the past twelve years, with much severity¹. Michael used other frauds to bring the property of his subjects into the public treasury, or to deprive them of a portion of the money justly due to them by the state. Under the pretext of changing the type of the gold coinage, and commemorating the recovery of Constantinople by impressing an image of its walls on the byzants, he debased the standard of the mint, and issued coins containing only fifteen parts of gold and nine of alloy². While on one hand he rendered

¹ Pachymeres, i. 101, 106, and 265.

² Pachymeres, ii. 343. See p. 320 of this volume. The practice of defrauding subjects by falsifying the coinage was common among sovereigns at this period. Charles of Anjou ordered his debased carlini to be received as agostali, asserting they were of the same value; but as he doubted whether his subjects would put

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property insecure and impoverished his subjects, he was striving by other arrangements to increase the Greek population of the capital, in order to counterbalance the wealth and influence of foreign traders. Many inhabitants of the islands of the Archipelago were induced to emigrate to Constantinople, and a colony of Tzakonians or Laconians from Monemvasia, which then supplied the imperial fleet with its best sailors, was settled in the Golden Horn¹. War, not commerce, was the object of Michael's care; and while he was endeavouring to increase the means of recruiting his army and navy, he allowed the Genoese to profit by his political errors, and render themselves masters of the commerce of the Black Sea and of great part of the carrying trade of the Greek empire. In the mean time, the fortifications of Constantinople were repaired; and when Charles of Anjou threatened to invade the East, a second line of wall was added to the fortifications on the land side, and the defences already existing towards the sea were strengthened². The port of Blanka, anciently called the Theodosian port, was improved by the addition of two new moles, constructed with immense blocks of stone, and was deepened with great art³.

But it was no longer in the power of Michael, nor in the spirit of Greek society, to restore vigour to the central government. Foreign conquest and internal revolutions had broken up the empire. Provincial dislocation and individual independence had in many districts proceeded so far that imperial fiscality was more feared than imperial protection was sought. The Greeks of Epirus, and even of Naxos, Athens, and Achaia, enjoyed a greater degree of prosperity, and as much security of property, under their foreign laws, as the Greeks of Constantinople, who pretended to preserve the judicial system of Rome and the code of the Basilika.

much faith in his royal word, he ordered that the hands of those who paid and received his coin at a less value should be cut off, and that an impression of the coin should be burned on their faces with the red-hot money.

¹ Pachymeres, i. 209.

² Pachymeres, i. 124, 248. Ἐδιδύμου τὸ τεῖχος τὸ πρὸς θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν γῆν δεδίπλωτο πάντως. The system of these double walls from the gate of Blachern to the Golden Gate is still visible.

³ Niceph. Greg. 74. Pachymeres (i. 249) says the port was deepened by using quicksilver. As it is impossible to believe that this was done by pouring in quicksilver to displace the mud, as the translators seem to suppose, the question arises, how the Byzantine engineers applied the weight of quicksilver to their dredging operations.

Michael VIII. fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty he had concluded with the Genoese. The public property of the republic of Venice was confiscated, and the Genoese were put in possession of the palace previously occupied by the Bailly of the Venetians. This building was immediately pulled down, and the marble of which it was composed was transported to Genoa, in order to be employed in the construction of the Church of St. George, where it formed a lasting memorial of this triumph of the republic¹. In the mean time, the war between Venice and Genoa continued to rage with extreme violence, and in this contest Michael's interests were deeply involved. When he regained possession of Constantinople, he found that a considerable part of the trading population consisted of Venetians, established in the East as permanent colonists. These traders readily transferred their allegiance from the Latin to the Greek emperor; and Michael, who knew the value of such subjects, granted them all legal protection in the pursuit of their commercial occupations, as he did also to the Pisans. But the Genoese, who had hastened to the East in great numbers in order to profit by the overthrow of the domination of the Crusaders and Venetians, considered that the emperor ought to expel every Venetian from his dominions. The democratic state of the Genoese republic at this period increased the insolence of individuals. The merchants who owned and the officers who commanded the Genoese galleys attacked the Venetians who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor Michael, and plundered their property as if they were enemies. The neutrality of the Greek territory was violated, and the hostile republicans often rendered the streets of Constantinople a scene of bloodshed by their contests. The emperor took into his pay sixty Genoese galleys, but the turbulent conduct of these auxiliaries and the defeat of a Genoese naval force by the Venetians near Monemvasia induced him to doubt the fidelity of their service, and when an adverse party at Genoa removed Boccanegra, who concluded the treaty of Nymphæum, from power, Michael dismissed the Genoese galleys. Charles of Anjou soon after effected the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, and the Genoese government became

¹ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople sous les Empereurs Français*, 161.

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more anxious to cultivate his friendship than that of the Greek emperor¹.

The character and conduct of Michael VIII. typifies the spirit of Greek society from the recovery of Constantinople to the fall of the empire. It displays a strange ignorance of the value of frankness and honesty in public business, a constant suspicion of every friend, restless intrigues to deceive every ally, and a wavering policy to conciliate every powerful enemy. The consequence of this suspicion, plotting, and weakness was, that very soon no one trusted either the emperor or the Greeks. The invasion of Italy by Charles of Anjou, and the pretensions of the Pope to dispose of crowns, alarmed both Venice and Michael, and induced them to forget all former grounds of hostility, and conclude a closer alliance than the Greek emperor had concluded with Genoa, with which he now declared war². This treaty is dated in June 1265, about a month before Charles of Anjou received the crown of the Two Sicilies from the Pope in the Lateran. The stipulations are remarkable both in a political and commercial light. The emperor engaged to expel the Genoese from Constantinople, and not to conclude peace with them except in concert with the republic. The Venetians engaged to hire their galleys to the emperor to serve even against the Pope, the King of France, and Charles of Anjou, as well as against the republics of Genoa, Pisa, and Ancona, and any prince or community that might attack the Greek empire. It is worthy of observation that when the Genoese concluded their alliance with the Greeks, in 1261, they had so far yielded to the public opinion of the West as to insert a clause in the treaty exempting their galleys in the imperial pay from serving against the Pope, the Emperor of Germany, the kings of France, Castile, England, and Sicily, the Prince of Achaia, and several other kings and princes, and yet they had incurred excommunication³.

¹ Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, i. 338; Sauli, *Colonia di Galata*, i. 72. By the treaty of 1261, the Genoese were exempt from serving against the Prince of Achaia, with whom the emperor was now again involved in war, and who was an ally of the Venetians. To judge the foreign policy of Genoa, we must study the history of its domestic parties.

² This treaty of 1265, which throws a new light on the affairs of the Greek empire at the time, was first published by Professors Tafel and Thomas, in the *Transactions of the Academy of Vienna*, Oct. 1850. A Latin copy of the subsequent treaty of 1268 had been published by Marin, *Storia del Commercio de' Veneziani*, iv. 336.

³ Sauli, *Colonia di Galata*, i. 63, note 3.

The Venetians now engaged to serve even against the Pope, and his vassal, Charles of Anjou; but his Holiness did not venture to excommunicate Venice, as its power on the continent of Italy was so much greater than the power of Genoa. The republic also bound itself to exact an oath from all Crusaders who embarked in Venetian transports, that they would not invade the dominions of Michael VIII.

The articles which relate to commerce prove that Roman prejudices and Byzantine pride still induced the diplomatists of Constantinople to view trade as a matter beneath the attention of monarchs. The change already visible in European society, which began to place a larger share of wealth, knowledge, and power in the hands of traders, and which had rendered the merchant-nobles of Venice and the trading citizens of Lombardy a match for the chosen mercenaries of Constantinople and the German chivalry of the house of Hohenstauffen, escaped the notice of Michael and his counsellors. The emperor consequently neglected the commercial interests of the Greeks; and while he made great concessions to foreigners, he only stipulated that his own subjects should have free intercourse with Venice on paying the usual duties, and that they might import and export whatever merchandise they pleased¹. On the other hand, the Venetians obtained a long series of concessions in their favour, and as these concessions formed the basis of all the commercial treaties concluded by the emperors of Constantinople until the Turkish conquest, and exercised some influence in diminishing the trade of the Greeks and weakening the empire, it is important to notice their extent. The Venetians were exempted from the ordinary control of the revenue officers; and, to guard against frauds on the imperial revenue, a separate quarter or a single warehouse, as the exigency might require, was granted to them, according to the extent of their trade, in the principal ports of the Greek empire. Within these factories the Venetians were governed by the laws of Venice and their own magistrates. They had full liberty to transport their goods by land as well as by sea to any part of the empire without paying any duty, being only required to furnish the imperial collectors of customs with exact statements of the amount,

¹ Compare the treaty of 1265 (Tafel and Thomas, 182) with the treaty of 1268 (Marin, iv. 345).

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in order that the duty might be levied from the purchaser. They were also allowed to export grain until the price at Constantinople rose to fifty byzants for one hundred measures¹. They had, of course, the right to erect Catholic churches within the precincts of their factories.

The close political alliance which this treaty established between the empire and the republic was not of long duration. The intrigues of Charles of Anjou in Tuscany, where he arrayed Florence and Lucca against Siena and Pisa, affected the interests of Genoa, and enabled the opposition to gain strength, while the victories of the Venetians, and the overtures of peace which were made to them by Pope Clement IV., appear to have awakened some distrust of his new allies in the suspicious mind of Michael VIII. These circumstances induced the emperor and the republic to conclude a new treaty in 1268, which modified the offensive and defensive stipulations of the earlier treaty with regard to Genoa, the island of Euboea, the principality of Achaia, and the duchy of the Archipelago². In the year 1270, a change in the government of Genoa placed the administration in the hands of the families of Doria and Spinola, who were opposed to Charles of Anjou, and a truce was subsequently concluded by the Genoese both with the Byzantine empire and with Venice, while the Greeks and Venetians became engaged in war. Hostilities were nevertheless again renewed, until at length, in the year 1275, the Emperor Michael formed a new alliance with the Genoese; but, in order to prevent their making the streets of Constantinople the scene of their disorders, he obliged them to establish their factory at Heracleia, on the Propontis³. Some years later, they were allowed to transfer their settlement to Galata, where they laid the foundation of a colony which soon deprived the Greeks of the greater part of their trade in the Black Sea⁴.

¹ This would be about 2s. 9d. a bushel.

² The Latin copy of this treaty is given by Marin, *Storia del Commercio de' Veneziani*, iv. 336; and more correctly by Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, iii. 92.

³ Sauli, *Colonia di Galata*, ii. 204; Pachymeres, i. 108.

⁴ Nicephorus Gregoras (57) says that Michael established the Genoese at Galata when he retook Constantinople; but no record fixes the precise year from which the foundation of the colony of Galata should be dated. See also an interesting account of the manner in which the Genoese carried on trade and war in the empire, and of the concession of the monopoly of alum and the mines of Phocaea to a Genoese noble, Zacharia, in Pachymeres, i. 284; Niceph. Greg 81. It is very difficult to fix the precise chronology of the events.

The change which took place in the Asiatic provinces of the empire towards the end of the reign of Michael VIII. must be attentively observed. When he mounted the throne, the power of the Seljouk empire was so broken by the conquests of the Moguls, and the energy of the population was so great, in consequence of the wise government of John III. and Theodore II., that the Greeks under the Turkish dominion seemed on the eve of regaining their independence. Azeddin Kaikous II., sultan of Iconium, was an exile; his brother Rokneddin ruled only a small part of the Seljouk empire of Roum; for Houlagon, the brother of the great khans Mangou and Kublai, possessed the greater part of Asia Minor, and many Turkish tribes lived in a state of independence. The cruelty and rapacity of Michael's government, and the venality and extortion which he tolerated among the imperial officers and administrators, arrested the progress of the Greeks, and prepared the way for their rapid decline. The jealousy which Michael showed of all marks of national independence, and the fear he entertained of opposition, are strong characteristics of his policy. His governors in Asia Minor were instructed to weaken the power of the local authorities, while the fiscal officers were ordered to find pretexts for confiscating the estates of the wealthy. Indeed, all the proprietors of wealth in the mountain districts of Bithynia were deprived of their possessions, and pensioned by the grant of a sum of forty byzants to each, as an annual allowance for subsistence¹. Both rich and poor, finding that they were plundered with impunity, and that it was vain to seek redress from the emperor, often emigrated with the remains of their property into the Turkish territories². So rapacious was the imperial treasury that the historian Pachymeres, who held high offices at the Byzantine court during Michael's reign, believed that the emperor systematically weakened the power of the Greek population from his fear of rebellion³. The consequence was that the whole country beyond the Sangarius, and the mountains which give rise to the Rhyndakos and Makestos, were occupied by the Turks,

¹ Pachymeres, i. 8, 145-149, 209-212, 322-324.

² Pachymeres, i. pp. 6-10. Compare the conduct of Justinian II. to the Mardaites of Mount Lebanon, above, vol. i., *Greece under the Romans*, p. 387.

³ Pachymeres, i. 148.

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who were often invited by the inhabitants to take possession of the small towns. The communications between Nicaea and Heracleia on the Euxine were interrupted by land; and the cities of Kromna, Amastris, and Tios relapsed into the position of Greek colonies surrounded by a foreign population. Even the valley of the Maeander, one of the richest portions of the Greek empire, was invaded; and unfortunately the great possessions of the monasteries and nobles in this fertile district placed it in a similar condition to that which had facilitated the ravages of the Normans in France under the Carolingians, and in England under the Saxons. Immense wealth invited the invasions of the Turkish nomades, while the population consisted only of monks, or the agents of absent proprietors, and unarmed peasants. When John Palaeologos, the emperor's brother, attempted to expel the Turks from their conquests, he found them already so well fortified in the monasteries of Strobilos and Stradiotrachia that he could not attempt to dislodge them (A.D. 1266-1268). Perhaps the violent opposition of the monks to Michael's schemes for uniting the Greek and Latin churches may at last have rendered the emperor indifferent to the fate of these monasteries¹.

As the reign of Michael VIII. advanced, the encroachments of the nomade Turks became more daring. John Palaeologos, who had for some time restrained their incursions, was by his brother's jealousy deprived of all military command; and Andronicus, the emperor's eldest son, was sent to the frontier as commander-in-chief. In the year 1280 the incapacity of the young prince threw all the imperial provinces open to invasion. Nestongos, who commanded in the city of Nyssa, was defeated and taken prisoner. Nyssa was taken, and the Turks then laid siege to Tralles, which had been recently rebuilt and repopled. This city contained a population of thirty-six thousand inhabitants, but it was ill supplied both with provisions and water. Yet its inhabitants made a brave defence, and had Andronicus possessed either military talents, activity, or courage, Tralles might have been saved. The Turks at last formed a breach in the walls by sapping, and

¹ Pachymeres, i. 209-212.

carried the city by storm. The inhabitants who escaped the massacre were reduced to slavery¹.

About the time Michael VIII. usurped the throne of the Greek empire, a small Turkish tribe made its first appearance in the Seljouk empire. Othman, who gave his name to this new band of immigrants, is said to have been born in the year 1258, and his father Ertogrul entered the Seljouk empire as the chief of only four hundred families; yet Orkhan the son of Othman founded the Othoman empire². No nation ever increased so rapidly from such small beginnings, and no government ever constituted itself with greater sagacity; but no force or prudence could have enabled this small tribe of nomades to rise with such rapidity to power, had it not been that the energy of the Greek empire and nation were paralyzed by political and moral corruption. History records that Michael Palaeologos recovered possession of Constantinople by accident; it ought also to proclaim that, by his deliberate policy, he prepared the way for the ruin of the Greek race and the conquest of Constantinople by the Othoman Turks. There is no other instance in history of a nation so numerous, so wealthy, and so civilized, as the Greeks were in the fourteenth century, having been permanently subdued by an enemy so inferior in political and military resources. The circumstance is the more disgraceful, because it can be directly traced to social and moral causes.

The discontent of his subjects in Asia made Michael anxious to secure peace in Europe. In order to counter-balance the successes of the Despot of Epirus, and dispose him to conclude a treaty, Michael resolved to release the Prince of Achaia, who had been taken prisoner at the battle of Pelagonia in 1259. William Villehardouin, prince of Achaia, was freed, by the destruction of the Latin empire of Romania, from those feudal ties which connected him with the throne of Baldwin II. To obtain his liberty, he consented to become a vassal of the Greek empire, and to re-establish

¹ Pachymeres (i. 322-324) says the inhabitants of Tralles continued their defence by living on human flesh when all other provisions were exhausted, and drinking horses' blood. This is the way pedants write history. Compare Niceph. Greg. 84-87, and Phrantzes, 23, edit. Bonn.

² [For a singularly brilliant and interesting account of the rise of the Ottoman power, the reader is referred to an article in the *Christian Remembrancer* for April 1855, entitled *The Early Ottomans*. Ed.]

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the imperial power in the Peloponnesus, by putting Michael in possession of the fortresses of Monemvasia, Misithra, and Maina. On swearing fidelity to Michael VIII. he was released from captivity, after having remained a prisoner for three years¹. The Pope, however, was so much alarmed at this example of a Catholic prince becoming a vassal of the Greek emperor, that as soon as the Prince of Achaia was firmly settled in his principality, his Holiness absolved him from all his oaths and obligations to the Greek emperor. Pope Urban IV. even went so far as to proclaim a crusade against Michael, and to invite St. Louis to take the command; but the King of France, who was much more deeply imbued with the Christian spirit than the Pope, declined the office. The crusade ended in a partisan warfare between the Prince of Achaia and the governors Michael had placed in the fortresses of which he had gained possession in the Peloponnesus.

The conquest of Naples by Charles of Anjou threatened the Greek empire with a new invasion. Under the auspices of Clement IV. a treaty was concluded between the fugitive emperor Baldwin, Charles of Anjou, and William, prince of Achaia, by which Baldwin ceded to Charles the suzerainty of Achaia, and the prince agreed to transfer his allegiance from the titular Emperor to the King of Naples. In return, Charles of Anjou engaged to furnish Baldwin with a force of two thousand knights, and to aid him in reconquering the Greek empire. This treaty was concluded at Viterbo on the 27th of May 1267². Its stipulations alarmed Michael Palaeologos, who had already involved himself in ecclesiastical quarrels with his subjects; and in order to delay an attack on Constantinople, he sent an embassy to Pope Clement IV., proposing measures for a union of the Greek and Latin churches. On this occasion Michael was relieved from fear by Conradin's invasion of the kingdom of Naples, which enabled him to conclude a truce with the Prince of Achaia. He then neglected his overtures to the Pope, and turned all his attention to fitting out a fleet, which he manned

¹ *Livre de la Conquête de la Principauté de la Morée*, par Buchon, p. 144; Greek text, vv. 2996 and 3134; Pachymeres, i. 52. Charles of Anjou had already acquired the absolute sovereignty of Corfu and several cities in Epirus, which formed the dowry of the wife of Manfred, king of Sicily, who was the daughter of the despot Michael II.

² Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 30.

with Gasmouls, Tzakonians, and Greeks of the Archipelago¹. The insincere negotiations of Michael for a union with the Roman church were often renewed under the pressure of fear of invasion from abroad and dread of insurrection at home. The opposition of the Greek clergy and people to his authority encouraged the enterprises of his foreign enemies, while the entangled web of his diplomacy, taking a new form at every change of his personal interests, involved him at last so inextricably in its meshes that he had no means of concealing his bad faith, cruelty, and hypocrisy.

In the year 1271 the treachery of Andronikos Tarchaniotes, the emperor's nephew, reanimated the war in Thessaly. Having invited the Tartars to invade the empire from the north, he abandoned Mount Haemus, of which he was governor, to their ravages, and fled to John Dukas, prince of Vallachian Thessaly, his father-in-law, whom he persuaded to invade Thessaly. The emperor sent his brother, John Palaeologos, with an army of forty thousand men and a fleet of sixty-three galleys, to re-establish the imperial supremacy. John Dukas was besieged in his capital, Neopatras², and the place was reduced to the last extremity, when the prince passed through the hostile camp in the disguise of a groom, to seek assistance from his Latin allies. Leading a horse by the bridle he walked along, crying out that his master had lost another horse, and would reward the finder. When he reached the plain of the Spercheus he mounted his horse, and gained the territory of the Marquess of Boudonitza³. The Duke of Athens furnished him with a band of three hundred knights, and he returned to Neopatras with such celerity that he surprised the imperial camp and completely dispersed the army. John Palaeologos escaped to Demetrias (Volo), where his fleet was stationed. A squadron composed of Venetian ships, and galleys of the Duke of Naxos and of the Barons of Negropont, was watching the imperial fleet. On hearing of the total defeat of the army

¹ Pachymeres, i. 209. The Gasmouls were children of a Latin father and Greek mother, and possessed the vigour of one parent, and the intelligence of the other.

² Patradjik, now called Hypate.

³ Pachymeres, i. 220. The Russian Chronicle of Nestor recounts a similar anecdote concerning a young man who passed through the camp of the Patzinaks, when they besieged Kief in 968. *Chronique de Nestor*, trad. en Français par L. Paris, i. 91.

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they attacked the admiral Alexios Philanthropenos in the port, and were on the point of carrying the whole Greek fleet by boarding, when John Palaeologos reached the scene of action with a part of the fugitive troops. He immediately conveyed a large body of soldiers to the ships, reanimated the sailors, and compelled the Latins to retire with the loss of some of their own ships, but they succeeded in carrying off several of the Greek galleys¹.

In the following year the imperial fleet, under the command of Zacharia, the Genoese seigneur of Thasos, defeated the Franks near Oreos in Euboea, and took John de la Roche, duke of Athens, prisoner. But, on the other hand, John Dukas again routed the army in Thessaly, and by his activity and military skill rendered himself the most redoubted enemy of the Emperor Michael; so that, when the majority of the Greek population declared openly against the emperor's project for a union with the Latin church, the Prince of Vallachian Thessaly became the champion of the orthodox church, and assembled a synod which excommunicated Michael VIII. (A.D. 1277)².

In the year 1278 Charles of Anjou would in all probability have besieged Constantinople, had he not been prevented by the express commands of his suzerain, Pope Nicholas III., who was gained over by Michael's submission to expect the immediate union of the Greek with the Papal church. But the elevation of Martin IV. to the See of Rome changed its policy. The Emperor Michael was excommunicated, and, to render the excommunication more insulting, he was reproached with persecuting the Greeks who consistently abstained from his own delusive compliances. Michael revenged himself by ceasing to pray for the Pope in the Eastern churches. A league was formed between the Pope, the King of Naples, and the republic of Venice, for the conquest of the Greek empire, and a treaty was signed at Orvieto on the 3d July 1281³. The danger was serious. Charles of Anjou promised to furnish eight thousand cavalry, and the Venetians engaged to arm forty galleys, in order to commence operations in the spring of 1283. In the mean time a body of

¹ Pachymeres, i. 225.

² Pachymeres, i. 280; Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 194.

³ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople—Recueil des Chartes*, 27.

troops, under the command of Solimon Rossi, was despatched to occupy Dyrrachium and assist the Albanians, who had recently revolted against Michael. This expedition proved unsuccessful; Rossi was taken prisoner while besieging Belgrade (Berat), and the Neapolitans and Albanians were completely defeated. But the Greek emperor could only intrigue to avert the great storm with which he was threatened by the treaty of Orvieto, and in the end he was saved by the deeds of others. The Sicilian Vespers delivered him from all further fear of Charles of Anjou and of a French invasion, and Michael was able to smile at the impotent rage of Martin IV., and despise his excommunications.

The vicinity of the Bulgarians, joined to their national influence over the numbers of their countrymen settled in the Greek empire, gave Michael some uneasiness at the commencement of his reign. Constantine, king of Bulgaria, had married a sister of the dethroned Emperor John IV., and he was induced, by his wife, by the intrigues of the fugitive Sultan of Iconium, and by the hopes of assistance from the Mogul emperor, Houlagon, to attack the Greek empire. Michael took the field against the Bulgarians, and in the year 1265 drove them beyond Mount Haemus; but as he was returning to Constantinople he had nearly fallen into the hands of a body of Bulgarian and Tartar cavalry, through the treachery of Kaikous, the fugitive Sultan of Iconium, who informed the enemy of his movements. Constantine, king of Bulgaria, having lost his wife Irene Lascaris, married Maria, the second daughter of Michael's sister Eulogia, and the emperor promised to put him in possession of Mesembria and Anchialos as the dowry of his niece. But this promise was given in the year 1272, when the danger of Charles of Anjou invading the empire appeared imminent. As soon, therefore, as the influence of the Pope and the crusade of St. Louis to Tunis had secured Michael from all danger, with his usual treachery he found a pretext for refusing to fulfil his promise. A treaty which the emperor concluded with a powerful Tartar chief named Nogay, and civil dissension among the Bulgarians, relieved Michael from all serious danger on his northern frontier during the remainder of his reign¹.

¹ There is much curious information in Pachymeres concerning the Bulgarians and the Tartars, i. 140, 153-159, 234-239, 292-306, 319, 356.

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The affairs of Servia, also, gave the emperor very little trouble¹.

The period of Greek history during which the empire of Constantinople was ruled by the dynasty of Palaeologos is the most degrading portion of the national annals. Literary taste, political honesty, patriotic feeling, military honour, civil liberty, and judicial purity, seem all to have abandoned the Greek race, and public opinion would, in all probability, have had no existence, or at least have found no mode of expression, had not the Greek church placed itself in opposition to the imperial government, and awakened in the breasts of the people a spirit of partisanship on ecclesiastical questions, which drew forth strong expressions of public opinion and national feeling. The church was converted into an arena where political and social discontent arrayed their forces under the banners of orthodoxy, heresy, or schism, as accident or passion might determine. In spite of the mental torpidity of the Greeks, during this period, the church is full of heresy and schism. Yet, strange to say, no political, moral, or religious improvements resulted from the innumerable discussions and disputes which formed the principal occupation of the Constantinopolitan Greeks for a hundred and fifty years. The cause of this is evident; the right of exercising private judgment was denied to the Greeks: they might range themselves as partisans of Barlaam or Palamas; they might believe that the mind perceived a divine light when the eyes remained long fixed on the stomach; and they might dispute concerning the essence and the active energy of the Divinity, but they dared not appeal to common sense and human reason, as entitled to influence the decision of the point at issue². Public discussion being prohibited, no real

¹ Pachymeres, i. 240. The Servians, however, gained possession of the upper valley of the Axios (Vardar) and the city of Skopia (Uskup). Cantacuzenus, 778.

² [The controversy here referred to is that relating to the views of the Hesychasts, who maintained that the light of Mount Tabor, that is, the light which appeared to the disciples at the transfiguration of Christ, was part of the essence of God himself, and therefore immortal and eternal. With this were combined other mystical views as to the possibility of seeing this light in ecstatic moments after long abstinence. This opinion was combated by a Calabrian monk called Barlaam, and Palamas was his chief opponent. The dispute continued for ten years (1341-51), gave occasion for four councils, and involved emperors and patriarchs in its confusion. Barlaam was supported by Nicephorus Gregoras, and Palamas by Cantacuzene. It ended in the establishment of the doctrine of the uncreated light of Tabor. Ed.]

public opinion could be formed in the nation. Each different section of the people only heard the opinions of its own leaders, and formed its ideas of the doctrines of its opponents from their misrepresentations. Instead of some general convictions, which ought to have been impressed on the mind of every Greek, what appeared to be public opinion even on the most important subjects was nothing but the temporary expression of the popular will, uttered in moments of excitement and passion.

Such was the mental condition of the Greeks from the recovery of Constantinople until its conquest by the Othomans. Justice was dormant in the state; Christianity was torpid in the church. Orthodoxy performed the duties of civil liberty, and the priesthood became the focus of political opposition. Financial oppression was often local; judicial iniquities affected a small number, and national feelings were unconnected with material interests. Ecclesiastical formulas and religious doctrines were the only facts with which the Greek people were generally acquainted, and on which every man felt called upon to pronounce an opinion. The mob of Constantinople had once made the colours of the jockey-clubs of the hippodrome a bond of party union; the Greek nation now made theology a medium for expressing its defiance of the emperor and its hatred of the imperial administration. This fact explains how matters in themselves not very intelligible to ordinary intellects acquired a real political importance, and questions apparently little calculated to excite popular interest drew forth the liveliest expressions of sympathy. We understand why the Greeks, who showed little national energy in defending their political independence against the Crusaders and the Turks, displayed the greatest enthusiasm in defending their church against their own emperors and patriarchs, as well as against the Pope. The social organization of the Greeks has its seat at the family hearth, and they have only moved as a nation when some personal impulse has excited their individual feelings.

The anxiety of the Emperor Michael VIII. to be relieved from the ecclesiastical censures pronounced by the Patriarch Arsenios against him, for his treachery to his pupil and sovereign John IV., caused his first disputes with the Greek church and his negotiations with the Popes. Michael solicited

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the Patriarch to impose some penance on him which might expiate his crime, but Arsenios could suggest nothing but reparation. The emperor considered this tantamount to a sentence of dethronement, and he deposed Arsenios. The Patriarch was accused before a synod of having omitted a prayer for the emperor in performing the church service, of having allowed the exiled Sultan of Iconium, Kaikous, to join in the celebration of divine service on Easter Sunday, and of allowing the sultan's children to receive the holy communion from the hands of his chaplain without any proof that they were Christians. To these accusations Arsenios replied, that he only omitted one prayer for the emperor and used another, and that he had treated the sultan and his children as Christians, because he had been assured by the Bishop of Pisidia that they had received baptism¹. While this synod was pursuing its inquiry, the Emperor Michael attempted to gain his object by one of the diplomatic tricks to which he was strangely attached; but his subterfuge was detected, and he received a rebuke from the Patriarch which inflamed his animosity. When the Patriarch was proceeding to the Church of St. Sophia the Emperor joined him, having previously sent forward an order to the clergy to commence high mass the moment the Patriarch should enter. On approaching the door of the cathedral the Emperor laid hold of the Patriarch's robe, in order to enter the church as if he had received absolution; but Arsenios hastily withdrew his robe from Michael's hand, and exclaimed, 'It was an unbecoming trick; could you expect to deceive God, and obtain pardon by fraud?' This scene, in the vestibule of St. Sophia's, was too public to leave any hope of reconciliation. Arsenios was deposed, and exiled to Proconnesus. Germanos, the bishop of Adrianople, a mild and learned prelate, was named his successor.

Even in his banishment Arsenios was considered the lawful Patriarch by the orthodox, and he was visited by thousands who were anxious to hear his words and receive his blessing. The emperor was eager to punish him, but his popularity rendered it dangerous to attempt doing so in an arbitrary way. A conspiracy was discovered against the emperor's

¹ Pachymeres, i. 174.

life, and some of the accused, when put to the torture, declared that Arsenios was implicated in the plot. The examination of the affair was remitted to a synod, which gratified the emperor by excommunicating Arsenios without waiting for his conviction. Four deputies were despatched to Proconnesus, to communicate this sentence to the deposed Patriarch, and to examine him on the accusation. Of these the historian Pachymeres, then an ecclesiastical official in the patriarchate, was one. As soon as the deputation entered on business, Arsenios interrupted the speaker with great warmth, saying, 'What have I done to the emperor to be thus persecuted? I found him in a private station; I crowned him emperor, and he has rewarded me by driving me from the patriarchal palace to a rock where I live on common charity!' He then spoke of the new Patriarch as a 'phratriarch,' and glanced at his blessing (eulogia) as being rather temporal than spiritual. This was an allusion to the emperor's sister Eulogia, the protectress of Germanos, to whose influence Arsenios attributed the cruel treatment of John IV. The deputies then began to read the sentence of excommunication, but Arsenios rose from his seat, covered his ears with his hands, and walked about the room mumbling what we must suppose to have been prayers. The deputies followed, raising their voices as they walked; and as prayers were recited and official documents were read in a strong nasal tone with a chanting cadence, the irate patriarch hurrying up and down the room, and the four imperial deputies pursuing the old man, rivalling one another in discordancy and loyalty, the scene could have been little calculated to secure reverence either to the church or state. Arsenios at last interrupted them in a passion, calling Heaven to witness that he was treated with injustice; but when the deputies threatened him with the Divine vengeance for despising the deputies of the church, he grew calmer, and said, with more moderation, 'It seems I am accused of having made my patriarchal duties the means of conspiring against the emperor's life. The accusation is false. He has left me to die of hunger, but I have never ceased to pray for him.' But his whole discourse was filled with bitterness against Michael, and he made no scruple of condemning his usurpation.

The deputies, having executed their commission, sailed for

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Constantinople, but a storm overtook them, and they were in danger of shipwreck. They attributed their danger to their having sailed from Proconnesus without asking the blessing of Arsenios, whom all appear to have considered as the true Patriarch. Pachymeres relates that each of the deputies owned afterwards that he was anxious at parting to obtain the blessing of Arsenios, but was afraid of rendering himself an object of suspicion and persecution at court. The report of the deputies induced Germanos to intercede for his predecessor. Arsenios was absolved from the accusation, and a pension of three hundred byzants was allowed him for his subsistence, granted from the privy purse of the empress—for it was believed that Arsenios would accept nothing from the excommunicated emperor¹.

The courtiers of Michael were as active in their intrigues as the emperor. A party in the church declared that the election of Germanos was invalid, for he had been removed from the see of Adrianople in violation of the canon which prohibits the translation of a bishop from one see to another. The emperor's confessor, Joseph, pronounced that the new Patriarch could not grant a legal absolution to the emperor, in consequence of this defect in his title to the patriarchal throne. Germanos soon perceived that both Michael and Joseph were encouraging opposition to his authority. He immediately resigned, and Joseph was named his successor². The emperor received his absolution as a matter of course. The ceremony was performed at the gates of St. Sophia's. Michael, kneeling at the Patriarch's feet, made his confession, and implored pardon. The Patriarch read the form of absolution. This form was repeated by every bishop in succession, and the emperor knelt before each in turn and received his pardon. He was then admitted into the church, and partook of the holy communion. By this pompous ceremony the Greeks believed that their church could pardon perjury and legitimatize usurpation³.

About this time the treaty of Viterbo drew the attention of Michael from the schism of the Arsenites to foreign policy,

¹ Pachymeres, i. 193.

² Joseph was named Patriarch on the 28th December 1266. Pachymeres, i. 206.

³ The ceremony took place on the 2nd February 1267. Pachymeres, i. 207.

and his grand object being to detach the Pope from the alliance with Charles of Anjou, he began to form intrigues, by means of which he hoped to delude the Pope into the persuasion that he was anxious and able to establish papal supremacy in the Greek Church; while, on the other hand, he expected to cheat the Eastern clergy into making those concessions which he considered necessary for the success of his plans, on the ground that their compliance was a mere matter of diplomacy. Gregory X. knew that it would be easier to effect the union of the Greek and Latin Churches by the instrumentality of a Greek emperor than of a foreign conqueror. He therefore prohibited Charles of Anjou, who held the crown of Naples as his vassal, from invading the empire; but he forced Michael, by fear of invasion, to assemble a synod at Constantinople, in which, by cruelty and violence, the emperor succeeded in obtaining an acknowledgment of the papal supremacy. The severest persecution was necessary to compel the Greeks to sign the articles of union, and many families emigrated to Vallachian Thessaly and to the empire of Trebizond, to avoid committing what they considered as equivalent to an act of apostasy¹.

The formal union of the Greek and Latin Churches was completed in the year 1274 at the Council of Lyons. On the 6th of July, at the fourth session of the Council, Germanos, who had resigned the patriarchal throne, George Acropolita the historian, and some other Greek clergy and nobles, presented themselves and repeated the creed in the Latin form, with the words, 'proceeding from the Father and the Son.' They then swore to conform to the faith of the Roman Church, to pay obedience to its orders, and to recognize the supremacy of the Pope,—Acropolita, as grand logothetes, repeating the oaths in the name of the Emperor Michael.

When the news of this submission reached Constantinople

¹ The power of Michael was despotic, and his conduct arbitrary in the extreme. To render Vekkos and Xiphilinos amenable to his ecclesiastical reasoning, he ordered their houses to be destroyed and their vineyards to be rooted out, and in the case of Vekkos it will be seen that this mode of enlightening his mind appears to have proved successful. Pachymeres, i. 151, 165.

The government of the republic of Genoa was about this time administered on similar principles. Caffaro, in his annals, mentions that the refractory citizens who would not swear to keep the peace were forced to do so by the consuls, who pulled down their houses and towers. Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, i. 226.

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there was a general expression of indignation. The Patriarch Joseph, who opposed the union, was deposed, and Vekkos, an ecclesiastic of eminence, who had recently become a convert to the Latin creed, was named in his place. The schisms in the Greek Church were now multiplied, for Joseph became the head of a new party. Vekkos assembled a synod, and excommunicated those members of the Greek clergy who refused to recognize the Pope as the head of the Church of Christ. Nicephorus, despot of Epirus, and his brother John Dukas, the prince of Vallachian Thessaly, protected the orthodox. Both were excommunicated; and the emperor sent an army against John Dukas, whose position threatened the tranquillity of Macedonia; but the imperial officers and troops showed no activity in a cause which they considered treason to their religion, and many of the emperor's own relations deserted to the enemy¹.

By a series of intrigues, tergiversation, meanness, and cruelty, Michael succeeded in gaining his immediate object. Nicholas III., who ascended the papal throne in 1277, formally refused Charles of Anjou permission to invade the Greek empire, and sent four nuncios to Constantinople to complete the union of the churches. The papal instructions are curious as an exposition of the political views of the Court of Rome, and display astute diplomacy, acting at the suggestions of grasping ambition, but blinded by ecclesiastical bigotry². The first object was to induce all the dignitaries of the Greek church to sign the Roman formulary of doctrine, and to persuade them to accept absolution for having lived separate from the Roman communion; the second, to prevail on the emperor to receive a cardinal legate at Constantinople. Before the arrival of the Pope's ambassadors, the arbitrary conduct of Michael had involved him in a quarrel with his new patriarch, Vekkos, whom he was on the point of deposing.

¹ [It is probably owing to these violent proceedings, that a tradition exists in various parts of Greece, that a Pope of Rome once came and ravaged the country. A farmer on Mount Pelion, speaking to me of the Hellenic ruins of Casthanæa on the sea-shore of that mountain, said that the place was believed to have been destroyed by the Pope. The monastery of Cutlumusi and others on Mount Athos are said by the monks to have once been ruined in the same way. Sir T. Wyse, in his *Impressions of Greece*, p. 136, mentions a similar tradition as existing at the monastery of St. Luke on Mount Helicon. Ed.]

² See Raynaldi, *Annal. Eccles.*, and Waddingi *Annal. Minorum*, under the year 1278.

All Michael's talents for intrigue were called into requisition, to conceal from the Pope's ambassadors the state of his relations with Vekkos, who was in high favour at the court of Rome, and prevent the Greek clergy from breaking out into open rebellion against the Pope's authority. Bribes, cajolery, and meanness on his part, and selfishness and subserviency on the part of the Eastern clergy, enabled him to succeed¹. But the death of Nicholas III. in 1280 rendered his intrigues unavailing. Martin IV., a Frenchman, devoted to the interests of Charles of Anjou, became Pope. He hated the Greeks, and excommunicated Michael as a hypocrite who concealed his heresy. While Martin IV. openly negotiated the treaty of Orvieto, Michael secretly aided the conspiracy of Procida. The condition of the Greek emperor was almost desperate. He was universally detested in his own dominions for his exactions and persecutions, and a numerous and bigoted party was ready to make any foreign attack the signal for a domestic revolution. The storm was about to burst on Michael's head, when the fearful tragedy of the Sicilian Vespers broke the power of Charles of Anjou.

Michael then quitted his capital to punish John Dukas, whom he considered almost as a rival; but death arrested his progress at Pachomion, near Lysimachia in Thrace, on the 11th December 1282, after a reign of twenty-four years². He was a type of the empire he re-established and transmitted to his descendants. He was selfish, hypocritical, able and accomplished, an in-born liar, vain, meddling, ambitious, cruel, and rapacious. He has gained renown in history as the restorer of the Eastern Empire; he ought to be execrated as the corrupter of the Greek race, for his reign affords a signal example of the extent to which a nation may be degraded by the misconduct of its sovereign when he is intrusted with despotic power.

¹ Pachymeres, i. 311-318.

² Ibid. i. 360.

SECT. II.—*Reign of Andronicus II.*, A. D. 1282-1328.

Character of Andronicus II.—Ecclesiastical affairs during his reign.—Persecutions and schisms in Greek church.—Council of Adramyttium.—Anecdotes of various patriarchs.—Military arrangements in the Greek empire.—Conquests of the Seljouk Turks in Asia Minor.—Foundation of the Othoman power.—Arrival of the Catalan Grand Company.—Roger de Flor.—Catalans at Cyzicus.—Campaigns in Asia Minor.—Assassination of Roger de Flor.—Battle of Apros.—Catalans ravage the empire.—Their departure.—Return of their Turkish auxiliaries.—Rhodes conquered by the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem.—Andronicus the younger.—Civil war of the emperor with his grandson.—Peace of Rhégion.—Second civil war.—Peace of Epibates.—Third civil war.—Taking of Constantinople.—Death of Andronicus II.

Andronicus the Second ascended the throne at the age of twenty-four, having been born about the time his father received the imperial crown at Nicaea¹. He had most of the defects of his father's character, without his personal dignity and military talents. In youth he was destitute of vigour, in old age of prudence. His administration was marked by the same habits of cunning and falsehood which had distinguished his father's conduct; and the consequence was, that, towards the end of his long reign, he was as generally despised as his father had been hated. In his private character he was arbitrary, peevish, and religious; in his public administration despotic, fond of meddling, industrious, and inconsequent. Every evil that had taken root during Michael's reign extended itself through his incapacity, for, though always engaged with public affairs, he could neither transact business himself with due promptitude, nor would he allow his ministers to perform the duties he neglected. He was personally frugal, but he ruined the Greek empire by increasing the expenditure of the court and rendering offices and pensions the only objects of ambition².

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 4.

² Pachymeres, ii. 129. The emperor made the Patriarch a yearly present of one thousand byzants; but as they were paid in his debased coinage, it is not easy to say whether it is a proof of his superstitious liberality or of his frugality. Pachymeres, ii. 195. Chumnos, the principal secretary of state, was the richest man in the empire. The wealth of Constantine, the emperor's brother, seems to have been the real cause of the accusation of treason on which he was condemned, the object being to fill the public treasury by the confiscation of his property. Pachymeres, ii. 104; Niceph. Greg. 114. Andronicus II. carried his brother, during his journeys, in a litter formed of iron bars, to prevent his escape. Bajazet's iron cage was one of these Byzantine litters for state prisoners. Pachy-

The ecclesiastical policy of Andronicus was as arbitrary and tyrannical as Michael's, but his religious opinions were sincerely and strictly orthodox. To him the addition to the creed and the use of unleavened bread in the communion were matters touching a man's salvation; he was therefore eager to destroy his father's work. The court, headed by the emperor's aunt Eulogia, instead of weeping for the death of Michael, wept that his soul was in danger of eternal perdition; and the clergy attacked his memory before his remains were committed to the earth. Andronicus, eager to efface the stain of his own sinful compliance with the union of the churches, allowed the body of his father to be deprived of the usual funeral honours and public prayers. Michael's widow was compelled to abjure the union, and to approve of the indignities to his memory, before her own name was inserted in the public prayers for the imperial family. The Patriarch Vekkos was forced to resign, and his predecessor Joseph was reinstated on the patriarchal throne.

The ecclesiastical disputes and clerical intrigues in the Greek church were for many years the principal object of the emperor's attention and the central pivot of his policy. The restoration of Joseph introduced additional troubles and abuses into the church, which was already distracted by schisms. Yet even in its confused and corrupted state, the Greeks looked up to their ecclesiastical establishment as their guiding institution, and paid comparatively little attention to the misconduct of the civil government and the defects of the judicial administration. It has been already noticed that the administrative and judicial authority of the bishops increased greatly after the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders. Theodore II. had viewed the increase of their authority with distrust, but Michael VIII. had favoured their assumption of administrative power, as he found he could easily fill the church with prelates subservient to his will; while the nobles and local magistrates began in every distant province to display feelings of feudal independence which they had imbibed from their intercourse with the Western nations.

meres, ii. 110. [The story of Bajazet's iron cage arose from a verbal mistake, the same word (*kafes*) being used for a cage, and for the litters in which ladies of the harem are conveyed from place to place between two horses. The earliest Osmanli historian mentions that Bajazet was carried in a litter in this manner. See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, i. p. 254 (2nd edit.). Ed.]

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Andronicus II. found the prelates in possession of great judicial power: they were the judges as well as the priests of the Greek nation. We need therefore feel no surprise at finding the clergy commanding the people, and synods assuming the characteristics of national assemblies. The vice of the system was that the clergy were an irresponsible body as far as their civil duties were concerned, and the bishops had interests different from the people even in matters of law and justice. Their power consequently followed the usual course of all irresponsible institutions. As it was founded on what was deemed an indisputable and sacred right, it admitted of no improvement, nor of any reform, so that, according to an invariable law of man's corrupt nature, its immutability soon filled it with abuses. Of these, simony was the most prominent¹. The political condition which society assumed in the Greek empire of Constantinople, under this exorbitant influence of the church, deserves to be contrasted with the vigorous impulse which popular action displayed in the Byzantine empire under the Iconoclast emperors, when the civil power and the legal administration disputed for their independence against the efforts of the orthodox church to enslave society. The uncontested supremacy of the clergy has ever been a political evil of fearful magnitude.

The bigotry of Andronicus induced him to sanction the establishment of a tribunal, consisting chiefly of monks, which was empowered to fix the penance to be performed by those who desired to obtain absolution from a general sentence of excommunication, launched against all who had communicated with the Latin church. As nearly the whole population of the empire had fallen under this sentence of excommunication, the power of the tribunal was unlimited. The rich were mulcted according to the sensibility of their consciences and the malice of their enemies, while ecclesiastics obnoxious to the bigots were suspended from the exercise of their functions. The facility with which Michael VIII. had persuaded the

¹ The avarice of the clergy and the corrupt state of the ecclesiastical body at this period is proved by the ordinance of Andronicus prohibiting the payment of money for ordinations; by the corrupt practices of Theophanes during the patriarchate of Athanasios, and by the conduct of the Patriarch Niphon. The exertions of Andronicus to reform the administration of justice are noticed by Pachymeres, ii. 160. Compare Pachymeres, ii. 135; Niceph. Greg. 159, and *note*. Banduri, *Imp. Orient.* ii. 985.

majority of the orthodox to adopt the heterodox doctrines of union and charity, persuaded the hyperorthodox that violent measures were required to guard against any future reaction. It was determined to make the deposed Patriarch Vekkos the scapegoat of the church. A synod was assembled, in which he was condemned; but this synod was so notoriously under the influence of fanatical monks, that Theoktistos, the bishop of Adrianople, sarcastically observed, 'It seems the bishops are to be used as wooden spits to roast Vekkos; and when the dish is served they will be thrown into the fire to make a blaze¹.' Vekkos, however, was not more inclined to seek the crown of martyrdom than his contemporaries. He signed a written renunciation of the patriarchate and an orthodox profession of faith.

The Patriarch Joseph enjoyed a short triumph; he died in 1283. The partisans of Arsenios, who had never recognized any subsequent election, now claimed to be alone truly orthodox. The emperor so far acknowledged their pretensions as to put them in possession of the great church of All-Saints, which, having remained closed ever since the reconquest of Constantinople, on account of the diminished numbers of the Greek population, had escaped profanation by the Josephites and the Unionists. The Emperor Andronicus selected a layman of considerable learning, George of Cyprus, to be the new Patriarch, who received his consecration from the Bishop of Debron, a prelate who had taken no part in the ecclesiastical disputes which followed the deposition of Arsenios². George of Cyprus assumed the name of Gregorios as Patriarch. The bigoted party now gained the ascendancy. A council was held in the church of Blachern; all the bishops who had advocated papal supremacy were expelled from their sees, and many were imprisoned. The partisans of Arsenios and Joseph were then

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 14. Every traveller who has seen the Greeks roast a sheep whole, has probably seen the wooden spit on which it was roasted thrown into the fire after the dish was served. This synod condemned some of the writings of Acropolita, and other works on the procession of the Holy Ghost.

² Debron or Divri, in Macedonia, was a see dependent on the archbishopric of Achrida or patriarchate of Bulgaria, and was within the dominions of Nicephorus, despot of Epirus. The bishop was residing at Constantinople as the despot's ambassador. [The Dibra is the mountainous district through which the Black Drin flows from the lake of Ochrida until it joins the White Drin. Its inhabitants at the present day are the most famous carpenters in Turkey, and a large number of them make annual migrations in search of work. Ed.]

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left alone to contend for absolute power in the church, and an immediate collision ensued. The violence of the Arsenites alarmed both the emperor and the patriarch; they were led on by Andronikos, the Bishop of Sardes, and supported by the monks and the people.

The emperor was unable to decide between the disputants; and in order to settle his own opinions, as well as those of his subjects, he ordered a council of the church to assemble at Adramyttium¹. The whole attention of the imperial administration was directed to the business of this assembly. An army of monks marched to attend its meetings; for, in the Greek empire, monks were almost as numerous an element of the population as soldiers are now in the empires of France, Austria, and Russia. To preserve order, the government found it necessary to issue regular rations to these ecclesiastical troops, among whom were crowds of blind and mutilated victims of the persecutions of the late emperor. Incidental disputes soon rendered all agreement among the members of the assembly impossible; and at last both parties consented to remit the decision to the judgment of God. They expected Heaven to pronounce whether the Arsenites or Josephites were most worthy to rule the Greek church, and to reveal its sentence by a miracle. Two scrolls, inscribed with the adverse opinions, were cast into the flames in presence of the assembled clergy, and both were instantly reduced to ashes. The emperor and the people were satisfied; and the Arsenites, feeling themselves condemned, consented to receive the communion from the hands of the Patriarch Gregorios. Next day, however, their murmurs revived, and they recommenced their intrigues. The emperor summoned their leaders to his presence, and asked them if they recognized Gregorios as lawful Patriarch; which they were compelled to admit that they did, as they had communicated with him the day before. Gregorios, who was concealed to overhear their admission, then entered the room, and, after upbraiding them for their intrigues, pronounced an excommunication against all who should venture to disobey his orders. This trick awakened new passions. The Divine condemnation of their disputes was forgotten by

¹ Pachymeres (ii. 35), with Byzantine pedantry, says Thebes; but Nicephorus Gregoras, though as great a pedant, uses the ordinary name Adramyttium.

both parties, and the ecclesiastical warfare recommenced with redoubled violence.

Andronikos, bishop of Sardes, the emperor's confessor, though the leader of the Arsenites, had contrived to remain at Constantinople, where he awaited the deposition of Gregorios, whose place he expected to occupy. He had quitted the cloister to intrigue at court. He was now accused of treasonable discourse, and degraded from the episcopal rank. When he was brought up to receive his sentence, one of the bishops, expelled from his see by the council of Blachern, dropped a monk's cowl on his head. The deposed bishop seized it with such vivacity that, in throwing it away, he pulled off his skull-cap, and left his head bare. The people, who were in the habit of attending every ecclesiastical assembly as a public amusement, enjoyed the comic scene, and shouted, in allusion to his intrigues, that Andronikos had now his head ready for the patriarchal crown¹.

The emperor, who could never follow any line of conduct steadily, revived the spirit of the Arsenites by allowing them to transport the body of Arsenios from Cyzicus to Constantinople, while, at the same time, he determined to allow Vekkos an impartial hearing. A new council was assembled at Blachern, A.D. 1284. Vekkos could neither moderate his presumption nor conceal his envy, and his defence degenerated into a virulent attack on the Patriarch Gregorios, which disgusted everybody; and he was sent back to his exile at Brusa.

The Patriarch Gregorios, who was as fond of polemics as Vekkos, and as proud of his eloquence, indulged his taste, until one of his tracts was condemned as heterodox, which compelled him to resign in 1289².

Athanasios, a hermit of the most rigid principles, was raised to the patriarchal throne that he might reform the church, and he retained at court all the inflexibility of the ascetic. The bishops who resided at Constantinople, immersed in political intrigues, were ordered to retire to their sees. The monks, who acted as confessors and political agents for the nobles, and who might be seen, at all hours of the day and night,

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 40.

² There is a notice of the events of the patriarchate of Gregorios in Banduri, *Imperium Orientale*, ii. 934-962.

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ambling on their sleek and richly-caparisoned mules from palace to palace, were sent back to their monasteries. Bishops and nobles, monks and court ladies, rose in rebellion against these reforms; and the Emperor Andronicus, who wished a patriarch to act as a minister of his own intrigues, not as an ecclesiastical reformer, joining the opposition, Athanasios was forced to resign, after he had governed the church four years¹.

Some curious proceedings are connected with the resignation of Athanasios. Christian charity was not a virtue prevalent in the Greek church at any time, and Athanasios had even less than other priests. Before resigning the patriarchate, he prepared a writing, justifying his conduct, and anathematizing his calumniators, and all who had assisted in procuring his resignation. To this document he affixed the leaden seal of the patriarchate, and having deposited it in an earthen jar, he concealed it in the ornamental work above the galleries of St. Sophia's. Four years after his resignation, it was found by some boys who were seeking for young pigeons, which were then as numerous about the churches of Constantinople as they now are about the mosques. The paper was carried to the reigning Patriarch, Joannes, and the whole body of the orthodox were thrown into a state of consternation by the discovery; for the empire appeared to be placed under an interdict, from which there was no possibility of obtaining canonical relief. Many of the sincere bigots began to fancy that they were already suffering the pains of the damned. Tranquillity was at last restored by the Emperor Andronicus, who obtained from Athanasios a written declaration that he had revoked the anathema before his resignation, on his mind becoming more tranquil, and that it was only from inadvertency that he had forgotten to destroy the writing².

Joannes, a monk of Sozopolis, succeeded Athanasios (A.D. 1294-1303)³. Like all his predecessors, he became involved in differences with the emperor, who was incessantly meddling in ecclesiastical affairs. Joannes signed an act of abdication; but a question arose concerning its validity, and his name

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 117; Niceph. Greg. 110.

² This curious document is given by Pachymeres, ii. 113. Compare Pachymeres, ii. 169. and Banduri, *Imperium Orientale*, ii. 968-973.

³ Cuper, *De Patriarchis Constantinopolitanis*, 172.

continued to be mentioned as patriarch in the public prayers. The emperor was eager to terminate the business, in order to reinstate Athanasios in the government of the church; the Patriarch Joannes was as eager to retain his place. While matters stood thus, Andronicus paid Joannes a visit, at which the Patriarch made a bold attempt to intimidate the scrupulous emperor. As Andronicus entered the hall, he asked a benediction. Joannes replied, 'God will grant you his blessing; but do you recognize me as Patriarch?' The unsuspecting emperor answered, 'Certainly.' 'Then,' exclaimed the ambitious pontiff, 'as Patriarch I excommunicate all who endeavour to reinstate Athanasios on the patriarchal throne.' The emperor was so confounded at this bold reception that he retired without uttering a word on the subject¹. But Joannes was, nevertheless, compelled to sign a formal act of abdication, and make way for the restoration of Athanasios.

Athanasios resumed his schemes of reform, which he pursued with undiminished energy and little effect for eight years. His headstrong temper and violent disposition are said to have caused his second resignation. A caricature was discovered painted on the patriarchal footstool, in which the emperor was represented with a bridle in his mouth, held by Athanasios, who was goading him forward towards an image of Christ, with violent gestures and marks of excitement. Those who first observed the painting, accused Athanasios of impiety; but the emperor, suspecting that they were the real authors of the caricature, ordered them to be arrested, and they were condemned to perpetual imprisonment for calumniating the Patriarch. Athanasios, however, demanded a more signal satisfaction, and, being unable to obtain it, resigned the patriarchate².

Niphon, bishop of Cyzicus, a man of talents, versed in public business, but not remarkable for theological learning; was the next Patriarch. He succeeded to the throne after a vacancy of more than two years, and ruled the church little more than a year (A.D. 1313-1314³). He had displayed judgment and energy in defending his see against the incur-

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 261.

² Niceph. Greg. 159. Compare Boivin's note, p. 762, where the act of resignation is given; and Banduri, *Imp. Orientale*, ii. 976.

³ Cuiper, *De Patriarchis Constantinopolitanis*, 174.

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sions of the Seljouk Turks; and by repairing the ancient fortifications on the isthmus of Cyzicus, he had rendered the whole peninsula a safe place of refuge for the inhabitants of the neighbouring continent¹. As Patriarch he distinguished himself by his magnificence, luxury, and cupidity. His table and his stud were superior to those of the emperor; but as he affected extraordinary eagerness to accomplish the emperor's favourite scheme of uniting the schismatic Arsenites with the orthodox, his faults were overlooked. Accusations of simony at last caused his deposition². His successor was John Glykys, a layman of high character, whom bad health caused to abdicate after he had governed the church four years.

The Emperor Andronicus then determined to govern the church himself, and, in order to meet with no opposition, he placed an old deaf and ignorant monk³ named Gerasimos on the patriarchal throne. Of the eight patriarchs who ruled the church during the reign of Andronicus, he was the first who was not compelled to resign, unless we add Joseph, who died as Patriarch in the reign of Andronicus, after having been compelled to resign his throne to Vekkos during the reign of Michael VIII. Gerasimos occupied the patriarchal throne about a year (A.D. 1320-1321).

The last Patriarch named by Andronicus II. was Isaiah, a monk of Mount Athos, whom he had expected to find as docile as Gerasimos. He was disappointed; but the quarrel which ensued requires to be noticed in connection with the civil wars that ended in the dethronement of Andronicus.

This short abstract of the ecclesiastical events during the reign of Andronicus II. is sufficient to give the reader some idea of the occupations for which the emperor neglected the civil administration and military defence of his empire.

The state of the Seljouk empire invited Andronicus to regain possession of those districts in Asia Minor in which the Greeks still formed a majority of the population. Theodore Lascaris I., even while pressed on one side by the Crusaders, had, nevertheless, defeated the whole forces of the Seljouks when united under a warlike sultan. Andronicus II. was now unable to resist the attacks of the petty chiefs, who acted as

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 271.

² Niceph. Greg. 166; Banduri, *Imp. Orientale*, ii. 986.

³ Niceph. Greg. 179.

independent princes under the nominal sovereignty of Alaeddin III., the last of the Seljouk sultans of Iconium. The provincial governors who dismembered this Turkish empire are usually said to have founded ten principalities or emirats; for some of the independent chiefs who ruled only a few cities were not ranked in the list of emirs. These emirats are known in history by the names of their founders; but their boundaries can only be approximatively determined, as they were undergoing continual change. Their extent corresponded neither with that of the Byzantine themes into which the country had been divided, nor with the ancient geographical divisions of which the Greek writers make use in describing the relations of the emirs with the empire of Constantinople¹.

During the earlier years of the reign of Andronicus, the power of the Turks excited no alarm. The garrisons in the frontier fortresses were reduced, the number of the legions was diminished, and many of the ships which Michael VIII. had kept ready for service were laid up in the arsenal. Andronicus required all the money he could divert from the military and naval services for the court and the church. Officers could only gain advancement by becoming courtiers; the soldiers could only avoid neglect by becoming monks². The system adopted for maintaining the troops in garrison and in winter-quarters reveals the extent to which disorder and peculation might be carried. The imperial authorities announced to the municipal magistrates the number of troops to be quartered in the town, and the repartition was then made to each house according to the census of the proprietor. The householder was obliged to furnish the soldier with a daily ration of provisions and wine at a price fixed by a commission, and for these he was paid at distant intervals when the soldiers received their pay. As the troops were

¹ Enumerations of the chiefs and tribes are given by Pachymeres, ii. 270; Niceph. Greg. 130; Chalcocondylas. 7; and Ducas, 4. Compare Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 53; and Niceph. Greg. lib. xxxvii. edit. Parisot, p. 157. The geographical division may be vaguely given as follows:—1. Karasi (part of Mysia); 2. Saroukhan; 3. Aidin (Lydia); 4. Mentesh; 5. Hamid (Caria and Lycia); 6. Tekké (part of Lydia and Pamphylia); 7. Karaman (Phrygia); 8. Kermian (Pisidia and Lycaonia); 9. Kastemoni (part of Paphlagonia, Phrygia, and Bithynia); 10. Othman (a small part of Bithynia).

² Pachymeres, ii. 43; Niceph. Greg. 106. The Gasmuls, who were the best sailors in the Greek fleet, were dismissed from economy.

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always in arrears, they were generally deeply indebted to their landlords. A door was thus opened for every species of fraud on the part of the officers, who granted leave of absence to the soldiers to pocket their pay; and on the part of the soldiers, who indulged in recklessness and pillage. The local authorities participated in the frauds committed by the officers, so that neither the proprietors nor the soldiers could ever obtain redress from the central government¹. The emperor preferred foreign troops, as they were generally found more willing to defraud their landlords and march out of their winter-quarters before receiving the full amount of their pay. The native troops were also more inclined to take part with the people in seditions caused by financial oppression. The army of Andronicus consisted principally of Alans, Gasmuls, Turks, Turkopuls, and refugee Cretans². The Alans received double the pay of the best native troops. The native troops with which the Emperors of Nicaea had defeated the Turkish sultans, the Latin emperors, the kings of Bulgaria, and the French knights of Achaia and Athens, were disbanded and neglected. The state maxim of imperial Rome, that no man who paid the land-tax should be allowed to bear arms, was again revived, and mercenaries and Turks plundered the Greek empire as the Goths and Huns had plundered the Roman³.

The Greek empire of Constantinople, at the accession of Andronicus II., embraced the whole coast of Asia Minor, from the mouth of the Sangarius to the Rhodian Peraia; but the nomade tribes who lived under the Seljouk dominion were daily pushing their incursions farther and farther into the Greek territories. In the year 1296, the regular army of the empire continued to maintain a decided superiority in the field over any force the Turks could bring into action; but the carelessness of the emperor, who left the troops in Asia without pay, caused this neglected army to break out into rebellion⁴. The Turkish mercenaries in its ranks plundered the Greek landlords; the Cretans sold their services to the highest bidder. Alexios Philanthropenos, who had successfully resisted the Seljouk tribes, was proclaimed emperor by his

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 142; Muntaner, *Chronique d'Aragon, de Sicile, et de Grèce*; traduction nouvelle du Catalan, par Buchon: Paris, 1840, p. 421.

² Pachymeres, ii. 142, 212.

³ Ibid. ii. 148.

⁴ Ibid. ii. 143.

rebellious troops, but allowed himself to be taken prisoner, and was deprived of sight. His successor, John Tarchaniotes, vainly attempted to reform the abuses, which rendered the army more oppressive to the emperor's subjects than dangerous to his enemies. The anarchy that prevailed in the civil, military, and ecclesiastical administration rendered him powerless, and he was compelled to abandon the undertaking¹.

In the year 1301, Michael, the eldest son of Andronicus, who received the imperial title from his father in 1295, took the command of the army in Asia, and about the same time a body of veteran warriors entered the imperial service, who, under an able general, would have secured victory to the Greeks. Andronicus allowed a colony of Alans to settle in his dominions, and about eight thousand who had served in the Tartar wars beyond the Danube were enrolled in the Byzantine service. To furnish these foreigners with well-broken horses, Andronicus dismounted the best cohorts of his native cavalry. It was already known that the emperor distrusted his Greek troops. Henceforth it was evident that no confidence could be placed in men whom he had openly insulted by his preference for foreign mercenaries². The Alans, though brave and experienced soldiers, united many of the wild habits of their original nomadic life with the worst vices of mercenaries. They required to be kept constantly under the strictest discipline, and to be ruled with a strong hand. Michael, who had no military talent, could neither employ their valour with effect against the Turks, nor restrain their disorders. After a short term of service, they mutinied, deserted the camp, and marched to the Hellespont, plundering the Greek inhabitants of the country they passed through. The young emperor then broke up his own camp, and abandoning his head-quarters at Magnesia on the Hermus, retired to Pergamus, leaving the Turkish tribes to extend their plundering expeditions as far as Adramyttium, Lampsacus, and Cyzicus³.

About the same time the Venetians and Genoese were so emboldened by the weakness of the Greek empire and the neglected state of its marine that they pursued their

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 175.

² Ibid. ii. 212.

³ Ibid. ii. 214.

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hostilities in the port of Constantinople, while private vessels plundered the islands of the Propontis within sight of the palace of Andronicus, and compelled him to ransom the captive inhabitants by parading them before the walls of the capital, suspended from the rigging of their ships¹.

Rapid conquests were now made by the Seljouk emirs, and a destructive warfare against the Greek race was carried on by the nomade tribes, who were more anxious to exterminate the agricultural population than to subdue them. The valley of the Maeander was overrun by Mentshe and Aïdin; Philadelphia and Magnesia were threatened by Kermian and Saroukhan. The citadel of Sardes was divided into two forts, and the troops of Sultan Alaeddin III., the last of the Seljouk emperors of Roum, were put in possession of one, as it was hoped that the emirs and nomades would respect a city that paid tribute to their sultan². Michael, distracted by the number rather than by the force of his enemies, abandoned his head-quarters at Pergamus, where he found himself straitened for provisions by the ravages of Karasi, and retired to the maritime fortress of Pegae. The Greeks were everywhere in despair. In the empire of Trebizond, matters were not much better than in the empire of Constantinople. But it was in the provinces between Nicomedia and Smyrna, along the Propontis and the Aegean, that the greatest confusion reigned. The roads to the coast were covered with fugitives from the interior, endeavouring to save their property and families. Thousands were left to perish by famine, and thousands died from disease. Whole provinces were deserted by their inhabitants, and became pasture-lands for hordes of Turkomans. In the course of a single generation, the Greek race and language disappeared from countries in which it had been spoken for two thousand years, and Turkish colonies took possession of Aeolis and Ionia. Andronicus II. witnessed these dreadful calamities

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 224. The captives were released on payment of four thousand byzants. The precious metals were now as rare at Constantinople as in western Europe. Two centuries before, twenty thousand and thirty thousand byzants had been paid as the ransom of an imperial general, but the ruin of Byzantine commerce had produced a great change in the abundance of gold. See Niceph. Bryennius, 66, 140, 163.

² Pachymeres, ii. 280. Sultan Alaeddin died in 1307.

with feelings benumbed by piety: even the extermination of the orthodox failed to animate his energy¹.

The Byzantine and Seljouk empires, and the Greek and Turkish people, displayed unequivocal signs of a state of society in which the ties that had once connected the various ranks of the population with the central government were broken or dissolved. The conquests of the Crusaders had weakened the imperial authority at Constantinople, and the irruption of the Moguls had diminished the power of the Sultan at Iconium. No bond of union existed between the sovereign and the people except that of religion, either in Christian or Mohammedan society in Western Asia, and this state of civil and political anarchy enabled a small nomade tribe of Turks, who had recently entered the Seljouk dominions, and whose education and feelings were not yet corrupted, to lay the foundations of an empire which advanced to greatness more rapidly than that of Rome, and whose power has proved more durable than the empire of Alexander. Othman, whose father's tribe consisted of only four hundred tents, was invested with the government of Karadja-hissar (Melangeia) in the year 1289, by the Sultan Alaeddin III.² The education of Othman had taught him that the impartial administration of justice is a powerful instrument of ambition, and he adopted systematic arrangements for securing it both to Christians and Mohammedans in his territory. The market held on Friday at Karadja-hissar was celebrated for its security. A judge sate constantly to decide every difference that might arise on the spot, and Othman frequently occupied the judgment-seat. It happened that, as he was presiding, a dispute arose between a Christian of Belokoma (Biledjik), in the Greek empire, and a Turk of Kermian. The decision was in favour of the Christian, and the justice of the sentence raised the fame of Othman and the commercial importance of Karadja-hissar. Yet Othman is represented as just only when justice aided his ambition; when injustice was profitable, he acknowledged no law. He plundered the Greek territories when he could do so with impunity; and he is said to have murdered his uncle, Dundar, who was ninety years of

¹ Pachymeres (ii. 231, 269, 279, 285, 287) gives fearful descriptions of the sufferings of the people. Niceph. Greg. 130.

² See above, p. 360.

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age, because he advised him to remain at peace with the Byzantine empire¹. The city of Tarakli (Yenidje-Tarakdji), where the Greeks carried on a great manufacture of combs and spoons with which they supplied all Western Asia and the East of Europe, and the town of Modreni, which was the seat of an equally important manufacture of knives and needles, were both plundered.

In the year 1301, after twelve years of preparation, Othman ventured to attack the regular army of the Greek empire. The action took place at Baphaeon, near Nicomedia. Pachymeres estimates the number of the imperial troops commanded by Muzalon at only two thousand, while the forces of Othman consisted of five thousand. The Greek infantry fled, and their misconduct was attributed to the dissatisfaction caused by the manner in which they had been deprived of their horses and compelled to serve on foot. The Alans fought bravely, and covered the retreat to Nicomedia. Othman laid waste the whole of Bithynia, from Nicomedia to Lopadion. The Greeks could hardly venture out of the gates of Nicaea; and the communications with Constantinople were kept up by means of boats on the lake Askanios. Even the road from the end of the lake to Kios was usually travelled in the night. The suburbs of the towns on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus were burned by the Othomans, whose foraging parties were sometimes visible from the towers of the imperial palace in Constantinople².

The disgraceful retreat of his son Michael to Pegae induced Andronicus to change the military governors in Asia, instead of teaching him the necessity of reforming the military system. The command of Nicomedia was intrusted to a Tartar chief who had recently embraced Christianity; and by the marriage of this Tartar's daughter with Suleiman, a Turkish emir, peace was restored to a small district, and a barrier was formed against the incursions of Othman³. But the unemployed Turkish troops transferred their services to other leaders, and carried on their incursions in more distant provinces. This preference of a Tartar general indicates a

¹ Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 76.

² Pachymeres (ii. 286) enumerates the towns taken and ruined by Othman, and Hammer extends the list from the Turkish historians (i. 97).

³ Pachymeres (ii. 237) calls the Tartar Ruximpax, and the Turk Suleimanpax.

deep-rooted distrust of the courage and fidelity of the Greek nobles, as well as contempt for their military skill; and, indeed, a factious spirit, directed to personal interest, could alone have caused the insensibility to national honour which made the nobles and the troops submit tamely to the insults they received from their emperor. Well might the brave old Spaniard Muntaner declare that God had stricken the Greek race with His curse, for every one could trample them down.

A new crisis in the fate of the Byzantine empire suddenly presented itself by the arrival of an army of Spaniards, composed chiefly of Catalans and men of Aragon; but this race of strangers soon disappeared from the scene. They came and departed as if under the guidance of the destroying angel. In daring courage, steady discipline, and military skill, they were not surpassed by any Greek or Roman army. Their warlike deeds entitle them to rank as a host of heroes; their individual acts made them a band of demons. They had proved invincible on every field of battle. They had shivered the lances of the chivalry of France in many a well-fought action; and they were firmly convinced that no troops on earth could encounter their shock. Guided by a sovereign like Leo III., or like Basil II., they might have conquered the Seljouk Turks, strangled the Othoman power in its cradle, and carried the double-headed eagle of Byzantium victorious to the foot of Mount Taurus, and to the banks of the Danube; but Andronicus could neither make use of their valour, nor secure their obedience. His own senseless intrigues roused their hostile feelings; and after they had made every tribe in the Seljouk empire tremble for a moment, they turned back on the Greek empire, where they carried on their ravages with a degree of cruelty and rapacity which history cannot attempt to portray. They laid the empire prostrate in the dust, bleeding with wounds from which it never recovered.

The Catalan Grand Company—for that is the name by which this Spanish army is known in Eastern history—consisted of troops formed in the twenty years' war that followed the Sicilian Vespers. The kings of Aragon for some time supported the people of Sicily in their courageous defence of their independence against the French kings of Naples; but at last Jayme II. of Aragon abandoned their cause. The Sicilians then conferred their crown on Frederic, the brother

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of Jayme II., and carried on the war gallantly against the combined forces of Naples, Aragon, and France, supported by the temporal and spiritual power of the popes. In this war the Spanish leaders gradually formed a mercenary army, of which every individual soldier was a match in military exercises for the best knights of France. Spain was filled with a poor and proud nobility. High pay and great license drew the best sinews in Catalonia and Aragon into the mercenary battalions of Sicily, and induced them to submit to the severest discipline. The spirit which long after astonished the world in the followers of Cortes and Pizarro, then animated every Spanish soldier with an enthusiastic desire to encounter the most renowned knight in France; and the great admiral, Roger de Lauria, well expressed their feelings when he said to the Count de Foix, 'Let the King of France arm three hundred galleys; I will sweep the sea with one hundred, and no ship shall sail without a pass from the King of Aragon¹.'

In the year 1302, peace was at last concluded between the kings of Naples and Sicily. The marriage of Charles of Valois with Catherine of Courtenay made the kings of France and Naples eager to enforce their claims on the empire of Constantinople². The kings of Aragon and Sicily, on the other hand, had much to fear from any increase of French influence in the Mediterranean; but Frederic of Sicily had bound himself by treaty not to conclude any alliance with the Greek emperor. It was known at Constantinople that Pope Boniface VIII. eagerly supported the pretensions of Charles of Valois to the Eastern Empire; yet the bigoted Andronicus took no measures to avert the storm, by creating a diversion against the French princes in the West³. Frederic was anxious to free Sicily from the presence of the Spanish troops who had carried on the war in Calabria. He had no longer the means of paying them, and he feared lest they should plunder the island. Roger de Flor performed the

¹ Bernat d'Esclot, *Cronica del Rey En Pere e dels seus Antecessors Passats*, cap. 166, edit. Buchon.

² Charles of Valois was the brother of Philippe le Bel, king of France, and Catherine of Courtenay was the niece of Charles II., king of Naples. She was the representative of Baldwin II., the last Latin emperor of Constantinople, being the daughter of his son Philip by Beatrice, daughter of Charles of Anjou.

³ Pachymeres (ii. 274) mentions that Boniface crowned Charles of Valois, and anointed him emperor, though he possessed no empire.

important service of inducing them to seek a new career of action in the East.

This adventurer was a type of a new race of generals, who were rapidly diminishing the importance of the military nobles in western Europe. He was the second son of a German falconer in the service of the Emperor Frederic II., named Robert Blum, who adopted the Italian name of Flor, and married an heiress of Brindisi. The commander of a galley belonging to the order of the Temple, pleased with his intelligence as a child, took him to sea when only eight years old. In due time he entered the order, distinguished himself by his attention to naval tactics and military discipline, and received the command of a galley. But when Acre was taken by the Mohammedans in 1291, brother Roger was accused of employing his galley only to save those who paid him large sums of money. Certain it is, he neglected to join the rest of the Templars, who, even after the Grand-master, Guichard de Beaujeu, was slain, prolonged the defence of their quarter under his successor Gaudini. For absenting himself from this desperate struggle, Roger was degraded from his rank, and compelled to seek refuge at Genoa, in order to escape imprisonment. He soon fitted out a private galley, and sought his fortune as a mercenary or a pirate. He first offered his services to the French in Naples, but the Duke of Calabria treated him with neglect; he then sought Frederic, whose affairs seemed desperate, and entered the Sicilian service. The king of Sicily perceived his talents, and honoured him with the rank of Vice-admiral of Sicily. Roger extended the sphere of his naval expeditions along the coasts of Italy, France, and Spain. In hostile countries he carried off everything he could embark in his ships; in friendly districts he levied contributions, and gave receipts for the amount, payable by the Sicilian treasury at the end of the war. In this way he not only enriched himself and his followers, but brought large sums into the exhausted treasury of Frederic. But when peace was concluded, the Grand-master of the Temple urged the Pope to insist that Frederic should surrender the recreant Templar. The danger was serious, and before the demand was made, Roger offered his service to the Emperor of Constantinople, promising to bring with him a body of Spanish troops to serve against the Turks. His enterprise

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had the air of a crusade; he was known at Constantinople from having rendered assistance to several Greek vessels, when he commanded the galley of the Temple; and in addition to his military qualities, he spoke Greek fluently¹. Andronicus accepted his offer; but, with the perverseness which marks every administrative act of his life, he made no arrangements for fixing the number of mercenaries he was about to hire. No quarters were prepared for them; no magazines were formed to insure their immediate employment against the enemy; and no care was taken that their pay should be issued with regularity.

In the month of September 1303, Roger de Flor arrived at Constantinople with a fleet of thirty-six sail, and an army of six thousand men². Seven galleys, one thousand cavalry, and one thousand infantry carried his own private standard³. There were several generals in this army, equal in rank and superior in birth to Roger, who submitted voluntarily to his command, without being bound to serve under his orders. The supreme authority in the Grand Company was supposed to reside in the army itself; Roger was only its elected chief. The first idea that struck the Greeks, always more ready to intrigue against their allies than to act energetically with them, was, that it would be possible to separate the interests of the generals of the Grand Company from the interests of their men, and thus render both dependent. Andronicus adopted this policy, without reflecting that it was likely to end in an appeal to the sword. As a means of securing the unbounded gratitude of Roger de Flor, he was adopted into the imperial family, and married to Maria, daughter of Asan, the exiled King of Bulgaria, and granddaughter of the Emperor Andronicus II. He was invested also with the rank of Grand-duke, and was named commander-in-chief of the army in Asia Minor and the imperial fleet on the Asiatic coast. In the mean time, Andronicus lavished immense sums on fêtes, and in presents to the Catalan leaders, whom he wished to gain. To the troops he issued four months' pay before he had taught them to obey his orders⁴. During these amusements and intrigues the Turks continued to ravage Asia Minor, the Spaniards lounged idly through the streets of

¹ Muntaner, 415.² The numbers are given by Muntaner, 417, 419, and by Pachymeres, ii. 293.³ Pachymeres, ii. 273; Niceph. Greg. 134.⁴ Muntaner, 418.

Constantinople, and the sailors of Barcelona engaged in bloody quarrels with the Genoese of Galata. Both parties despised the imperial police, and the grand drungarios was slain at the head of the Greek troops while he was attempting to separate the combatants in one of their battles¹. The Spaniards were at last transferred to Asia, where they employed the last months of 1303 in clearing the immediate neighbourhood of Cyzicus and Pegae of the troops of Karasi and Othman.

The Catalans were placed in winter-quarters at Cyzicus. According to the usage of the Byzantine empire, the soldiers were dispersed in the houses of the citizens, who were obliged to furnish them with rations of bread, wine, cheese, salt meat, vegetables, and provender for their horses². Fresh meat, and any condiments they might require, were to be paid for. The money due to the citizens for rations and extra supplies was to be paid in March, when government was to liquidate all accounts before the troops took the field. A commission, consisting of six Spanish officers and six Greeks, fixed the price of provisions³. Roger brought the grand-duchess to Cyzicus; and Muntaner, the historian of the army and one of its leaders, says that the winter was passed in joyfulness and pleasance. The natural insolence of the mercenaries, increased by the republican organization of the Grand Company, the weakness of the Greek army, and the corruption and inefficiency of the Byzantine administration, exposed the defenceless population of Cyzicus to every species of extortion. When the time arrived for paying the army, it was found that many Spaniards had incurred debts far exceeding the pay due to them. Muntaner pretends that these debts were discharged by the grand-duke; but Pachymeres, with more probability, asserts that the citizens of Cyzicus were plundered of great part of their property⁴. The inhabitants of Cyzicus were the victims

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 277.

² This must have been the immemorial practice of the Roman empire. The laws of the Burgundians and Visigoths adopted the usage, and a northern warrior was quartered permanently on the estate of a Roman family.

³ Muntaner, 420.

⁴ Muntaner (422) says that Roger went to Constantinople and received four months' pay for the army, yet he pretends that with this he paid debts to the amount of fifty thousand ounces of gold for the cavalry, and sixty thousand ounces for the infantry, which he considers equal to eight months' pay for the whole army. The debts due at Cyzicus appear really to have been discharged by burning the tallies after making a small payment. Compare Pachymeres, ii. 277, 289, 302, 303. He says (p. 291) that the pay of the Spaniards was two and three

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of foreign mercenaries, but those of Pegae suffered equal injustice at the hands of the cowardly young emperor, Michael. When Roger de Flor assumed the command, Michael quitted Pegae full of hatred against the Catalans, leaving an order which proclaimed his hostility and sowed the seeds of distrust in the breasts of Roger and his followers. This order commanded that the Catalans were not to be admitted into Pegae, though he knew that the inhabitants would be guilty of high treason if they resisted the authority of the grand-duke; and when they opened their gates to a Catalan garrison, he compelled them to pay a fine of several thousand byzants for disobeying his illegal order. Such was the treachery, avarice, and meanness of the heir-apparent of the Greek empire¹.

The military operations of the Catalans were delayed in the spring of 1304 by a quarrel with the Alans, and the streets of Cyzicus became the scene of a bloodier battle than had been fought with the Genoese in the streets of Constantinople. The son of George, the general of the Alans, was slain, and a deep debt of vengeance incurred. It was the middle of May before Roger took the field. The Turks in the mean time, despising the warriors who were so slow in their movements, surprised Tripolis and closely invested Philadelphia, then the largest city in Asia Minor, which was reduced to such extremities by famine that the blood of a sheep or a pig was sold for a byzant; and it must be remembered that the Greeks, in ordinary circumstances, have always observed the apostolic command to refrain from things strangled and blood². The Catalans at last arrived. One division of the Turkish army stationed at Germe was routed, its camp stormed, and its baggage plundered. The grand army, under the command of Alishir Kermian, still attempted to cover the siege. Roger advanced by Chliara, and an

ounces a-month per man, while the Alans only received three nomismata. Muntaner (415) says a horseman received four ounces, and an infantry soldier one. It is not easy to determine the precise value of the ounce, nor of the depreciated nomismata at this time.

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 288.

² Muntaner (423) says Philadelphia was 'eighteen miles in circuit; that is, as large as Rome and Constantinople.' Pachymeres (ii. 291) says the head of an ass was sold for many siglas; by this pedantic use of the word shekel the historian means the current silver coin, whether it was the keration, the miliaresion, or the modern aspron. Ducange, *Glossarium med. et inf. Latinitatis*, s.v. Siclus.

engagement took place at Aulaka ; but Kermian retired as soon as he could draw off the troops, and Roger entered Philadelphia in triumph. The grand-duke occupied himself more with the measures necessary to advance his own ambitious projects than with carrying on the war actively for the interests of the empire. The Turks were allowed to retain possession of Tripolis and Tralles, though without these cities the rich valley of the Maeander could not be secured against their incursions. Roger even neglected the offers of the Greeks of Tripolis to co-operate with the Catalans if he would advance to their walls, and moved in the opposite direction to regulate the pecuniary contributions and supplies of provisions which he could levy from the cities which still belonged to the emperor. The Catalans advanced no farther east than Kula. They then visited Nymphaeum, Magnesia on the Hermus, Tyria on the Cayster, Ephesus and the seaport of Anaia, whence they marched as far south as the Iron Gates on the frontiers of Lycia, defeating successively the troops of Saroukhan and Aidin¹. They boasted that the scene of their last victory over Aidin was in the mountains between Anatolia and the kingdom of Armenian Cilicia. Roger placed his army in winter-quarters at Anaia, Ephesus, Pyrgion, and Philadelphia, while his fleet occupied Chios, Lesbos, and Lemnos. In all these places the insolence of the Catalans and the rapacity of the grand-duke knew no bounds².

Roger de Flor saw clearly that neither the Emperor Andronicus nor the Greek nation possessed the vigour necessary for defending Asia Minor against the Turks. This circumstance suggested to him the project of forming an independent principality for himself in the East, for which he was ready to do homage to the Emperor of Constantinople. His first step was to increase the strength of his own corps of personal followers. After the display of hostile feeling on the part of the Emperor Michael, he felt that wealth and power could alone protect him against intrigues at Constantinople. He therefore used his authority as grand-duke entirely to serve his own ends. The Byzantine troops who were attached to the government were severely punished for the slightest

¹ Moncada, *Expedicion de los Catalanés*, ch. xvi. and xvii.

² Moncada, ch. xviii.; Pachymeres, ii. 202.

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breach of discipline. The officers who had abandoned their posts while the Catalans were amusing themselves at Cyzicus were hung without mercy. Governors of towns were condemned to pay exorbitant fines, and some who were unable to collect the sums demanded from them were put to death. Immense contributions were levied in Philadelphia, Pyrgos, and Ephesus, and in the islands on the Asiatic coast.

Several cities in Asia, when they found themselves abandoned by the Emperor Michael, assumed a certain degree of independence, and repulsed both the Turks and the imperial tax-collectors from their walls¹. Of these cities, Magnesia on the Hermus was the most important. Attaleiotes, an equerry of the emperor, was elected by the inhabitants to perform the duties of chief magistrate, and no Byzantine governor was allowed to enter the place. He repulsed the Turks, conciliated the good-will of Roger de Flor by a timely submission, and prevented him from sending a Catalan garrison to oppress the citizens. When the grand-duke began to prepare for asserting his independence, he fixed on Magnesia as the fortress in which he resolved to secure his treasures and the stores of the army. They were accordingly sent to Magnesia under the guard of a small body of Catalans, who were ordered to remain, in order to strengthen the native garrison. Attaleiotes saw that a Greek would have little chance of rising to power if the plans of Roger proved successful. Instigated by his councils, the inhabitants of Magnesia flew to arms, put the Catalans to the sword, seized the treasures of Roger and the stores of the Grand Company, and prepared to resist the fiercest assaults of the Spaniards. The grand-duke marched with his whole army to avenge an injury which touched the honour of his arms and struck a dangerous blow at his military power. The siege of Magnesia was formed, but the Grand Company was as weak in siege-artillery and engineers as the army of Hannibal. Attaleiotes made a brave defence, repulsed all the attacks of Roger, and defeated an attempt of the Catalans to destroy the aqueduct that supplied the city with water by a vigorous sortie.

¹ Machramas, who possessed rich possessions on the Scamander, was elected by the people to defend Assos against the Turks, who had established themselves on Mount Ida; but he was unsuccessful, and fled to Mitylene. Roger fined him 5000 byzants for deserting his post, and on his failing to pay the money he was beheaded. Pachymeres, ii. 303.

In order to put an end to these disorders in Asia Minor, Andronicus ordered the grand-duke to join the army under the command of his son Michael at Adrianople; but Roger, hoping to recover his treasures, delayed his march. The Alans, who were mindful of the injuries they had received at Cyzicus, made the order a pretence for quitting the grand-duke's standard. Many small bands wandered about plundering the inhabitants or living at free quarters. Constantinople was filled with alarm, Asia Minor with misery, and the camp at Adrianople with indignation. The Greek army now demanded to be led against the Catalans; disorder spread through its ranks, and Michael, to gain popularity, issued a golden bull restricting the time of service of the native troops, and declaring that they should never be called upon to serve in company with the Catalans. Such was the military condition of the empire. The Greeks would only serve as long as suited their convenience: the Alans and the Catalans disobeyed the orders of the government with impunity.

Roger, finding that he could not take Magnesia, at last raised the siege, in obedience, as he pretended, to the emperor's orders. He was now forced to provide pay for the Grand Company by levying contributions on the country he occupied, for the imperial government ceased to furnish him with money, and as he was also determined to replace the treasures he had lost as quickly as possible, his exactions became intolerable. He led his army to the Hellespont, crossed into Europe, occupied the whole Thracian Chersonesus, and put his troops into winter-quarters in the towns of Gallipoli, Potamos, Sestos, and Madytos, at the end of 1305¹.

¹ The chronology of the Catalan expedition in the East is variously given by different authors. The date of their arrival is distinctly stated by Pachymeres (ii. 273, 276), confirmed by the date of the treaty of Lentini between Frederic, king of Sicily, and Charles of Valois, as 27th September of the seventh year of the reign of Frederic, who was elected King of Sicily in January 1296. Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 48, note. The first winter was passed at Cyzicus. Pachymeres, ii. 277; Muntaner, 420, 445. Philadelphia, according to Pachymeres (ii. 285) and Muntaner (423), was relieved in the first campaign, A.D. 1304; but Nicephorus Gregoras (135), in consequence of the operations mentioned by Muntaner (417), calls it the second campaign, and this has induced most chronologers to place it in 1305. According to Moncada (ch. xviii.), the Catalans wintered in Asia Minor about Ephesus. In 1305, they besieged Magnesia, and wintered at Gallipoli; but Muntaner, who says not one word about their defeat, calls this their second winter in the East (432, 433). There can be no doubt that he slurs over the whole disgraceful campaign of 1305, for Roger de Flor was

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Roger de Flor then visited Constantinople, to demand pay for the Grand Company. His claim amounted to the sum of three hundred thousand byzants, but his extortions had forestalled a large part of the imperial revenues, and the treasury was reduced so low that the Emperor Michael had sent his plate to the mint, and sold his wife's jewels, to raise the army with which he carried on war against the Bulgarians. Roger was only able to procure a small sum, consisting of an adulterated gold coinage¹. His return, under these circumstances, spread discontent among the Catalans, who commenced plundering the country in the vicinity of their quarters.

About this time Beranger d'Entenza, a Spanish nobleman of high rank and military renown, joined his countrymen with a fleet of nine ships, three hundred cavalry, and one thousand infantry; and during the preceding winter, another distinguished leader, Beranger de Rocafort, had brought them a reinforcement of two hundred cavalry and one thousand infantry. Andronicus, who hoped by his intrigues to be able to divide the Spaniards into two parties, and thus reduce them to subserviency, invited d'Entenza to Constantinople, and treated him with great honour. Roger de Flor, who feared his rivalry with the Grand Company much more than his favour with Andronicus, resigned the office of grand-duke, in order that the emperor might confer it on d'Entenza².

assassinated at Adrianople on the 4th April 1306. Pachymeres, ii. 365; Muntaner, 434. The negotiations between Andronicus and the Grand Company, after the death of Roger, are said by Pachymeres (ii. 393) to have occurred after the termination of the twenty-third year of the reign of Andronicus, and of the twelfth of the reign of Michael. This synchronism perplexes Possin. But the twenty-fourth year of Andronicus commenced on the 11th December 1305, and Michael, who was crowned by the patriarch John Kosmas, was undoubtedly crowned on the 21st May 1294, and not 1295; consequently it is not until after the 21st May 1306 that the thirteenth year of Michael coincides with the twenty-fourth of Andronicus, and this only until the 11th of December, when the twenty-fifth year of Andronicus commences.

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 343. Muntaner (428) says Andronicus II. coined money in imitation of the ducat of Venice, worth *eight deniers Barcelonnais*, and adulterated money called *Vintillions*, worth three deniers. The old byzant or perpre of gold was worth ten sous Barcelonnais. See p. 439 (Buchon's translation), in which deniers and sous seem to be used for the same coin; but he adds the following note: 'Suivant Perra, *Storia di Genova*, i. 385, un perpre ou hyperpre était évalué à 15 sous gènois. Vingt sous gènois formaient une livre, équivalent à une once d'or, et une once d'or valait environ cent livres d'aujourd'hui.'

² When d'Entenza was named Grand-duke, many of his followers received knightly offices. The court of Constantinople copied the usages of chivalry, though the Greeks were dead to its spirit. Pachymeres, ii. 347.

The winter was passed in intrigues. Roger, to secure the attachment of the Grand Company, publicly advocated all their pretensions, while at the same time he secretly professed devotion to the emperor's service. No experience could teach the Greek statesmen the danger of too much artifice with men of the sword. Roger enjoyed intriguing as much as the Greeks. He was their equal in ability, and their superior in courage. Every day increased the difficulties of the imperial government. A new tax called *sitokrithon* was imposed on grain, and set apart for the payment of the Catalans¹. One-third of the pay of every Byzantine official was deducted, and every exertion was made to collect money, but all was insufficient to supply the demands of the Spaniards. The Emperor Andronicus, in order to show d'Entenza the injustice of his countrymen, produced accounts that proved they had exacted a million of byzants from the country, and bags of despatches filled with petitions against their enormities². D'Entenza saw the impossibility of appeasing the quarrel between the Greek government and the Grand Company, and immediately returned to Gallipoli.

The spring of 1306 was now far advanced. The Turks had again overrun great part of Asia Minor, and reinvested Philadelphia. The Catalans were fortifying themselves at Gallipoli, and the Genoese reported at Constantinople that Fernand, infant of Majorca, was about to place himself at the head of the Spaniards, in order to conquer a kingdom for himself in the Greek empire. The Emperor Andronicus and Roger de Flor were both alarmed by the knowledge they obtained of the treaty which was then negotiating between Frederic of Sicily and Fernand of Majorca, and which was signed before the end of March. By this treaty Fernand was appointed commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in Romania, as lieutenant-general of the King of Sicily; he engaged to obey the orders of the king, and neither to conclude a treaty nor to marry without his consent³. Every

¹ This tax amounted to six measures of wheat (*modioi*) and four of barley on each *zeugari*, or yoke of land, in Macedonia and Thrace; and as an indemnity for this impost, the cultivators were allowed to export their grain free. Pachymeres, ii. 343.

² Pachymeres, ii. 349.

³ The treaty is printed by Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, 217; *Recueil des Chartes*, 58; and more complete by Buchon in his translation of Muntaner, 457. The date is 10th March 1306; but this is really 1307, as in Sicily, after its

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exertion was made by the Greek emperor to gain over Roger de Flor to his interests. Roger was created Caesar, an honour which, though often degraded, was now, for the first time, conferred on a mercenary adventurer¹. He was offered twenty thousand byzants, three hundred thousand measures of corn, and the command over all Asia Minor, exclusive of the cities, if he would march to the relief of Philadelphia with his own corps². But Roger, who knew he could place no reliance on the promises of the Greeks, only urged the Catalans the more to prosecute their demands for payment. A deputation of the leaders of the Grand Company waited on the emperor, and were received by Andronicus with a long harangue, in which he rebuked the Catalans for their conduct, boasted of his own power, depreciated their services, and threatened to punish them if they disobeyed his orders. The discourse is so absurd from its bombast, and so ridiculous from its vanity, that it is more surprising to find it recorded by a historian than it is difficult to believe that it was uttered by an emperor. If the Catalans had really arrived at Constantinople half starved and in rags, as the emperor told them was the case, he ought to have reflected that the change in their circumstances proved the worthlessness of the imperial government and the cowardice of the Greek army³. The emperor attempted to gain time by paying the Spaniards four months' arrears in his depreciated coinage. This money the Spaniards compelled the Greeks to receive at its nominal value. It was also arranged that Roger should immediately march to the relief of Philadelphia at the head of three thousand men, who were alone to remain permanently in Byzantine pay. But the whole Spanish army resolved to accompany Roger, being persuaded that he was about to take possession of Asia Minor as Caesar, in order to hold it as an imperial fief, and they expected to partition their conquests as the Crusaders had partitioned Europe after the conquest of Constantinople⁴.

Before quitting Europe Roger visited Adrianople to pay

conquest by the Normans, the year commenced on the 25th of March. *L'Art de vérifier les Dates*, i. 9, quarto edit.

¹ Muntaner (431) gives a very curious account of the power and dignity attached to the title of Caesar.

² Pachymeres, ii. 353.

³ Ibid. 358.

⁴ Pachymeres, ii. 363; Muntaner, 432.

his respects to the Emperor Michael. As he entered the apartment of the empress, he was assassinated by George, the general of the Alans, whose son was slain in the tumult at Cyzicus, and three hundred Catalan cavalry, who formed his escort, were massacred by the Alan troops. Three Spaniards alone escaped to carry the news to Gallipoli¹. The Emperor Michael acted as if he considered that George had taken a just revenge for the death of his son, and the Greeks who participated in the assassination remained unpunished. It was evident that half measures were no longer possible, yet Michael had not the courage to attack the Grand Company before it had time to prepare for action and replace its leader. The news of the assassination of Roger de Flor filled the Catalans with rage, and they resolved to be signally revenged. Everything they did was undertaken with a solemnity that marked unalterable determination. A deputation waited on the Emperor Andronicus, and announced to him that the treacherous assassination of Roger de Flor had broken the ties of their allegiance to the empire. These merciless adventurers knew better how to guard their own honour, than the Greek emperor knew how to guard the honour of his empire. The Catalan envoys, after boldly performing their mission, and declaring war according to the forms of chivalry, quitted Constantinople with a safe-conduct of Andronicus, but they were waylaid and murdered at Rhedestos. The people of the capital also massacred Fernand d'Aones, the admiral, and all the Spaniards in the capital. The cavalry of Michael swept the country round Gallipoli, and slew many Catalans before they could reach the camps of their countrymen.

The Grand Company immediately commenced a war of extermination against the Greek race. Beranger d'Entenza, finding that Gallipoli was in no immediate danger, sailed with a division of the army to collect supplies of money and provisions. The city of Perinthos was stormed, and the cruelty with which the Greeks were everywhere treated exceeds belief, and cannot be recorded in detail; men were burned alive, women were violated and stabbed, and even children

¹ Muntaner (435) mentions the names of these three fortunate individuals.

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were impaled¹. On his return to Gallipoli, d'Entenza met a Genoese fleet on its way to Trebizond. With these ships he held some communication; but a Genoese fleet, hired by Andronicus to attack the Catalans, arriving soon after from Constantinople, the whole Genoese forces fell on d'Entenza, destroyed his squadron, and carried him prisoner to the emperor. But Andronicus not being able to pay the Genoese the sum they demanded as his ransom, he was taken to Trebizond, and thence to Genoa².

The loss of their fleet was a serious blow to the Catalans. Some proposed to abandon Gallipoli and establish themselves in Mitylene, until the arrival of the Infant Fernand of Majorca. This plan was nevertheless abandoned as dishonourable, and it was resolved to keep possession of Gallipoli, and defend it against the whole force of the Byzantine empire. The death of Roger de Flor and the captivity of Beranger d'Entenza made it necessary to reorganize the government of the army. Rocafort was elected commander-in-chief, with a standing council of twelve officers. The seal of the army bore the inscription, 'Seal of the Frank army in Macedonia.' Four standards were borne before its ranks. The standard of St. Peter was planted on the ramparts of Gallipoli, three others, bearing the arms of Sicily, the arms of Aragon, and the figure of St. George, accompanied the troops in their expeditions to collect plunder. The few ships that remained were sunk off the entrance of the port, to obstruct an attack by sea, and a corps of Turkish light cavalry was hired to assist in foraging.

The Emperor Michael sent forward a body of troops to observe Gallipoli, until he arrived in person to besiege the Catalans. The first exploit of the Grand Company was to march out and attack this army of observation. But the Catalans, on account of their inferiority in numbers, abandoned the usual tactics of the age, and instead of dividing their army into an advanced guard, centre, and reserve, drew up their force in two bodies, placing the cavalry on the left wing and the infantry on the right. The cavalry charged the Byzantine horse, and were met by the Greeks and Alans with

¹ The author of this work has seen enough of war in the East to know from personal observation that the accounts of these enormities are not exaggerations.

² Compare Pachymeres, ii. 371, with Muntaner, 437, and Moncada, ch. xxxiii.

a bold front; but they sustained the shock of the Spaniards only for a moment, and then fled in confusion, leaving their infantry exposed. The Catalan infantry rushed forward to attack the main body of the Greeks, drawn up on the slope of a hill and making a gallant appearance with their well-dressed lines and glittering armour. Each Spanish soldier seemed to fear that his companion might be intimidated by the immense number of the enemy, though he felt no fear himself. A simultaneous shout of 'Aragon! Aragon! St. George! St. George!' rose from the whole line as it quickened its step to close in combat. The Greeks made a feeble resistance; the Catalans took a bloody vengeance on their flying battalions until nightfall, when they returned and pillaged the Byzantine camp.

When the Turkish mercenaries were perfectly drilled into obeying the Catalan signals, the Grand Company marched to attack the imperial army under the command of the Emperor Michael. Three days' march brought them to Imeri, near Apros. The Catalans were rejoiced to hear that Apros was a strong fortress, for they said the battle would be short, since the Greeks would soon think of seeking safety within its walls. The Byzantine army consisted of Alan and Turkopul cavalry, of Macedonian and Thracian infantry, of Asiatic troops, of Vallachians, and mercenaries of other nations. It was drawn up in five divisions, and Michael placed himself at the head of the reserve. The Grand Company was formed in four divisions; the heavy cavalry occupied the centre, the Almogavars composed the main body and the reserve¹, while the auxiliary Turks were placed on the wings.

The battle was commenced by the Alans and Turkopuls, who formed the left wing of the imperial army. The terrible array of the chivalry of Aragon and Catalonia palsied the courage of these veteran mercenaries, and they retreated before its charge. Their retreat was ascribed by the Greeks to treachery, and was a pretext for every coward to think of his own safety. The fact is, that order and discipline did not, in the army of Michael, replace the want of a sense of honour and of the feelings of patriotism, while no soldier had any confidence in the military talents of the emperor. The native

¹ The word *Almogavar* is derived from Arabic. The term was applied more particularly to the infantry of Aragon.

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legions could not be expected to fight better than the mercenaries, who had been honoured as the flower of the army. Squadron after squadron yielded to the Spanish lance, and battalion after battalion fled before the long swords of the Almogavars, until the battle was irretrievably lost. The Emperor Michael made a spirited attempt to stop the rout. He led the reserve up bravely to meet the victorious Spaniards, and charged with his lance into the thickest ranks of the assailants. He was soon struck down by the pike of a powerful Catalan sailor, who had gained a splendid suit of armour and a superb charger in the preceding victory, but Beranger, the Catalan, was himself nearly slain by the lance of Michael, and his fall allowed the imperial guards to close round the emperor, carry him off the field, and transport him to Didymoteichos, where the native troops rallied round their prince¹. The Catalans, after plundering the imperial camp, made an attempt on Apros, but that fortress repulsed their attack, and they retired to Gallipoli, in order to place the immense plunder they had collected in the Byzantine camp in security.

The victory of Apros rendered the Catalans masters of all the open country on the Thracian shore of the Propontis. They inflicted a dreadful punishment on Rhedestos, because it had been the scene of the murder of their envoys. Muntaner confesses that they put to the sword men, women, and children, in indiscriminate massacre. Rhedestos, being more central for the foraging operations of the Grand Company than Gallipoli, was converted into their head-quarters. Muntaner, who acted as secretary-at-war, was appointed commandant of Gallipoli, and intrusted with the care of the treasures, magazines, and arsenal of the army². Rocafort increased the number of Turks in his army, by a reinforcement of two thousand men from the tribes under Aidin, and the Grand Company was subsequently joined by eight hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, under Isaac Melek, a descendant of the Seljouk sultans, who was slain soon after; but his Turks remained the faithful allies of the Catalans in all the

¹ Muntaner bears testimony to the personal courage of Michael: 'Il était bon chevalier, et rien ne lui manquait si ce n'est pas la loyauté.' Buchon's translation, 442; Pachymeres, ii. 381; Niceph. Greg. 140.

² Muntaner, 446.

vicissitudes of their fortunes¹. The Byzantine government was so unpopular among the Christians in Asia that many Greeks joined the Turks, and shaved their heads, in order to enter the Catalan service as Turkopuls².

The Catalans burned with an unextinguishable desire to avenge the assassination of Roger de Flor. They learned with satisfaction that the Alans had separated themselves from the Greek army, and were plundering on their own account; but a rumour soon arrived that the troops of George had resolved to transfer their services to the King of Bulgaria. No time was therefore to be lost. A body of Catalan cavalry, under the guidance of a corps of Turkopuls, set out to hunt down the assassin, whom they overtook near the Bulgarian frontier. A bloody battle ensued; George was slain, with the best part of his followers, and their wives and children were captured in their camp. This bold enterprise increased the reputation of the Catalan arms; for these Alans had long been regarded as the best soldiers in the East, and the two parties had met on equal terms³.

The Grand Company plundered Thrace for two years without meeting any opposition in the field. The Emperor Michael occupied Didymoteichos, Tzurulos, and Adrianople, with strong garrisons, but made no attempt to defend the country near the Propontis. City after city was taken, plundered, and burned to the ground; the fruit-trees were cut down, and the vineyards destroyed; men, women, and children were carried off to Gallipoli, which became one of the great slave-marts for Asia Minor. In one of these expeditions they massacred about five thousand cultivators of the soil in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople⁴. For two years the Catalan host lived at free quarters, in the midst of wealth and plenty. They built no houses, they cultivated no land; what they wanted they seized where it was to be found, careless if they reduced the richest districts to the condition of a desert. They lived by the sword alone; and

¹ Muntaner, 454. Pachymeres (ii. 413) gives a different account of the conduct of Isaac; but Muntaner is a better authority for the service of the troops.

² Pachymeres, ii. 409, 436.

³ Muntaner (449) gives an interesting account of the valiant death of an Alan, who slew his wife and perished by her body, after killing one Spanish cavalier and wounding two others. Pachymeres, ii. 420; Niceph. Greg. 142.

⁴ Pachymeres, ii. 421.

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no volume could record all their valiant deeds, or their infamous cruelties¹.

The Emperor Andronicus vainly attempted to negotiate the retreat of the Catalans; his ill-timed pretensions and the penury of his treasury rendered his negotiations abortive. The Grand Company insisted on payment of arrears, on the release of all prisoners without ransom, on the restoration of the ships captured with d'Entenza, and that the emperor should pay them for the booty which they were unable to carry away². Andronicus, finding his own negotiations and the military operations of his subjects equally unsuccessful, again hired a Genoese fleet to attack the Spaniards by sea; but the naval warfare produced no result, and the Genoese concluded a separate peace.

The fame of the Catalans resounded through all Europe. Frederic of Sicily became eager to revive the connection with them which he had been so anxious to dissolve some years before, and sent the Infant Fernand of Majorca to command the Grand Company as his lieutenant-general. The Spaniards were now divided into three separate bands. Rocafort, who had been elected commander-in-chief, was at the head of the most numerous division, including the Almogavars and the Turkish auxiliaries. D'Entenza, who had been released by the Genoese at the request of the King of Aragon, had returned to the army, and was now the leader of the Aragonese nobles; while a third body followed the standard of Ximenes d'Arenos. The difficulty of procuring supplies of provisions began to be seriously felt. The Emperor Andronicus had laid waste the country between Selymbria and Constantinople³. No man could venture to till the ground within range of the Catalan forays, so that it became necessary for the Grand Company to seek new quarters. The arrival of the Infant Fernand enabled the army to move without the three parties coming to open hostilities⁴.

It was resolved to march into Macedonia, and establish themselves in some rich district which the evils of war had

¹ Muntaner says, '*Ainsi vecûmes nous pendant cinq ans à bouche-que-veut-tu*' (446 and 460); and at 448 he speaks of Gallipoli as having been the Catalan head-quarters for seven years; but two dates are well ascertained. They arrived at Constantinople in 1303, and quitted Gallipoli in 1308.

² Pachymeres, ii. 435.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 424.

⁴ Pachymeres, ii. 455; Muntaner, 446; Niceph. Greg. 142.

not yet reached. The army, consisting of about six thousand Spaniards and three thousand Turks, moved in two divisions. The main body, under Rocafort, marched a day's journey in advance of the second division under d'Entenza and Ximenes. The Infant Fernand placed himself in the second division. Strict order was observed for several days, but one day the main body delayed moving from its quarters until noon; and the second division, having passed the night in a spot where nothing was to be found, reached its quarters before they were completely evacuated. A dispute took place between the rear-guard of the first and the advanced guard of the second division; and d'Entenza, who hastened to the front to arrest the disorder, was attacked and slain by the brother of Rocafort. Ximenes d'Arenos was compelled to fly for safety to a Greek fortress in the neighbourhood. Rocafort then persuaded the army to refuse acknowledging Fernand as lieutenant-general of the King of Sicily, but it offered to elect him commander-in-chief. Muntaner, who had been left at Gallipoli to embark the plunder, the stores of the army, and two thousand women in the ships collected to attend the expedition, joined the army a short time after this revolution. He now resigned his command, and attached himself to the Infant Fernand, who refused to violate his engagements to the King of Sicily, and therefore quitted the Grand Company. Rocafort continued his march, but being unable to take the town of Christopolis, where the army had proposed to pass the winter, he was compelled to proceed and occupy the peninsula of Cassandria.

The operations of the Catalans in the year 1308 were not very successful. The fortifications of Thessalonica were found in good order, and manned by a strong garrison. They were repulsed in an attempt to storm the city, and when they would fain have retraced their steps in order to regain their old quarters in Thrace, they were unable to force the pass between the plain of Philippi and Christopolis, through which they had penetrated with considerable loss the preceding year. The position of the Grand Company was growing difficult; and Rocafort, who was a mere mercenary, began to open negotiations with the French admiral, Thibaut de Sipoy, in order to induce the Spaniards to recognize Charles of Valois, the hereditary enemy of their nation, as their chief. But the

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French admiral was meaner and more faithless than the treacherous mercenary. He seized Rocafort, sailed away to Italy, and delivered his prisoner to Robert, king of Naples, whom he had often defeated in the field. The house of Anjou was a revengeful race; Rocafort was cast into a dungeon and starved to death¹. When the perfidy of the French was known, and the Spaniards found they had lost their leader, they massacred all their colonels for having connived at the treachery of Sipoyes, elected new leaders, and, marching forward, passed the winter in Thessaly². In the year 1309 they quitted the Byzantine territory, and entered the service of the Duke of Athens. They found the Vallachians of Thessaly a very different race from the peasants of Thrace, and even the Byzantine officers in the mountain districts of Macedonia offered a firmer resistance than the Catalans had previously encountered³.

Walter de Brienne, duke of Athens, quarrelled with the Catalans, and perished in the battle of the Cephissus on the 15th of March 1310. The conquest of Attica followed, which is narrated in another volume⁴. The Turkish auxiliaries returned home after the battle of Cephissus, to enjoy the wealth they had amassed in the expedition. The Emperor Andronicus allowed them to pass through the empire unmolested, on condition that they refrained from every act of pillage, and they reached the shore of the Hellespont, escorted by a corps of three thousand Greek cavalry. The imperial government could never act either with honesty or boldness. A plot was framed to disarm the Turks as they were waiting for vessels to transport them over to Asia; but the Greeks were so universally distrusted that their plots had little chance of succeeding, for everybody suspected their treachery and watched their proceedings. The Turks learned their danger, surprised a neighbouring fort, and commenced plundering the country. The Emperor Michael attacked

¹ Muntaner, 467, with Buchon's notes.

² Niceph. Greg. 152.

³ Boissonade (*Analecta Graeca*, vol. ii. pp. 188 and 212) has published two tracts, from which it might be expected that some new facts could be gleaned concerning the history of this period. Buchon (*Chroniques étrangères*, lxii.) has reprinted the first, entitled 'A Discourse by Theodoulos, magister to the Emperor Andronicus;' the second is by the same Theodoulos, concerning the events that occurred during the invasion of the Italians (Catalans) and Persians (Turks). Forty pages of frothy elocution give us hardly a single fact worth recording.

⁴ See vol. iv. *Mediaeval Greece and Trebizond*, ch. vi. § 3.

them with the Greek army, but defeat was his invariable companion. Khalil, the Turkish general, was a soldier formed in the severe discipline of the Catalan camp; his superior generalship and the perfect tactics of his troops gained a complete victory. The camp, baggage, and imperial crown of Michael became the spoil of the conquerors. Khalil gleaned the remains of the Catalan ravages¹.

Philes Palaeologos, a man remarkable for his virtue, afflicted by the sufferings of his fellow-countrymen, solicited the emperor for permission to serve against the Turks. Andronicus, though he placed more confidence in his piety than in the military operations he proposed, conferred on him the office of Protostrator, and authorized him to levy an army. The success of Philes proves that the ruin of the empire was caused by the folly of Andronicus and the corruption of the government. Philes enrolled only veteran soldiers, and selected officers of experience, without reference to birth and court favour. Constant exercise and strict discipline soon restored the spirit of the Byzantine army, and Philes led his men to encounter a plundering expedition of the Turks in the vicinity of Bizya, commanded by Khalil in person. A bloody battle ensued, for the Turks were too much accustomed to vanquish the Greeks to yield without a desperate contest. Philes, however, remained master of the field, and followed up his success with such vigour that he soon besieged the Turks in their fortified camp, while the Byzantine fleet, aided by eight Genoese galleys, blockaded them by sea. After a fierce struggle, the camp was taken; the greater part of the Turks were slain by the Greeks, and the remainder sold as slaves by the Genoese². This affair occurred in the year 1315. It may be considered as the last scene of the Catalan expedition, so that for twelve years the Greek empire had been plundered and devastated by the Catalan Grand Company and its Turkish auxiliaries.

Other enemies had taken advantage of this calamitous period. The Seljouk Turks almost completed the conquest of Asia Minor; the Othomans extended their possessions on the southern shores of the Propontis; the Genoese arrogated to themselves the possession of several cities and islands, and

¹ Niceph. Greg. 156.

² Ibid. 162-166.

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various chiefs seized different towns that were left without garrisons, and lived in a state of piratical independence¹. Every bond of society appeared to be dissolved in the countries inhabited by the Greek race, and every stranger, whether Mussulman or Christian, thought himself strong enough to subdue the Greeks.

The most important conquest of the time, however, was that of Rhodes, by the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, both from its durability and from the renown of the conquerors. The knights settled in Cyprus after their expulsion from Acre, but they were soon discontented to remain as vassals of the King of Cyprus. They aspired to form a sovereign state, but it was not easy to make any conquests from the Infidels which they could hope to maintain for any length of time. They therefore solicited permission from the Pope to turn their arms against the Greeks. His Holiness applauded their Christian zeal, and bestowed on them innumerable blessings and indulgences, besides nine thousand ducats to aid their enterprise. Under the pretext of a crusade for the recovery of Christ's tomb, the knights collected a force with which they besieged Rhodes. So great was their contempt for the Greek emperor that they sent an embassy to Constantinople, requiring Andronicus to withdraw his garrisons, and cede the island and its dependencies to them as feudatories, offering to supply him with a subsidiary force of three hundred cavalry. Andronicus dismissed the ambassadors, and sent an army to raise the siege; but his troops were defeated, and the knights took the city of Rhodes on the 15th August 1310. As sovereigns of this beautiful island, they were long the bulwark of Christian Europe against the Turkish power; and the memory of the chivalrous youth who for successive ages found an early tomb at this verge of the Christian world, will long shed a romantic colouring on the history of Rhodes. They sustained the declining glory of a state of society that was hastening to become a vision of the past; they were the heroes of a class of which the Norse sea-kings had been the demigods. The little realm they governed as an independent state consisted of Rhodes, with

¹ Pachymeres (ii. 445) and Muntaner (464) mention Zaccaria, who seized Thasos; and Muntaner speaks with delight of the noble reception he met with from the gallant pirate.

the neighbouring islands of Kos, Kalymnos, Syme, Leros, Nisyros, Telos, and Chalke; on the opposite continent they possessed the classic city of Halicarnassus, and several strong forts, of which the picturesque ruins still overhang the sea¹.

The Emperor Andronicus II. displayed the same want of sound judgment and right feeling in his private that he did in his public conduct, and his latter days were embittered by family disputes caused by his own folly and injustice. His second wife, Irene of Montferrat, persecuted him with demands to dismember the empire, in order to form appanages for her children. Andronicus resisted her solicitations at the expense of a quarrel, and Irene long lived separated from him at Thessalonica. The Emperor Michael allowed his father to control the arrangements of his family and regulate his private actions. Michael's eldest son was named Andronicus. He was the third emperor of the name who occupied the Byzantine throne, but he is known in history generally as Andronicus the Younger. When a child, he was an especial favourite with his grandfather, who directed his education. That education was undoubtedly a mixture of unwise indulgence and capricious restraint. The young Andronicus grew up a dissipated youth, and his debauched habits produced a terrible tragedy in his family. He was informed that his favourite mistress admitted another lover, and he employed bravos to waylay his rival. It happened that on that very night his own brother Manuel went in a great hurry to the lady's house, where he expected to find Andronicus. The assassins mistook the despot for the lover, and Manuel was murdered on the spot. The dreadful news reached their father Michael at Thessalonica, where he was residing in a declining state of health, and anguish terminated his life in eight days².

The young Andronicus was now heir-apparent to the

¹ Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers de St. Jean de Jerusalem*, vol. i.

² The Emperor Michael died on the 12th October 1320. Cantacuzenos, p. 11. From this time Cantacuzenos becomes one of our historical guides; but his writings must be read with distrust, for his art often conceals his misrepresentations. He commences his history by concealing the murder of Manuel by his patron. Gibbon gives an admirable sketch of his insincerity and self-laudation (vii. 402, edit. Smith). For the murder of Manuel, see Niceph. Greg. 175, and Phrantzes, 33, edit. Bonn. There is a learned and critical examination of the character of Cantacuzenos by Parisot, under the title, *Cantacuzène Homme d'État et Historien*, Paris, 1854, but it is sometimes hypercritical in exposing the inexhaustible phases of Byzantine perfidy and intrigue.

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empire, if the expression be admissible in a state without a fixed order of hereditary succession; but the murder of Manuel changed the affection of the old emperor into implacable hatred, and it was generally thought that the reigning sovereign had the power of naming his successor. The Emperor Michael VIII. had introduced the custom, that a new oath of allegiance should be taken whenever a change occurred in the order of succession. When Michael, the son of Andronicus II., died, the new oath was administered in the name of Andronicus II. alone, and did not contain that of Andronicus III., the direct heir. It also contained a clause promising implicit obedience to whomsoever he might declare emperor. These circumstances indicated that he intended to exclude his grandson from the throne; nor was he long in selecting a favourite on whom it was supposed he intended to confer the imperial title. The choice was marked by the singular perverseness which characterized many of his most important acts. He had compelled his second son Constantine to marry the daughter of his favourite minister, Muzalon. The incidents of this union were both ridiculous and disgraceful. The lady had been destined to be the bride of Theodore, the emperor's brother, when it was discovered that she had already indulged in illicit intercourse with one of her relations, and would have presented the imperial family very prematurely with an intruder. Theodore broke off the match: but the emperor, moved by his attachment to the father, and by the penitence of the fair sinner, subsequently compelled his own son Constantine to marry her¹. The young prince thought himself entitled to have a bastard as well as his wife. This illegitimate child was named Michael Katharos, and became so great a favourite with his grandfather, the Emperor Andronicus, that many feared lest he should attempt to adopt him as his heir, but the representations of his ministers prevented this act of folly².

The government of the old emperor was generally unpopular; and as he was suspected of being anxious to prevent his grandson Andronicus from succeeding to the throne, the cause of the prince was made the rallying-point

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 120.² Niceph. Greg. 180.

of the discontented. The younger Andronicus was a lover of pleasure, extravagant in his expenses, careless in his disposition, but possessing a fund of good-humour that rendered him personally extremely popular. Nor was he by any means destitute of ability and courage. A party formed itself round the young prince, who was treated by his grandfather with unjust severity. He was prohibited from wearing the dress which marked his rank as an imperial prince, and was not allowed to visit the palace. The most distinguished partisans of Andronicus the younger were Cantacuzenos the historian, a man of the highest rank, of extensive connections among the Byzantine aristocracy, of great wealth, ability, and military as well as literary accomplishments, but devoured by ambition, and overflowing with cunning and self-conceit; Synadenos, a man of equal rank and talent; and Sir Janni, a man of superior boldness and ability, but with a want of fixed principles and steady conduct that gave him the character of a political adventurer¹. With these it is necessary to mention Apokaukos, who was the ablest administrator and financier of the party. The intrigues of the partisans of the young prince did not escape the attention of the emperor's ministers, who would doubtless have maintained order by arresting the most dangerous, had not Andronicus been more anxious to punish his grandson than to prevent a rebellion. He resolved to bring the prince to a public trial; and on Palm Sunday, 1321, the young Andronicus was unexpectedly summoned to the palace of Blachern. His partisans comprehended that the crisis of their own fate, as well as that of the prince, must be decided before sunset. Cantacuzenos and Synadenos accordingly assembled their followers, and filled the palace with a force that so completely intimidated both the judges and the emperor that the prince was pardoned, and a feigned

¹ Συργιάννης, pronounced Siryani, is evidently Sir John. Boissonade (*Anecdota Graeca*, iii. 146, note 7) makes the observation; and Parisot (*Cantacuzène Homme d'État et Historien*), having adopted Sir Janni as the correct mode of writing the name, I follow his example. The Chiotes still use the Sir, but with them it is a contraction of Signore, which they learned from the Genoese. Pachymeres (ii. 347) tells us that the Byzantine court adopted titles of knighthood—καβαλλαρικαῖς τιμαῖς ἐτετίμην τὸ παρὰ Βασιλέως. Sir Janni was the son of one of the Roman chiefs who had entered the service of the Emperor John III. (Vatatzes), and married a lady connected with the imperial family. Niceph. Greg. 182; Cantacuzenos, 14.

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reconciliation took place between the grandfather and the grandson.

Andronicus II. resolved to remove Cantacuzenos and Synadenos from his grandson's society, for he justly considered them as the authors of the plots against his government. Cantacuzenos was named governor of Thessaly, and Synadenos was sent to Prilapos. These officers collected as many troops as they were able, under the pretence of repairing to their posts; and when their levies were completed they marched to Adrianople, where the young Andronicus joined them, and raised the standard of rebellion¹.

The prince was popular; he gained the people by proclaiming that the province of Thrace was exempt from some of the most onerous taxes, and his mercenaries enabled him to advance against Constantinople². But his soldiers, who cared little for political questions, pillaged the inhabitants wherever they passed; bands of robbers laid waste the villages which had escaped destruction from the Catalans and the Turks, and the collectors of the public revenue, availing themselves of these disorders, embezzled the money in their hands³. Cantacuzenos says that the young Andronicus was averse to march against his grandfather, fearing lest his army should storm Constantinople. In order, therefore, to prevent his grandfather from being dethroned, he wrote secretly to the old emperor, to advise that measures might be concerted to turn aside the first ardour of his own troops. The double-dealing and treachery of the leaders of both parties render the circumstance not improbable, and nothing can be a better apology for the apathy of the Greeks concerning the fate of their government. But their cowardice in failing to assert their inalienable rights as citizens to a just administration of their civil and ecclesiastical affairs is not so easily explained, for it proceeded from the complication of causes which had produced national degradation as well as weakness. The Emperor Andronicus II., seeing that it

¹ Cantacuzenos (57) vaunts his honour in not receiving fifty thousand byzants from the imperial treasury at the moment he was about to rebel. He preferred plundering the poor, whose complaints went for nothing (see p. 60), to defrauding the rich, who were the arbiters of the distribution of fame and power.

² Niceph. Greg. 196. Ἐλευθερίαν κηρύξαντες καὶ ἀτέλειαν.

³ Cantacuzenos, 60; Niceph. Greg. 196.

was not in his power to resist the military force his grandson had brought into the field, resolved to yield to the principal demands of the rebels, and recommence the contest by a war of intrigue. A treaty was concluded at Rhegion, where the prince had established his head-quarters, by which the rights of Andronicus the younger to the succession of the empire were recognized, and he was invested with the government of Thrace from Selymbria to Christopolis as his appanage¹.

This peace was of very short duration. The prince carried on his debaucheries at Adrianople, unrestrained either by prudence or decency. He was soon in want of money to supply his extravagance and reward his mercenaries, for he had freed the people in his appanage from the most profitable taxes to gain their support to his rebellion, and he did not now venture to annul his concession. An attempt which he made to seduce the wife of Sir Janni caused that able and daring leader to return to the service of the emperor, and point out to the revengeful grandfather the advantages he could derive from the immediate renewal of the war. The exactions of the prince's troops, and the intrigues of Sir Janni and the emperor, induced several cities of Thrace to desert the party of the young Andronicus. Heracleia received an imperial garrison, and the prince, observing that his cause was losing ground, assembled his army and laid siege to that city in November 1321. His troops had clamoured for the renewal of the war during the summer; they were averse to keep the field in winter, so that, when the attack on Heracleia was defeated, the prince marched up to the walls of Constantinople hoping to gain admittance within its walls. But he had now few partisans in the capital, and he was soon compelled to retire into winter-quarters at Didymoteichos. In the mean time, Sir Janni re-established the emperor's authority in Apros, Garellas, Rhedestos, Bizya, and Sergentzion, and laid siege to Selymbria. The unpopularity and avarice of Andronicus did more for the rebels than the military talents of Cantacuzenos and Synadenos, or the courage of the prince. In the campaign of 1322 they recovered all they had lost during the winter, chiefly by the desertion of the

¹ Cantacuzenos, 60; Niceph. Greg. 197.

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emperor's troops. Thessalonica declared in favour of young Andronicus, and his uncle Constantine, whom the emperor was supposed to be on the point of declaring heir to the empire, and of investing with the imperial title, was made prisoner. The young Andronicus on this occasion showed that, with all his easy good-humour, there was some leaven of the malignant nature of the house of Palaeologos in his heart. The Despot Constantine was treated with great cruelty. After submitting to many insults, he was let down into a cistern cut in the rock at Didymoteichos, where he was left for some time, before his nephew would order him to be transferred to a suitable place of confinement¹. Neither the emperor nor young Andronicus possessed the talents necessary for conducting the civil war; the ministers of the emperor were afraid of treason, the counsellors of the prince were embarrassed by the want of discipline of the rebel troops: both were more attentive to their own private interests than to those of their masters or of the empire. A new treaty of peace was concluded at Epibates in July 1322, which removed some causes of dissatisfaction². The troops of young Andronicus were provided for by a donative, and by the ratification of the grants of land they had received in Thrace. The prince was guaranteed an annual pension from the imperial treasury of thirty-six thousand byzants, and the emperor resumed the whole civil and fiscal administration of the appanage conceded to his grandson by the treaty of Rhesion³.

This second peace existed for five years. It would have been difficult, even for prudent friends and honourable counsellors, to have established a sincere reconciliation between the elder and younger Andronicus, but both were surrounded by selfish intriguers, and guided by bad passions. The apparent calm at court was marked by two events, which indicate the operation of different causes. On the 2nd of February 1325, Andronicus the younger received the imperial crown. This may be considered a proof that the imperial ministers had persuaded the old emperor to stifle his resentment, and lay aside his schemes for excluding his grandson from the

¹ Niceph. Greg. 220.² Cantacuzenos, 103.³ Cantacuzenos, 102. Parisot (*Cantacuzène*, 58) states the conditions of this treaty, which he has collected with sagacity. For the chronology, see p. 64.

throne¹. But in the following year the two emperors allowed the city of Prusa to be taken by the Othoman Turks, without either making an effort to relieve it. This fact seems to prove that neither could allow his best officers and troops to succour this important city, lest his colleague should take advantage of their absence². Intrigues followed intrigues. The old emperor sought to avail himself of the assistance either of the Servians or the Bulgarians, and would willingly have attacked his grandson, though he made no exertions to defend the empire against the Turks. The young emperor, while he pretended to be eager to attack the Mohammedans, was really forming an alliance with the Bulgarians to oppose his grandfather³.

The malignant old Andronicus would not admit that the coronation of his grandson had put an end to all chance of depriving him of the succession. The young man continued his extravagance and debauchery. After many acts of violence on both sides, the old emperor named a commission, consisting of eighteen ecclesiastics and six senators, who proceeded to Rhegion, where the younger Andronicus had taken up his temporary residence, to state articles of accusation against him and hear his defence⁴. These charges were, that he had unlawfully appropriated to his private use large sums of money belonging to the public treasury; that the expenses of his household were extravagant⁵; that he had driven several governors named by the emperor from their posts, and replaced them by officers of his own nomination, in violation of all law; and that his debauchery and vicious conduct threatened society with dissolution, for he had assailed the honour of his aunt Simonida, the widow of the Kral of Servia, who had taken the veil⁶. Cantacuzenos says much concerning calumnies and perjuries, which owed their existence to the instigations of the elder Andronicus, but not a syllable concerning the accusation of incest that was officially

¹ Cantacuzenos, 121; Niceph. Greg. 230.

² Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 103; Cantacuzenos, 136.

³ Cantacuzenos, 129, 160, 183; Niceph. Greg. 230, 238, 255.

⁴ The tribunals for investigating charges of treason were always, in the Byzantine empire, named for the especial occasion, if the case was not sent to the senate. The predominance of ecclesiastics at this period is marked by their numbers in this commission. Compare Pachymeres, ii. 125.

⁵ The hunting establishment of Andronicus III., while emperor, amounted to one thousand huntsmen, one thousand hawks, and as many hounds. Its annual expense was fifteen thousand byzants. Niceph. Greg. 247, 350.

⁶ Niceph. Greg. 240.

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brought forward against the younger. He omits entirely the charges against his patron, though he mentions that they were read in the assembly at Rhegion; and he endeavours to confuse the judgment of his readers by recording the vague declamation of Andronicus the younger in praise of his own virtues¹. The violence and indecency with which the old emperor attacked his grandson threw discredit on his cause. The majority of the commissioners were anxious to avoid a civil war, which any attempt to change the order of succession was sure to produce, at a time when the Turks, Servians, and Bulgarians were all ready to take advantage of any opportunity to dismember the empire. As the report of the commissioners was favourable to the younger Andronicus, the emperor refused to receive it. He ordered his grandson's name to be omitted in the public prayers, and the Patriarch Isaiah, who refused to transmit this order to the clergy, was confined as a prisoner in the monastery of Mangana.

The young emperor could no longer avoid an appeal to arms, and the civil war was renewed under circumstances extremely unfavourable to the old emperor, whose conduct rendered it inevitable. The people were universally disgusted with his despotism and injustice, and the young Andronicus expected that they would immediately admit him into Constantinople. Disappointed in this expectation, he hastened into Macedonia in the midst of winter, leaving the Protostrator Synadenos to blockade the capital. Liberal promises of reduced taxation, and the assurance that all arrears due to the imperial treasury should be cancelled, rendered his march a triumph. Thessalonica, Edessa, Kastoria, Berrhoea, Pelagonia, Achrida, and Deabolis opened their gates. The Kral of Servia, who consulted his own interest, refused to assist the officers of the reigning emperor, and took advantage of the confusion to gain possession of the frontier fortress of Prosakon. Strumbitza and Melenikon were the only strong places that remained in the possession of the partisans of Andronicus II.²

In the mean time, Synadenos gained a complete victory over the garrison of Constantinople, which made an attempt to raise the blockade. When the news of this victory reached

¹ Cantacuzenos, 140; Niceph. Greg. 243.

² Cantacuzenos, 164; Niceph. Greg. 250.

young Andronicus, he hastened to the army before the walls of the capital. Treasonable assistance was soon secured. On the night of Monday, 23rd of May 1328, a party of soldiers scaled the walls, and the garrison joined in proclaiming Andronicus III.; the gates were thrown open, and the young emperor marched directly to the imperial palace to assure his grandfather, that though he had ceased to govern, he would be treated with all the honour due to a sovereign prince¹. The young emperor then performed his devotions in the Church of St. Sophia, and reinstated his friend, the Patriarch Isaiah, in the government of the church.

This conquest of Constantinople was attended with few disorders; the palace of the grand logothetes Metochites, the favourite minister of the dethroned emperor, was the only house that was pillaged². The old emperor continued to reside in the palace with a pension of twenty-four thousand byzants; but he was forsaken by all his flatterers, and few pitied him or regretted his fall. Two years after the taking of Constantinople, Andronicus III. was attacked by a serious illness, and his ministers feared lest his grandfather might again recover the throne. To prevent the possibility of this event, Synadenos compelled the old man to become a monk, and to sign a declaration that he would never again mount the throne, nor pretend to dispose of the empire, in case of his grandson's death. Andronicus II. had already lost the use of his eyes, and this, his last public act, was signed with two crosses, one in red ink as emperor, and another in black as a humble monk. The Patriarch Isaiah sent to congratulate him on his change of life: the petulant old man regarded the message as an insult, and sent back some violent and probably not unjust reproaches to the head of the church. His name continued to be mentioned in the public prayers as the most religious and most Christian basileus, the monk Antony. One evening, after a literary party at which his daughter Simonida was present, he was suddenly seized with an illness which soon terminated his life. He expired on the 13th of February 1332, in the seventy-fourth year of his age³.

¹ Cantacuzenos (184 and 187) says the city was taken on the night of Monday following Whitsunday, yet he gives the 19th May. Nicephorus Gregoras (262) correctly says that the conquest was completed on the 24th May.

² Cantacuzenos, 187. Nicephorus Gregoras (261) does not give quite so favourable an account of the behaviour of the conquerors.

³ Niceph. Greg. 290.

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Andronicus II. was a man who, with few personal vices, possessed many of the worst qualities of a sovereign. He had capacity enough to direct the whole civil and ecclesiastical business of the empire, but was destitute of the judgment necessary to direct it well. He rarely took a right step, and never at the proper time; so that his petulant pride and pedantic despotism proved more ruinous to the emperor than the worst vices of his predecessors. His ecclesiastical bigotry especially served as an instrument of Providence for effecting the ruin and degradation of the orthodox church, and of the Greek race. That the Greeks allowed themselves to be so long misguided and oppressed by so worthless and weak a sovereign, may perhaps be accepted as a proof that the nation was sunk in selfishness and bigotry like the emperor.

SECT. III.—*Reign of Andronicus III. (the Younger),*

A.D. 1328-1341.

Character of Andronicus III.—Public administration.—Bulgarian war.—Progress of the Othoman Turks.—Battle of Pelekanon.—Capitulation of Nicaea.—Ravages of the Turks in the European provinces of the empire.—Wars with the Genoese nobles established in Chios and Phocaea.—Expeditions into Epirus.—Death of Andronicus III.

The private character of Andronicus III. had some singular features, which excite our curiosity to learn more than history has preserved concerning his personal opinions. His health was weak, but he displayed a restless activity in his amusements; his talents were considerable, but he was indolent and careless in transacting public business; his thoughtless disposition and easy temper enabled him to banish from his mind the memory of the crimes with which his youthful passions had tortured his own family, and the misery they had inflicted on the whole empire. Instead of tormenting him with remorse he regarded the terrible events of his life as the work of destiny, and he consoled himself alike for his crimes and his misfortunes by a faith that diminished his own personal responsibility. His indolence induced him to confide the direction of public business to his ministers; but his cynicism prevented his placing implicit trust even in his favourites, and his abilities enabled him to see through the selfish motives of

his most obsequious partisans. The condition of Greek society, sinking into a state of political weakness, moral degradation, and military incapacity, might have persuaded men more virtuous and pious than Andronicus III., that the evils from which the empire suffered were to be directly attributed to a judgment of God.

The opinions as well as the indolence of Andronicus gave him a contempt for the ceremonials that formed an important part of the emperor's duty. He abolished many courtly pageants, and absented himself even from some ecclesiastical ceremonies that had been regarded by his predecessors as necessary exhibitions of imperial dignity. At the same time, he astonished the courtiers by mingling with the people, and by admitting every subject, without distinction, to his audience-chamber. In the opinion of the staunch conservatives of Constantinople, the changes he allowed in ceremonials and the alterations he tolerated in dress foreshadowed the ruin of the empire more surely than the lavish expenditure of the revenue, the incessant devastations of the Bulgarians, Servians, Moguls, Turks, and Albanians, and the corruption in the administration of justice¹. The only violent passion Andronicus appears to have retained on the throne was his love of hunting; the expense of his establishment was immense; and every suitor who had a boon to ask knew that the surest way of gaining his end was to present the emperor with a well-trained falcon, a noble hound, or an Arabian horse². His love of active exertion and his eagerness for personal excitement, joined to his contempt for Byzantine etiquette, induced him to take part in the jousts and tournaments which the nobles of Savoy, who accompanied his second wife, the Empress Anne, had introduced at the court of Constantinople³. To the amazement of the long-robed senators and courtiers, he rushed into the *mêlée* without a crown on his helmet, and exposed himself without a sign to indicate that, if his opponents respected the emperor, they must spare their blows. With his ministers of state he held little private intercourse. John Cantacuzenos became his prime-minister, and continued to be his personal friend; he alone enjoyed

¹ Compare Niceph. Greg. book xxxvii., published by Parisot, p. 26.

² Niceph. Greg. 350.

³ Cantacuzenos, 126; Niceph. Greg. 296; *Ντζούστρα καὶ τορνεμέντα*.

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unreserved communication with his master; but Andronicus had discernment enough to perceive that a character so intriguing and false as that of Cantacuzenos could not be thoroughly honest, and he balanced his authority by the power he conferred on Synadenos, Apokaukos, and the Patriarch John of Apri¹.

The accession of Andronicus III. put an end to the civil war; but it brought little relief to the inhabitants of the empire, nor did it arrest the decline of the Greek nation. The emperor was indolent, his prime-minister was vain and incapable, so that no systematic plan was adopted either for reforming the abuses of the internal government or for defending the frontiers. Andronicus made one great attempt to eradicate the worst social evil of his age. His judgment revealed to him more clearly than to his prime-minister, that the corruption in the administration of justice was the worm which secretly consumed the national energy; and knowing that, until justice was equitably administered, it would be impossible to reform the public administration, he determined to put an end to the prevailing judicial iniquities. To effect this, he appointed four chief justices, of whom one was a bishop, and these judges were ordered to sit in open court in the Church of St. Sophia and decide all civil suits. The result of this measure affords a fearful picture of the incorrigible degradation of Greek society at this unhappy period. These judges were intrusted with great authority; they were rendered independent by large salaries, and they were compelled to take an oath that they would administer justice impartially, under the sanction of those fearful imprecations which the Greek church makes use of to strengthen moral feelings by ecclesiastical terrors. Yet Andronicus was soon overwhelmed with proofs that three of his chief justices, including the bishop, made a shameless traffic of their judicial decisions. They were tried and convicted in a solemn tribunal which sate in the Church of St. Sophia, from whence their corrupt sentences had issued. The bishop was degraded and incarcerated; and the real cause of the victories of the barbarians, and of the commercial superiority of the Italians, was thus rendered apparent to every reflecting man².

¹ Cantacuzenos (203) reports a rebuke he received for his intrigues to release Sir Janni.

² Niceph. Greg. 330.

The intrigues of the court fill many pages of the works of Cantacuzenos and Gregoras, but they produced so little change in the troubled current of events, that it is only necessary to notice that the reign of Andronicus was not free from those court conspiracies for seizing the throne which were an incurable intermittent disease of the Byzantine despotism. Sir Janni ended his many plots by a rebellion, which so alarmed the emperor and his prime-minister that they sent a courtier to assassinate him¹. The Despot Demetrius formed a plot to seize his nephew's throne, which proved abortive²; and Phrantzes Palaeologos, the assassin of Sir Janni, without having inherited the great talents and indefatigable activity of the man he had murdered, hatched another unsuccessful plot³. As Andronicus lived among a small circle, the ladies of his court exercised a degree of influence which might have proved highly injurious, for they certainly increased the number of party intrigues. But the chief ladies of the court possessed more virtue and quite as much talent as the men. Indeed, Theodora, the mother of Cantacuzenos, whose connections, rank, and wealth gave her great influence, was evidently superior in ability to her son.

Andronicus had little intercourse with the courts of western Europe; but at the commencement of his reign an embassy from Louis of Bavaria, the Emperor of Germany, visited Constantinople to demand a sum of money which it would seem had been promised for some military operations against the house of Anjou. The greediness of the Bavarians astonished even the Greek courtiers, who were themselves insatiable; but the want of money in the imperial treasury was great, and the services of Louis the Bavarian were no longer wanted, so his ambassadors were dismissed with diplomatic evasions. Cantacuzenos boasts that he frustrated the demands of the Germans by offering to furnish their sovereign with a corps of auxiliary troops⁴.

The first campaign of Andronicus was against his brother-in-law, Michael, King of Bulgaria, who invaded the empire and advanced as far as Didymoteichos, but retired when the emperor took the field. This war was distinguished by no

¹ Cantacuzenos, 276; Niceph. Greg. 305.

² Cantacuzenos, 293; Niceph. Greg. 325.

³ Niceph. Greg. 341.

⁴ Cantacuzenos, 206.

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important action, and at the end of the following year peace was concluded under the mediation of Xenia, the mother of Andronicus, and of the Queen of Bulgaria. The events of a war which took place after the death of Michael, and the hostilities which Andronicus carried on with Stephen Dushan and the Servians, do not require to be noticed in detail.

The political importance of the reign of Andronicus III. in European history can be more correctly appreciated by comparing it with that of Orkhan, the sovereign of the Othoman Turks, than by reviewing all the events of his desultory wars. To his contemporaries Andronicus appeared as the powerful and wealthy emperor of an extensive but ill-organized state, and of a numerous but degenerated people; while Orkhan seemed nothing more than the able and active leader of a confederacy of nomade tribes, and the receiver of the tribute of a few recently-conquered Greek cities. To us Andronicus has dwindled into a mere name in Byzantine chronology, while Orkhan stands forward in the world's history as one of the few lawgivers who created a nation and founded an empire by his legislative enactments. The legislation of Orkhan belongs to a later period of his reign; but the Othoman Turks already displayed more systematic habits, and a higher sense of the value of order as well as justice, than the Seljouk tribes.

The method employed by the Othomans to gain possession of the large, populous, and well-fortified cities, inhabited by the wealthy but unwarlike Greeks, was not unlike that employed by the Dorians in the early ages of Greece. Indeed, it is almost the only way by which the courage and perseverance of a small force can conquer art and numbers. Instead of attempting to form a regular blockade of the city against which they directed their operations, and thereby compelling the inhabitants to exert all their unbroken power to deliver themselves from the attack, the Othoman Turks established strong posts in the vicinity of the city, ravaged the fields, carried off the cattle and slaves, and interrupted the commercial communications of the inhabitants. The devastation of the country and the insecurity of the roads gradually raised the price of provisions, and caused emigration and famine. In this way, Nicæa, the cradle of the Greek church, and which had been for two generations the capital of the

Greek empire, was closely blockaded; and in order to prevent its surrender, Andronicus must not only have thrown large supplies of provisions into the city, but have undertaken a military expedition to drive the besiegers from their fortified posts. This would not have been a very difficult operation, for it was easy to open communications between Constantinople and Nicaea by Kios and the lake Askanios, and in that way concentrate an overwhelming force at Nicaea. To prevent any military operation of this kind, Orkhan transferred the seat of war to the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

In the spring of 1329 the Othomans passed Nicomedia, and threatened to lay waste all the open country as far as the Asiatic suburbs of the capital. The people of Constantinople were alarmed for their property; the danger of Nicaea was forgotten, and the emperor was compelled to take the field in person, with some precipitation. Two thousand veteran troops could alone be spared from the garrison of the capital; the rest of the army was hastily collected from the militia in the Thracian cities, whose discipline had been relaxed during the civil wars, and who were now brigaded together without much skill. A numerous fleet of boats transported the troops over to Skutari, and attended their march as if to secure an easy mode of retreat. The emperor led his army by short marches along the gulf of Nicomedia, and on the morning of the third day he reached Pelekanon, where he found Orkhan encamped with about eight thousand men in a secure position on the hills. A council of war decided that it would be imprudent to advance farther, but advised the emperor to offer battle to the Turks next day.

Orkhan, who felt no desire to risk the success of his operations against Nicaea in a pitched battle, kept his station on the slopes of the Bithynian hills, where ravines and broken ground enabled his light cavalry to avoid the charge of the Byzantine men-at-arms, but from whence they could descend and skirmish with the Greeks. The position of Orkhan might have been turned without difficulty, and the emperor might have crossed the gulf with his fleet and taken the shortest road to Nicaea, which he could have reached long before the Turks; but neither Andronicus nor his prime-minister Cantacuzenos were capable of planning or executing a combined series of military movements. After a day spent in desultory

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skirmishes, the emperor resolved to withdraw his army into the camp at Pelekanon; and Cantacuzenos recommended that, as there was no danger of the Turks advancing any farther, it would be as well to lead the army back to Constantinople. As the Greeks were retiring into their camp, the Turks pressed on their rear-guard, and the emperor, in repulsing their attack, received a wound in the thigh. Both armies then retired into their camps. Unfortunately there was no general capable of taking the emperor's place. Cantacuzenos, on whom the chief command devolved, was unable to preserve order during the night. A report was spread among the soldiers that the emperor's wound was dangerous, perhaps mortal; the recent levies attempted to escape on board the fleet; a body of Turks, stationed to watch the Greek army, perceived the confusion, and attacked the fugitives; a panic spread through the camp; the emperor was embarked in a small boat, and escaped to Philokrene, a maritime fort on the road to Constantinople. A retreat was immediately commenced, and the army, separated into four divisions, marched towards the neighbouring forts of Nikeitates, Dakibyza, Ritzion, and Philokrene. Morning showed the Turks the camp at Pelekanon completely deserted, and the time they spent in plundering it enabled three divisions of the flying army to effect their retreat in safety. A body of Othoman cavalry, however, hung on the rear of the division that marched to Philokrene, which suffered severely, and two officers of high rank were slain. The emperor Andronicus sailed to Constantinople without making an effort to repair the honour of his arms. He consoled himself for his disgrace by reflecting that the real loss of the imperial army in killed and wounded was inconsiderable, and that he would gain credit for having saved the property of the Constantinopolitans, as summer was so far advanced that the nomade Turks would retire with their plunder to their pastoral encampments on the Bithynian Olympus, leaving Orkhan to watch the siege of Nicaea¹.

The battle of Pelekanon was the first engagement in which

¹ Compare Cantacuzenos, 209-222, with Niceph. Greg. 266. The object of the march to Pelekanon was not to relieve Nicaea, or Cantacuzenos would not have advised Andronicus to return so quickly to Constantinople. I do not think it necessary to point out the misstatements of Cantacuzenos; those who wish to follow his intrigues must read Parisot, *Cantacuzène, Homme d'État et Historien*.

the Emperor of the Greeks had encountered the Othoman sultan. Insignificant as it really was, its moral effect was incalculable; the heavy-armed and disciplined troops of the empire had fled before the light-armed and irregular Turks; and the spirit of the Greek emperor and of the Greek nation was broken. The capitulation of Nicaea, which Cantacuzenos passes over in silence, took place in the following year (1330). Its conditions were remarkable. Every person who desired to quit the city was allowed to retire with all his movable property. Orkhan permitted the Greeks to transport their ecclesiastical archives and sacred relics to Constantinople, and adopted effectual means for insuring the execution of every article of the capitulation. The Greeks acquired confidence in the justice as well as the power of his administration, and few of the inhabitants of Nicaea availed themselves of the permission to emigrate. The municipal constitution of the city was called into active operation as a principle of government, and the inhabitants were relieved from the oppressive centralization of the Byzantine system which treated the empire as a fiscal domain, and every local magistrate as nothing more than a fiscal agent. The Othoman Turks were still few in number, simple in their habits, and restrained by their rivalry with the neighbouring Seljouk princes; so that the condition of the Greeks under the government of Orkhan was better than under the imperial sway; their taxes were lighter, and they were secure from the ravages of hostile invaders¹.

After taking Nicaea, Orkhan besieged and captured Kios (Ghiumlek), which served as its port. Nicomedia was closely watched, and the harvest of its inhabitants destroyed; but Andronicus in person supplied the city with provisions, and a treaty of peace, which he concluded with the sultan, delayed its fall. The principal object of this treaty appears to have been to secure the property of the citizens of Constantinople on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus from devastation. Cantacuzenos mentions that Orkhan engaged not to molest the few Greeks who were still subjects of the emperor in Asia Minor, but he omits to notice the concessions by

¹ Niceph. Greg. 282; Phrantzes, 38, edit. Bonn. The conditions are given by Hammer, i. 137.

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which this boon was purchased¹. At all events, the peace was not of long duration, and Nicomedia surrendered to Orkhan about the commencement of the year 1338². Orkhan also made an attempt to extend his system of blockade by seizing forts in the vicinity of Constantinople, both in Europe and Asia, but he was not yet able to succeed in so great an enterprise³.

The danger to which his capital was exposed induced Andronicus to pay some attention to his fleet; but the measures he adopted only increased the disorder in the imperial administration. Apokaukos was appointed grand-duke or high admiral, on condition that he expended one hundred thousand byzants in fitting out the fleet. That wily financier not only fulfilled his engagement, but also fortified Epibates, one of the fortresses in the vicinity of Constantinople best adapted to baffle the operations of the Othomans, which he held as his own private castle⁴.

During the whole reign of Andronicus, even the European provinces of his empire were infested by incessant invasions of the Turks. The neglect of the imperial navy by Andronicus II. allowed the Turks to make piracy a profitable occupation. Andronicus III. attempted to diminish the evil by forming alliances with the Seljouk emirs of Karasi, Saroukhan, and Aidin, but he was unable to prevent the islands of the Aegean Sea and all the continent, from the walls of Constantinople to the rocks of Maina, from being plundered, and the inhabitants carried off into slavery⁵. These unceasing devastations, and the constant demand for men, women, and children in the slave-markets of the Turkish cities of Asia, caused a sensible diminution of the Greek race during a single generation. In the year 1329 or 1330, a fleet of seventy ships landed a Turkish army that ravaged the valley of the Hebrus as far as Trajanopolis. Fortunately the emperor was at Didymoteichos, and the force he was able to assemble arrested their devastations, and

¹ Cantacuzenos (273) enumerates the horses, hounds, carpets, and panthers' skins that were given by Orkhan to Andronicus, and the silver goblets, woollen and silk fabrics, and robes of brocade that the emperor presented to the sultan.

² Nicephorus Gregoras (335), supported by Phrantzes (38), seems to afford better chronological guidance than the Turkish historians. Hammer, i. 113.

³ Niceph. Greg. 332; Cantacuzenos, 307.

⁴ Cantacuzenos, 327, 381; Niceph. Greg. 373, 374.

⁵ Cantacuzenos, 326; Niceph. Greg. 215, 216.

repulsed them with some loss¹. In the following year a body of Turkish cavalry crossed the Hellespont, but of these plunderers about fifteen hundred were cut in pieces by the imperial troops². In 1331, another army landed in Europe, and laid waste the country round Rhedestos, Kissos, Polyboton, and Akonites, and the emperor again took the field to drive them back to their ships³. In 1332, an army landed in the gulf of Thessalonica, while the emperor was marching from Rhendina to Thessalonica. He overtook and defeated this expedition, and captured all the Turkish ships but two⁴. In 1334, the Turkish corsairs committed terrible depredations in the Greek islands, and captured many merchant ships⁵. As a proof of the naval power of the Seljouk emirs at this time, it may be mentioned that when Andronicus formed an alliance with the emirs of Saroukhan and Aidin against the Genoese of Phocaea, he obtained a reinforcement of twenty-four vessels from Saroukhan, and of thirty from Amour, the son of Aidin. Amour had previously invaded the empire with a fleet of seventy-five ships⁶. In the year 1337, another enemy laid waste a great part of Thrace. A horde of Moguls crossed the Danube, and plundered the territory of the empire for upwards of six weeks. During this expedition they fell in with a band of Turks who had crossed the sea from Asia, and were also engaged in plundering the country. The Moguls attacked and defeated the Turks, whom they carried off into slavery, mingled with the Greeks. Nicephorus Gregoras asserts that the Moguls carried away three hundred thousand captives from Thrace in this expedition⁷. In the same year the troops of Orkhan were repulsed in an attack on Rhegion, after they had landed and set fire to the houses. The sudden arrival of the Byzantine fleet gave the Greeks a superiority, and a large part of the Othoman naval force was captured⁸. Other expeditions are mentioned by Gregoras, who recounts that, in the year 1340, an army of eight thousand Turks, attended by a long train of pack-horses for transporting their plunder, overran all Thrace as far as the foot of Mount Haemus, and, after leisurely transporting their

¹ Cantacuzenos, 238.² Ibid. 261.³ Ibid. 266.⁴ Ibid. 278.⁵ Niceph. Greg. 321.⁶ Cantacuzenos, 287, 293.⁷ Niceph. Greg. 329.⁸ Cantacuzenos, 308; Niceph. Greg. 332.

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booty to their ships, returned to Asia without encountering any opposition ¹.

Several Genoese nobles had acquired considerable possessions in the empire as vassals, but they really governed them as independent princes. Andronicus III. resolved to re-establish the imperial authority. In the year 1329 he regained possession of Chios, which had been occupied by the family of Zaccaria, in the reign of Andronicus II., under the pretext that the island had been granted to them by Michael VIII. The recovery of Chios was effected by the treachery of Benedetto Zaccaria, the brother of the ruling noble, and by the assistance of the Greek inhabitants. As Chios then yielded an annual revenue of one hundred and twenty thousand byzants to the public treasury, it was a valuable if not a glorious conquest ². Phocaea was held by the Genoese family of Cattaneo : and it was also reduced to obedience with the assistance of the Seljouk emirs of Saroukhan and Aidin, but soon rebelled under Domenico Cattaneo, who formed an alliance with Nicholas, duke of the Archipelago, and the knights of Rhodes. A naval station was formed by the knights of Rhodes at Delos to protect the Archipelago from the piratical expeditions of the Turks. Domenico Cattaneo made an attempt to conquer Lesbos, but the Emperor Andronicus arriving with a fleet, and the allies of Domenico abandoning his cause, both Lesbos and Phocaea received Byzantine garrisons ³.

Andronicus sought to acquire glory by distant and desultory wars, in which victory was hardly doubtful, and temporary conquests were easily acquired. The defence of his own subjects, the permanent interests of his people, and the most necessary arrangements in the administration of the empire, were neglected to gratify the idle military vanity which was the fashionable vice of the age. In these expeditions the prime-minister Cantacuzenos had generally some private object of ambition to gain. He increased his influence, extended his party connections, and prepared to maintain

¹ Niceph. Greg. 338. Compare 329, 331, 334, 335.

² Cantacuzenos, 227, 233; Niceph. Greg. 269. When Andronicus took Martin Zaccaria prisoner, his brother Benedetto claimed Chios as a fief that had devolved on him, and refused to accept a palace at Constantinople, and a pension of twenty thousand byzants annually, in lieu of this claim.

³ A.D. 1336. Cantacuzenos, 238, 290; Niceph. Greg. 321.

himself in power after the death of Andronicus, whose health was rapidly declining.

While the Turks were continually ravaging Thrace and Macedonia, Andronicus made three expeditions into Epirus. The first expedition took place in the year 1334. Stephen Gabrielopoulos governed Thessaly for some time as an independent prince, but with the title of despot. On his death, Monomachos, the governor of Thessalonica, recovered possession of the towns of Golos, Kastri, and Lykostoma. At the same time John Dukas, despot of Epirus, and Count of Cephallenia, seized Stagos, Trikala, Phanari, Damasis, and Elasson. Andronicus, thinking the moment favourable for annexing the whole of Thessaly to the empire, took the field in person, and recovered all the towns occupied by the Despot of Epirus. Three Albanian tribes, the Malakasians, Bouians, and Mesarits, who could muster a force of twelve thousand men, made their submission, and tranquillity was established for some time¹.

In the year 1337, the news that the Turks and Moguls were ravaging Thrace appears to have induced the Albanians in the neighbourhood of the fortresses of Valagrita and Kanina to plunder the Greeks in their vicinity and lay siege to several towns. The emperor took the field against them in person, proposing to carry his arms afterwards southward against the despotat of Epirus. The Albanians had hoped to secure their plunder in their mountain fastnesses, but two thousand Turkish auxiliaries in the emperor's pay proved as active in mountain warfare as the Skipetars. Not only the booty recently taken was recovered, but the native fastnesses of the Albanians were stormed, and their wives and children reduced to slavery by the Turks. Cantacuzenos, on this occasion, indulges in a vain boast that the Greek troops in the imperial army were not allowed to enslave their fellow-Christians, but we must not forget that the imperial army was unable to subdue these fellow-Christians without the assistance of Turkish mercenaries, who were allowed to pay themselves by carrying away Christians as slaves. The Mohammedans took what they considered the most valuable part of the booty, and left the cattle to the emperor's troops. The number of slaves taken on this occasion is not recorded ;

¹ Cantacuzenos, 289.

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but 5,000 horses, 300,000 oxen, and 1,200,000 sheep were captured ¹.

The despotat of Epirus, which owed its independent existence to the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders, had now remained separated from the empire for a hundred and thirty years. It was formed by members of the family of Angelos, but passed by marriage and assassination into the allied family of the Counts of Cephallenia, who assumed the name of Dukas. The assassination of John Dukas by his wife Anne, daughter of the protovestiarios Andronikos Palaeologos, in the year 1337, enabled his murderess to govern as regent for her son Nicephorus II., a child of seven years of age. Anne, finding that she would be unable to maintain her authority, invited the Emperor Andronicus to take possession of the despotat, and succeeded in placing all its fortresses in his hands without opposition ².

After the emperor's return to Constantinople, a party in Epirus took up arms and gained possession of the three principal fortresses near the coast, Arta, Rogo, and Thomokastron (A.D. 1339). Andronicus again visited Epirus in person, though he was in a weak state of health. He recovered the fortresses from the rebels, and pacified the country³, but did not long survive his return to Constantinople, dying on the 15th June 1341, and leaving his son John V., a child nine years of age, his successor ⁴.

SECT. IV.—*Reign of John V. (Palaeologos), A.D. 1341-1391, including the Reigns of John Cantacuzenos, A.D. 1347-1354, and of Andronicus, the son of John V., A.D. 1375-1376 and 1379-1381.*

Regency of Anne of Savoy.—Intrigues of John Cantacuzenos.—Rebellion of John Cantacuzenos.—Civil war during 1342, 1343, and 1344.—Murder of Apokaukos.—Devastation caused by the civil war.—Conquests of Stephen Dushan, king of Servia, who founds a Servian empire.—Alliance of Cantacuzenos with the Turks.—Greeks carried off as slaves.—Cantacuzenos gives his daughter in marriage to Orkhan, the sultan of the Othoman Turks.—Reign of John

¹ Cantacuzenos, 301.² Cantacuzenos, 305; Niceph. Greg. 335.³ Cantacuzenos, 311-324; Niceph. Greg. 340.⁴ Cantacuzenos, 339; Niceph. Greg. 346.

Cantacuzenos.—Extent of the Greek empire.—Internal administration.—Seizure of money sent from Russia to repair St. Sophia's.—Increase of taxes.—Unpopularity of Cantacuzenos.—Genoese war.—Recovery of Thessalonica.—Second Genoese war.—Civil war with John V.—John Cantacuzenos de-throned.—Relations with Othoman sultan.—John V. joins the papal church.—Becomes the vassal of Sultan Murad.—Rebellion of Andronicus.—Reign of Andronicus with his son John.—Greek empire tributary to the Othoman sultan.—Conquest of Philadelphia.—Attempt to fortify Constantinople.—Death of John V.—Depopulation and dilapidation of Constantinople.

The Empress Anne of Savoy was, both by the nomination of the deceased emperor and by the custom of the empire, regent during the minority of her son John V. (Palaeologos). Byzantine etiquette required her to weep for nine days beside the body of her husband, who expired in the habit of a monk in the monastery of the Guiding Virgin; but John Cantacuzenos, the grand domestikos, who directed the public administration as first minister of state, having immediately established himself in the imperial palace in order to constitute himself tutor to the young emperor, and having assumed a guard of five hundred men, the widowed empress deemed it necessary to return to the palace on the third day, that she might watch over the rights of her children. The absence of a strict rule of hereditary succession, and the contempt of the Greek nobles for every principle of law and equity, rendered the imperial crown a prize for which party leaders and powerful ministers were constantly plotting. Cantacuzenos had worked for a long time with great activity to form a party in the public administration and in the provinces. He was vain, wealthy, and ambitious; but both his friends and enemies knew that his mind was destitute of that vigour which affords original suggestions and gives firmness of purpose. That he would assume the rank of emperor seemed certain; whether he would content himself with remaining the colleague of the young Palaeologos was more doubtful. Apokaukos, the ablest, boldest, and most unprincipled of the Byzantine statesmen, in order to gain the credit of being the first to urge the completion of an act which he supposed was unavoidable, recommended Cantacuzenos to lose no time in proclaiming himself emperor. The weak prime-minister listened to the treason without following the advice of the traitor; and Apokaukos, suspecting that the treason was to be executed without his being allowed to participate in its

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profits, became the enemy of Cantacuzenos, and determined to support the empress in the regency¹.

The Patriarch, John of Apri, who had been appointed tutor of the young emperor during the last expedition of Andronicus to Epirus, claimed both the tutorship of the emperor and the superintendence of public affairs². By the support of the party opposed to Cantacuzenos, and the jealousy of the empress, who feared the prime-minister's ambition, the Patriarch was appointed president of the ministerial council. A contest of intrigue then commenced between the two parties, in which neither was able to gain a decided superiority in the capital, for the empress-regent was as little inclined to trust implicitly in the good faith of the Patriarch and Apokaukos as in the loyalty of Cantacuzenos. It was necessary to assemble a considerable army in Thrace, as the empire was threatened with invasion by the Bulgarians, Albanians, and Turks, and the grand domestikos assumed the command of this force, for he feared to intrust it even to one of his own partisans. While he was absent from Constantinople, Apokaukos attempted to seize the direction of public affairs and render himself master of the young emperor's person. Failing in his attempt, he escaped to the castle of Epibates, which he had fortified so strongly that Cantacuzenos did not venture to attack it³. On returning to the capital, Cantacuzenos made an abortive attempt to get himself declared emperor by means of a tumult in which his soldiers endeavoured to force an entry for him into the imperial palace on horseback. This act would have been tantamount to declaring him emperor, and, if the plot had succeeded, would have been followed by a proclamation to that effect⁴. He had already prepared for rebellion by fortifying Emphythion, near Didymoteichos, as Apokaukos had fortified Epibates; and as he was solicited by the Greeks in the Peloponnesus to attack the principality of Achaia, he quitted Constantinople at the end of September to make preparations for an expedition to reannex the Peloponnesus to the empire. Apokaukos then returned to the capital, and was appointed Prefect of Constantinople: in a popular sedition the houses of many of the partisans of Cantacuzenos

¹ Cantacuzenos, 337; Niceph. Greg. 358.² Cantacuzenos, 351; Niceph. Greg. 358.³ Cantacuzenos, 381.⁴ Cant. 389; Niceph. Greg. 363.

were plundered; his friends were placed under arrest; but he himself, though satisfied that his intrigues were known, and believing that it was now necessary for his safety to mount the throne, still pretended to refuse the title of Emperor, which his partisans urged him to assume. This tortuous conduct made even his most violent supporters distrust his behaviour, for his indecision led every party to believe that he was carrying on some secret negotiation from which they were excluded. At length he was proclaimed emperor at Didymoteichos, about four months after the death of Andronicus III., and the ceremony of his coronation was performed on the feast of St. Demetrius¹. Cantacuzenos, in describing his coronation, would fain insinuate that the blunders and crimes of his rebellious reign must be attributed to the decrees of Providence, whose dissatisfaction was presaged by the blunder of the imperial tailor, who made the robe of state so small that Cantacuzenos could hardly squeeze himself into the embroidered vestment, while the mantle was so long that it hung round him like a horseman's cloak. The Bishop of Didymoteichos, seeing that the mind of the rebel emperor was affected by this omen, consoled him with a sneer, saying that those who eat figs while they are green are sure to have their lips blistered².

The weakness, indecision, and incapacity of Cantacuzenos became apparent when he mounted the throne. He was destitute of the energy necessary to command the factious chiefs of his party, and his vanity prevented his selecting ministers who could perform the services required to keep his supporters closely united. The people, though discontented with the fiscal extortions and judicial corruption of the central government, knew well, from their experience in the civil wars of Andronicus, that the rebellion of a rival emperor would only add to their sufferings. Feudal usages had penetrated into Greek society; many provincial nobles had assimilated their authority to that of feudal barons, and the magistrates of many towns were striving to establish or defend their local independence. The whole state of society beyond the immediate sphere of the court and the imperial administration rendered the question whether John V. should be replaced

¹ 26th October 1341; Niceph. Greg. 381.

² Cant. 437.

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by Cantacuzenos, or whether Apokaukos should govern as prime-minister, or Cantacuzenos as emperor, matters of secondary consideration¹. Every page of the dethroned rebel's memoirs, written after he had time to reflect on the past in the calm of monastic seclusion, proves that he was incapable of understanding the circumstances of his age and the popular feeling of his contemporaries. Both he and Gregoras are in an especial degree the historians of the court and church of Constantinople; of the interests and opinions of the people they took no account. Court intrigues, family alliances, party interests, personal hatreds, local prejudices, and religious bigotry concealed the existence or stifled the growth of every national and patriotic sentiment.

The Regent Anne, under the guidance of the Patriarch and Apokaukos, adopted prompt and effectual measures to intimidate the partisans of the rebels. Theodora, the mother of Cantacuzenos, a woman of more virtue and talent than her son, was thrown into prison, and treated with great cruelty until her death. The young emperor was solemnly crowned at Constantinople on the 19th of November; Apokaukos was then named Grand-duke, and the war was prosecuted with a degree of promptitude and energy that confounded all the plans of their opponents². Cantacuzenos had counted more on the effect of his intrigues than on his own military talents. The grand-duke had taken effectual measures to countermine these intrigues, and he now showed that he knew far better how to direct the operations of a campaign than the rebel emperor.

The desire of the people for peace, and their aversion to the aristocratic partisans of Cantacuzenos, contributed to his failures at Adrianople and Thessalonica quite as much as the activity of the grand-duke. The authority of the regency was re-established in all the Thracian towns. The only fortress of which the rebels retained possession was Didymoteichos; but Cantacuzenos and his followers, being cut off from all communication with this place, and unable to defend

¹ Cant. 442. The aristocratical faction in the towns favoured the rebellion, but the magistrates and people supported the cause of the regent and of order. See the popular insurrections at Adrianople, Thessalonica, and Constantinople. Cant. 476, 507, 547, 672. Compare also the independent position held by Chares, Cant. 499; John Angelos in Great Vlaxia, Cant. 521; Momitzilos, 589; Vatatzes, 617; Dobritzas, 737.

² Cant. 467; Niceph. Greg. 384.

himself in Macedonia, fled into Servia, hoping to conquer the Greek empire by the assistance of the Sclavonians. The wealth of Cantacuzenos was confiscated; but though his losses were immense, he still possessed considerable riches, with which he could pay followers, bribe partisans, and reward friends¹. The immense fortunes accumulated in the imperial service form a strong proof of the corruption of the administration; while, on the other hand, some traces of a healthy national feeling appear in an attempt to awaken Hellenic traditions by addressing the people as Greeks and not as Romans. Unfortunately these Hellenic reminiscences produced neither love of liberty, nor respect for order; their operation was confined to rhetorical commonplace².

Stephen Dushan, who ascended the throne of Servia in the year 1333, and was subsequently crowned emperor, was one of the most dangerous enemies of the Greeks. Active, brave, able, and perfidious, he was formed by nature to contend with the Byzantine court, over which he gained many advantages; and he laboured indefatigably to transfer the empire of the Greeks to the Servians. He had already established his residence at Skopia, in order to watch every occasion for extending his dominions; and he availed himself of the pretensions and difficulties of Cantacuzenos to form an alliance with the rebel and invade the empire³. The Servian auxiliaries enabled the rebel emperor to lay siege to Serres, a city of great importance, from its command over a rich and extensive plain; but they were soon attacked with fevers in the plains of Macedonia, and the siege was abandoned. About the same time, Didymoteichos was closely invested by the imperial troops, and was in great danger of being taken, when it was relieved by a Turkish army under Amour, the son of Aidin, with whom Cantacuzenos formed a strict alliance⁴ (January 1343). The failure of the attack on Serres, the retreat of the Servians, an insurrection of the peasantry against the partisans of Cantacuzenos in the neighbourhood

¹ Cant. 471. Compare 426 and 447. Cantacuzenos says he lost 5000 head of kine, 1000 yoke of oxen, 2500 brood mares, 200 camels, 300 mules, 500 asses, 50,000 swine, and 70,000 sheep, besides 200 dishes of silver. Niceph. Greg. 373, 398.

² Cant. 362. *Ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι, μάλλον δὲ καὶ Ἕλληνες*. Ducas, 9.

³ Cant. 497; Niceph. Greg. 402. The Servians gained possession of Skopia (Uskup) in the reign of Michael VIII. Cant. 778.

⁴ Cant. 540; Niceph. Greg. 403.

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of Didymoteichos, and the return of Amour with his Turks to Asia Minor, again reduced the rebels to the verge of ruin. In these circumstances, the support of the Vallachians of Thessaly was of the greatest importance to their cause. The inhabitants of Great Vallachia, it is true, were more anxious to secure the neutrality of their territory, and the enjoyment of their local usages and municipal laws, than to establish the supremacy of any emperor at Constantinople. It was probably rather to protect themselves against a Servian invasion, than from any preference for Cantacuzenos, that they now received John Angelos, a near relation of the rebel emperor, as their prince. The charter, under the golden seal of the Emperor Cantacuzenos, conferring his office, ran in the name of the Emperor John V. and the Empress-regent Anne, as well as in that of the rebels, Cantacuzenos and his wife Irene¹.

The support of the Thessalian Vallachians enabled Cantacuzenos to open the campaign of 1343 with an effective force. He gained possession of Berrhoea, Servia, Platamona, Petra, Soskos, and Staridola, but his hopes of being admitted into Thessalonica were disappointed by the activity of Apokaukos, who arrived in time to protect the city with a naval force of seventy Greek and thirty-two Turkish ships². Even in maritime warfare, the Turkish race was rapidly advancing to an equality with the Greeks. The return of Amour with a Turkish army subsequently re-established the ascendancy of Cantacuzenos. He invaded Thrace, seized the pass of Christopolis, and once more made Didymoteichos his headquarters. But his progress in Thrace was arrested by the departure of his ally Amour to Asia, where the whole forces of the emir were occupied in defending his dominions against the Genoese and the Knights of Rhodes³.

The assistance of the Turks alone enabled the rebels to maintain their ground during the year 1344. The imperial government formed alliances with Alexander, king of Bulgaria,

¹ This act of the chancery of Cantacuzenos is given by himself at full length, p. 522. It is on the same model as the hatti-sherifs of the Othoman sultans, beginning with a notice of the fall of man. Though filled with misrepresentations and self-glorification, it affords us some curious information concerning the state of northern Greece. The Vallachian principality then bordered on the territories of the despotat of Epirus, and of the Catalan duchy of Athens and Neopatras.

² Cant. 548.

³ Cant. 584.

and Stephen Dushan, king of Servia, who both marched against the rebels. Apokaukos himself took the field, and though he failed in an attempt to take Didymoteichos, he succeeded in detaching a Bulgarian chief, named Momitzilos, from the party of Cantacuzenos. This warrior held the districts of Merope and Morrha, in the chain of Mount Rhodope, as an independent principality¹. The most fortunate event of this campaign for the rebels was the accidental defeat of the Servian army by the Turks, in which Cantacuzenos had no share. The ships belonging to a large body of Turks who had landed to plunder Thrace were destroyed at Pallene by the Knights of Rhodes. The Turks were therefore compelled to march by land to the Hellespont; and as they passed through the Chalcidice they were attacked by the Servians, whom they completely defeated². This victory enabled Cantacuzenos to gain possession of Gratianopolis, and to conclude treaties both with the Kings of Servia and of Bulgaria.

The most important event of the year 1345 was the murder of Apokaukos, which happened during the summer³. Symptoms of discontent manifested themselves at Constantinople and other cities attached to the regent's cause, and an opposition to the government of Apokaukos was formed, both in the court and the administration. It is always the policy of the prime-minister in a despotism to treat even a moderate and legal opposition as sedition; and the grand-duke, who was as daring as he was ambitious, determined to strengthen his authority by getting rid of his most dangerous opponents. A proscription of all the men of wealth and influence who were either suspected or disliked by Apokaukos was commenced; numbers of rich and eminent persons were imprisoned in the building called the palace of Constantine, of which the ruins, still rising over the walls of Constantinople, retain the same name. The official residence of the grand-duke, as admiral of the fleet, was situated not far from this palace and prison, overlooking the head of the port. There Apokaukos dwelt, surrounded by military guards, and by crowds of the rude Tzakonians and insolent Gasmuls who served in the fleet; and at the nearest quay, an armed galley,

¹ Cant. 594; Niceph. Greg. 440.

² Cant. 586.

³ Niceph. Greg. 458.

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fully manned, constantly awaited his orders. His power, his boldness, his activity, his armed attendants, and his suspicions, all seemed to insure his safety. New dungeons were constructed within the precincts of the palace of Constantine, and many persons accused only of political offences were soon to be consigned to hopeless captivity by the cruelty of Apokaukos, who watched the completion of their prison with an inhuman interest. When the work was finished, the grand-duke resolved to inspect it, and, contrary to his usual habit, entered the court of the old palace without his guards. Many prisoners of rank were allowed to walk at large in this court; and for some time they were in the habit of speaking of the death of the grand-duke as the only means of averting their perpetual imprisonment in the dungeons he was building to receive them. While they were holding this conversation, he suddenly made his appearance among them, and it seemed to them as if Heaven had delivered him into their hands. One of the prisoners seizing a block of wood struck him to the ground, and the others, snatching up such materials as the workmen had left in the court, killed him on the spot. His head was cut off with a carpenter's axe, and exhibited from the walls. The guards, who remained by his orders at the outer gate, seeing that their master was dead, retired without attempting to avenge his death. The prisoners, proud of having delivered the empire from a cruel master, made no attempt to escape. They expected thanks, if not rewards; but the empress-regent felt that she had lost the services of a man of energy and talent, whose place it would be difficult to supply from among the Greek nobles of her court, and she resolved to punish his murderers. The servants of Apokaukos, and the sailors about the arsenal, were allowed to take up arms and fill the capital with bloodshed and pillage. All the political prisoners were massacred with the greatest cruelty, though only a few had any share in the death of the grand-duke. The murder of Apokaukos took place on the 11th of June 1345¹.

¹ Cant. 656; Niceph. Greg. 485; Ducas, 9. There is a magnificent MS. of the works of Hippocrates in the Great Library at Paris, which appears to have been transcribed for Apokaukos. It contains his miniature, and some verses celebrating the profundity of his scientific knowledge. The miniature is engraved in the Parisian and Venetian editions of the Byzantine history of Nicephorus Gregoras, and the verses are given at p. 777 of the Parisian edition, and p. 52 of the notes of Boivin in the Venetian.

The civil war continued to lay waste all the country in the vicinity of Constantinople. The industrious citizens of the Thracian towns and the cultivators of the soil were plundered by military leaders, who frequently changed sides to prolong the contest. The Bulgarians, the Servians, the Albanians, the Genoese, and the Turks were all encroaching on the empire. But the miseries inflicted on the Greek population by the mercenary troops of Cantacuzenos surpassed their other sufferings. The ranks of these mercenaries were filled with Sclavonians, Vallachians, and Germans, whose hearts were hardened by great military vicissitudes and constant change of place. They plundered the cultivators of the soil without compassion, and compelled even friendly cities to pay extraordinary contributions. In vain the magistrates acknowledged the title of the rebel emperor, and offered to admit his garrisons within their walls; their offers of submission were refused, for the mercenaries could only be maintained by extorting sums far exceeding the amount of the ordinary taxes; and as an excuse for practising extortion, it was deemed necessary to treat the richest towns as inimical, and the peasantry, where contributions could be levied, as a hostile population¹. The partisans of the Regent Anne were not less rapacious than those of Cantacuzenos; the property of the rebels, and of those who were accused of favouring their cause, both in the cities and the country, was plundered, and their houses and vineyards destroyed². Anarchy began to dissolve all political bonds. Some cities shut their gates against both the emperors³. Some leaders declared themselves independent; and Momitzilos, at the head of a band of four thousand well-armed veterans, defied them both. Cantacuzenos admits that he consulted his own interests rather than those of the empire by distributing the command of the Thracian cities among his own relations and his noble partisans, in order to afford them the means of living according to their rank. The insecurity of property was so great that all commercial intercourse was interrupted, and many articles previously manufactured to a considerable extent, for

¹ Cant. 543.

² Sir Guy of Armenia, one of the military adventurers in the interest of the Regent Anne, plundered the possessions of Cantacuzenos and his partisans with the greatest rapacity. Cant. 452.

³ For the example of Anactoropolis, see Cant. 768.

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home consumption and for foreign exportation, ceased to be produced. The civil wars of Andronicus III. and of Cantacuzenos, following one another at so short an interval, reduced the Greek population of Thrace and Macedonia to such a state of destitution that they were prepared to submit to any foreign invader. The people became as corrupted and unprincipled as their rulers. Party passions and religious schisms inflamed their quarrels, and so completely absorbed their attention that they remained torpid spectators of the contest which was to decide the existence of their empire, the orthodoxy of their church, and the fate of their nation. Even the schisms which rent the Greek church at this period, and the disputes of the Palamites and Barlaamites, which fill so many pages of the political history of Constantinople, never interested the whole Greek population, whose orthodoxy was satisfied with their doctrines concerning the procession of the Holy Ghost, the use of leavened bread in the Eucharist, and their inveterate hatred of the Pope and the Latin church.

The first foreigner who took advantage of the paralyzed state of the Greek nation was Stephen Dushan, the king of Servia, whom we have already seen changing sides more than once during the civil war. He was a man of great ambition, and was celebrated for his gigantic stature and personal courage. His subjects boasted of his liberality and success in war; his enemies reproached him with faithlessness and cruelty. He had driven his father, Stephen VII., from the throne, and the old man had been murdered in prison by the rebellious nobles of Servia, who feared lest a reconciliation should take place with his son. Stephen Dushan passed seven years of his youth at Constantinople, where he became acquainted with all the defects of the Byzantine government and with all the vices of Greek society. The circumstances in which the rival emperors were placed during the year 1345 were extremely favourable to his ambitious projects, and he seized the opportunity to extend his conquests in every direction. To the east he rendered himself master of the whole valley of the Strymon, took the large and flourishing city of Serres, and garrisoned all the fortresses as far as the wall that defended the pass of Christopolis¹. He extended

¹ Cant 786; Niceph. Greg. 467; Chalcocondylas, 13.

his dominions along the shores of the Adriatic, and to the south he carried his arms to the gulf of Ambracia. He subdued the Vallachians of Thessaly, and placed strong garrisons in Achrida, Kastoria, and Joannina. Flushed with victory he at last formed the ambitious scheme of depriving the Greeks of their political and ecclesiastical supremacy in the Eastern Empire, and transferring them to the Servians. He assumed the imperial crown at Serres, where he established a court on the Roman or Byzantine model, and took the title of Emperor of Romania, Sclavonia, and Albania, conferring at the same time the title of King of Servia on his son. He promulgated a code of laws, which is now the oldest existing monument of the Servian language. His political sagacity is shown by his endeavours to modify the principles of slavery prevalent in Servia and to encourage trade. Seeing how much the Greek emperors had lost by neglecting the commercial interests of their subjects, he secured the friendship of the Venetian republic, and inscribed his own name in the register of her nobility called the Golden Book¹. His arms were successful against the Bosnians and the Hungarians, as well as against the Greeks; and at his death in 1355 the Servian empire extended from the Danube to the frontiers of Aetolia. The dominions which he conquered were partitioned after his death; but the Greeks never recovered their former preponderance in the provinces from the valley of the Strymon to the shores of the gulf of Arta. In that extensive district they no longer compose a decided majority of the population.

The success of Cantacuzenos was at last decided by the aid he received from the Turks, not by his own political intrigues and military exploits. His own history of the civil war presents the Greeks under the most unfavourable aspect, and far inferior both in morality and courage to the Turks. Amour, the Seljouk emir of Aidin, is the noblest character of the age; Orkhan, the Othoman sultan, is the most sagacious statesman; and both these princes were the allies of the rebel at the end of the war. But the Regent Anne also relied

¹ Cant. 789. The armorial bearings of the states of Sclavonia and Sclavonian Illyria, published by Ducange in his *Familiae Byzantinae*, are taken from a collection prepared by order of the Emperor Stephen Dushan, which is preserved in the library at Vienna.

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more on the aid of Turkish mercenaries than on the courage of the imperial army, and it was the defection of Orkhan from her cause, and the desertion of the troops of the Emir of Saroukhan, which ruined her military position in the year 1346.

The manner in which both Cantacuzenos and the empress-regent generally paid their Mussulman allies was by allowing them to plunder the country and carry off the Greek population to be sold as slaves in Asia Minor. The friendship of the Emir Amour for Cantacuzenos may have been as disinterested as the rhetorical historian represents it; but the Turkish mercenaries under his banner required to be maintained and rewarded. The rebel emperor was often unable to furnish them with provisions and money; and when this was the case they plundered both friend and foe, and carried off the wretched inhabitants into slavery wherever they could seize them. The historian Ducas, a warm partisan of Cantacuzenos, who wrote in the next century, declares that the treaty by which the Empress Anne purchased the aid of Orkhan contained a clause authorizing the Othoman Turks to make slaves of the Christian subjects of the rebel emperor, and to transport them to the slave-markets in Asia by the way of Skutari; thus rendering the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople the principal *dépôt* of the trade in Greek slaves. When Orkhan subsequently changed sides, there can be no doubt that he enforced a clause of similar tenor against the Christian subjects of the Emperor John V. with the approval or connivance of Cantacuzenos¹. Slaves were at this time the most marketable commodity throughout all western Asia.

Cantacuzenos perceived that the power of the Othoman Turks was fixed on firmer foundations than that of the other Turkish princes, and that their alliance would afford the surest guarantee of ultimate success to the rebel cause. He succeeded in detaching the Sultan Orkhan from the party of the lawful emperor, though he was compelled to purchase a permanent alliance with the house of Othman by sending his daughter Theodora to Brusa, where she received the rank of one of the sultan's wives and became a tenant of the harem.

¹ Ducas, 15.

The Tartar and Turkish princes had long attached great importance to marriages that introduced into their families the blood of the emperors of Constantinople; and when Cantacuzenos affected to reject the overtures of Orkhan, the sultan backed his negotiations with a threat that he would prosecute the war in favour of the empress-regent in a vigorous manner¹. The junction of the Othoman army with the rebels formed the crisis of the civil war. The campaign of 1346 rendered Cantacuzenos master of the greater part of Thrace, and enabled him to advance to the walls of the capital.

In this period of danger there was no person of talent to conduct the affairs of the young emperor. The Empress Anne quarrelled with the Patriarch, and became the protector of his enemies in the church. A council of bishops was assembled, and the orthodoxy of the head of the church was called in question, examined, and condemned. The Greek church was torn by schisms, and had fallen into the same state of anarchy as the rest of the empire. Indeed, the prevalent opinion that the Greek church has been more free from heresies and schisms than other churches is not strictly true. On the contrary, the Greek church has been the prolific mother of heretical opinions, and has filled her household with the disputes of her children; but the power of the emperor over the temporalities of the ecclesiastical establishment, the simoniacal spirit of the higher clergy, the consequent torpidity of the public mind on purely religious questions, and the veil with which Byzantine history conceals the feelings of the people prevent our knowing exactly to what extent each successive generation protested against the corruption of the Greek church. But we nevertheless discover proofs that in every age there were Greeks who advocated the cause of liberty and religion.

The people of Constantinople at last became tired of the civil war; and as Cantacuzenos was evidently more inclined to grant a general amnesty than the regency, his cause rapidly gained ground after the murder of Apokaukos. Fortunately for the Greek empire, he was enabled to gain

¹ Cant. 682; Ducas, 17. The hypocritical explanations of Cantacuzenos on the subject of this marriage, which Ducas, in spite of his admiration for the rebel emperor, calls an impious alliance, are amusing.

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possession of Constantinople without the participation of his Turkish allies. His partisans organized a plan for admitting him within the city, and while the attention of the government party was occupied in celebrating the deposition of the Patriarch John of Apri, the Golden Gate was thrown open, and the rebel emperor entered Constantinople without bloodshed. The empress-regent showed a determination to defend herself in the imperial palace; but her partisans were less courageous than their female chief, and she was compelled to submit to the victor.

The terms dictated by Cantacuzenos, as master of the capital, prove the real weakness of his party as much as his own moderation. He entered Constantinople on the 3rd of February 1347, and it was not until the 8th that a treaty was concluded with the empress-regent, and the gates of the palace of Blachern were opened to receive the new emperor¹. By this treaty Cantacuzenos was recognized as emperor, but his right to the sole direction of the government was limited to ten years, and John V. was to enjoy an equal share of the imperial power on attaining the age of twenty-five. A general amnesty was proclaimed; all landed property was restored to its original possessors; but movable property was left in the possession of those who had acquired it during the civil war. The termination of hostilities was evidently caused more by the general desire of the people for peace, than by the victorious arms of the rebels. On this occasion a long period of anarchy was not, as usual in civil contests, terminated by the establishment of a military despotism. Cantacuzenos was a man of intrigues and stratagems, not of battles and strategy. His leading partisans were courtiers in armour, not soldiers, and his armies consisted of temporary musters of foreign mercenaries, so that the interests of the middling classes, and the feelings of the mass of the people, in the end, warned those who were contending for power that they must hasten to make peace. But public opinion did not possess the power or consistency necessary for insuring permanent respect to the articles of the peace of Blachern.

The Emperor Cantacuzenos found the empire shrunk into a mere shadow of that which he had governed as the prime-minister of Andronicus III. Whole provinces were lost, and

¹ Cant. 699.

the treasury was empty; yet with that insatiable vanity which has ever been a curse of Greece, his first care was to exhibit himself to the people with an appearance of pomp and splendour. He had already been twice crowned, yet he was not satisfied until the ceremony was performed a third time¹. The exhibition was ill-timed. Custom required that the coronation of an emperor should take place in St. Sophia's, but an earthquake in the preceding year (1346) had thrown down the great eastern semi-dome of that magnificent church, and covered the bema with ruins². It was therefore necessary that he should receive the imperial crown in the church of Blachern, where he and his wife Irene were crowned at the same time. Eight days after the coronation of Cantacuzenos, on the 21st of May, which is the Feast of Constantine and Helena, the young emperor, John V., then fifteen years of age, married Helena, the daughter of Cantacuzenos, who was only thirteen. She received the imperial crown, and the people were entertained with the spectacle of two emperors and three empresses seated on their thrones. The strange spectacle delighted the gazers; but it was not viewed without some feeling of contempt; for it was generally known that the imperial crowns were bright with false pearls and diamonds; that the robes were stiffened with tinsel; that the vases were of brass, not gold; and that instead of the rich brocade of Thebes, the hangings were of gilded leather³.

A review of the limits into which the empire had now shrunk reveals the full extent of the injuries inflicted by the civil wars of Andronicus III. and Cantacuzenos. Many provinces were lost for ever, and the Greek race was expelled from many districts. The property of the Greeks was plundered, their landed estates were confiscated, and even their families were often reduced to slavery. From this period we lose all trace of an independent class of Greek landed proprietors. In the empire, the Greek nobility was composed of titled officials, salaried courtiers, courtly abbots, and simoniacal bishops; in the conquered provinces the higher classes of Greeks sank into farmers of the public revenue, local tools of the government, and tax-gatherers. The landed property and the military power, with the social influence they con-

¹ Cant. 717.

² Cant. 718; Niceph. Greg. 469.

³ Niceph. Greg. 496; Ducas, 19.

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ferred, passed into the hands of the Servians, the Albanians, the Genoese, and the Othoman Turks; and after the middle of the fourteenth century, we find foreign names occupying an important place in the history of Macedonia, Epirus, and Greece, and Servian and Albanian chiefs attaining a condition of almost entire independence¹.

The Greek empire consisted of several detached provinces when Cantacuzenos seated himself on the throne; and the inhabitants of these different parts could only communicate freely by sea. The direct intercourse by land, even between Constantinople and Thessalonica, by the Egnatian Way, was interrupted, for the Servian emperor possessed Amphipolis and all the country about the mouth of the Strymon from Philippi to the lake Bolbe². The nucleus of the imperial power consisted of the city of Constantinople and the greater part of Thrace. On the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, the Greek possessions were confined to the suburb of Skutari, a few forts, and a narrow strip of coast extending from Chalcedon to the Black Sea. In Thrace, the frontier extended from Sozopolis along the mountains to the south-west, passing about a day's journey to the north of Adrianople, and descending to the Aegean Sea at the pass and fortress of Christopolis. It included the districts of Morrha and the Thracian Chalkidike³. The second portion of the empire in importance consisted of the rich and populous city of Thessalonica, with the western part of the Macedonian Chalkidike, and its three peninsulas of Cassandra, Longos, and Aghionoros. By land it was entirely enclosed in the Servian empire. The third detached portion of the empire consisted of a part of Vallachian Thessaly and of Albanian Epirus, which formed a small imperial province interposed between the Servian empire and the Catalan duchy of Athens and Neopatras. The fourth consisted of the Greek province in the Peloponnesus,

¹ The later Byzantine historians, Cantacuzenos, Nicephorus Gregoras, Ducas, Chalcocondylas, and Phrantzes, abound with proofs.

² Amphipolis had been restored and fortified by Andronicus III. towards the end of his reign. It fell into the hands of the Servian emperor in 1345, and was governed by one of his officers, named Vranas, in 1347. Cant. 328, 769.

³ Sozopolis refused to receive a garrison from Cantacuzenos in 1352. Cant. 825. Ameilhon. *Le Beau (Histoire du Bas-Empire, xx. 123, 135, 137)*, and Hammer (*Histoire de l'Empire Othoman, i. 185*) confound Morrha of Thrace with the Morea. Compare Cant. 588, 650, 846, and Niceph. Greg. 456. It is necessary also to distinguish the Chalcidice of Thrace, of which Gratianopolis was the capital. Cant. 585.

which obtained the name of the Despotat of Misithra, and embraced about one-third of the peninsula. Cantacuzenos conferred the government on his second son, Manuel, who preserved his place by force of arms after his father was driven from the throne. The remaining fragments of the empire consisted of a few islands in the Aegean Sea which had escaped the domination of the Venetians, the Genoese, and the Knights of St. John; and of the cities of Philadelphia and Phocaea, which still recognized the suzerainty of Constantinople, though surrounded by the territories of the emirs of Aidin and Saroukhan. Such were the relics of the Byzantine empire, which were now burdened with the maintenance of two emperors, three empresses, and an augmented list of despots, sebastokrators, and salaried courtiers.

As Cantacuzenos gained the empire by a sudden revulsion of opinion in the inhabitants of Constantinople, it was evident that the stability of his power depended in a great measure on the wisdom and success of his internal administration. Public opinion called him to the throne as the readiest means of establishing security of property and lessening the public burdens. The people consented to try his talents for administration without believing that he had any right to share the Byzantine throne. The new emperor soon showed himself unequal to the exigencies of his position, and his whole reign consists of a succession of temporary expedients¹. His first financial step was a gross blunder. Instead of endeavouring to revive the trade of the capital and restore the fortunes of the inhabitants, whose estates had been ravaged during the civil war by his mercenaries, he attempted to fill the imperial treasury. His object was to reward his partisans, and surround himself with a foreign guard; but he did not venture to impose any new taxes on the people. He expected that his eloquence and power would induce all classes to grant him a voluntary contribution, and he convoked an assembly of the leading men in Constantinople—merchants, manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, administrators of monasteries, and

¹ The difficulties of Cantacuzenos were doubtless increased by the great plague which raged at Constantinople and throughout the empire in 1347. Cant. 730; Niceph. Greg. 501. This was the plague called the Black Death, of which Boccaccio has left us the well-known description. It visited England in 1349, and report said it carried off above fifty thousand persons in London, though the whole population can hardly have exceeded that number. Hume, chap. xvi.

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trustees of ecclesiastical property—to whom he proposed a contribution for the public service. The request was peremptorily refused, for the subjects of the Byzantine empire feared with reason that their contributions would be expended in increasing the existing evils in the state¹. Their prudence was soon justified by the events that followed. The warmest partisans of Cantacuzenos were dissatisfied with the restraints imposed on his power of enriching them. Cantacuzenos was himself disposed to set aside the clause of the treaty of pacification which excluded his family from the throne. Matthew Cantacuzenos, taking advantage of these feelings, placed himself at the head of the most violent adherents of his father's rebellion, and before the end of the year 1347 gained possession of Didymoteichos, Adrianople, and the surrounding country. His father allowed him to retain in his hands the government of all the country from Didymoteichos to Xantheion, on his restoring Adrianople to the imperial administration. The friends of John V. naturally considered this rebellion as collusive, and availed themselves of the circumstance to render the young emperor dissatisfied with the proceedings of his father-in-law, and to engage in active opposition to the usurpations of Matthew. Every suspicion was confirmed when, in 1353, after open hostilities had taken place between John V. and Matthew, the latter was proclaimed emperor by his father². This step became the signal for a mortal strife between the houses of Palaeologos and Cantacuzenos.

Cantacuzenos was a heretic, but as the church of Constantinople was during his reign a heretical church, his religious opinions in all probability facilitated his ecclesiastical administration. Nevertheless he alienated the feelings of the Palamite clergy, while he roused the indignation of the orthodox, by an iniquitous misappropriation of the funds of the great cathedral of St. Sophia. The church of Russia preserved its orthodoxy when that of Constantinople lapsed into the Palamite heresy; but the Russian clergy did not break off their communion with the mother church, and the orthodox patriarch of Russia continued to receive his

¹ Cant. 721.

² About a year appears to have elapsed between the proclamation of Matthew and his coronation. Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, 280.

investiture from the heretical Byzantine patriarch. The Russians continued to take the warmest interest in the misfortunes of the Greek ecclesiastics; and when they learned that the reconstruction of the portion of St. Sophia's, which had been thrown down by the earthquake of 1346, was stopped from want of money, Simeon the Proud and many of his nobles remitted large sums to complete the repairs. The money arrived at Constantinople about the year 1350; and this sacred deposit was seized by the Emperor Cantacuzenos, and employed, with the connivance of the Greek patriarch Kallistos, to pay the Othoman mercenaries in his service¹.

Again, in the year 1352, Cantacuzenos found it necessary to employ twelve thousand Turks to oppose the Bulgarians and Servians, who aided his colleague, John V., in the civil war that had broken out between them. In order to pay these Infidels, Cantacuzenos laid his hands on the treasures of the church a second time. He seized all the gold, silver, and jewels in the treasuries of the churches and monasteries of Constantinople².

The financial operations of Cantacuzenos were not confined to soliciting contributions and plundering the church. He exempted his own subjects from some customs paid by foreigners, and put an end to some monopolies from which the Genoese had derived great profit³. But the advantage obtained by the Greeks from this remission of duties was of short duration, and he added to his unpopularity by not only re-establishing the old duties and monopolies but also imposing new taxes. The Genoese, exasperated at the loss of their previous gains, attacked the Greek merchants and insulted the emperor in the port of Constantinople. Cantacuzenos resolved to expel them from their settlement at Galata, and in order to obtain the means of fitting out a strong fleet, he increased the taxes of his subjects. Vineyards were then the most profitable portion of their landed property. There was an immense demand for wine, not only for the ships of all the Italian republics, but also for the supply of Russia and a part of western Europe, where the most esteemed

¹ Simeon reigned from 1340 to 1353. Niceph. Greg. book xxxviii., cited from the inedited MS. by Parisot, *Cantacuzène, homme d'état et historien*, and notes to book xxxvii., of which he has published the Greek text with a French translation, Paris, 1851, pp. 76 and 302.

² Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, 322.

³ Niceph. Greg. 529.

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qualities commanded high prices. Cantacuzenos could not omit taxing an article which promised to furnish a large sum with little trouble. A duty of two byzants was imposed on the purchaser for every fifty measures, and an additional impost of one byzant on the grower¹. This tax inflicted a serious blow on the Greek landed proprietors, already burdened with the payment of a tenth of their produce, and exposed to have their crops destroyed by foreign invaders. A duty of half a byzant was imposed on every measure of wheat imported into Constantinople, and the customs, which had hitherto amounted to ten per cent., were increased by the addition of one-fiftieth, or two per cent.² The people complained that they paid two hundred thousand byzants in consequence of these new taxes, of which, however, only fifty thousand reached the treasury. The whole maritime policy of Cantacuzenos was imperial, not commercial. His immediate object in augmenting the burdens of his subjects was to fit out a powerful fleet, and time did not allow him to wait for the result of the wiser measures he had previously adopted for enabling the Greeks to enrich themselves by recovering the share of the commerce of the East of which the monopolies and concessions of earlier emperors had deprived them.

In addition to these causes of unpopularity, it is necessary to add, that the accession of Cantacuzenos did not, as was expected, put an end to the invasions of the Turks and relieve the Greeks from the burden of maintaining the Othoman troops. The greater part of the population of Constantinople favoured the house of Palaeologos. The great palace was therefore an insecure position to Cantacuzenos, who might be blockaded in it whenever a popular insurrection received the aid of a Genoese fleet. In order, therefore, to secure his communications with his partisans in the provinces and with his Turkish allies, he constructed a new citadel at the Golden Gate, which subsequent additions converted into the castellated enclosure called the Seven-Towers. He also surrounded his person and filled his palace with Turkish and Catalan guards³. In all the wars the new emperor carried

¹ Cant. 748.

² Cant. 748. The measure of wine may have been about the capacity of the modern oka, but the measure of wheat must have exceeded considerably the present kilo of Constantinople.

³ Nicephorus Gregoras, as cited by Parisot (*Cantacuzène*, 290), informs us that,

on, whether with the Servians, the Bulgarians, or with his son-in-law and colleague John V., the greater part of his army consisted of Infidels, whose cruelty and rapacity seemed to increase every year. His egregious self-conceit, his incurable habits of tergiversation, his deficiency in administrative talent, and his want of personal determination became apparent to all, and it seems probable that his abdication was a measure to which the increasing discontent of his subjects compelled him to look forward from the time his colleague John V. took up arms against him in 1351¹.

The wars of Cantacuzenos were not undertaken on any political plan; and his desultory hostilities with the Servians, Bulgarians, Genoese, and Turks do not require to be narrated in detail. It is only necessary to group the events of the reigns of Cantacuzenos and John V. in such a way as to paint the anarchy that existed in the empire, and the momentary exigencies under which Cantacuzenos acted. He had not reigned a year before he was involved in hostilities with the Genoese colony of Galata, which contained many warm partisans of the house of Palaeologos. This factory had grown into a flourishing town, and commanded a large portion of the Golden Horn. During the civil war the Genoese capitalists had supplied the regency with money, and farmed almost every branch of the revenue which the imperial government derived from the port. The duties they collected amounted to two hundred thousand byzants, and they paid for this only thirty thousand to the imperial treasury². The financial measures of the new emperor reduced their profits; and if he had persevered in his policy of lightening the burdens of his own subjects, the Greeks might soon have recovered some portion of the trade, which the insecurity of property, caused by the civil wars, had transferred to Galata. As it was, the increased industry of the

in marching to relieve his son Matthew, who was besieged by John V. in Didymoteichos, Cantacuzenos had with him only sixty Greeks and two thousand Turks and Catalans. Cant. 868. The general disorganization of society was as marked in the West as in the East. The population of large cities was often divided into several hostile sections, and the towns of Italy were filled with fortified dwellings.

¹ Concerning the promise of abdication whenever Cantacuzenos was in difficulty, see Parisot (*Cantacuzène*, 268, 269), and the speech of John V., from the 27th book of Niceph. Greg., Annexe A, p. 318.

² Niceph. Greg. 530.

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Greeks, and the jealousy of the Genoese, led to open hostilities. The colonists of Galata commenced the war in a treacherous manner, without any authority from the republic of Genoa, (1348). With a fleet of only eight large and some small galleys they attacked Constantinople while Cantacuzenos was absent from the capital, and burned several buildings and a great part of the fleet he was then constructing¹. The Empress Irene, who administered the government in the absence of her husband, behaved with prudence and courage, and repulsed a bold attack of the Genoese. Cantacuzenos hastened to the capital, where he spent the winter in repairing the loss his fleet had sustained. As soon as it was ready for action, he engaged the Genoese in the port, where he hoped that their naval skill would be of no avail, and where the numerical superiority of his ships would insure him a victory. He expected, moreover, to gain possession of Galata itself by an attack on the land side while the Genoese were occupied at sea. The cowardly conduct of the Greeks, both by sea and land, rendered his plans abortive. The greater part of his ships were taken, and his army retreated without making a serious attack. Fortunately for Cantacuzenos, the colonists of Galata immediately after this victory received an order from the senate of Genoa to conclude peace, even should they be compelled to make considerable concessions. Their victory enabled them to obtain favourable terms, and to keep possession of some land they had seized and on which they soon completed the construction of a new citadel².

The friendly disposition manifested by the government of Genoa induced Cantacuzenos to send ambassadors to the senate to demand the restoration of the island of Chios, which had been conquered by a Genoese expedition under Simon Vignoso in 1346. He proposed that the island should be restored to the empire in ten years, and that in the meantime the republic should pay an annual tribute of twenty-two thousand byzants. But if these stipulations were accepted by any negotiators, it is certain that they were never carried into

¹ Nicephorus Gregoras (533) calls the large Genoese ships triremes. It seems, from several passages of the Byzantine historians, that though the war-galleys of the middle ages had only two tiers of oars, they had sometimes a spar-deck over the upper tier.

² Cant. 747; Niceph. Greg. 546.

execution, for the Genoese at Chios retained possession of their conquest¹.

Thessalonica long refused to recognize Cantacuzenos as emperor; but the people became at last afraid that their leaders would enter into terms with the Servian emperor, and they determined to renew their connection with the government of Constantinople. Cantacuzenos was invited to visit the city in person, and take measures for defending it against the intrigues and hostilities of Stephen Dushan.

The young emperor, John V., was now eighteen years of age, and his good temper, personal beauty, noble figure, and martial air concealed the defects of his mind and rendered him popular with all ranks. The jealousy of Cantacuzenos was increased by the attachment generally shown to his young colleague; and in order to prevent the partisans of the house of Palaeologos availing themselves of the public favour to emancipate the young emperor, he never allowed him to quit his side. In 1350 he carried him in his train to Thessalonica. The two emperors left Constantinople with a fleet, while Matthew Cantacuzenos, with an auxiliary force of twenty thousand Turkish cavalry, under the command of Suleiman, the son of Orkhan, advanced by land against the Servians in order to reconquer the country between Christopolis and Thessalonica. But Suleiman, whose object was to enrich his followers and keep together a large army at the expense of others, felt no wish to see the Greeks gain any very decided advantage over the Servians. He declared that his father had recalled him to Asia Minor; and, separating his troops from those of Matthew Cantacuzenos, he marched up the valley of the Hebrus into the Bulgarian territory, from whence he carried off immense booty in cattle and prisoners. With these spoils he crossed the Hellespont. Matthew, finding his troops insufficient to attack the Servians, disbanded his new levies, and sent back the veterans to the garrisons from which they had been drafted, remaining on the defensive behind the walls of Christopolis. In the mean time the fleet advanced to Anactoropolis (Eion), where a Bithynian

¹ Cant. 748. The articles which the imperial historian pretends were embodied in the treaty, appear to have been proposed but not accepted. A treaty between Cantacuzenos and Genoa was subsequently concluded, A.D. 1352. Sauli, *Della colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, ii. 216; Pagano, *Delle imprese e dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia*; Documenti, 261.

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named Alexios, who had been a partisan of Apokaukos, was established as an independent chief, and maintained a few piratical vessels, with which he levied contributions on the people of Lemnos and incommoded the troops at Christopolis. Cantacuzenos made a fruitless attack on Anactoropolis, but he destroyed the ships of Alexios.

The retreat of his Othoman auxiliaries made Cantacuzenos afraid to trust himself within the walls of Thessalonica, where the partisans of Palaeologos possessed the ascendancy. While he was in doubt how to act, he received the news that a fleet of twenty-two Turkish ships had anchored at the mouth of the Strymon on a plundering expedition. He immediately engaged the marauders in his service, and entered Thessalonica under the escort of these Mussulman robbers. Partly by their assistance, and partly in consequence of the dissatisfaction of the Greek population at the Servian yoke, he regained possession of several towns in Macedonia. But he failed in an attempt to conclude a treaty of peace with Stephen, emperor of the Servians. Cantacuzenos, finding himself obliged to return to Constantinople, left his colleague, John V., at Thessalonica (1351). Whether jealousy induced him to take this step voluntarily, in order to exclude his son-in-law from the capital, or whether the power of the partisans of Palaeologos in Thessalonica enabled John V. to refuse quitting the place, the measure was a serious blow to the authority of Cantacuzenos, and soon caused a renewal of the civil war.

The ecclesiastical disputes of the period compelled Cantacuzenos to hurry back to Constantinople; but they are so devoid of practical interest, and so like a rehearsal of more important religious contests in the Greek church, that they may be left to be narrated by ecclesiastical historians. Those who take an interest in the history of the heresies which have ripened in the fruitful soil of the Greek church, will read with pleasure the passionate account of the controversy which has been transmitted to us by Nicephorus Gregoras, one of the orthodox. His opposition to the heretical emperor and patriarch drew on him a degree of persecution which he would fain magnify into a species of martyrdom¹.

¹ Nicephorus Gregoras was confined in the monastery of Chora, and ill-treated by the monks, as he tells us (p. 656). When Cantacuzenos was dethroned he

Sound policy required the two emperors to combine their forces for recovering the country between Thessalonica and Christopolis; but Cantacuzenos felt that the expulsion of the Servians from this district would increase the power of John V. He therefore preferred adopting measures to annihilate the influence of the house of Palaeologos at Constantinople. This could only be done by driving the Genoese out of Galata, and he hoped to effect this with the assistance of the Venetians, who were then carrying on the war with Genoa, called the war of Caffa.

The Genoese had drawn into their hands the greater part of the commerce of the Black Sea. The town of Tana or Azof was then a place of great commercial importance, as many of the productions of India and China found their way to western Europe from its warehouses¹. The Genoese, in consequence of a quarrel with the Tartars, had been compelled to suspend their intercourse with Tana, and the Venetians, availing themselves of the opportunity, had extended their trade and increased their profits². The envy of the Genoese led them to obstruct the Venetian trade and capture Venetian ships, until at length the disputes of the two republics broke out in open war in 1348.

In the year 1351, Cantacuzenos entered into an alliance with Venice, and joined his forces to those of the Venetians, who had also concluded an alliance with Peter the Cereimonious, king of Aragon. Nicolas Pisani, one of the ablest admirals of the age, appeared before Constantinople with the Venetian fleet; but his ships had suffered severely from a storm, and his principal object was attained when he had convoyed the merchantmen of Venice safely into the Black Sea. Cantacuzenos, however, expecting to receive important aid from Pisani, attacked the Genoese colony of Galata by sea and land. His assault was defeated in consequence of the weakness of the Greeks and the lukewarmness of the Venetians³. Pisani retired to Negropont, to effect a junction

was set at liberty, and the two historians held some violent theological disputes. The smooth Cantacuzenos shows less respect for truth than the passionate Gregoras. Cant. 800; Niceph. Greg. 554. A sketch of the Palamite controversy will be found in Mosheim's *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. ii. p. 660, Soames' edit 1845.

¹ Karamsin, *Histoire de l'Empire de Russie*, iv. 143.

² Sauli, *Colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, i. 320; Marin, *Storia del Commercio de' Veneziani*, vi. 58; Raynaldi, *Ann. Eccles.* vi. 449.

³ Cant. 813.

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with the Catalan fleet ; and Pagano Doria, who had pursued him with a superior force, in returning to Galata, stormed the town of Heracleia on the Sea of Marmora, where Cantacuzenos had collected large magazines of provisions, and carried off a rich booty, with many wealthy Greeks, who were compelled to ransom themselves by paying large sums to their captors. Cantacuzenos was now besieged in Constantinople, but his fleet was safe from the attacks of the Genoese in the port of Heptaskalon, which he had cleared out. The walls of the city were repaired on the land side, and strengthened by the addition of a deep ditch, extending from the Eugenic to the Wooden Gate (*Xyloporta*)¹. The Genoese, unable to make any impression on the city, indemnified themselves by ravaging the Greek territory on the Black Sea. They captured Sozopolis, which refused to allow the garrison sent by the emperor to enter its walls ; and this city, which had previously been in possession of a flourishing trade, was now ruined. The Genoese carried away everything they could find, and then threatened to reduce the houses to ashes, unless the inhabitants paid a large sum from the treasures which they were supposed to have concealed.

Early in the year 1352, Pisani returned to Constantinople with the Catalan fleet, under Ponzio da Santapace, and the Greek fleet joining these allies, a great battle was fought with the Genoese, in full view of Constantinople and Galata. The scene of the combat was off the island of Prote, and it received the name of *Brachophagos* from some sunken rocks, of which the Genoese availed themselves in their manœuvres. The honour of a doubtful and bloody day rested with the Genoese. The Catalans displayed undaunted valour, but suffered severe loss from getting entangled among the rocks. The Greeks accused the Venetian admiral of timidity, and the Venetians asserted that the Greek fleet abandoned the action to shelter themselves in their own port². Pisani quitted the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and Cantacuzenos, having nothing more to hope from the Venetian alliance, and finding himself again involved in civil war with the partisans of the house of Palaeologos, concluded a peace with the republic of Genoa. The treaty confirmed all the previous privileges and

¹ Cant. 824.² Cant. 827 ; Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, i. 546.

encroachments of the colony of Galata and other Genoese establishments in the empire, and Greek ships were only allowed to trade with Tana in company with the Genoese, and with a special license from the republic¹. Cantacuzenos had exposed the weakness of the Greek empire, and rendered the insignificance of its maritime power manifest to all Europe.

As soon as John V. found himself surrounded by his partisans at Thessalonica, he took measures for emancipating himself from the authority of Cantacuzenos, and prepared for driving the usurper from the throne. He entered into a treaty with the Servian emperor, by which he engaged to divorce Helena, the daughter of Cantacuzenos, and espouse the sister of the Servian empress². This was not carried into effect; and it is not worth our pains to follow all the personal intrigues of the rival emperors. John V. was the first to take up arms and involve his country in a new civil war, without having sufficiently weighed his strength or determined on his plans. He drove his brother-in-law, Matthew Cantacuzenos, from the appanage he had been allowed to occupy, and besieged him in the citadel of Adrianople. The Emperor Cantacuzenos marched from Constantinople with a body of Turks and Catalans to relieve his son, and recovered possession of the city of Adrianople, which he allowed his mercenaries to plunder and then to make slaves of the inhabitants³. John V. called in the Servians and Bulgarians to his aid; Cantacuzenos, as usual, filled the empire with Turks, who plundered the people without mercy, but did little to put an end to a war from which they derived an assured profit. The superiority of his Turkish troops enabled Cantacuzenos at last to drive the young emperor from the continent, and compelled him to seek a refuge in the island of Tenedos. The moment seemed favourable for transferring the empire from the house of Palaeologos to that of Cantacuzenos. Matthew was proclaimed emperor in 1353, but the opposition of the Patriarch

¹ Cant. 836. Sauli (ii. 216) gives the treaty, which is dated 6th May 1352. It was John V. who allowed the Genoese to gain possession of the two ruined castles which may still be seen overlooking the entrance of the Bosphorus into the Black Sea, and commanding the passage.

² Nicephorus Gregoras, book xxvii., cited by Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, 266, and Annexe A.

³ Cant. 842; Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, Annexe B.

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Kallistos deferred his coronation. Kallistos was deposed, and his successor Philotheos performed the ceremony in 1354¹. But the memory of the treaty of Blachern, concluded in February 1347, by which Cantacuzenos had engaged to resign the government of the empire to its hereditary sovereign at the expiry of ten years, and not to raise any of his own family to the throne, had ever been fresh in the memory of the people of Constantinople. The Emperor Cantacuzenos was generally hated by the Greeks; and his throne was only supported by his son-in-law, Orkhan, whose troops were allowed to use the Greek territories as a hunting-ground to supply their slave-markets. From every quarter John V. was urged to make another attempt to dethrone the detested ally of the Infidels.

While John V. was seeking for means to renew the war, Francesco Gattilusio, one of the merchant nobles of Genoa, and member of a family which had long possessed influence in the Greek empire, chanced to anchor at Lesbos with a small fleet. His vessels were well armed, for every coast in the Levant was infested by Turkish pirates. John V. purchased the services of Gattilusio by a promise of bestowing on him one of his sisters in marriage and investing him with the sovereignty of Lesbos as her dowry².

On a dark stormy night in December 1354³, a large ship was driven by the wind towards the port of Heptaskalon. The sailors shouted from the deck to the guards of the tower at its entrance that their vessel was in danger of going to pieces; they said she carried a valuable cargo of oil, and offered large rewards for assistance. The gates were thrown open, and the soldiers hastened to the spot towards which the ship was drifting. At this moment two galleys, following the great merchantman, landed a body of troops, who seized the open gates, and rendered themselves masters of the tower and

¹ Niceph. Greg. lib. xxviii., cited by Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, 280.

² Two Gattilusii signed the treaty of Nymphaeum in 1261. Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 462. The family appears to have reconquered Ainos in Thrace for the Emperor Michael VIII., and to have held it as a fief or acted as governors for some time. The coins of the descendants of Francesco as princes of Lesbos occupy the attention of numismatists, but we do not yet possess an exact account of their weights and value. Pinder und Friedländer, *Beiträge zur ältern Münzkunde*, i. 29.

³ Boivin gives this year in his *Life of Nicephorus Gregoras*; and Parisot (*Cantacuzène*, 286) shows its correctness.

the fortifications that surrounded the port. It was soon known over all Constantinople that John V. was within the walls; the partisans of the house of Palaeologos filled the city with their acclamations, and the people everywhere declared in his favour. Cantacuzenos, who could rely only on his Turkish and Catalan guards, shut himself up in the palace of Blachern, and attempted to negotiate. He had more than once talked of resigning his power when no one could insist on his keeping his word: he now renewed his promise in order to gain time; but either from timidity, or a conviction that he would be able to overreach his enemies, he omitted to retire into his new citadel at the Golden Gate, and thus lost his only chance of making delay conducive to his ultimate success. The young emperor showed more talent and vigour than the veteran hypocrite. He cut off Cantacuzenos from his Turkish and Catalan guards, and gave him to understand that his life could only be preserved by an immediate abdication and by taking the monastic vows. It is impossible to read the partial account which Cantacuzenos has left us of these events without a feeling of contempt for the emperor, and a conviction of the falsity of his narration. Whatever may have been his virtues in private life and his literary merits, and both were considerable, he was nevertheless, as a man, vain and hypocritical; as a statesman, timid and intriguing; as a minister, treacherous; and as a general, incapable, though as a soldier he was brave. While he reigned, the most dangerous enemies of his nation and religion were his most cherished allies, and after he was dethroned, he laboured, like the imperial prisoner of St. Helena, to falsify history in order to gratify his own egregious vanity¹.

John V. became sole emperor at the age of twenty-five, and he carelessly watched the decline of the empire for thirty-six years. Cantacuzenos had indeed left him little territory,

¹ Cant. 908; Panaretos, *Chron. of Emperors of Trebizond*, chap. xxxii.; Montfaucon, *Palaeographia Graeca*, 71. Cantacuzenos became the monk Joasaph, and resided at Constantinople. About 1358, accompanied by his eldest son Matthew who had been also compelled to abdicate, he visited the Peloponnesus, where his son Manuel still retained his authority as despot. In 1360 he returned to Constantinople, where he dwelt in the monastery of Mangana engaged with his literary pursuits. He afterwards retired to end his days in the monastery of Vatopiedon on Mount Athos, of which he had been a great benefactor. Ducas, 22; Montfaucon, *Palaeographia Graeca*, 465.

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dignity, or power to lose, and his own policy aspired only at making the empire supply him with the means of enjoying life. Yet in the earlier years of his reign he showed some personal activity: he was enabled by an accident to detach Sultan Orkhan from the interests of the house of Cantacuzenos, and thus relieve the empire from its most dangerous enemy.

Suleiman, the warlike son of Orkhan, made repeated encroachments on the empire, even while his father was in the closest alliance with Cantacuzenos; for the usurper was often unable or unwilling to pay the sums due on account of the services of his Othoman mercenaries. On one occasion Suleiman had taken possession of the fortress of Tzympe, for the restoration of which he exacted the payment of ten thousand byzants¹. In March 1354 a series of earthquakes threw down the walls of several cities in Thrace, and Suleiman, taking advantage of the confusion, occupied Callipolis, repaired its fortifications, and filled the abandoned houses within its walls with a colony of Turkish families. This was the first permanent establishment of the Othoman Turks in Europe. Cantacuzenos in vain called upon Orkhan to evacuate Callipolis, offering, when it was too late, to pay forty thousand byzants, which was probably the sum due to the Othoman mercenaries².

There can be no doubt that the restoration of John V. to his paternal throne was not pleasing to Orkhan, and that the Turk saw with pleasure that Matthew Cantacuzenos was able to continue the civil war. But, as we have already said, an accident induced the sultan to alter his policy, and form a friendly alliance with John. His son Khalil, while enjoying the freshness of the sea-breeze in a boat on the gulf of Nicomedia, in the summer of 1356, was captured by a pirate galley, which suddenly issued from its concealment in a neighbouring creek. The pirates were from Phocaea, and they carried their prisoner to that city, which was considered as a portion of the Greek empire. The governor, Kalothetes, however, being attached to the party of Cantacuzenos, held the place as an independent chief. Orkhan invited John

¹ Cant. 860. Tzympe was on the sea near Callipolis. Tafel, *Symb. crit. Geog. Byz.* ii. 118.

² Cant. 861; Niceph. Greg. lib. xxxvii. edit. Parisot, p. 38.

to obtain his son's release, offering his alliance, and the remission of the debts due by the empire to the Turkish government, as a recompense for his success, and threatening him with vengeance in case of failure. Stimulated by the hope of detaching the Othoman sultan from the party of Matthew Cantacuzenos, the Emperor John collected a fleet, and besieged Kalothetes in Phocaea. The Greeks had lost the art of conducting sieges, so that any fortress of moderate strength baffled their skill. The siege dragged on slowly, and Kalothetes would probably have defeated the whole power of the Greek empire, had not the hopes of his party been annihilated by the defeat of Matthew Cantacuzenos, who was taken prisoner by the Servians in 1357, delivered up to John V., and compelled to abdicate. After this, Kalothetes consented to release Khalil on receiving a ransom of one hundred thousand byzants, and the grant of a high Byzantine title¹. During the following winter, Suleiman was killed by a fall from his horse; and about a year later (A.D. 1359) Sultan Orkhan died after a reign of thirty-three years. Orkhan was one of the greatest legislators of modern times; his institutions made the Othoman armies superior to those of all other nations, at a period when western Europe was rapidly advancing in civilization and force. But in the following chapter we must examine the progress of the Othoman power and the effect of Orkhan's institutions more particularly.

Murad I. ascended the Othoman throne on the death of his father Orkhan. He soon recommenced that system of encroachment which a powerful government and increasing population invariably carries on against a feeble neighbour with a depopulated territory. Every year added some new cities to the Othoman dominions. The strong fortresses of Tzurulon and Didymoteichos received his garrisons, and in 1361 he became master of Adrianople². It must be observed that the country now so easily subdued by the Othomans was precisely that in which the partisans of the house of Cantacuzenos were most numerous, so that we are warranted in surmising that party animosities persuaded the Greek

¹ Niceph. Greg. lib. xxxvii.

² Phrantzes (46 and 80, edit. Bonn) and Ducas (5, edit. Paris) agree with the Turkish historians (Hammer, i. 220) in attributing the taking of Adrianople to Murad I. Chalcocondylas, who ascribes it to Sulciman, has misled some modern writers (p. 16, edit. Paris).

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nobles of these districts to prefer the government of Sultan Murad to that of the Emperor John. The voluntary submission of the people explains the silence of the Greek historians concerning the causes of these conquests. Murad then turned his arms against the Bulgarians and Servians. In 1363 he took Philippopolis from the former, and Serres from the latter. The fame of Murad's justice, as well as of his power, induced the republic of Ragusa to conclude a commercial treaty with the Othoman government. The sultan granted the Ragusans the privilege of trading throughout his dominions; and as this concession was viewed in the light of the donation of a superior, the republic sent the sultan an annual present of five hundred pieces of gold. This treaty, concluded in 1365, is said to have been the first which the Othomans entered into with any Western nation. Murad, either because he found it troublesome to sign his name, or because there happened to be no reed for writing at hand, daubed the ink on his palm, and impressed it at the top of the treaty. This sign-manual has been imitated by every succeeding sultan, and figures in fantastic form at the head of firmans and on the obverse of coins¹.

The increasing power of Murad alarmed the emperor to such a degree that he resolved to beg assistance from the Pope. He commenced a hypocritical endeavour to delude the Latins into fighting for his cause, by pretending that the Greeks were ready to sacrifice the only thing for which they had, during the preceding century, displayed any attachment—namely, their superstitions. Urban V. did all in his power to revive the crusading spirit; but Peter, king of Cyprus, directed the operations of the crusading army to serve the interests of the Catholic powers in the Levant, not to fight for the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Servians. A force composed of the troops of the King of Cyprus, contingents from the Venetians and the Knights of Rhodes, with a band of English volunteers, stormed Alexandria on the 13th of October 1365; but as soon as they had plundered its rich warehouses, Peter considered it necessary to abandon his conquest².

¹ Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 251. As Murad was a younger son of a sovereign so intelligent as Orkhan, I cannot suppose that he was *unable* to write.

² *Historie de' Re' Lusignani da Henrico Giblet*; Venetia, 1679, p. 384.

The Greek emperor visited the Court of Rome in person in the year 1369, and carried his hypocrisy so far as to join the Latin communion. He delivered to Pope Urban V. a written profession of faith, agreeable to the tenets of the Roman church, and declared verbally his conviction that the third person of the Trinity proceedeth from the Father and the Son; that it is lawful to distribute the communion in unleavened bread; that the church of Rome is the mother church—that she alone has authority to decide questions of faith, and that she has the sole right of receiving appeals on ecclesiastical matters. All this was publicly pronounced in the Church of St. Peter; yet the emperor gained little by his servility: the Pope only supplied him with two galleys, three hundred soldiers, and a few thousand ducats; and on his way back to Constantinople he was arrested for debt at Venice. His eldest son, Andronicus, who acted as regent of the empire during his absence, pretended that he was unable to raise the money required to release his father; but his second son Manuel succeeded in raising the necessary funds at Thessalonica, of which he was governor, and John returned covered with disgrace to his palace, A.D. 1370¹.

Murad had watched this attempt to oppose a barrier to the Othoman power with prudent circumspection. In the mean time, he had consolidated his conquests in Thrace by subduing the Greek, Bulgarian, and Servian chiefs, who held independent districts in the chains of Haemus and Rhodope. But when the sultan saw the Greek emperor return to his capital as weak as ever, and far more unpopular with his orthodox subjects, hostilities were renewed. John, unable to form a generous resolution, consented to become the vassal of the sultan as he had already consented to become a servant of the Pope. He had hardly concluded his treaty with Murad when the imprudence of his son Manuel again exposed the empire to the attacks of the Othomans. The position of Manuel, as governor of Thessalonica, enabled him to form a plot with the Greek inhabitants of Serres, by which he hoped to gain possession of that city. The conspiracy was revealed to Murad, and John V. was compelled to disavow the conduct of his favourite son. Manuel abandoned Thessalonica, and

¹ Phrantzes, §3; Chalcocondylas, 26.

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fled to Lesbos; but seeing little chance of escape, he resolved to trust to the known generosity of the sultan. He repaired to Adrianople, and begged for pardon at the feet of Murad, who treated him with clemency, and even kindness. But the Othoman sultan took advantage of the gratuitous violation of the recent treaty with the empire by the Greek prince to take possession of Thessalonica¹.

The historians who have narrated the events of the last century of the Greek empire often disagree both in the history and the chronology of the period². Many of the details, therefore, require to be illustrated by the publication of new official documents; but much may always remain to exercise the sagacity of critics who deem this unfortunate period of Greek history worthy of minute attention. It seems that, about the year 1375³, the Emperor John V., being summoned to join the camp of Sultan Murad in Asia with his contingent of Greek troops, left his eldest son Andronicus to act as regent at Constantinople during his absence, as at the time of his visit to Italy. Andronicus formed a conspiracy to keep possession of the throne; and having united with Saoudgi, the eldest son of Sultan Murad, who had been intrusted with the direction of the government in the Othoman territories in Europe, the two rebel princes proclaimed themselves sovereigns. Murad at first suspected John V. of being privy to his son's rebellion, but was soon convinced that this was not the case. He hastened to Europe, the Turkish troops deserted his son's standard, and the two rebel princes threw themselves into Didymoteichos, where their leading partisans, who had no hope of pardon, made an obstinate defence. The place was compelled to surrender from want of provisions. Murad put out the eyes of his son Saoudgi, and sent Andronicus to his father, who had agreed to inflict on him the same punishment. The sultan treated his other prisoners with excessive cruelty: the soldiers were drowned in the river that flowed beneath the walls of the fortress, and the fathers of the

¹ Phrantzes, 47; Chalcocondylas, 23.

² Gibbon (viii. 28, *note*, edit. Smith) remarks that, after the conclusion of Cantacuzenos and Nicephorus Gregoras, there follows a dark interval of a hundred years. George Phrantzes, Michael Ducas, and Laonicus Chalcocondylas, all wrote after the taking of Constantinople.

³ I adopt this date from Ameilhon's continuation of Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xx. 444. Hammer places the rebellion in 1385 (i. 258); but several official documents are at variance with his chronology.

rebel officers were compelled to become the executioners of their sons; for the sultan determined that as many of his subjects as possible should share his grief¹ (1376).

The blind Andronicus was imprisoned in the tower of Anemas, near the palace of Blachern, for two years, but he then succeeded in making his escape through the assistance of the Genoese of Galata, for he had secured the friendship of the republic of Genoa during his rebellion, by bestowing on it the island of Tenedos². He succeeded in driving his father from the throne, which he held for two years and a half³. He conferred the title of Emperor on his son John, and immured his father, John V., in the prison from which he had himself escaped. But the protection the Genoese had accorded to the rebellious son rendered the Venetians favourable to the cause of the imprisoned father. Carlo Zeno, a Venetian noble, undertook to deliver John V. on his signing a grant of the island of Tenedos to the republic of Venice. Zeno asserted that the timidity of the emperor alone prevented his escape. The plot for his release was discovered, and Zeno was obliged to quit Constantinople, carrying with him the emperor's deed ceding the island of Tenedos to Venice. Zeno fell in with a Venetian fleet under the command of Giustiniani, his own father-in-law, whom he persuaded to seize the opportunity for gaining possession of an island which commanded the entrance of the Dardanelles. When the success of the Venetians was known at Constantinople, the rebel Emperor Andronicus and the Genoese made an attempt to regain possession of Tenedos. The city was closely invested, and it is said that mortars for throwing stone bullets were employed on board the Genoese fleet at this siege for the first time. The attack was nevertheless defeated⁴.

John V. at last effected his escape, and obtained the support of Murad, which rendered all resistance on the part of Andronicus hopeless. A treaty was concluded between the

¹ Phrantzes, 50, edit. Bonn; Ducas, 22, edit. Paris; Chalcocondylas, 20, edit. Paris.

² The grant of the island of Tenedos, dated 23rd August 1376, is published by Pagano, *Delle Imprese e del Dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia*; Genova, 1846, p. 307.

³ Phrantzes, 55, edit. Bonn.

⁴ Amelhon, contin. of Le Beau, *Hist. du Bas-Empire*, xx. 451; Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, i. 631.

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father on one side, and the son and grandson on the other, by which John V. resumed the government of the empire, and took possession of Constantinople, but by which he recognized the right of Andronicus and his son John to the imperial title as the lawful heirs to the throne¹. The city of Selymbria became the residence of the Emperor Andronicus, and its revenues, with those of the towns of Dancion, Heracleia, Rhedestos, and Panion, formed his appanage. The podestat and council of the Genoese colony of Galata engaged to assist in enforcing this treaty; yet it appears to have been very soon violated, for in the year 1384, Manuel, the second son of John V., was crowned emperor at Constantinople, and proclaimed heir to the throne².

When John V. escaped from prison in the year 1381, he concluded a treaty with Sultan Murad, acknowledging himself again a vassal and tributary of the Othoman empire³. Murad continued to pursue his career of conquest in Europe without disturbing the fragments of territory which still retained the proud name of the Roman empire, but of which the exact extent mocks the research of the historian. The princes who shared the throne were all equally contemptible, and the people was in no degree superior to its rulers. The rapacity of the aristocracy and the clergy, and the bigotry and turbulence of the populace, cannot be described in all their mean details. Indeed, no description could convey a stronger impression of the degradation of Greek society, than the fact that the policy and courage of the merchants of Genoa and Venice were more effectual in deciding the fate of Constantinople than the feelings and interests of the Greek nation.

¹ A patriarchal letter of Neilos confirming this treaty, dated in May 1381, is published in the *Sitzungsberichte der K. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Wien, 23rd July 1851, p. 345.

² By the treaty of Turin, 8th August 1381, the Venetians engaged to destroy the fortifications of Tenedos, and included John V. (Kalojanni) in its provisions as an ally of the republic. Marin, *Commercio de' Veneziani*, vi. 218. Sauli (*Colonia dei Genovesi*, ii. 263) gives a treaty of the emperors John V., Andronicus, and John the son of Andronicus, with the republic of Genoa, dated 2nd November 1382, for giving effect to the treaty concluded between the emperors in the preceding year. Several curious documents relating to the cession of Tenedos to the Genoese, and the destruction of the fortifications by the Venetians, in execution of the stipulations contained in the treaty of Turin (A.D. 1381), are published by Hammer (*Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, x. 457).

³ Phrantzes, 56, edit. Bonn; Chalcocondylas, 33, edit. Paris. It would require a long dissertation to compare the order of events and the discordant facts narrated by Phrantzes, Ducas, and Chalcocondylas.

In the year 1389 the celebrated battle of Kossova was fought. The Othoman army gained a complete victory, and destroyed the power of the Servians; but Murad was stabbed by a Servian noble as he contemplated the scene of the bloody contest. His son, Sultan Bayezid, renewed his father's treaty with John V., but called on Manuel to take the command of the Greek contingent in the Othoman camp¹. This contingent, with the Emperor Manuel at its head, was directed against the city of Philadelphia, the last community of Greeks which had retained its independence in Asia Minor. The history of Philadelphia excites our curiosity and sympathy, though unfortunately we know little of its political condition and civic government. For two generations it maintained its independence in the midst of the Seljouk Turks. In the year 1323, it was besieged by the Seljouks, and reduced to the last extremity by famine. On that occasion it was relieved by Alexios Philanthropenos, one of the last patriotic warriors named in Byzantine history². A veil then covers its fate: it was cut off from the central administration of the Greek empire, and, being relieved from fiscal oppression and commercial monopolies, its resources appear to have increased; local independence became of practical value, and the valour and prudence of the citizens protected their liberty. In the year 1336, when Andronicus III. besieged Phocaea, Philadelphia was considered of so much importance, that in his treaty with the Seljouk emirs of Aidin and Saroukhan he inserted a clause binding those princes to treat the people of that city as friends and allies³.

The commercial importance of a neutral city in the midst of the rival emirs, which afforded a regular market for all Turkish produce, and insured a constant communication with Greek and Italian merchants on the sea-coast, was generally felt. This circumstance contributed to maintain the independence of Philadelphia. But if its magistrates and citizens had been as worthless as those of Constantinople, its liberty could not have continued for two generations. The rapid conquests of the Othomans changed the state of Asia Minor, and Sultan Bayezid, who possessed many seaports, no longer desired to see a neutral commercial city on the frontier of

¹ Phrantzes and Chalcocondylas.² Niceph. Greg. 222.³ Cant. 294.

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his dominions. Philadelphia refused his summons to submit; but when the people saw the Emperor Manuel and the imperial standard in the hostile army, they perceived that the cause of Greek liberty and of the orthodox church was hopeless, and they capitulated. The terms conceded to the Greeks at this time by the Othoman sultans were not regarded as oppressive, for their fiscal burdens were lightened. At the same time the Emir of Aidin was forced to cede Ephesus to Bayezid, and the principalities of Saroukhan and Menteshé were incorporated in the Othoman empire. These new conquests were formed into a government of which Philadelphia, called by the Turks Alashehr, was constituted the capital, and Ertogrul, the son of Sultan Bayezid, was appointed governor¹.

The haughty conduct of the young sultan alarmed John V., who now, when it was too late, began to strengthen the fortifications of Constantinople. Thirty-six years had elapsed since he had dismantled the citadel constructed by Cantacuzenos at the Golden Gate. He now commenced repairing this stronghold and strengthening the defences of the Gate itself by the addition of two towers. To complete the work with the greatest celerity, he employed the solid marble blocks of the Church of the Holy Apostles and other sacred edifices, which were little better than heaps of ruin; while, to hide the plan of his fortifications, he lavished architectural decorations on the outer walls. Bayezid, however, was no sooner informed of his proceedings, than he sent an order to his imperial vassal to level the work with the ground, threatening that, in case of any delay, he would render the Emperor Manuel responsible. The miserable old emperor, who feared that his son might be deprived of sight, immediately destroyed his work, and shortly after sank into the grave.

The personal beauty of John V. obtained for him the name of Kalojanni, which his subjects repeated as a contemptuous compliment, on account of his success in licentious amours.

¹ Leunclavius (*Annales Turcici*, 318) places the conquest of Philadelphia in 1380. Hammer places it in 1390, in vol. i p. 302, but in 1391 at p. 299. Ducas (7) and Chalcocondylas (33) agree in placing it in the reign of Bayezid; yet Ameilhon (contin. of Le Beau, xx. 460) gives the date 1379; and the work of Keri, which shows that the author paid some attention to the chronology of this period, dates it in 1374. *Imperatores Orientis compendio exhibiti a Constantino Magno ad Constantinum ultimum*, studio F. Borgiae Keri e Soc. Jesu, Tyrnaviae, 1744, fol. p. 530.

It is difficult to convey any idea of the rapidity with which Constantinople declined during his long reign. The Greeks, who aspired only at remaining stationary, could not conceal from themselves that they were descending in the scale of nations. They imitated the dress and the manners of the Italians and the Turks, but they never attempted to emulate their activity and courage. The depopulation and poverty of the empire were exhibited in long ranges of dilapidated edifices, which disfigured many of the principal streets of Constantinople, once adorned with palaces faced with the richest marbles. The government and the nobles had sold the architectural ornaments, variegated marbles, columns, tessellated pavements, and rich mosaics to the merchants of Genoa and Venice, who had transported them to the Adrian lagunes and Ligurian rocks, to decorate new palaces, and to ornament the temples and shrines of a rival church¹.

SECTION V.—*Reign of Manuel II.*, A.D. 1391–1425.

Escape of Manuel II. from the court of Bayezid.—Bayezid attacks the empire.—Marshal Boucicault brings assistance to Manuel.—Manuel visits western Europe.—Formation of the Othoman power.—Legislation of Orkhan.—Tribute-children.—Character of the earlier sultans.—The variety of race among the Christians assisted the Othoman conquests.—Weakness of the Greek empire.—Return of Manuel.—Othoman civil wars.—Mousa besieges Constantinople.—Reforms of Manuel.—Manuel visits Greece.—State of the Peloponnesus.—Murad II. besieges Constantinople.—Death of Manuel II.

The Emperor Manuel was generally esteemed, being neither destitute of talent nor personal courage, while his disposition was mild and conciliatory. He was residing at Brusa when he heard of his father's death, from whence he contrived to escape and reach Constantinople before the news reached Bayezid. The sultan treated him as a rebellious vassal in consequence of his secret departure, and encouraged John Palaeologos, the son of Andronicus, who had succeeded his father in the appanage of Selymbria, to claim the empire in virtue of the treaty of 1381, by which the succession had been secured to his father and himself. A body of Turkish troops was sent to ravage the Greek territory up to the very

¹ Compare Benjamin of Tudela, i. 50, Asher's edit., with Nicephorus Gregoras, lib. xxxvii. edit. Parisot, p. 28.

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walls of Constantinople; but other matters calling for Bayezid's care, he accepted the submission of Manuel, and the Greek emperor again appeared as a vassal at the Sublime Porte¹.

The ambition of Bayezid was unbounded, and his love of war was inflamed by an inordinate confidence in his own military talents and in the power of the Othoman army. He despised the Christians, and considered it his first duty to reduce them to the condition of subjects, if not of slaves. The position of Manuel was therefore as dangerous as it was degrading; for although the spectacle of a Roman emperor standing as a suppliant before his throne soothed the pride of Bayezid, it was apparent that his vanity would readily yield to his ambition, if an opportunity presented itself of gaining possession of Constantinople.

For several years Bayezid was employed consolidating his dominions both in Europe and Asia, and he was compelled to watch the movements of the Western powers, which threatened him with a new crusade. When Sigismund, king of Hungary, was about to invade the Othoman dominions, the sultan convoked an assembly of the Christian princes who were his vassals, in order to prevent their combining to assist the invaders. Manuel the Greek emperor, John despot of Selymbria, Theodore despot of the Peloponnesus, Stephen king of Servia, Constantine Dragazes, the son of Tzarko, prince of the valley of the Vardar, and several Greek, Servian, Bulgarian, and Albanian chiefs of less importance, who were already independent, appeared in the Othoman camp at Serres. Circumstances induced the Emperor Manuel and the Despot Theodore to believe that their correspondence with the Pope was known to the sultan, and that their lives were in danger. They both fled, and gained their own states in safety². John of Selymbria remained to profit by the flight of his uncles; but the Hungarian war prevented Bayezid from attending to other business until his brilliant victory at Nicopolis in 1396 left him at liberty to punish the Greek princes for their desertion. He immediately turned his arms against the Despot Theodore, and marched in person into

¹ The portal of the Sultan's audience-hall or tent was already the official waiting-place of princes, and the acts of the Othoman government were already dated from this *porte*, or entrance to the Sultan's presence. Ducas, 27, edit. Paris.

² Phrantzes (59, edit. Bonn) indicates the connection between the flight of Manuel and the Hungarian war.

Thessaly. The Bishop of Phocis was the first traitor who joined the Mussulmans, and urged them to conquer Greece. The Vallachians of Thessaly and the widow of the Count of Salona submitted to the terms imposed on them; and the sultan seeing that no resistance would be offered to his troops by the Greeks in the Peloponnesus, turned back to Thrace. His generals, Yakoub and Evrenos, advanced and took Corinth and Argos; while Theodore shut himself up within the walls of Misithra, and contemplated the ruin of his subjects without making an effort to save them. The Othoman army, after ravaging great part of the peninsula, retired, carrying away immense booty and thirty thousand prisoners, whom they sold as slaves¹.

Bayezid not being master of a sufficient naval force to attempt blockading Constantinople, resolved to undermine the power of Manuel in such a way as would be least likely to awaken the jealousy of the commercial republics of Italy. He fanned the flames of family discord, which shed their lurid light on the last days of the house of Palaeologos, by acknowledging John, despot of Selymbria, as the lawful Emperor of Constantinople, and supplying him with a Turkish army to blockade Manuel by land. In return for this assistance, John engaged to put the Othomans in possession of a quarter in Constantinople, in which they were to enjoy all the privileges of the Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese in their quarters. They were to be allowed to build a mosque and to celebrate their worship publicly. A *cadi* named by the Sultan was also to be established in the Othoman quarter, who was empowered to decide all judicial questions that might arise among the Mohammedans. In order to render the blockade as troublesome as possible to the citizens of Constantinople, Bayezid prohibited all intercourse with his dominions, and cut off the supply of provisions from the coast of Asia. The necessities of life rose to an enormous price; the people began to repine at their sufferings, and many escaped into the Othoman territory, leaving their houses to be destroyed for firewood. Ducas tells us that the modios of wheat was sold for twenty byzants². The Emperor Manuel, as soon as he saw that war was inevitable, sent an ambassador to solicit assistance from

¹ The date is given by the short chronicle at the end of Ducas (196), and confirmed by Chalcocondylas (p. 42).

² Ducas, 29.

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Charles VI., king of France. The Marshal de Boucicault, who had already served with distinction in the East, and had been taken prisoner by Bayezid at Nicopolis, was appointed to command the forces which Charles VI. sent to assist the Greek emperor. Boucicault sailed from Aiguesmortes, and after some delay effected his junction with a fleet composed of eight Genoese, eight Venetian, two Rhodian galleys, and one of Mitylene, and proceeded to Constantinople, where he arrived in 1398. The arrival of Boucicault and his little army, which consisted of six hundred men-at-arms, without horses, six hundred infantry soldiers, and one thousand archers and crossbowmen, revived the courage of the Greeks. The Genoese and Venetians were well acquainted with the Othoman coast, and under the direction of Boucicault the garrison of Constantinople carried on a succession of plundering incursions along the Asiatic coast, from the gulfs of Nicomedia and Mudania to the shores of the Black Sea. It was evident that this system of warfare could not long uphold the empire, and Boucicault, finding the Greeks incapable of making any exertions in their own defence, advised Manuel to seek assistance from the Western nations. But any assistance that could have been obtained would in all probability have proved insufficient to save the empire, had the Othoman power not at this moment been threatened by the great Tartar conqueror, Timor. The sultan was therefore as much inclined to conclude a temporary peace as the emperor. The pretensions of John of Selymbria were the only obstacle, and Manuel overcame this difficulty by a generous resolution. He opened communications with his nephew, whom he easily convinced that, if he entered Constantinople with Turkish troops, his reign would prove of short duration; but he offered to receive John as his colleague, and invest him with the government, while he himself visited western Europe. The Marshal Boucicault guaranteed these arrangements, and a French force remained in the capital to protect the interests of Manuel during his absence. On the 4th of December 1399, John entered Constantinople, and was proclaimed emperor, and on the 10th Manuel quitted his capital with Boucicault, to present himself as a suppliant at the European courts¹.

¹ *Le Livre des Faicts du bon Messire Jean le Maingre, dit Boucicault, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, chaps. 30-35.

We must now turn from contemplating the decline of the Greek empire and the debasement of the Greek race, to examine the causes which led to the rapid rise and solid organization of the Othoman power. The state of society both in the Greek and Seljouk empires, after the middle of the thirteenth century, held out no hope of internal reform. Mutability being a law of nature in the political as in the physical world, every community which ceases to be in a state of progress must soon begin to retrograde. The whole mass of the Christian and Turkish population between the Danube and Mount Taurus was smitten with a moral palsy, or absorbed in the selfish pursuit of individual interests. Order and discipline, reposing on no basis of duty and law, acquired little strength among the people when their adventitious bonds were loosened. Insecurity of property caused a rapid diminution of the population. The labour of rural slaves became of little value: free labourers could not venture to seek employment at any distance from walled towns or fortified castles. The revenues of the central government failed, the administration of justice ceased in many provinces, and was corrupt in all, and even the influence of religion was powerless among the Christian clergy. Anarchy pervaded the whole fabric of society; both the Greeks and the Seljouk Turks talked only of their orthodoxy, and both trembled at their own want of faith. The conquest of the Seljouk empire by the Tartars, and of the Greek empire by the Italians, seemed probable events. The storm of conquest at last burst, but it desolated all around, leaving the Greek empire uninjured, but incapable of profiting by the respite. The Tartars broke the Seljouk power to pieces, and reduced the Russians to the condition of the most abject slaves. A new career was opened for the Greek race, but no Greek arose in any rank of society whose name deserves to be recorded among the great or the good; no individual arose who strove to make the sentiments of patriotism, of justice, and of truth predominate over the prejudices of orthodoxy in the breasts of his countrymen.

The Mohammedan world presented a different spectacle. A small nomadic tribe of Turks, which had recently quitted the deserts of Mesopotamia, suddenly became impressed with the noble ambition of excelling in morals and religion as much as in military virtues. It embraced a career of progressive

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improvement, which rapidly changed the face of the East. We have already noticed the history of Othman, who gave his name not only to his own tribe, but also to the empire which was founded by his son Orkhan. We must now record the institutions which entitle Orkhan to be regarded as the greatest legislator of modern times. The Code Napoleon is a mere mimicry of Roman law, and Napoleon himself was only 'a kind of bastard Caesar.' The institutions of Orkhan, on the contrary, were not composed of rules drawn from a different state of society by schoolmen; they were the expressions of native energy; they were modelled on the unexpected demands of a progressive society, and they were calculated to provide for future exigencies by organizing a conquering nation.

The establishment of the Othoman Turks in Europe is the last example of the conquest of a numerous Christian population by a small number of Mussulman invaders, and of the colonization of civilized countries by a race ruder than the native population. The causes which produced these events were in some degree similar to those which had enabled small tribes of Goths and Germans to occupy and subdue the Western Roman Empire; but three particular causes demand especial attention. *First*, The superiority of the Othoman tribe over all contemporary nations in religious convictions and in moral and military conduct. *Second*, The number of different races which composed the population of the country between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, the Danube and the Aegean. *Third*, The depopulation of the Greek empire, the degraded state of its judicial and civil administration, and the demoralization of the Hellenic race.

First, The superiority of the Othoman tribe is proved by the respect with which Othman and his followers were treated in the Seljouk empire, and the readiness with which both Mohammedans and Christians submitted to his government, even before he was powerful enough to extend his territory by conquest. He could utter the proud boast, that tribe after tribe quitted the Seljouk emirs to join his followers, and that city after city threw off the yoke of the Greek empire to admit his garrisons, but no tribe ever forsook his banner, and no city threw off his yoke. The virtues of the Othoman Turks would have soon yielded to the seductions of wealth and

power, had not Orkhan laid the foundations of a new power by blending together his father's tribe, the Seljouks and the Turkomans who joined his banner, and the apostate Christian population which served in his armies, into one body by a framework of civil and military institutions. We must not, however, overlook the fact that, after the conquest of Constantinople, the legislation of Orkhan was smothered in new laws and ordinances borrowed from the Caliphate, from Persian law-books, and from Byzantine usages; and that the Kanun Namé, or laws of Suleiman the Magnificent, the only Othoman code known in Europe, represents the original institutions of Orkhan, in the same way as the code of Justinian represents the laws of the Twelve Tables, or as the constitution of the United States of America represents the Magna Charta of England¹.

The establishment of the Othoman empire dates from the year 1329, as in that year Orkhan first assumed the power of coining money, and ordered his own name to be mentioned in the public prayers, to the exclusion of the Seljouk sultan. At the same time, his brother Aladdin, who acted as his vizier or prime-minister, advised him to reorganize his military force, and create an army of household slaves, who would remain for life members of his own family. This army, which for several centuries met no equal [on the field of battle, and whose deeds rival the exploits of the Macedonians and the Romans, was composed of Christian children, who, if they had received as good an education from their parents and from orthodox priests as they did from the sultan and the Mohammedan moolahs, ought successfully to have resisted the power they established. Orkhan formed his army of regular cavalry and infantry. The cavalry was already called Sipahi; but it is doubtful whether the name Yenitsheri, or janissaries, was then applied to the infantry, or only adopted about thirty years later, when the dervish Hadji Bektash consecrated the corps for Murad I. Two important bodies of irregular militia were formed at the same time, consisting of light cavalry and infantry, or armed pioneers;

¹ As the legislation of Orkhan was confined to administrative ordinances, the Othoman Turks often consider Murad I., who organized the system of military fiefs, and rendered them hereditary in 1376, as their first legislator. The civil law of the Othomans was of course nearly the same as that of the Caliphate and of the Seljouk empire, since all were alike borrowed from the Koran.

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and it is a proof both of the enlightened views of Orkhan, and of the comparative weakness of the Othoman tribe, that several squadrons of cavalry and regiments of infantry among these irregulars were formed of Christians, in order to secure the population from the oppression and insolence of the Seljouk Turks, who formed the bulk of these irregulars. Orkhan also regulated the relations of the leaders of the military forces established in his new conquests to the government, and laid the foundation of the military fiefs, timars and siamets, which for a long period occupied an important position in the history of the Othoman empire. These fiefs were rendered hereditary by Murad I. in 1376.

The household of Orkhan formed the nucleus of the Othoman power, and the primary object of his legislation was to concentrate the whole strength of his government within his palace walls. He effected this in a most singular manner, by educating all the civil servants of the administration, and the best officers and soldiers of his army, as members of his family, after having annihilated every other domestic tie which connected them with their natural parents and with the place of their birth. The object of Orkhan was to form able and energetic instruments of his will, and he attained his object by collecting a regular tribute of children from his Christian subjects. A systematic education founded on regulations introduced by the counsels of his brother Aladdin, moulded these children into a community more obedient to the Sultans than the Jesuits were to the Popes. The tribute-children trained for service in the administration rivalled the Jesuits in intellectual superiority, and the corps of janissaries surpassed in deeds of arms the exploits of the military orders of Christian knights. The civil and military superiority of the Othoman government over all its contemporaries must in great part be ascribed to the wise system adopted in the education of the tribute-children, for it was by their mental as well as physical power that a vast variety of races both Mohammedan and Christian were held together by as firm a grasp as that by which imperial Rome held her provinces; and the standard of the sultan was carried victoriously into the heart of Europe and Asia, and far along the shores of Africa. Never was so durable a power reared up so rapidly from such scanty means as were possessed by Orkhan and

his vizier, when they conceived the bold idea of exterminating Christianity by educating Christian children.

The Mohammedan law expressly places one-fifth of the booty taken in war, and particularly of slaves—which then formed the most valuable portion of all booty—at the disposal of the sovereign. Besides this, every child without parents who falls into the hands of a Mussulman belongs to Islam, and his master is bound to bring him up in the religion of Mahomet, and even to force him to embrace the true faith¹. The wars of Orkhan, as an ally of Cantacuzenos, were therefore in a great measure undertaken to fill his palace with young slaves. But a sufficient number could hardly be obtained of the tender age at which they could be brought up as Mussulmans, for the Mohammedan law strictly prohibits the forced conversion of prisoners. The Othoman tribe was small, the Seljouks were disorderly, and no dependence could be placed on mercenary troops. Orkhan consequently felt the necessity of seeking for a permanent supply of well-disciplined recruits. In this difficulty, either his brother Aladdin, or his relation Kara Khalil Tchenderli, suggested that he should in future impose a tribute of children on every Christian district which he conquered. This singular tax met with little opposition from the Greek Christians, whose country had been laid waste by war, and whose families were often in danger of perishing from famine during the civil wars of their emperors. The tribute established by Orkhan was extended by Murad I., and was not legally abolished until the year 1685.

The tribute-children were generally collected about the age of eight. They were lodged in the sultan's palace, and instructed by able teachers selected by Orkhan and his counsellors. The history of the Othoman empire proves the excellence of the system adopted in their education. As their talents and physical strength were developed, they were divided into two classes. One class was educated as men of the pen, and from these the officials of the civil and financial administration, the secretaries in the public departments, and even the ministers of state, were chosen. The other class was disciplined as men of the sword, and formed the corps of

¹ Compare d'Ohsson, *Tableau Général de l'Empire Othoman*, tome v. 79, and tome vi. 113, 8vo. edit. In this learned work the year 1362 is erroneously given as the date of the establishment, in the observations at p. 91 of the fifth volume. At that time Murad I. extended the requisition of tribute-children.

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janissaries. This college of conquerors was founded with one thousand neophytes; but as every year added to its numbers, the janissaries soon increased to an army of twelve thousand young men in the prime of youthful enthusiasm and manly vigour¹.

The Othoman princes were educated on the same system as the tribute-children, and for several generations the sultans were eminently men of progress as well as sagacious sovereigns. They were always ready to receive suggestions for the improvement of their army and their government. Each successive sultan embraced new schemes of conquest, and adopted new inventions in war and new ideas in administration. Intelligence was stimulated in every rank. New combinations daily presented themselves to every Othoman officer in authority which called for a prompt decision, and he was compelled to report the reasons for his decision to an able and despotic master. Hence it was that the pashas of the Othoman empire formed a clear conception of the object they wished to attain. The first modern school of statesmen and generals was formed under the early sultans. The preceding pages have furnished ample proofs of the great abilities and wise administration of Orkhan and Murad I. The bitterest enemies of the Othomans bear testimony to the wisdom and talents of their successors. Even the fiery Bayezid was liberal and generous to his Christian subjects, and admitted them freely to his society, by which he rendered himself extremely popular². Sultan Mohammed I., who transferred the capital of his empire from Brusa to Adrianople, was a firm friend and liberal master to all his followers; but in his hostility to his enemies he was (to borrow the expression of the Greek historian, Phrantzes) as persevering as a camel³. Murad II. distinguished himself by his attention to the administration of justice, and by his reforms of the abuses prevalent under the Greek emperors. If any of his pashas or judges oppressed his Christian subjects, they were punished without mercy⁴. Such was the conduct of the five sultans who prepared the way for the conquest of the Greek race; it ought to be carefully contrasted with that of the contemporary Greek emperors.

¹ D'Ohssoon, vii. 330; Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 121.

² Phrantzes, 81, edit. Bonn.

³ Ibid. 90.

⁴ Ibid. 92.

The *second* cause which facilitated the conquest of the Othomans in Europe was the number of different races of Christians who dwelt in the Greek empire and in the countries south of the Danube. The Slavonians were probably then the most numerous body of the population, for they formed a portion of the population in every state, from the banks of the Save to the mountains of the Peloponnesus¹. The Greeks, who were then perhaps next in number, were even more dispersed than the Slavonians, and lived under as many different governments. Even the Bulgarians were not all united under the government of the King of Bulgaria. The Albanians were governed by many chieftains without any supreme head. And the power of the Prince of Great Vlachia, and the number of the Thessalian Vlachians, was rapidly diminishing. The geographical distribution of all these races being quite independent of the actual distribution of political power, the Greek emperors, the Servian and Bulgarian kings, the chieftains of the Albanians and Vlachians, and the Frank princes of Greece, were unable to awaken a national interest in opposition to the Othoman government. The daily complaint of every Christian who dwelt to the south of the Danube was, that he was governed by a rapacious and unjust master, that his property and his life were insecure, and that no change could render his condition worse. The Othoman armies appeared, and the sultan promised security to the timid and justice to the oppressed. As the Othoman sovereigns respected their promises, we need not wonder at the rapidity of the conquests of the Mohammedans.

The *third* cause which facilitated the progress of the Othoman power was the weakness of the Greek empire ; and this weakness was caused by the degraded state of its judicial and civil administration and the demoralized condition of its people. The preceding pages have treated this subject in detail, and marked the decay of the Byzantine empire, and its transformation into a petty Greek state, whose rulers were characterized by financial rapacity, whose church lost its sentiments of Christianity in its eagerness to maintain a national orthodoxy, and whose people became a type of ignorant and concealed immovability. The state of the civil

¹ Chalcocondylas, 17 ; Mazaris, in Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca*, iii. 164, 174.

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and sanitary police affords a sad illustration of the demoralization of the Hellenic race and the decay of Greek civilization. In the interval between the years 1348 and 1418 the Greek empire was visited by eight great pestilential disorders and by a succession of famines¹.

Manuel II. gained very little by his mendicant pilgrimage to Italy, France, and England². Some valuable presents were bestowed upon him by Visconti, the magnificent Duke of Milan, and Charles VI. of France granted him a pension of thirty thousand crowns; but he was compelled to return to Constantinople at the end of two years, with little money and few volunteers collected from nations poorer and not more numerous than the Greeks. He learned on his way home that his enemy Bayezid had been defeated by Timor, and that the Othoman empire was utterly ruined. On reaching Constantinople he deprived his nephew John, who had ruled during his absence, of the imperial title, and banished him to Lemnos. John had already placed the Greek empire in a state of vassalage to the Tartar conqueror; Manuel ratified the treaty, and paid to Timor the tribute which he had formerly paid to Bayezid³.

Historians have indulged in the wildest fables concerning the battle of Angora⁴. The armies of Bayezid and Timor are said to have consisted of such numbers that it would have been impossible to feed them for a day without a month's preparation at every station. It is only necessary to expose the falsity of these accounts by citing one example. The Servian contingent in the army of Bayezid consisted of two thousand men at the opening of the campaign, yet after the losses which it must have sustained in its march from the Bosphorus, it is said to have amounted to twenty thousand at the battle of Angora⁵. Every number appears to have been

¹ Short Chronicle at the end of Ducas; Phrantzes, 109, 157; Boissonade, *Anecdota Græca*, iii. 112.

² Manuel's visit to England is alluded to by Chalcocondylas, who gives a notice of the state of France and England after the departure of the emperor, p. 47. Manuel probably reached Constantinople before the end of 1402.

³ *Histoire de Timour-bec*, par Cherefeddin Ali, traduite par Pétis de la Croix, iv. 38.

⁴ 20th July 1402.

⁵ Ducas (35. edit. Paris) makes the Servians 5000. Chalcocondylas (78) says 10,000; but the Servian contingent was fixed at 2000 heavy cavalry in the first treaty between Servia and the Byzantine empire and Sultan Bayezid adopted the same number when he completed the subjection of Servia. See p. 173 of this volume.

augmented in the same manner with as little foundation. Rarely, however, has the world seen a more total defeat than that sustained by the Othoman army. Bayezid died a captive in the hands of Timor¹. Brusa was occupied by the victorious Timor, and the whole of the Othoman dominions in Asia Minor, with the treasures and the harem of the sultan, became the spoil of the Tartars, and the institutions of Orkhan seemed doomed to annihilation. Yet rarely has so great a victory produced so little effect on the fate of the vanquished. For a moment, indeed, the Othoman power was humbled, and an opening formed for the revival of the Greek empire; but no energy remained in the political organization of the Hellenic race beyond the confined sphere of local and individual interests; while the institutions of Orkhan, surviving the defeats and civil wars of the Othomans, soon restored power to their central government, and rendered the children of Bayezid again the arbiters of the fate of Greece. Timor would have annihilated the Othoman power had it reposed only on the talents and dynastic position of the sultan; and when he held Bayezid a captive, and saw his sons disputing for the remnants of his succession, he very naturally believed that the Othoman power was utterly destroyed. He beheld the insignificance of the Othomans as a people, but he could not see the living soul that survived in their political administration.

The civil wars among the sons of Bayezid prolonged the existence of the Greek empire. The Othoman historians reckon an interregnum of ten years after the battle of Angora, during which four of the sons of Bayezid contended for the sovereignty. Suleiman, Isa, and Mousa successively perished, and the youngest of the family, Mohammed I., at last reunited all his father's dominions, and was regarded as his legitimate successor, and the fifth sultan of the Othomans, including Othman, the founder of the dynasty².

¹ It was long generally believed that Timor carried Bayezid about in triumph, shut up like a wild beast in an iron cage, but a much stranger report was for some time current among Christian nations. It was said a ring had been passed through the nose of the Othoman Sultan, and that Timor led his prisoner about wherever he went, by a cord attached to the ring, as men lead buffalos. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, i. 417.

² The Byzantine historians call the sons of Bayezid Μουσουλμάν, Έσές, Μασήs, and Κυρτζελεβί. This last name is a corruption of Kyrishdji Tchelebi (the Noble Wrestler), and was given to Mohammed on account of his skill in wrestling.

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After the battle of Angora, Suleiman, the eldest son of Bayezid, who reigned at Adrianople, concluded a treaty with the Emperor Manuel in the year 1403, by which he yielded up Thessalonica, the valley of the Strymon, the coast of Thessaly, as far south as Zeitounion, and the coast of the Black Sea, as far as Varna, to the Greeks. John of Selymbria was recalled from Lemnos, and established at Thessalonica, with the title of Emperor; but the control of the government was vested by Manuel in the hands of Demetrius Leontaris, a Byzantine noble¹.

Isa contrived to conceal himself in the neighbourhood of Brusa until Timor quitted Asia Minor. He then assembled an army, retook Brusa, and recovered possession of all the early possessions of the house of Othman. He was subsequently attacked and defeated by his brother Mohammed, and is supposed to have perished in attempting to reach Karamania.

Mousa was taken prisoner with his father, and placed by Timor in the hands of the Sultan of Kermian, who afterwards released him. He then retired to Vallachia, and, obtaining assistance from its prince, Myrtshy, and from Stephen, king of Servia, he waged war with his brother Suleiman. The debauchery of Suleiman at last induced the janissaries to join Mousa, and Suleiman was slain in attempting to escape to Constantinople, A.D. 1410.

The close alliance which had existed between Suleiman and Manuel induced Mousa to turn his arms against the Greek empire. He reconquered many of the towns in Macedonia and Thessaly which his brother had ceded to Manuel, and then laid siege to Constantinople; but his operations were paralyzed by the destruction of his naval armament. The emperor had strengthened the imperial fleet, the command of which he intrusted to his natural brother, named also Manuel, a man of courage and military talents. This admiral gained a complete victory over the Othoman fleet; but his brilliant success excited the jealousy of his imperial brother, and when he returned to receive the thanks

¹ Ducas. 43. 74. edit. Paris John Palaeologus was emperor of, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, emperor *at* Thessalonica from A.D. 1403 to his death, A.D. 1413. Suleiman married a daughter of Theodore, brother of the Emperor Manuel.

of his country, he was thrown into prison on an accusation of treason, where he remained during the life of his brother¹. The siege of Constantinople was merely a succession of skirmishes under its walls, in which several Greek nobles were slain. The attention of Mousa was soon exclusively occupied by the attacks of his brother Mohammed.

Mousa rendered his government as unpopular by his severity as Suleiman by his debauchery, and many Othoman officers in Europe invited Mohammed to seize the throne. The Emperor Manuel agreed to furnish transports to convey the Asiatic troops over the Bosphorus; but he refused to admit them into Constantinople, though he allowed them to form their camp under its walls. The first operations of Mohammed were unsuccessful; but at last he forced Mousa to retire to Adrianople, where he was, in the end, deserted by all his followers and slain, A.D. 1413². Little more than ten years elapsed from the day that Mohammed, then a mere youth, fled from the field of Angora with only one faithful companion, until he reunited under his sway nearly all the extensive dominions which had been ruled by his father. Timor had not perceived that the tribute of Christian children being the keystone on which the whole fabric of the Othoman power rested, its resources were really much greater in Europe than in Asia.

The energy displayed by the Othomans in recovering all they had lost by Timor's victories is surprising, and the circumstance that this was effected amidst incessant and bloody civil wars requires some explanation. It seems strange that a powerful party was always found ready to embrace the cause of any one of Bayezid's sons who claimed the throne, and that the bloody wars they carried on in no degree weakened the Othoman empire. The origin of Othman and his tribe solves the mystery. From the son of a foreign emigrant he gained the rank of a Seljouk prince, and his new power made him the ruler of a numerous population of Seljouk landed proprietors and of nomadic Turkomans, as well as chieftain of the few families which had composed his father's horde. When the Othoman dominions were extended, the sultan's court was crowded with haughty Seljouk

¹ Phrantzes, 87, edit. Bonn; Ducas, 51, edit. Paris.

² Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 155.

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beys and powerful Turkoman chieftains; and when these proud Mussulmans beheld the army and the administration filled with tribute-children, who were devoted to the sultan as members of his family, their prejudices and their interests alike placed them in opposition to the Othoman government. The spirit of personal independence was as warmly cherished by the Seljouk and Turkoman beys as by the feudal barons of western Europe, and the civil wars in the Othoman empire correspond with the wars between the crown and the nobility which took place in the feudal kingdoms; they were the struggle between a despotic sovereign and a powerful aristocracy. The Greek emperors, Manuel and his son John VI., availed themselves of this dissatisfaction in a powerful body of the Turkish population to create frequent troubles in the Othoman empire, by putting forward claimants to the throne of the sultans, and every claimant found a party hostile to the central administration ready to take up arms. The love which the Greeks have always manifested for mental contests and diplomatic intrigues induced them to expect greater results from their manœuvres than could ever result from the political combinations of a power destitute of military force. The vanity of the Byzantine court prevented its tracing the unquiet spirit of the Turkish population to its antipathy to the institutions of Orkhan.

The Greek empire enjoyed an uninterrupted peace during the reign of Mohammed I., which lasted until the year 1421; and Manuel devoted his attention during this period to restoring some order in the public administration, and to re-establishing the sway of the central authority in the distant provinces of the empire. After completing his reforms in the civil, financial, military, and ecclesiastical departments at Constantinople, he found it necessary to visit the provinces in person, in order to reduce the local power of the Greek archonts within reasonable bounds. He quitted Constantinople in the month of July 1413, and commenced his operations by reducing the island of Thasos, the citadel of which resisted his little army for two months. The emperor then visited Thessalonica, where it appears that he remained more than a year¹. His nephew John, who governed the city with

¹ Phrantzes, 96, 107. Manuel reached the Isthmus of Corinth in 1415. Short chronicle at the end of Ducas, 196.

the title of emperor, died about this time, and Andronicus, the emperor's second son, was appointed despot of Thessalonica, which he held as an appanage of the empire, but ruled as an independent prince. After his father's death he sold the city to the Venetians for the sum of fifty thousand sequins¹.

In March 1415 Manuel visited the Peloponnesus. The Empire of the East had shrunk to such pitiful dimensions that the despotat of the Morea, which only comprised about three-quarters of that peninsula, was its most extensive province. The first care of the emperor was to strengthen the means of defending this territory by fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth. He then directed his attention to reforming the abuses which the feudal tyranny of the Franks and the fiscal extortions of the Greek archonts had introduced into the administration. These abuses were rapidly exterminating the Greek agricultural population, and making way for the immigration of a ruder class of Albanian labourers.

When we compare the reforms of Manuel with the legislation of Orkhan, we are astonished at the great intellectual superiority displayed by the Othomans at this period. The Greek emperor adopted only a few temporary devices to arrest the progress of social putrefaction in a diseased society. His own talents and the energies of his people were incompetent to make any bold efforts for extirpating the sources of the evil; yet it was generally acknowledged, and appears to have been clearly seen by the emperor, that the decay of Greek society presaged the speedy dissolution of the empire. The Despot Theodore, Manuel's brother, who died about the year 1407, had felt the task of undertaking the regeneration of Greece so hopeless, and had found the difficulty of governing the Peloponnesians so great, that he attempted to sell his province to the Knights of Rhodes, after he had introduced numerous colonies of Albanians to fill up the void caused by the decrease of the native population². George Gemistos Plethon, the Platonist, one of the Byzantine officials employed in the Peloponnesus, feeling that some

¹ Phrantzes, 122, edit. Bonn. Murad II. took Thessalonica from the Venetians in 1430. We have an account of this last siege, written in imitation of the work of Cameniates, inserted in the volume of the Bonn edition of the Byzantine historians which contains Phrantzes. Its title is *Joannis Anagnostae de Thessalonicensi excidio Narratio*.

² While at Misithra the Emperor Manuel delivered a funeral oration in honour

A.D. 1391-1425.]

great change in the social condition of the Greeks could alone avert their ruin, proposed plans of reform as radical but less practicable than those of Orkhan. The extent of the evils he wished to cure is shown by the violence of the remedies he proposed to use. He boldly declares that no reform was possible without a complete change in the whole frame of society, and to effect this he recommended the abolition of all individual rights of property in land, which were to be replaced by rights of occupancy alone, while the absolute property in the soil was to be vested in the state. His reforms with regard to persons were not less at variance with the feelings of his age and the feudal manners of the Peloponnesians. He proposed reviving the great Roman principle of imperial policy, that a complete separation ought to exist between the classes of soldiers and tax-payers. On these two maxims he formed the details of his reform, which were so adverse to every existing interest and prejudice that it would have been as easy to attempt restoring the laws of Lycurgus.

From a satirist of the time we learn that while the Emperor Manuel was occupied in diminishing the power and checking the abuses of the archonts of the Peloponnesus and of the Constantinopolitan officials, many of the courtiers in his household made a traffic of creating new corruptions in the administration by selling imperial decrees and golden bulls. The character of the native Greeks is represented as no better than that of the courtiers. He says, 'They are formed of three parts; their tongue speaks one thing, their mind meditates another, and their actions accord with neither¹.' There can be no good administration among an utterly demoralized people. When the emperor returned to Constantinople, he carried with him some of the most turbulent and intriguing of the Peloponnesian chiefs, who had previous

of his brother Theodore, which is printed. Combefis, *Patrum Bibliothecae novum Auctarium*, Paris, 1648.

¹ Plethon, in his discourse addressed to the Despot Theodore, says, 'We do not use asses to do the work of blood-horses; we even discriminate in the use of horses, using one breed for war and another for labour.' p. 228. Two discourses of Plethon on the subject of his proposed reforms—one addressed to the Emperor Manuel, the other to the Despot Theodore, Manuel's son—are printed in Canter's edition of the *Eclogae* of Stobaeus. Antverpiae. 1575. A letter to Manuel, forming a third discourse, has been recently published. Müller, *Byzantinische Analekten*, p. 67; Wien, 1852. The work of the satirist Mazaris is printed in the third volume of Boissonade's *Anecdota Graeca*.

to his arrival contrived to appropriate to their own use the greater part of the taxes levied on the people. Indeed, the most important result of Manuel's visit was the introduction of such a degree of order in the provincial administration, that a fixed sum could be regularly remitted to the imperial treasury at Constantinople. His son Theodore remained as his viceroy at Misithra.

The death of sultan Mohammed I. in 1421 involved the empire in a contest with his son, Murad II. The self-conceit of the Greeks persuaded them that they could guide the policy of the Othomans by their superior skill in diplomacy. No experience could teach them that rhetoric and scholastic learning are feeble arms against military discipline and national courage. A pretender to the Othoman throne, named Mustapha, resided at Constantinople, who asserted that he was a son of Bayezid. He was now acknowledged as lawful sultan, and Manuel concluded with him a treaty, by which Mustapha promised to restore Gallipoli, the Chalcidice of Macedonia, and the maritime cities on the Black Sea, and in return the emperor engaged to furnish money and military stores for an expedition against the young Sultan Murad. Mustapha gained possession of Gallipoli, but refused to surrender it, saying that it was not in his power to yield up a city inhabited by Mussulmans to an infidel sovereign. Manuel would then willingly have made his peace with Murad II., but the Othoman councils were guided by steadier principles than the Greek, and the terms they insisted on were such that the emperor preferred abiding the fortune of war. For some time the enterprise of Mustapha was successful; he subdued all the European provinces, and crossed the Hellespont to fight a decisive battle with Murad in Asia. But the Turks had discovered his unfitness for the throne. He was abandoned by his followers, taken prisoner by Murad II., and hanged, in order to convince the world that he was an impostor¹.

¹ Ducas (99) gives some interesting information concerning the size of the Genoese ships employed in the Black Sea trade at this time. One in which Murad II. crossed the Hellespont, in order to attack Gallipoli, carried five hundred Turks, besides the Podestat Adorno and eight hundred Genoese. Seven Genoese ships could detach two thousand men, armed in brazen cuirasses with spears and battle-axes, to accompany the sultan to Adrianople. In return, Murad remitted arrears of tribute due by Adorno for the alum-works at New Phocaea,

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Murad resolved to punish Manuel for his intrigues. The emperor was now weakened by age, and the direction of public affairs was in a great measure intrusted to his son John, who endeavoured to appease the sultan with abject apologies. Murad gave the imperial ambassadors no answer until his preparations were completed. He then marched forward and formed the siege of Constantinople, establishing his own head-quarters at the Church of the Fountain, and commencing his lines of circumvallation in the month of June 1422¹. Manuel now sent another ambassador to Murad. Korax, a Greek of Philadelphia, the official interpreter of the court, was charged with the mission. Like all Greek ministers, Korax was extremely unpopular, and his knowledge of the Turkish language, joined to the circumstance that he was not a born subject of the empire, made him the object of malicious calumny. His diplomacy failed; he was accused of treachery, insulted by the people on his return from the Othoman camp, and seized by the Cretan guards, who occupied the place of the Varangians of older times. The emperor was compelled to bring the obnoxious interpreter to trial on a charge of holding treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Writings of Korax were found which appeared to confirm the accusation. The gold and silver plate in his house was said to consist of the presents destined for the sultan. Korax was tried, but as his judges sat in fear of the Cretans and the populace, it is not surprising that he was found guilty, even if he was innocent. Death was then rarely inflicted at Constantinople by a judicial sentence; Korax was therefore only sentenced to lose his eyesight; but the punishment was inflicted with such barbarity as to cause his death. His house was pillaged by the people, and burned to the ground. This occurrence paints the suspicious feelings of the inhabitants of the capital and the want of discipline of the troops too vividly to be passed over in recording the degradation of the empire.

amounting to twenty-seven thousand nomismata. Ducas (92) says Murad II. paid fifty thousand nomismata for the service of the fleet. Idris says five thousand ducats. Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 483.

¹ Joannes Cananus, *De Constantinopoli oppugnata*, 458, edit. Bonn. Phrantzes (116), Ducas (102), and Gibbon (viii. 71, edit. Smith) make the besiegers two hundred thousand—an egregious exaggeration. Hammer (ii. 235) says their army consisted of twenty thousand men.

Murad in the mean time carried on his operations with activity. His lines extended from the Golden Gate to the Wooden Gate; two movable towers were built to assist the storming of the wall, and cannon were employed by the Othomans for the first time. This early artillery, however, was so ill-constructed and ill-served that it produced little effect. When everything was ready for the assault, the besiegers directed their principal attack against the wall near the gate of St. Romanus, which crosses the low ground where the water-course Lykos enters the city. On the 24th of August a celebrated dervish, named Seid-Bokhari, led on the Othoman troops to the assault. The Seid had prophesied that before nightfall the banner of the Prophet would wave on the ramparts of the imperial city. His followers, persuaded that to him Heaven had revealed its will, boldly rushed onward to fulfil his prediction. The sultan promised the whole plunder of the captured city to the victorious army. But the dervish proved a false prophet. The ladders of the assailants were broken; a thousand of the bravest janissaries fell before the walls; while the Greeks, fighting under cover of their battlements, lost only a hundred and thirty, killed and wounded. The numerical loss of the Turkish army was not very serious, for when Mousa attacked Constantinople ten years earlier, the Emperor Manuel had observed that the loss of ten Greek soldiers was more difficult to replace than the loss of one hundred Turkish. Fortunately for the empire, Murad was compelled to raise the siege, in order to march against his brother Mustapha. This young prince had been furnished by the imperial government with the means of assembling an army. He was soon betrayed into Murad's power, and strangled by his order. Murad II. did not renew his attack on Constantinople, and the last act of Manuel's reign was to sign a treaty of peace, by which Murad left the empire in possession of a few cities in Thrace, of Thessalonica, and a few forts near the mouth of the Strymon, Mount Athos, Zeitounion, and some places in Thessaly. Manuel also engaged to pay the sultan an annual tribute of 300,000 aspers¹.

¹ Ducas. 109. The asper of Ducas in this passage is a larger coin than the argyron of Chalcocondylas (257), of which Mohammed II. allowed the despot an annual pension of 600,000. This smaller coin is mentioned by Ducas (90),

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Manuel adopted the monastic habit two years before his death, and took the name of Matthew, but he continued to give his advice on public affairs. He died in July 1425, at the age of seventy-seven, after a reign of thirty-four years¹.

SECT. VI.—*Reign of John VI.*, A.D. 1425-1448.

State of the Greek population in Constantinople—John VI. at the Council of Florence.—Union of the Greek and Latin Churches.—Rebellion of Demetrius.—Death of John VI.

John VI. found the Eastern Roman Empire reduced to the city of Constantinople, a few neighbouring towns, Thessalonica, and a part of the Peloponnesus. His reign of twenty-three years passed in almost uninterrupted peace; yet this long period of tranquillity was productive of no improvement. The emperor did nothing to render the administration of justice more equitable, the clergy made no effort to improve the morality of the people, and the citizens used neither industry nor good faith to increase the commercial resources of their country. As far as the revenues both of the government and of the nation were concerned, the emperor and the people alike consumed, before the expiration of each year, all that the year had produced. The lethargy of the empire must be attributed quite as much to the insensibility of the Greek people as to the weakness of the emperor.

The diminution of the Greek population contrasted strangely with the rapid increase of the Othomans, while their decline in wealth and industry offered a still more unfavourable point of comparison with the Genoese colony of Galata. The trade of the Greeks had passed into the hands of the Italians;

where he says 15,000 were equal to 500 nomismata, or gold byzants, according to the Italian translation. As the 300,000 aspers of Ducas were equal to 30,000 gold byzants of this period, ten aspers were equal to a byzant, and the smaller silver coins were half an asper.

¹ Phrantzes, 121. The dates of the text, even in the Bonn edition, require constant correction. Ducas, 109; Chalcocondylis, 151, edit. Paris. Phrantzes (121) places the death of Manuel on the 21st July 6933=1425, but at p. 123 he says John VI succeeded his father in August 6934=1426. As John died on the 1st October 6957=1448, after a reign of twenty-three years, three months, and ten days, the earlier date is correct. Phrantzes, 203.

the power of the Byzantine emperors was transferred to the Othoman sultans. The loss of national honour and military energy arose from a general deficiency of common honesty and personal courage among the Greeks. Plague and pestilence, as often happens, came as attendants on neglected police, bad government, and social disorder. In the year 1431 a contagious disease of fearful mortality decimated the population of Constantinople; and it was the ninth return of pestilence since the great plague of 1347. Nations, however, are rarely sensible of their own degradation, and at this time the Greeks looked on the Latins with contempt as well as hatred; they despised the western Europeans as heretics, and the Turks as barbarians. Court processions, religious ceremonies, and national vanity amused and consoled them as they hastened along the path of degradation and ruin. Dramatic representations of sacred subjects were performed in the Church of St. Sophia, as musical exhibitions had been celebrated in earlier days¹. Exercises of archery and imitations of Turkish horsemanship replaced the military pageants and the games of the hippodrome, which had been the delight of the Byzantine populace in better days. An interesting description of the aspect of Constantinople, and of the condition of the Greek territory in its vicinity, has been transmitted to us by a Burgundian knight, who visited Constantinople at the end of the year 1432, on his return from a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He describes the fortifications of Constantinople as strong and imposing; but within the walls there were so many open spaces that they equalled in extent the portion still covered with buildings; several palaces were in ruins, and part of the portico which enclosed St. Sophia's had already disappeared. Beyond the walls of the city, the country in every direction presented a desolate aspect. All the castles and forts in the neighbourhood had been destroyed by Murad II. when he besieged Constantinople, and, as far as Selymbria, the only inhabitants were a few Greeks engaged in agriculture, who dwelt in open villages. The Greek empire ended at Selymbria. The frontier territory of the Othomans was a similar scene of devastation,

¹ Compare the Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquière, printed in *Early Travels in Palestine*, Bohn's edit. p. 338, with the preceding volume of the present work, p. 301.

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the land being tilled by a few Christian peasants for their Turkish masters¹. But in the following year the emperor John VI. repaired the walls of Constantinople towards the land, and cleared out the ditch, as we find recorded in several inscriptions².

The conquest of Thessalonica by Sultan Murad in 1430, the quarrels of the despots Theodore, Constantine, and Thomas, in the Peloponnesus, and the insolence of the Genoese of Galata, who attacked Constantinople on account of some disputes relating to the Black Sea trade, warned the Emperor John VI. that, unless he could secure efficient military aid from strangers, there was little prospect of his being able to defend the empire against the Othomans. The Pope might be able to afford him effectual aid; but there was no probability that the Pope would exert his influence unless the Emperor John consented to the union of the Greek and Latin churches, and recognized the papal supremacy. In this critical conjuncture the statesmen and ecclesiastics of rank at Constantinople decided that the political exigencies of their situation authorized their tampering even with the doctrines of their church.

In the year 1438 the Emperor John and the Greek Patriarch made their appearance at the council of Ferrara. In the

¹ *Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquière*, 334-345. This traveller saw the Empress Maria Comnena of Trebizond, John's third wife, visit St Sophia's. His description deserves to be read from its simplicity and truth. 'The empress seemed very handsome; but as I was at a distance, I desired to have a nearer view, and see how she mounted her horse; for she came to church on horseback attended only by two ladies, three old men (ministers of state), and three of that species of men to whose guard the Turks intrust their wives. At length she appeared. A bench was brought, and placed near her horse, which was superb, and had a magnificent saddle. When she had mounted the bench, one of the old men took the mantle she wore, passed to the opposite side of the horse, and held it extended as high as he could; during this, she put her foot in the stirrup, and bestrode the horse like a man. When she was in her seat, the old minister cast the mantle over her shoulders, and one of those long hats with a point, so common in Greece, was given to her; it was ornamented at one of the extremities with three golden plumes, and was very becoming. I was so near that I was ordered to fall back, and consequently had a full view of her. She wore in her ears broad flat rings set with precious stones, especially rubies. She looked young and fair, and handsomer than when in church. I should have had no fault to find had she not been painted, and assuredly she had no need. The two ladies mounted their horses in the same way; they were both handsome, and wore, like her, mantles and hats. The company returned to the palace of Blachern.' Bertrandon did not form a favourable opinion of the Greeks in general. He says, 'All those with whom I have had any concerns have only made me more suspicious, for I have found more probity in the Turks.'

² Mordtmann, *Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453*, 8vo. 1858, pp. 33, 136.

following year the council was transferred to Florence, where, after long discussions, the emperor, and all the members of the clergy who attended the council, with the exception of the Bishop of Ephesus, adopted the doctrines of the Roman church concerning the procession of the Holy Ghost, the addition to the Nicene Creed, the nature of purgatory, the condition of the soul after its separation from the body until the day of judgment, the use of unleavened bread in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; and the Pope's supremacy. The union of the two churches was solemnly ratified on the 6th of July 1439, when the Greeks abjured their ancient faith in a vaster edifice and under a loftier dome than that of their own much-vaunted temple of St. Sophia¹.

The Emperor John derived none of the advantages he had expected from the union of the churches. Pope Eugenius, it is true, supplied him liberally with money, and bore all the expenses both of the Greek court and clergy during their absence from Constantinople; he also presented the emperor with two galleys, and furnished him with a guard of three hundred men, well equipped, and paid at the cost of the papal treasury; but his Holiness forgot his promise to send a fleet to defend Constantinople, and none of the Christian princes showed any disposition to fight the battles of the Greeks, though they took up the cross against the Turks.

On his return John found his subjects indignant at the manner in which the honour and doctrines of the Greek church had been sacrificed in an unsuccessful diplomatic speculation. The bishops who had obsequiously signed the articles of union at Florence, now sought popularity by deserting the emperor, making a parade of their repentance, and lamenting their wickedness in falling off for a time from the pure doctrine of the orthodox church. The only permanent result of this abortive attempt at Christian union was to increase the bigotry of the orthodox, and to furnish the Latins with just grounds for reproaching the Greeks with their perfidious conduct and bad faith². In both ways it assisted the progress of the Othoman power. The Emperor

¹ An inscription placed to commemorate the event may be read on one of the great pillars which support the dome.

² The Latins and Greeks have each their own account of the council of

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John, seeing public affairs in this hopeless state, became indifferent to the future fate of the empire, and thought only of keeping on good terms with the sultan. His brother Demetrius, however, who had accompanied him to Florence, shared his apostasy, and partaken of the papal bounty, now basely attempted to take advantage of the popular dissatisfaction. He claimed the throne as a Porphyrogenitus, because he was the first child born after Manuel mounted the throne, but he trusted to gain his ends by the aid of Turkish troops rather than by the merits of his title or the preference of the Greeks. Collecting a large force composed of the Turkish nomades, who were ready to join any standard that offered them an opportunity of plundering and enslaving the Christians, Demetrius marched to besiege his brother in Constantinople. Sultan Murad took no direct part in the contest, but he allowed Demetrius to enrol Turkish troops without opposition, and viewed with satisfaction a rebellion which tended to weaken the empire. When called upon to choose between the two brothers, the Greek people acknowledged the superiority of the reigning emperor. Demetrius, after plundering the suburbs of Constantinople, saw his army melt away, and was happy to find that his brother's moderation and love of peace was so great that he was allowed to retain his principality at Mesembria with the title of Despot¹.

The exploits of John Hunniades might have awakened the Greeks from their lethargy, had any warlike spirit survived in the nation. The victory of the Hungarian army at the pass of Isladi, and a war with the Sultan of Karamania, threatened the Othoman empire with serious danger; but the victory of Varna re-established the glory of the sultan's arms. Neither the successes of the Hungarians nor the presence of a papal force in the Hellespont, which at last made its appearance under the command of Cardinal Gondolmieri, could induce the Emperor John to unite his cause with that of the Western powers. He had obtained too many proofs of the instability and imprudence of their counsels. The moment he heard of the great victory of Sultan Murad

Florence. The Greek version is that of Sgyropulos, *Historia concilii Florentini*, Gr. et Lat., studio Rob. Creghtonii, Hag. 1660. The Latin is, *Acta sacri oecumenici concilii Florentini*, ab Horatio Justiniano collecta, Romae, 1638.

¹ Phrantzes, 194; Chalcocondylas, 162.

at Varna, he sent an embassy to congratulate his suzerain, and solicit a renewal of their alliance, which the sultan immediately granted. John even contrived to avoid taking any part in the war carried on against the sultan by his brother Constantine in Greece, and succeeded in preserving uninterrupted peace until his death in 1448¹. During his inglorious reign of twenty-three years he never forgot that he was a vassal of the Othoman empire. Though a voluptuary, he appears to have been a man of considerable ability and judgment, of a kind disposition and a good heart; but he was deficient in all nobler qualities. It is said that the Emperor Manuel II. had feared that the enterprising character which his son John VI. displayed when a young man would bring ruin on the empire. The old man observed that the Eastern Roman Empire required an overseer, not a sovereign. John VI. proved precisely the temporizing manager that circumstances required; and his pliancy averted, during his lifetime, the calamities which were ready to overwhelm the Greek empire².

SECT. VII.—*Reign of Constantine XI.*, A.D. 1448–1453.

Coronation of Constantine XI.—Character of Mohammed II.—Impolitic behaviour of Constantine.—Mohammed constructs the European castle on the Bosphorus.—Preparations for the siege of Constantinople.—Bigotry of the Greeks.—Latin auxiliaries.—Mohammed's preparations.—Numbers of the Othoman forces.—Success of the Christian ships in entering Constantinople.—Mohammed transports his galleys by land into the port.—Bridge over the port.—Final assault.—Death of the Emperor Constantine XI.—Mohammed enters Constantinople.—Fate of the Greek population.—Conduct of Giustiniani.—Cruelty of the sultan.—Nomination of a Greek patriarch.—Constantinople repeopled as a Turkish city.

Constantine XI. (Dragases), the last of the Greek emperors, was residing in his despotat at Sparta when his brother John VI. died. As he had been recently engaged in hostilities with the sultan, it was doubtful whether Murad would acknowledge him as emperor, and Demetrius availed himself of these doubts to make another attempt to occupy the throne. The absence of truth, honour, and patriotism among the Greek

¹ Phrantzes, 203.

² Ibid. 179.

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aristocracy during the last century of the Eastern Empire is almost without a parallel in history; but Demetrius was too well known and too generally despised to find a large party even in that worthless aristocracy disposed to espouse his cause. Constantine, on the other hand, was known to possess both candour and energy; and even though he was attached to the union of the churches, this taint of heresy did not prevent his being respected by all, except the most bigoted among the orthodox Greeks. He was therefore formally proclaimed emperor; and the consent of the sultan having been obtained to his assumption of the imperial title, a deputation was sent to the Peloponnesus to carry him the insignia of empire. The ceremony of his coronation was performed at Sparta in the month of January 1449¹. On arriving at Constantinople he would not allow the ceremony to be repeated in the Church of St. Sophia, lest it should give rise to disputes between the unionists and the orthodox.

Sultan Murad II. died in February 1451, after a prosperous reign of thirty years, and was succeeded by his son Mohammed II., who was only twenty-one years old. Mohammed II. was a man of great ambition and great talents; he united with extraordinary activity and courage a degree of judgment rare in his high station, and still rarer at his early age. On ascending the throne his pride was soothed by the obsequious attentions of all the Christian powers in the East, whose ambassadors crowded to Adrianople to offer him their congratulations, their condolences, and their homage. The Emperors of Constantinople and of Trebizond, the Despots of the Peloponnesus, the Dukes of Athens and of Naxos, the Princes of Acarnania, Lesbos, and Chios, the Podesta of Galata, and the Grand-master of Rhodes, all sent their envoys to solicit a continuance of the friendly intercourse they had maintained with Murad II. Mohammed sent all away pleased with their friendly reception. Phrantzes, the historian, who had often

¹ Gibbon enumerates Constantine the son of Romanus I. as Constantine VIII., and makes the last Constantine the twelfth. Numismatists count the last Constantine as the fourteenth. Phrantzes (205) reckons the commencement of the reign of Constantine from his coronation, for he says it lasted four years and four months: p. 304. He was slain 29th May 1453: p. 288. Constantine sometimes receives the surname of Dragases. His mother, the Empress Irene, was the daughter of Constantine Dragases, a petty Servian prince of Macedonia. The Greeks may therefore say that their last Constantine was half a Slavonian and more than half a heretic.

seen the young sultan when he visited the court of Murad II. as an ambassador, has left us an interesting sketch of his character. He says that Mohammed united the enterprise and valour of youth with the prudence and wisdom of old age both in war and politics; that he was firm and sagacious, and sought the society of able and learned men¹. Nor was he destitute of scientific instruction. He had made considerable progress in astrology, the favourite science of the age both among Christians and Mohammedans, and he was fond of reading. He spoke five languages correctly, besides his native Turkish—Greek, Latin, Arabic, Persian, and Sclavonian².

The conquest of Constantinople was the first object of the ambition of Mohammed II. As long as it remained in the hands of the Greeks the Othoman empire lay open to the invasions of the western Christians, and its commercial resources tended to enrich strangers. Constantinople was destined by nature to be the capital of the country which was already in his possession. Having concluded a truce for three years with John Hunniades, the young sultan crossed over into Asia to suppress the hostile proceedings of Ibrahim, the sultan of Karamania. Constantine, who appears to have formed a very erroneous idea of the talents and character of Mohammed, took this opportunity of insulting him in the most sensitive manner, by sending an embassy to demand an augmentation of the pension of three hundred thousand aspers, which the Othoman court had accorded for the maintenance of Orkhan, the grandson of Suleiman. The ambassadors were instructed to insinuate that, if the demand were not granted, Orkhan might be allowed to lay claim to the Othoman throne. Such an insult was not likely to be ever forgotten by a haughty and ambitious prince. The Grand-vizier Khalil, who had steadily favoured the Greeks, and was supposed to have received bribes to protect their cause, lost all

¹ [In a just estimate of the character of Mohammed II., his deliberate fratricide and unnatural vices ought to be taken into account. Ed.]

² Phra.tzes, 93, 95. I change Chaldaic in this passage to Sclavonian, on account of the intercourse which subsisted between the Othoman and Servian courts and the number of Sclavonian slaves who inhabited the palace of Murad II. The Turks do not consider that Albanian is a language. They say that there are seventy-two languages and a half, and the Albanians speak the half language. [Von Hammer altogether disbelieves Mohammed II.'s knowledge of foreign languages. *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, i. p. 575. Ed.]

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patience at the folly of Constantine's ill-timed demand, and addressed the ambassadors in these words:—'Your madness will put Constantinople in the hands of the sultan. Proclaim Orkhan sultan in Europe, call in the Hungarians to your aid, retake what provinces you can, and you will speedily see the end of the Greek empire.' The wary young sultan, however, dismissed the ambassadors with courtesy. But as soon as his Asiatic campaign was finished, he ordered the imperial agents to be expelled from the territory in the valley of the Strymon which had been assigned for the maintenance of Orkhan, and stopped all further payments¹. Shortly after, without informing Constantine of his intention, he constructed a fortress on the Greek territory at the narrowest part of the Bosphorus, opposite a fort which had been constructed by Bayezid I. on the Asiatic shore. The distance between the two forts is about three-quarters of a mile, and a rapid current flows between. The work was completed with extraordinary celerity. An ample supply of materials had been collected before the Sultan's object was known, and as soon as the plan of the fortress was marked out, a thousand masons and two thousand labourers worked incessantly at the walls². The construction of this fortress within five miles of his capital, and commanding its approach from the Black Sea, was a direct infraction of the treaty between the two empires, but Constantine was too weak to resent this signal revenge for his own recent threats. He complained of the hostile invasion of the Greek territory, but Mohammed treated his reclamations with contempt, observing that the ground on which the fortress was built, having been purchased and paid for, was Turkish property, and the Emperor of Constantinople, being a vassal of the Porte, had no right to dispute the will of the sultan.

The first open resistance was offered by some Greeks, who endeavoured to prevent Mohammed's engineers from carrying off the marble columns of a church. These pious Christians

¹ Ducas, 132.

² This castle of the Bosphorus still retains its triangular form, which Turkish historians say was adopted to represent the letters composing the name of the Arabian Prophet and of the sultan. Three great towers at the angles form the 'M's,' that letter being in Arabic like our 'O.' The other letters are formed by the rest of the fortifications. Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, ii. 375. It really consists of five large and thirteen small towers with connecting walls, but three of the larger towers appear particularly prominent to those who sail past. Mordtmann, 133.

were cut to pieces by the Othoman troops. As the work advanced the sultan's aggressions increased. His soldiers were allowed to plunder; quarrels ensued in which blood was shed, and the Turks attacked the Greeks who were getting in the harvest, and slew the reapers. Constantine in alarm closed the gates of Constantinople, cut off all communications between the Greeks and the Othomans, and sent another embassy to the sultan to ask redress. Mohammed replied by a formal declaration of war.

Both parties now prepared for the mortal contest. The siege of Constantinople was to be the great event of the coming year. The sultan, to prevent the emperor's brothers in the Peloponnesus from sending any succours to the capital, ordered Tourakhan, the pasha of Thessaly, to invade the peninsula. He himself took up his residence at Adrianople, to collect warlike stores and siege-artillery. Constantine, on his part, made every preparation in his power for a vigorous defence. He formed large magazines of provisions, collected military stores, and enrolled all the soldiers he could muster among the Greek population of Constantinople. But the inhabitants of that city were either unable or unwilling to furnish recruits in proportion to their numbers. Bred up in peaceful occupations they probably possessed neither the activity nor the habitual exercise which was required to move with ease under the weighty armour then in use. So few were found disposed to fight for their country, that not more than six thousand Greek troops appeared under arms during the whole siege¹. The numerical weakness of the Greek army rendered it incapable of defending so large a city as Constantinople, even with all the advantage to be derived from

¹ Phrantzes (240), who was employed by the emperor to form the muster-rolls, gives the number of the regular troops at 4973. Leonard of Chios says there were 6000 Greeks and 3000 Latin auxiliaries under arms. Phrantzes estimates the auxiliaries at only about 2000.

The original authorities for the siege are Phrantzes, Cardinal Isidore, Leonard of Chios, and the Venetian Nicolo Barbaro, who were present in the city, and Ducas and Chalcocondylas, who were contemporaries. The interesting account of Leonard was composed only seventy-nine days after the taking of Constantinople. It is printed in the first volume of the octavo edition of the collection *Chronicorum Turcicorum, etc.*, a Ph. Lonicero, Franc. 1584 p. 315; and in the first volume of *Epitolarum Turcicarum, etc.*, ex recensione N. Reusneri Leorini, Franc. 1598, 4to. p. 113. The letter of Cardinal Isidore to Pope Nicholas V. is given by Raynaldi, an. 1453, and by Reusner in the *Epist. Turcic.* i. 104. The work of N. Barbaro, *Giornale dell' assedio di Constantinopoli*, was published by E. Cornet, Vienna, 1856. The best modern account is that of Dr. Mordtmann, *Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Türken*.

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strong fortifications. The emperor was, therefore, anxious to obtain the assistance of the warlike citizens of the Italian republics, where good officers and experienced troops were then numerous. As he had no money to engage mercenaries, he could only hope to succeed by papal influence. An embassy was sent to Pope Nicholas V., begging immediate aid, and declaring the emperor's readiness to complete the union of the churches in any way the Pope should direct. Nicholas despatched Cardinal Isidore, the metropolitan of Kief, who had joined the Latin church, as his legate. Isidore had represented the Russian church at the council of Florence; but on his return to Russia he was imprisoned as an apostate, and with difficulty escaped to Italy. He was by birth a Greek; and being a man of learning and conciliatory manners, it was expected that he would be favourably received at Constantinople.

The cardinal arrived at Constantinople in November 1452. He was accompanied by a small body of chosen troops, and brought some pecuniary aid, which he employed in repairing the most dilapidated part of the fortifications. Both the emperor and the cardinal deceived themselves in supposing that the dangers to which the Greek nation and the Christian church were exposed would induce the orthodox to yield something of their ecclesiastical forms and phrases. It was evident that foreign aid could alone save Constantinople, and it was absurd to imagine that the Latins would fight for those who treated them as heretics, and who would not fight for themselves. The crisis, therefore, compelled the Greeks to choose between union with the church of Rome or submission to the Othoman power. They had to decide whether the preservation of the Greek empire was worth the ecclesiastical sacrifices they were called upon to make in order to preserve their national independence.

In the mean time, the Emperor Constantine celebrated his union with the papal church, in the cathedral of St. Sophia, on the 12th of December 1452. The court and the great body of the dignified clergy ratified the act by their presence; but the monks and the people repudiated the connection. In their opinion, the church of St. Sophia was polluted by the ceremony, and from that day it was deserted by the orthodox. The historian Ducas declares that they looked

upon it as a haunt of demons, and no better than a pagan shrine¹. The monks, the nuns, and the populace publicly proclaimed their detestation of the union; and their opposition was inflamed by the bigotry of an ambitious pedant, who, under the name of *Georgios Scholarios*, acted as a warm partisan of the union at the council of Florence, and under the ecclesiastical name of *Gennadios* is known in history as the subservient patriarch of Sultan Mohammed II. On returning from Italy, he made a great parade of his repentance for complying with the unionists at Florence. He shut himself up in the monastery of *Pantokrator*, where he assumed the monastic habit and the name of *Gennadios*, under which he consummated the union between the Greek church and the Othoman administration. At the present crisis he stepped forward as the leader of the bigoted party, and excited his followers to the most furious opposition against measures which he had once advocated as salutary to the church and indispensable for the preservation of the state. The unionists were accused of sacrificing true religion to the delusions of human policy, of insulting God to serve the Pope, and of preferring the interests of their bodies to the safety of their souls. In place of exhorting their countrymen to aid the emperor, who was straining every nerve to defend their country—in place of infusing into their minds the spirit of patriotism and religion, these teachers of the people were incessantly inveighing against the wickedness of the unionists and the apostasy of the emperor. So completely did their bigotry extinguish every feeling of patriotism that the Grand-duke *Notaras* declared he would rather see Constantinople subjected to the turban of the Sultan than to the tiara of the Pope². His wish was gratified; but, in dying, he must have felt how fearfully he had erred in comparing the effects of papal arrogance with the cruelty of Mohammedan tyranny. The Emperor *Constantine* showed great prudence and moderation in his difficult position. The spirit of Christian charity calmed his temper, and his determination not to survive the empire gave a deliberate coolness to his military conduct. Though his Greek subjects often raised seditions, and reviled him in the streets, the emperor took no notice of their behaviour³. To induce the orthodox to fight for their country,

¹ *Ducas*, 146.² *Ibid.* 148.³ *Phrantzes*, 261.

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by having a leader of their own party, he left the Grand-duke Notaras in office; yet he well knew that this bigot would never act cordially with the Latin auxiliaries, who were the best troops in the city; and the emperor had some reason to distrust the patriotism of Notaras. seeing that he hoarded his immense wealth, instead of expending a portion of it for his country¹.

The fortifications were not found to be in a good state of repair. Two monks who had been intrusted with a large sum for the purpose of repairing them, had executed their duty in an insufficient, and it was generally said in a fraudulent manner. The extreme dishonesty that prevailed among the Greek officials explains the selection of monks as treasurers for military objects; and it must lessen our surprise at finding men of their religious professions sharing in the general avarice, or tolerating the habitual peculation of others².

Cannon were already used in sieges, but they were not yet very efficient engines of attack on account of the inaccuracy of their aim and the low velocity of their balls. Stone balls were alone used for large guns, and it was supposed that the larger the gun, the greater would be the effect it produced. But in Constantinople there were a few guns so large as to be almost useless; the land wall being too narrow to admit of their recoil, and the battlements so weak as to be shaken by their discharge³. The supply of gunpowder was also small. The machines of a past epoch in military science, but to the use of which the Greeks adhered with their conservative prejudices, were brought from the storehouses, and planted on the walls beside the modern artillery. Johann Grant, a German officer, who arrived with Giustiniani, was the most experienced artilleryman and military engineer in the place⁴.

A considerable number of Italians hastened to Constantinople as soon as they heard of its danger, eager to defend so important a dépôt of Eastern commerce. The spirit of enterprise and the love of military renown had become as much a characteristic of the merchant nobles of the commercial

¹ Phrantzes, 292.² Leonardus Chien. in *Chronic. Turcic.* i. 328.³ Chalcocondylas (206) mentions a gun, the ball for which weighed a talent and a half, or 150 lb.⁴ Phrantzes, 244; Leonard. Chien. 318.

republics as of the barons in feudal monarchies. All the nations who then traded with Constantinople furnished contingents to defend its walls. A short time before the siege commenced, John Giustiniani arrived with two Genoese galleys and three hundred chosen troops, and the emperor valued his services so highly that he was appointed general of the guard¹. The resident bailo of the Venetians furnished three large galleasses and a body of troops for the defence of the port. The consul of the Catalans, with his countrymen and the Aragonese, undertook the defence of the great palace of Bukoleon and the port of Kontoskalion. The Cardinal Isidore, with the papal troops, defended the Kynegesion and the angle of the city at the head of the port down to St. Demetrios. The importance of the aid which was afforded by the Latins is proved by the fact, that of twelve military divisions into which Constantine divided the fortifications, the commands of only two were intrusted to the exclusive direction of Greek officers². In the others, Greeks shared the command with foreigners, or else foreigners alone conducted the defence. When all Constantine's preparations for defence were completed, he found himself obliged to man a line of wall on the land side of about five miles in length, every point of which was exposed to a direct attack. The remainder of the wall towards the port and the Propontis exceeded nine miles in extent, and his whole garrison hardly amounted to nine thousand men. His fleet consisted of only twenty galleys and three Venetian galleasses, but the entry of the port was closed by a chain, the end of which, on the side of Galata, was secured in a strong fort of which the Greeks

¹ Phrantzes, 241. Giustiniani had been consul of Genoa at Chios two years before. His name was Giovan Guglielmo of the house of Longo, and he must not be confounded with Jacopo Giustiniani of the house of Fornetto, to whom Alfonso of Aragon surrendered at the sea-fight of Ponza in 1435. *La description et histoire de l'isle de Scios ou Chios* par Jerosme Justiniani, a work of extreme rarity, with the date 1506 for 1606 or perhaps 1616; see the part entitled *Famille Justinianne*, p. 97. The date of the taking of Constantinople is given 14c5 at pp. 91 and 96, but correctly at p. 97. Sismondi, *Republiques Italiennes*, vol. iv. c. 18, p. 469, edit. Brux. When the galley of Alfonso was taken, the king, struck by the valour of a Genoese officer, asked his name, and on learning that he was a Giustiniani, one of the signors of Chios, who possessed the right of coining gold ducats, delivered up his sword to this valiant enemy. Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, ii. 216.

² Of these the Grand-duke Notaras was one, and Theophilus Palaeologos, a Catholic, the other. Theodore of Karystos, who shared the command at the gate Charsias with Johann Grant, and who was a robust old man and an excellent archer, was also a Catholic. Leonard. Chien. 326; Phrantzes, 254.

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kept possession¹. During the winter the emperor sent out his fleet to ravage the coast of the Propontis as far as Cyzicus, and the spirit of the Greeks was roused by the booty they made in these expeditions².

Mohammed II. spent the winter at Adrianople, preparing everything necessary for prosecuting the siege with vigour. His whole mind was absorbed by the glory of conquering the Roman empire, and gaining possession of Constantinople, which for more than eleven hundred and fifty years had been the capital of the East. While the fever of ambition inflamed his soul, his cooler judgment also warned him that the Othoman power rested on a perilous basis as long as Constantinople, the centre and true capital of his empire, remained in the hands of others. Mohammed could easily assemble a sufficient number of troops for his enterprise, but it required all his activity and power to collect the requisite supplies of provisions and stores for the military and naval force he had ordered to assemble, and to prepare the artillery and ammunition necessary to insure success. Early and late, in his court and in his cabinet, the young sultan could talk of nothing but the approaching siege. With a writing-reed and a scroll of paper in his hand, he was often seen tracing plans of the fortifications of Constantinople, and marking out positions for his own batteries. Every question relating to the extent and locality of the various magazines to be constructed in order to maintain the troops was discussed in his presence; he himself distributed the troops in their respective divisions, regulated the order of their march, and discussed the various methods proposed for breaching, mining, and scaling the walls. He also constructed the first Othoman fleet, and laid the foundations of a navy which soon became one of the most powerful in the Mediterranean. His enthusiasm was the impulse of a hero, but the immense superiority of his force would have secured him the victory with any ordinary degree of perseverance.

The Othomans were already familiar with the use of cannon. Murad II. had employed them when he besieged

¹ Phrantzes, 238; Ducas, 152. The position of the chain corresponds to the site of the outer bridge, and the chain, of which a fragment is preserved in the arsenal consisted of large round blocks of wood bound and linked together with iron. Mordtmann, 35.

² Ducas, 145.

Constantinople in 1422; but Mohammed resolved to form a far more powerful battering-train than any which had previously existed. Neither the Greeks nor Turks possessed the art of casting large guns. Both were obliged to employ foreigners. An experienced founder, named Urban, by birth a Vallachian, carried into execution the sultan's wishes. He had passed some time in the Greek service; but even the moderate pay he was allowed by the emperor having fallen in arrear, he resigned his place and transferred his services to the sultan, who knew better how to value his skill¹. The first proof which he gave of this skill was the construction of a very large gun for the new castle of the Bosphorus, which carried its balls across the straits. But another gun far exceeding this in size was cast for the siege of Constantinople, the stone balls of which were nearly two feet and a half in diameter. Other cannon, of great size, whose balls of stone weighed 150 lb., were also cast, as well as many guns of smaller calibre. All these, together with a number of ballists and other ancient engines still employed in sieges, were mounted on carriages and transported to Constantinople. The conveyance of this formidable train of artillery, and of the immense quantity of ammunition required for its service, was by no means a trifling operation².

The first division of the Othoman army moved from Adrianople in the month of February 1453. In the mean time a numerous corps of pioneers worked constantly at the

¹ Chalcocondylas, 2c4. edit. Paris.

² Gibbon, viii. 152, edit. Smith. Leonard says the balls of the large gun were eleven of his spans in circumference. Hammer (ii. 514) mentions having seen several stone balls at Rhodes twelve palms in circumference. There are still a number of granite balls in the Jew quarter about two feet in diameter; and Captain Clician of the Turkish steamer *Vassivai Tidjaret* informed me that he had weighed one which was more than half a ton, but he had not a note of the exact measure. The ball of the largest gun at the Dardanelles weighed eleven hundred French pounds. De Tott, iii. 85. In the time of Mohammed II., guns were cast hollow, and consequently were very liable to burst. Various contrivances were adopted to fill the pores, prevent the guns from cracking, and hinder the granite balls from grinding away the metal. Machines throwing much larger balls were in use just before the invention of cannon, at the siege of Zara, by the Venetians in 1346. Francesco delle Barche threw balls weighing three thousand lb. into the city; but, like most inventors of remarkable instruments of destruction, he is said to have perished by his invention: it went off too soon, threw him into the besieged city, and he was dashed to pieces on the pavement of Zara. The Genoese used balls nearly as large at the siege of Cyprus in 1373. Daru. *Histoire de Venise*, i. 534. note. The celebrated gun at Edinburgh, called Mons Meg, was made in 1455. It weighs six tons and a half, and is composed of malleable iron bars, hooped together. Its granite balls are twenty-one inches in diameter. James Grant, *Memorials of the Castle of Edinburgh*.

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road, in order to prepare it for the passage of the long train of artillery and baggage waggons. Temporary bridges, capable of being taken to pieces, were erected by the engineers over every ravine and water-course, and the materials for the siege advanced steadily, though slowly, to their destination. The extreme difficulty of moving the monster cannon with its immense balls retarded the sultan's progress, and it was the beginning of April before the whole battering train reached Constantinople, though the distance from Adrianople is barely a hundred miles. The advanced guard of the army under Karadja Pasha had already reduced Mesembria, Anchialos, Bizya, and the castle of St. Stephanos. Selymbria alone defended itself, and the fortifications were so strong that Mohammed ordered it to be closely blockaded, and left its fate to be determined by that of the capital.

On the 6th of April Sultan Mohammed II. encamped on the slope of the hillock called Maltepe, facing the quarter of Blachern, a little beyond the ground occupied by the Crusaders in 1203, and immediately commenced constructing lines, extending from the head of the port to the shore of the Propontis. These lines were formed of a mound of earth, and served both to restrain the sorties of the besieged, and to cover his troops from the enemy's artillery and missiles. Batteries were then formed. The two principal points of attack were the gate Charsias, in the quarter of Blachern, and the gate of St. Romanos, near the centre of the city wall. It was against this last gate that the fire of the monster gun was directed and the chief attack was made¹.

The land forces of the Turks probably amounted to about seventy thousand men of all arms and qualities; but the real strength of the army lay in the corps of janissaries, then the best infantry in Europe, and their number did not exceed twelve thousand. At the same time, twenty thousand cavalry, mounted on the finest horses of the Turkoman breed, and hardened by long service, were ready to fight either on horseback or on foot under the eye of their young sultan. The fleet which had been collected along the Asiatic coast,

¹ The gate Charsias must be placed in accordance with a passage of Cananus (*De Constantinopoli oppugnata*, 462, cited by Mordtmann, 137) at a gate now walled up between the Adrianople gate (Polyandrium) and the gate of St. Romanos since called Top-Kapou, that is, Cannon Gate, in commemoration of the storming of Constantinople.

from the ports of the Black Sea to those of the Aegean, besides transporting the Asiatic troops, brought large supplies of provisions, and military stores. It consisted of three hundred and twenty vessels of various sizes and forms. The greater part were only half-decked coasters, and even the largest were far inferior in size to the galleys and galeasses of the Greeks and Italians¹.

The fortifications of Constantinople, towards the land side, vary so little from a straight line that they afford great facilities for attack. The defences had been originally constructed on a magnificent scale, and with great skill, according to the ancient art of war. Even though they were partly ruined by time, and weakened by careless reparations, they still offered a formidable obstacle to the engineers in Mohammed's army. Two lines of wall, each flanked with its own towers, rose one above the other, overlooking a broad and deep ditch. The interval between these walls enabled the defenders to form in perfect security, and facilitated their operations in clearing the ditch and retarding the preparation for assault. The actual appearance of the low walls of Constantinople, with the ditch more than half-filled up, gives only an incorrect picture of their former state.

Mohammed had made his preparations for the siege with so much skill that his preliminary works advanced with unexpected rapidity. The numerical superiority of his army and the precautions he had adopted for strengthening his lines frustrated the sorties of the garrison. The ultimate success of the defence depended on the arrival of assistance from abroad; but the numbers of the Othoman fleet seemed to render even

¹ Phrantzes, 240; Leonard. Chien. 317; Ducas, 150. 159, edit. Paris; Chalcondylas. 203.—all exaggerate the numbers of the Othoman force. Gibbon (viii. 154, edit. Smith) cites Philelphus, who resided in Greece about thirty years before the siege, and is confident that all the Turkish forces of any name and value could not exceed the number of sixty thousand horse and twenty thousand foot. It seems from a pretended prophecy of Mahomet, current among the Turks, that they estimated the sultan's army at seventy thousand. Mahomet addresses one of his disciples. 'Hast thou heard of a city of which one side looks to the Continent and two sides to the sea?' 'Yes, envoy of God.' 'The day of judgment will not arrive until that city is taken by seventy thousand of the sons of Ishak.' Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 293. The Othoman historian Cheirullah Effendi, whose work was printed in 1855, gives 80,000 as the number of the Turkish army. Mordtmann, 41. I have given the number of the fleet from Phrantzes. Leonard makes the number only 250. Phrantzes enumerates 18 tiremes and 48 biremes: Leonard 6 tiremes, 10 biremes, and seventy single-banked vessels. The number of the transports was of little consequence. Barbaro makes the Othoman fleet consist of only 145 vessels. *Giornale*, 21.

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this hope almost desperate. An incident soon occurred, that proved the great superiority that skill, when united with courage, confers over numbers in naval warfare. Four large ships, laden with grain and stores, one of which bore the Greek and the other the Genoese flag, remained for some time wind-bound at Chios, and were anxiously expected at Constantinople¹. At daybreak on the 20th of April these ships were perceived by the Turkish watchmen steering for Constantinople with a strong breeze in their favour. The war-galleys of the sultan, under the command of the Capitan-pasha Balta-oghlu, immediately got under way to capture them². The sultan himself rode down to the shore beyond the Seven Towers to witness a triumph which he considered certain, and which he thought would reduce his enemy to despair. The Greeks crowded the walls of the city, offering up prayers for their friends, and trembling for their safety in the desperate struggle that awaited them. The Christians had several advantages which their nautical experience enabled them to turn to good account. The great size of their ships, the strength of their construction, their weight, and their high bulwarks, were all powerful means of defence when aided by a stiff breeze blowing directly in the teeth of their opponents. The Turks were compelled to row their galleys against a strong wind and a heavy sea. They advanced slowly, but they placed themselves boldly before the Christian ships, which they attacked with reckless courage, for they were fighting under the eye of their fiery sultan, who was as stern in punishing failure as he was liberal in rewarding success. Towards noon the wind died away, but even with this advantage the skill of their enemy rendered all their attacks abortive. In vain one squadron attempted to impede the progress of the Christians, while another endeavoured to run alongside and carry them by boarding. Every Turkish galley that opposed their progress was crushed under the weight of their heavy hulls, while those that endeavoured to board had their oars shivered in the shock, and drifted

¹ Phrantzes, Leonard, and Barbaro, who were present, agree in saying there were only four ships. Gibbon, on the authority of Ducas, who was not present, says five.

² Balta-oghlu Suleiman, the first Othoman capitan-pasha, was, like many of the distinguished officers in the army of Mohammed II., a renegade from the orthodox church. He was a Bulgarian by birth.

helpless far astern. The few that succeeded in retaining their place alongside were either sunk by immense angular blocks of stone that were dropped on their frail timbers, or were filled with flames and smoke by the Greek fire that was poured upon them. The rapidity with which the best galleys were sunk or disabled appalled the bravest; and at last the Turks shrank from close combat, on an element where they saw that valour without experience was of no avail. The Christian ships, in the mean time, held steadily on their course, under all the canvas their masts could carry, until they approached the walls and placed themselves under the protection of the archers who manned the ramparts. In the evening they entered the port, where the chain was joyfully lowered to admit them.

The young sultan, on seeing the defeat of his galleys, lost all command over his temper. He rode into the sea, which near the Seven Towers is shallow for about a hundred yards from the shore, and in his passion heaped every term of reproach on his naval officers. When he saw that the enemy had escaped, he retired to his tent to brood over his defeat. On the following day he rode over to Beshiktash, where his fleet was stationed, and summoned Balta-oglou before him to answer for what he called the admiral's cowardice or treachery. He talked of ordering him to be impaled on the spot, but when he found that the capitan-pasha had not desisted from the attack until 115 men were killed or wounded in his galley, the sultan allowed himself to be pacified, and he spared the life of Balta-oglou, who however was deprived of his command, and all his property was distributed among the janissaries¹. This check revealed to Mohammed the danger to which his naval force was exposed, should either the Genoese or Venetians send a powerful fleet to the assistance of the Emperor Constantine.

This naval discomfiture was also attended by other disasters on shore. The monster cannon burst before it had produced any serious impression on the walls, and the Othoman army was repulsed in a general attack.

¹ The memory of the exploits of these large ships, and the sight of a Genoese ship of the burden of nine hundred pithoi, taken at Sinope, induced Mohammed II. to construct a vessel of three thousand pithoi, which may be translated hogsheds. It was so ill built that it could not put to sea. Hammer, iii. 71; Chalcocondylas, 260, edit. Paris.

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These defeats depressed the courage of the Othomans and raised the spirits of the Greeks, but their effect was soon counteracted by the sultan, who executed a bold and singular project with extraordinary promptitude and success. The Venetians had recently transported a number of their galleys from the river Adige overland to the lake of Garda: this exploit, which had been loudly celebrated at the time, suggested to the sultan the idea of transporting a number of vessels from the Bosphorus into the port of Constantinople, where the smooth water and the command of the shore would secure to his ships the mastery of the upper half of that extensive harbour¹. The distance over which it was necessary to transport the galleys was only five miles, but a steep hill presented a formidable obstacle to the undertaking. Mohammed, nevertheless, having witnessed the transport of his monster cannon over rivers and hills, was persuaded that his engineers would find no difficulty in moving his ships over the land. A road was accordingly made, and laid with strong planks and wooden rails, which were plastered over with tallow. It extended from the station occupied by the fleet at Dolma Baktshé to the summit of the ridge near the cemetery of Pera. On this inclined plane, with the assistance of windlasses and numerous yokes of oxen, the vessels were hauled up one after the other to the summit of the hill, from whence they descended without difficulty to the point beyond the present arsenal, where they were launched in the port under the protection of batteries prepared for their defence. Historians, wishing to give a dramatic character to their pages, have attributed marvellous difficulties to this daring exploit. It was certainly a well-conceived and well-executed undertaking, for a division of the Othoman fleet was conveyed into the port in a single night, where the Greeks, at the dawn of day, on the 23d of April, were amazed at beholding the hostile ships safe under the protection of inexpugnable batteries².

The besieged made two desperate attempts to destroy the Turkish ships in the port. The first was led by Coco, a

¹ Leonard. Chien. 321.

² Phrantzes (2:1, edit. Bonn) and Ducas (142, edit. Paris) distinctly indicate the ground; and Barbaro (27) proves that there is no reason for impeaching the accuracy of the account in so far as the transport of one division of galleys in a single night is concerned. Chalcocondylas, 205.

Venetian officer who commanded the galleys of Trebizond. His ship was sunk by the Turkish batteries, and all on board perished. In the second attack, Giustiniani's ship was destroyed, and though Giustiniani was saved with difficulty, 150 men perished. The Genoese of Galata were accused of betraying the plan of attack to the sultan in both cases, and the animosity of the Venetians was so great, that the emperor could hardly prevent their falling on the Genoese who were aiding in the defence of Constantinople.

In order to secure easy and prompt communications between the troops at Pera under the command of Zaganos Pasha and the army before Constantinople, Mohammed constructed a floating bridge across the port, from the point near the old foundery, on the side of Galata, to the angle of the city walls, near Haivan Serai, the ancient amphitheatre. The roadway of this bridge was supported on the enormous jars used for storing oil and wine, numbers of which were easily collected in the suburbs of Galata. These jars, when bound together with their mouth inverted in the water, possessed a degree of buoyancy and strength which rendered them admirably suited to form the basis of a bridge and floating battery¹. Artillery was mounted on this bridge, and the galleys were brought up to the city walls, which were now assailed from a quarter hitherto safe from attack.

During all these labours of the besiegers in other quarters, the approaches were pushed vigorously forward against the land wall. Though the activity in other and more novel operations might attract greater attention, the exertions of those engaged in filling up the ditch, and the fire of the breaching batteries, never relaxed. All attempts to cross the ditch at the gate of St. Romanos were long baffled by the Greeks, and the mining operations at Blachern were discovered and defeated by Johann Grant, but at last the superior numbers and indefatigable perseverance of the Othomans filled up the ditch, and the ceaseless fire of their guns ruined the walls. A visible change in the state of the fortifications encouraged the assailants, and showed the besieged that the enemy was gradually gaining a decided advantage. At the commence-

¹ Phrantzes, 250; Leonard, 322; Ducas, 157, edit. Paris. 1000 of these oil jars would be more easily obtained than 1000 barrels. There is no difficulty in making a plan of the bridge from the description of the writers cited.

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ment of the siege, the Othoman engineers had displayed so little knowledge of the mode of using artillery to effect a breach, that a Hungarian envoy from John Hunniades, who visited Mohammed's camp, ridiculed the idea of their producing any effect on the walls of Constantinople. This stranger was said to have taught the Turks to fire in volleys, and to cut the wall in triangular sections, in order to produce a practicable breach¹.

An immense tower constructed of timber and mounted on wheels, like those used in the sieges of earlier times, was dragged up to the edge of the ditch. Under its protection workmen laboured incessantly to construct a mound in order to admit of its being advanced to the walls; and the Turkish batteries, aided by the operations of a strong body of miners, succeeded in ruining the opposite tower. The progress of the besiegers was nevertheless still vigorously resisted, and when they ventured on an assault to prepare the ground for the advance of their wooden tower, they were repulsed after a desperate struggle. On the night after this defeat, Giustiniani made a sortie and forced his way into the tower. While the Greek workmen cleared the ditch the soldiers filled the tower with combustible materials, and before they could be driven back into the city, it was reduced to ashes, though it had been rendered impervious to Greek fire shot from the walls by a triple covering of buffaloes' hides².

The batteries at length effected a practicable breach at the gate of St. Romanos. Before issuing his final orders for the assault, Mohammed II. summoned the emperor to surrender the city, and offered him a considerable appanage as a vassal of the Porte elsewhere. Constantine rejected the insulting offer, and the sultan prepared for the assault. Four days were employed in the Othoman camp making all the arrangements necessary for a simultaneous attack by land and sea along the whole line of the fortifications, from the modern quarter of Phanar to the Golden Gate. The Greeks and Latins were not less active in their exertions to meet the crisis. The Latins were sustained by their habits of military discipline, and their experiences of the chances of war; the Greeks placed great confidence in some popular prophecies

¹ Ducas, 154.² Phrantzes, 245-7, edit. Bonn.

which foretold the ultimate defeat of the Turks. They felt a pious conviction that the orthodox city would never fall into the hands of Infidels. But the Emperor Constantine was deceived by no vain hopes. He knew that human prudence and valour could do no more than had been done to retard the progress of the besiegers. Time had been gained, but the Greeks showed little disposition to fight for a heretical emperor, and no succours arrived from the Pope and the Western princes. Constantine could now only hope to prolong the defence for a few hours, and, when the city fell, to bring his own life to a glorious termination by dying in the breach.

On the day before the assault the emperor rode round to all the posts occupied by the garrison, and encouraged the troops to expect victory by his cheerful demeanour. He then visited the Church of St. Sophia, which was deserted by the orthodox, where with his attendants he partook of the holy sacrament according to the Latin form. He returned to the imperial palace, that he might rest for a short time, and on quitting it to take his station at the great breach, he was so overcome by the certainty that he should never again behold those present that he turned to the members of his household, many of whom had been the companions of his youth, and solemnly asked them to pardon every offence he had ever given them. Tears burst from all present as he mounted his horse and rode slowly forward to meet his fate¹.

The contrast between the city of the Christians and the camp of the Mohammedans was not encouraging. Within the walls an emperor in the decline of life commanded a small and disunited force, with twenty leaders under his orders, each at the head of an almost independent band of Greek, Genoese, Venetian, or Catalan soldiers. So slight was the tie which bound these various chiefs together, that, even when they were preparing for the final assault, the emperor was obliged to use all his authority and personal influence to prevent Giustiniani and the Grand-duke Notaras from coming to blows. Giustiniani required some additional guns for the defence of the great breach, but Notaras, who had the official control over the artillery, peremptorily refused the demand.

In the Turkish camp, on the other hand, perfect unity prevailed; a young, ardent, and able sovereign concentrated in

¹ Phrantzes, 279.

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his hands despotic authority over a numerous and well-disciplined army. To excite the energy of that army to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, the sultan proclaimed that he abandoned the whole plunder of Constantinople to the troops, reserving to himself only the public buildings. The day of battle was regarded as a religious festival in the Othoman camp, and on the previous night lamps were hung out before every tent, and fires were kindled on every eminence in or near the lines. Thousands of lanterns were suspended from the flag-staffs of the batteries, and from the masts and yards of the ships, and were reflected in the waters of the Propontis, the Golden Horn, and the Bosphorus. The whole Othoman encampment was resplendent with the blaze of this illumination. Yet a deep silence prevailed during the whole night, except when the musical cadence of the solemn chant of a thousand voices calling the true believers to prayers, reminded the Greeks of the immense number and strict discipline of the host, which was waiting eagerly for the signal of attack.

On the 29th of May, long before the earliest dawn, the assault commenced both by land and sea. Column after column marched forward, and took up their ground before the portions of the wall they were ordered to assail. The galleys, fitted with towers and scaling-platforms, protected by the guns on the bridge, advanced against the fortifications of the port. But the principal attack was directed against the breach at the gate of St. Romanos, where two flanking towers had fallen into the ditch and opened a passage into the interior of the city. The gate of Charsias and the quarter of Blachern were also assailed by chosen regiments of janissaries in overwhelming numbers. The attack was made with daring courage, but for more than two hours every point was successfully defended. In the port the contest appeared favourable to the besieged. And even on the land side their valour was for some time successful. But fresh columns of the assailants followed one another in an incessant stream, and if one battalion fell back to reform its ranks, another rushed forward to take its place and renew the assault. The defenders were at last fatigued by their exertions, and their scanty numbers were weakened by wounds and death. Unfortunately, Giustiniani, the protostrator or marshal of the

army, and the ablest officer in the place, received a wound which compelled him to retire, and he was carried on board his ship to have it dressed. Until that moment he and the emperor had defended the great breach with advantage, but after the retreat of Giustiniani and his attendants, Sagan Pasha, observing that the energy of the defenders was relaxed, excited the bravest of the janissaries to mount to the assault. A chosen company led by Hassan of Ulubad (Lopadion), a man of gigantic frame, first crossed the ruins of the wall, and gained the summit of the dilapidated tower which flanked the breach. The defenders made a desperate resistance. Hassan and many of his followers were slain, but the janissaries had secured the vantage-ground, and fresh troops pouring in to their aid, they surrounded the defenders of the breach. The emperor fell amidst a heap of slain, and a column of janissaries rushed into Constantinople over his lifeless body¹.

About the same time another corps of the Othomans forced an entrance into the city at the Gate Kerkos, which had been left almost without defence, for the besieged were not sufficiently numerous to guard the whole line of the fortifications, and their best troops were drawn to the points where the attacks were fiercest. The corps that forced the Gate Kerkos took the defenders of the Gate Charsias in the rear, and overpowered all resistance in the quarter of Blachern².

Several gates were then thrown open, and the victorious army entered Constantinople at several points. The cry that the enemy had stormed the walls preceded their march. Senators, priests, monks, and nuns; men, women, and children, all rushed to seek safety in St. Sophia's. A prediction current among the Greeks flattered them with the vain hope that an angel would descend from heaven and destroy the Mohammedans, in order to reveal the extent of God's love for the orthodox. St. Sophia's, which for some time they had forsaken, as a spot profaned by the emperor's attempt at a union of the Christian world, was again revered as the sanctuary of orthodoxy, and was crowded with the flower of

¹ Phrantzes, 284.

² Ducas, 161. The *κερκόπορτα* must have been in the immediate vicinity of the palace Hebdomon, and its name seems to identify it with the Egri-kapu or Crooked Gate.

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the Greek nation, confident of a miraculous interposition in favour of their national pride and ecclesiastical prejudices.

The besiegers, when they first entered the city, fearing lest they might encounter serious resistance in the narrow streets, put every soul they encountered to the sword. But as soon as they were fully aware of the impossibility of any further opposition, they began to make prisoners. At length they reached St. Sophia's, and rushed into that magnificent temple, which could with ease contain twenty thousand persons. The men, women, and children who had sought safety in the church were divided among the soldiers as slaves, without any reference to their rank or respect for their ties of blood, and hurried off to the camp, or placed under the guard of comrades, who formed joint alliances for the security of their plunder. The ecclesiastical ornaments and church-plate were poor indeed when compared with the riches of the Byzantine cathedral in the time of the Crusaders; but whatever was movable was divided among the soldiers with such celerity, that the mighty temple soon presented few traces of having been a Christian church. The sack of this great cathedral was marked by many deeds of rapacity and cruelty, but it was not stained by the infamous orgies and wanton insults with which the Crusaders had disgraced their victory in 1204.

While one division of the victorious army was engaged in plundering the southern side of the city, from the Gate of St. Romanos to the Church of St. Sophia, another, turning to the port, made itself master of the warehouses that were filled with merchandise, and surrounded the Greek troops under the Grand-duke Notaras, who were easily subdued, and Notaras surrendered himself a prisoner.

About mid-day the Turks were in possession of the whole city, and Mohammed II. entered his new capital at the Gate of St. Romanos, riding triumphantly past the body of the Emperor Constantine, which lay concealed among the slain in the breach he had defended. The sultan rode straight to the Church of St. Sophia, where he gave the necessary orders for the preservation of all the public buildings. Even during the licence of the sack, the severe education and grave character of the Othomans exerted a powerful influence on their conduct, and on this occasion there was no example of

the wanton destruction and wilful conflagrations that had signalized the Latin conquest. To convince the Greeks that their orthodox empire was extinct, Mohammed ordered a moolah to ascend the bema and address a sermon to the Mussulmans, announcing that St. Sophia was now a mosque set apart for the prayers of the true believers. And to put an end to all doubts concerning the death of the emperor, he ordered the body of Constantine to be sought among the slain, and after it had been identified by the Grand-duke Notaras, the head was exposed to the inhabitants of the capital, from whence it was afterwards sent as a trophy to be seen by the Greeks of the principal cities in the Othoman empire¹. The body was interred with due ceremony at a spot which is still pointed out, and where the Othoman Sultans keep alive a striking memorial of their ancestor's victory, by maintaining a lamp constantly burning over the remains of the last Christian emperor of Constantinople².

It is not possible to describe the multifarious sufferings of the population of Constantinople. Though the storming of the city was attended with less disorder and bloodshed than the Latin conquest, it caused a greater degree of permanent misery, and sank the Greeks into a lower state of social degradation. Slaves were a much more negotiable article of commerce among the Turks than they had been among the Crusaders, and consequently private families were oftener dispersed, and a far larger proportion of the population was reduced to slavery. It is supposed that the calamities and emigrations which immediately preceded the siege, had reduced the Greek population of Constantinople to about one hundred thousand souls; of these forty thousand are said to have perished during the siege or in the sack of the city, and at least fifty thousand were reduced to the condition of slaves. Only the poorest labourers were allowed by the

¹ Ducas, 169.

² Mordtmann, 100. The spot is indicated by Mordtmann at the Vefa-meidan, near the remains of the aqueduct of Valens, and not far from the Suleimanyeh.

As Sultan Mohammed II. was riding through the hippodrome, his attention was arrested by a brazen column composed of three serpents, whose heads had once supported a tripod, dedicated by the Greeks at Delphi from the spoils of the Persian army they had defeated at Plataea. The young sultan with a blow of his mace-at-arms broke off the under jaw from one of the serpent's heads. The three heads have now disappeared; but the twisted column still retains its position in the Atmeidan, and its associations render it the noblest relic of Greek art which time has spared.

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conquerors to retain their liberty, that they might perform the meanest and most laborious occupations necessary for preserving cleanliness in a large city. The lot of persons of the highest rank and education was no better than that of the poorest and most ignorant; youth, strength, and beauty were the qualities valued by the victors, and these advantages insured their possessors the sad lot of hopeless slavery, accompanied often with a forced conversion to the Mohammedan faith.

It has been generally asserted that the retreat of Giustiniani from the great breach on receiving his mortal wound was the immediate cause of the capture of Constantinople; but the Genoese volunteer has been made the scapegoat of the lukewarmness or cowardice of the orthodox, who ought to have crowded to the walls to support their emperor. The fall of the city ought to be entirely attributed to the superior numbers, steady discipline, powerful artillery, and unity of command in the Othoman army. The fact is, that the breach was stormed about eight o'clock in the morning, and as the assailants had made their arrangements to renew the attacks until noon, there was no chance that any degree of valour or skill could have repulsed the fresh troops that were continually rushing forward. Indeed, the skill and valour of Giustiniani and Constantine prolonged the defence as long as human means could avail. Whether Giustiniani deserves to be branded with disgrace for retiring when he did may be doubtful, but Phrantzes, Leonard of Chios, and Nicolo Barbaro, who are most violent in reproaching him, ought to have remembered that they themselves avoided seeking a glorious death on the ramparts of the city. The writers who mention Giustiniani's wound differ concerning its nature. It is certain that during his whole life he was as distinguished for daring courage as for military skill. He was a gallant soldier, who lost his life fighting for the Greeks; and when he received his wound, he doubtless knew well that it was mortal, and feeling that he had honourably fulfilled his duties in this world, he turned his thoughts to prepare for another ¹.

¹ Compare Phrantzes, Leonard, Barbaro, Ducas, and Chalcocondylas. It may be admitted that Giustiniani, if he had received a similar wound in a breach at Genoa, would not have allowed himself to be carried away, but would have

The proceedings of the sultan after the taking of Constantinople were marked by the sternest cruelty whenever the smallest object could be gained. The bailo of the Venetians and the consul of the Catalans were both put to death with all their children. The rest of the Latin prisoners only escaped with their lives when it was in their power to pay liberal ransoms to their captors; some nobles purchased safety by presenting Sagan Pasha with seventy thousand sequins. A few of the garrison gained the ships in the port, and, weighing anchor, forced their way through the Othoman fleet. The Cardinal Isidore, who bravely kept his post on the walls, contrived to disguise himself in the dress of a dead soldier, and thus escaped recognition when he was taken prisoner. He was redeemed from slavery by a Genoese of Galata, and reached Italy in safety. A body of Cretans who bravely defended one of the towers were allowed by the sultan to capitulate and depart unmolested¹.

The fate of the Grand-duke Notaras and his family may be cited as an example of the treatment of the Greeks of high rank, whom the sultan could not expect to render the submissive instruments of the Othoman power. In the first moment of triumph, Mohammed affected to treat Notaras and his family with favour; but he soon sent an order that his youngest son, a youth of fourteen years of age, should be sent to become a page in the imperial palace. In such circumstances, the mildest fate that could await him would be to become a Mussulman. The father feared that he was destined to greater degradation. The faith of Notaras was unchristian from the intensity of his bigotry, but it had the merit of sincerity, and it ennobled the last scene of his life. He boldly refused to comply with the demands of the conqueror, deeming it better that he and his house should perish than that his son should become a dishonoured renegade. Mohammed, thus finding a plausible pretext for destroying the grand-duke, ordered him and his sons to be immediately put to death. Many other Greek families were exterminated: the men were executed, the male children

preferred perishing on the spot. The dialogue between Constantine and Giustiniani given in the pages of Gibbon is evidently a rhetorical invention. None of the historians were present, and who of those present could report any conversation with accuracy at such a moment?

¹ Phrantzes, 287.

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were sent into the schools of the janissaries among the tribute-children, and the females were shut up in the harems of the sultan and his courtiers.

The desolate aspect of Constantinople struck the observant mind of its young conqueror with a feeling of awe. Everything he saw within its walls attested that a long period of decline had preceded its fall. The deserted appearance of the imperial palace showed that, long before the accession of the last Constantine, it had been too vast for the diminished court by which it was tenanted, and its once splendid halls had evidently been long abandoned to solitude. The departed glory of an empire which for ages ruled the richest provinces in the East, and often rendered the Cross triumphant over the Crescent, suggested to Mohammed a couplet of the Persian poet Firdousee on the instability of human grandeur: 'The spider's curtain hangs before the portal of Caesar's palace; the owl is the sentinel on the watch-tower of Afrasiab¹.' An empty palace affected the mind of Mohammed II., while he gazed unmoved on mountains of dead men. The fall of Constantinople is a dark chapter in the annals of Christianity. The death of the unfortunate Constantine, neglected by the Catholics and deserted by the orthodox, alone gives dignity to the final catastrophe. The governments of western Europe, occupied with momentary interests, and the nations beginning to feel the impulses of new civil and political combinations in society, heeded little the destruction of an old and rotten edifice, incapable of receiving either internal repairs or external support; while on the part of the Greeks themselves no patriotic or religious enthusiasm has interwoven the struggle with the glories of their national history. No immortal band of martial youth crowding round their emperor, and dying in the breach the death of patriots, has left its exploits as a legacy of honour to the Hellenic race. The defence of Constantinople was intrusted to mercenary troops, and Constantine fell in their ranks.

¹ The verses are given by Hammer, *Hist. de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 527, and Malcolm, *History of Persia*, i. 540, 2nd edit. The verses of Homer repeated by Scipio at the taking of Carthage were *Iliad* iv. 165. In the East, the entrance into the apartments of the great is closed by a carpet that hangs before the door, and the owl's long cry is common even in well-peopled cities. It is ringing in my ear as I write this note.

During three days Mohammed II. allowed his army to plunder Constantinople according to the promise which he made to the troops on the eve of the assault. When that time expired he began to re-establish order, and his first step in settling the condition of his conquered subjects was to secure the allegiance of the orthodox, by proclaiming himself the protector of the Greek church. The hatred felt for the Latins by a numerous party among the Greeks facilitated the conclusion of this unholy alliance. George Scholarios, or Gennadios, accepted the dignity of Patriarch, and received the pastoral staff from the hands of the sultan. The ceremony of his installation was performed on the 1st of June, while the blood of the slaughtered Greeks still stained the pavements of the churches. A charter of Mohammed II. was subsequently published, securing to the orthodox the use of a few churches, and authorizing them to celebrate their religious rites publicly according to their national usages. The Patriarch was also empowered to decide questions of civil and ecclesiastical law according to the practice of the Greeks, and to keep open the gates of the quarter in which he resided for three nights at Easter¹.

It was necessary for Mohammed II. to repeople Constantinople, as the capital of the Othoman empire. The installation of an orthodox Patriarch calmed the minds of the Greeks, and many who had emigrated before the siege gradually returned, and were allowed to claim a portion of their property. But the slow increase of population, caused by a sense of security and the hope of gain, did not satisfy the sultan, who was determined to see his capital without delay one of the greatest cities of the East, and who knew that it had formerly exceeded Damascus, Bagdad, and Cairo, in wealth, extent, and population. From most of his subsequent conquests Mohammed compelled the wealthiest of the inhabitants to emigrate to Constantinople, where he granted them land to build houses. Five thousand families are said to have been immediately collected among the Turkish and Greek population of his dominions, who were induced to take up their residence in the new capital. Four thousand Servian prisoners, instead of being reduced to slavery, were established

¹ Phrantzes, 304; *Historia Politica*, 14; *Historia Patriarchica*, 108; in the *Turco-Graecia* of Crusius, reprinted at Bonn, 1849; Hammer, iii. 4.

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in the ruined villages without the walls as cultivators of the soil¹. When the Peloponnesus was conquered, thousands of Greek and Albanian families were removed to Constantinople². The same measures were adopted when Amastris, Sinope, Trebizond, Lesbos, Bosnia, Akserai (Gausaura), and Kaffa were conquered³. During his whole reign, Mohammed II. continued to pour into the imperial city fresh streams of inhabitants. Turks, Greeks, Servians, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Lazes followed one another in quick succession, and long before the end of his reign Constantinople was crowded by a numerous and active population, and presented a more flourishing aspect than it had done during the preceding century.

The embellishment of his capital was also the object of the sultan's attention. When Karamania was conquered, the most skilful artisans and artists in the two principal cities, Iconium and Laranda (Karaman), were transported to Constantinople⁴. Mosques, minarets, fountains, and tombs, the great objects of architectural magnificence among the Mussulmans, were constructed in every quarter of the city. Upwards of forty Christian churches, too splendid to be left in the hands of the conquered, were converted into mosques. Their original destination was concealed by defacing their internal ornaments, and their external form was modified by the addition of minarets⁵. In the year 1477 the whole circuit of the walls underwent repair; but the sultan's object was rather to remove the aspect of dilapidation than to give strength to the fortifications.

Thus Constantinople, in becoming the capital of the Ottoman empire, became a new city, and received a new race of Greek as well as of Turkish inhabitants. Its buildings and its population underwent as great a change as its political, moral, and religious condition. The picturesque beauty of the Stamboul of the present day owes most of its artificial

¹ Ducas, 179.

² Chalcocondylas (237, 253) makes the number of families ten thousand; but Ducas (192) mentions only two thousand families, and two thousand boys for the corps of janissaries.

³ Chalcocondylas, 245, 264, 280, 286; Hammer, iii. 140, 197, 209.

⁴ Hammer, iii. 119.

⁵ Ibid. xviii. 109. The mosaics of the dome of St. Sophia's were covered with whitewash, and the paintings in the churches at Trebizond were concealed by a layer of plaster.

features to the Othoman conquest, and wears a Turkish aspect. The Constantinople of the Byzantine empire disappeared with the last relics of the Greek empire. The traveller who now desires to view the vestiges of a Byzantine capital, and examine the last relics of Byzantine architecture and art, must continue his travels eastward to Trebizond.

APPENDIX.

I.

SELJOUK GRAND SULTANS.

Togrulbeg, grandson of Seljouk	.	.	.	1037 to 1063
Alp Arslan, nephew of Togrulbeg	.	.	.	1063 — 1073
Malekshah, son of Alp Arslan	.	.	.	1073 — 1092
Barkiarok, son of Malekshah	.	.	.	1092 — 1104
Mohammed, son of Malekshah	.	.	.	1104 — 1116
Sandjar, son of Malekshah	.	.	.	1116 — 1157

Sandjar is called by D'Herbelot, Moezzedin Borhan dit Sangiar.

II.

SELJOUK SULTANS OF ROUM OR ICONIUM.

Koultulmish, grandson of Seljouk.

Suleiman, son of Koultulmish, lieutenant of Malekshah	1074 — 1085
Alboulkassim, governor of Nicaea	1086 — 1091
Kilidji-Arslan I., son of Suleiman	1092 — 1106
Malekshah, son of Kilidji-Arslan I.	1107 — 1117
Called by the Greeks, Saisan.	
Masoud I., son of Kilidji-Arslan I.	1117 — 1156

Kilidji-Arslan II. 1156 — 1193

Divided the empire among his ten sons:—

- | | | |
|---|---|-------------|
| 1. Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou I., at Iconium | { | 1193 — 1200 |
| | | 1205 — 1211 |

Expelled by Rokneddin.

2. Rokneddin at Tokat, 1193 — 1203

Azeddin Kilidji-Arslan III., son of Rokneddin 1203 — 1205

3. Mohieddin at Angora.

4. Moazeddin Malatia.

5. Moghaïaseddin Elbistan.

6. Noureddin Kaisareia.

7. Kotbeddin Sivas.

8. Barkiarok Niksar.

9. Sandjarshah Amasia.

10. Shadjeddin Heracleia.

Azeddin Kaikous I., son of Kaikhosrou I. 1211 — 1222

To whom the empire of Trebizond was tributary.

Alaeddin Kaikobad I., son of Azeddin 1222 — 1237

Poisoned by his son and successor.

Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou II. 1237 — 1247

Tributary to the Mongols.

Azeddin Kaikous II., son of Kaikhosrou II. 1247 — 1261

Expelled, and returned to reign with several colleagues.

Rokneddin Kilidji-Arslan IV., son of Kaikhosrou II. 1261 — 1267

Called Rukratin by the Greeks.

Gaïaseddin Kaikhosrou III., son of Rokneddin 1267 — 1276

Masoud II., son of Azeddin Kaikous II. 1276 — 1283

Fled to Constantinople.

Alaeddin III. 1283 — 1307